paid. The appeal is from the decision in regard to two only of these claims. The claims having been consolidated are all affected alike and one cannot be appealed from, or there should be a separate appeal in each. The objections were bad in form.

Ritchie, Q. C.-The claims- were bad as filed, not complying with the statute. A claim must be accompanied with vouchers or affidavits accounting for their absence. Melinda Morton's claim was objectionable in this respect.

Rigby, Q. C., in reply. The statute is very particular about objections. In every objection to a claim the particulars must be set forth; Insolvent Act, sec. 114. This has not been done here, and the Judge refers to it in the latter part of his judgment. The assignee having filed the claim of Melinda Morton must have taken it as properly proved, and the only thing he could do was to contest it. In no particular do the objections come up to the requirements of section 114, and they might therefore be properly treated as a nullity: There was no affidavit filed with the assignee showing the service of the objections upon the claimants, as required by section 95.

The COURT.-We sustain the judgment of the County Court on the point last stated, that evidence should have been filed with the objections of previous service of a copy thereof on the claimant, and we dismiss the appeal.

MURPHY v. ROMO.

JUDGMENT of County Court reversed on the weight of evidence under County Court Consolidation Act of 1880.

THIS was an action of trover for an ox taken by the defendant under an execution against the plaintiff's son. The learned Judge of the County Court gave judgment for the defendant, and plaintiff appealed. The appeal was argued March 3rd, 1881, before MCDONALD, SMITH, JAMES and WEATHERBE, JJ.

Le Noir, for appellant, contended that the weight of evidence was in favor of the plaintiff.

J. J. Ritchie, contra.-The Court will not reverse a decision of the Court below on the weight of evidence; 3 Dowl., 668; Jones v. Calkin, 3 Pugsley, 376; Gray v. Turnbull, L. R., 2 Sc. App., 53.

The COURT allowed the appeal, and reversed the judgment of the County Court on the weight of evidence, holding that the County Court Consolidation Act of 1880 gave the Court the right to decide appeals on the weight of evidence.

MATHESON v. McLEAN.

THE Court declined to entertain an appeal from the County Court in a cause originating in the Magistrate's Court, where the rule for appeal was taken upon filing security, and not 'granted" by the Judgo within the meaning of sec. 8 of cap. 20, 1879.

THIS was an appeal from the judgment of the County County Court Judge in favor of plaintiff in an action originating in the Magistrate's Court, and was argued, March 7th, 1881, before MCDONALD, SMITH, JAMES and WEATHERBE, JJ.

Fielding, (with whom was Motton), in support of appeal. -Chapter 20 of the Acts of 1879, granting appeals from the County Court in all cases was passed in April, and this case was not decided in the County Court until September, 1879; the statute would therefore apply. I think the Act was intended to apply to all cases decided in the County Court subsequent to its passage. (Graham--This is not a case in which the Judge granted the appeal, for he required security. The appeal was taken under the statute.) The appeal was granted. The Judge under chapter 9 of the Acts of 1878, section 14, may grant the appeal in his discretion on such terms as to security or otherwise as he may require. This is an appeal allowed by the Judge on terms. (MCDONALD, J.-If the appeal had been granted under the Act of 1879 the Judge would not have required security. JAMES, J.-The intention must have been to grant appeals in all cases in which this Court would have jurisdiction. McDonald, J.—

My difficulty is that the rule for appeal is exactly as if the Judge had refused the appeal, but not as if the Judge had granted it, because on the face of the appeal, it is granted on security being given. On those terms it might be taken in spite of the Judge.) The part of the act of 1878 enabling the Judge to grant appeals on terms is not repealed. The act of 1879 extended the act of 1878.

MCDONALD, J.-It is quite clear that if we were to hold that there is an appeal in this case it would be to ignore the decisions of this Court all through. There was no appeal until the act of 1880, and under that act only where a case is stated by the Judge under section 107, which has not been done here.

SMITH, J.-Nothing has been stated to show that the proceeding is under section 107, under which alone we have authority.

JAMES, J.-I agree with Judge McDonald.
WEATHERBE, J., dubitante.
Appeal dismissed.

IN RE ASSESSMENT OF JOHN CAMERON.

Ir is a fatal objection to a writ of certiorari that it is not addressed to parties having any judicial functions to perform, and a claim to exercise the office of school trustee cannot, therefore, be tested by this writ.

The Commissioners of Schools for Pictou County, on an application made to them for the purpose, appointed school trustees for school section No. 16, south district, on the ground that the original trustees had failed to act.

The trustees last appointed having issued a warrant for the collection of rates, the original trustees, who still claimed to be trustees and acted as such, caused a writ of certiorari to be issued, bringing, the matter into this Court. The new trustees thereupon took out a rule to set the certiorari aside and quash the assessment, which was argued March 16th, 1881, before RITCHIE, E.J., DESBARRES, SMITH and JAMES, JJ.

Rigby, Q. C., in support of rule.-A rate and assessment levied by school trustees is not a matter that can be removed by certiorari; only the acts of persons acting judicially can be removed. School trustees have no judicial duty to perform in connection with the levying of an assessment. The assessment roll is sent them by the Clerk of the Peace, and the distribution of it is a mere matter of calculation. They levy a rate proportionately to the value of the property; The King v. The Justices of York, Chipman's notes, 110. I can find no authority for the statement in Crawley v. Anderson that the writ of certiorari has been given a wider scope here than in England. But it is not said even there that certiorari would lie in a case like this. In Dane's Abridgement, vol. 1, Certiorari, sub-section B, it is shown to what courts certiorari will lie, implying that it will only lie to courts. See also Bouvier's Law Dic.; Dane's Abridgement, vol. 5, p. 84.

In no case will certiorari lie to bring up a rate. Ex Parte Josslyn, 2 Allen, N. B., 737, proceeds on the principle that the trustees were acting judicially.

A single individual has no right to remove a rate, because it stops the whole machinery. I contend this on the recognized principle that a poor rate cannot be removed. See case cited in Fisher's Dig., vol. 1, p. 1503; Ex Parte Taunt, 2 Dowl. Pr. Cases, 54; Rex v. Inhabitants of Uxeter, 2 Str., 932; Rex v. Lloyd, Cald., 309; Fisher's Dig., 1506; King v. Justices of Shrewsbury, 2 Str., 975; 2 T. R., 234

Admitting that certiorari will lie to trustees for ministerial acts, it is claimed that the parties are not trustees. In that case they are only trespassers and an action will lie. A certiorari will not lie to a private individual. If private individuals act as a corporation the writ should be addressed to them as such; 8 A. & E., 936.

Graham, contra.-The papers should be entitled. Certiorari will lie to bring up a rate; McGregor v. Patterson, 1 Oldright, 235. It is frequently employed in New Brunswick; 1 Pugsley, 219. It is a little difficult to say what a judicial act is, but I don't know that we are limited to judicial acts. (RITCHIE, E. J.-There cannot be more than one

corporation. You say that you are the corporation, and yet you direct your writ to these individuals, who you say are not a corporation and have no jurisdiction.) If the writ must be confined to judicial acts, and the preparation of the rate roll is not a judicial act, that must, of course, dispose of the case. (Rigby, Q. C.-Ex Parte Jacob is wrongly quoted in the Chief Justice's judgment in The Bank of Nova Scotia v. The Town of New Glasgow. The case is in 5 Allen, 153, and entirely sustains my contention.) As to heading of affidavit,— it is not the Queen's suit against the trustees. There is no suit of the Queen against these trustees. It is the Queen's writ that issued. Even if it should be headed The Queen v. The Trustees, &c., that is mere matter of form, because there is no cause and no matter in the Court.

RITCHIE, E. J., delivered the judgment of the Court :

We think this certiorari cannot be sustained. A certiorari is a writ issued out of this Court to an inferior tribunal; it is a fatal objection that it is not addressed to parties having any judicial functions to perform. It is addressed to certain individuals by name in their private capacity, and, so far from recognizing them as a corporation, or indeed as school trustees at all, it is distinctly stated that they are not such. It would seem that the object of the proceeding was to try the question between the contending bodies of trustees as to their respective rights. This is not the mode of having that question settled. If the parties who are attempting to enforce this rate are not trustees their proceedings are wholly void, and they must fail in their attempt, or their right to act may be called in question by a writ of quo warranto. The rule nisi will be made absolute with costs.

We think nothing of the objection as regards the heading of the affidavit, especially as we think that in this case no affidavit was necessary.