Opinion of the Court.

which, as already said, provides for an "appeal to the Supreme Court on behalf of the United States, from all judgments of the Court of Claims, adverse to the United States, and on behalf of the plaintiff in any case where the amount in controversy exceeds three thousand dollars."

In the case before us there was, as held by the Court of Claims, no final judgment obligatory upon the Department of the Interior, or enforceable by execution from any court. Moreover, there was really no suit to which the United States were parties. The claimant did not pretend that the government owed him anything for property sold or services rendered. His effort was to get the Department of the Interior, which was paying money over to Indians under treaties, to withhold from them an agreed percentage thereof for services rendered by him to the Indians. While such a claim may be rightfully regarded as a matter pending in one of the executive departments, which involves controverted questions of fact or law, within the meaning of the 12th section of the act of 1887, we are unable to regard it as a suit brought against the United States, within the contemplation of the 9th section of that act. It is true that, by several statutes which appear in a compendious form in sections 2103, 2104 and 2105 of the Revised Statutes, the form and substance of contracts between Indians and agents or attorneys, for services to be performed in reference to claims by such Indians against the United States, are prescribed, and the approval of such contracts by the Secretary of the Interior and the Indian Commissioner is made necessary. But such enactments, intended to protect the Indians from improvident and unconscionable contracts, by no means create a legal obligation on the part of the United States to see that the Indians perform their part of such contracts.

Section 2104 provides that "the Secretary of the Interior and Commissioner of Indian Affairs shall determine therefrom whether, in their judgment, such contract or agreement has been complied with or fulfilled; if so, the same may be paid, and if not, it shall be paid in proportion to the services rendered under the contract."

Such a claim may be, as already said, a matter pending in

Syllabus.

the Department of the Interior, within the meaning of the 12th section of the act of 1887, but it is plainly not a suit against the United States, with respect to which an appeal is provided for by the 9th section.

The application for a writ of mandamus must, therefore, be

Denied.

GAINES v. RUGG.

GAINES v. LATTA.

ORIGINAL.

Nos. 12 and 13 original. Argued March 7, 8, 1893. Decided March 20, 1893.

This court, in Goode v. Gaines, (145 U. S. 141,) on an appeal by the defendant in a suit in equity, from a decree of the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Arkansas, reversed the decree, and ordered that each party pay one-half of the costs in this court, and the mandate recited the decree of this court, and remanded the cause "for further proceedings to be had therein in conformity with the opinion of this court," and commanded that such further proceedings be had in the cause, "in conformity with the opinion and decree of this court, as, according to right and justice and the laws of the United States ought to be had, the said appeal notwithstanding." The Circuit Court had decreed that the title of the defendant to a lot of land be divested out of him, and be vested in the plaintiffs, and that a master take an account of rents on the lot, taxes paid and improvements placed on it. This court held that no error was committed in any matter relating to the title or possession of the land, but that error was committed, in acting on the report of the master, in allowing the plaintiffs for rents which accrued before the filing of the bill. On the presentation of the mandate to the Circuit Court, with a proposed decree thereon, the defendant filed exceptions, and the Circuit Court entered an order allowing the defendant to take further testimony in support of his exceptions, "by way of defence to the title to the land in controversy," and set the cause down upon the issues formed by the pleadings and exceptions as to the title to the land, and sustained the exceptions, and overruled a petition of the plaintiff's for a writ of possession. This court awarded a mandamus for the entry of the proposed decree, and for a writ of possession.

This court had not disturbed the findings and decree of the Circuit Court in regard to the title and possession, but only its disposition of the matter of accounting.

The mandate and the opinion, taken together, although they used the word "reversed," amounted to a reversal only in respect to the accounting,

Opinion of the Court.

and to a modification of the decree in respect of the accounting, and to an affirmance of it in all other respects.

The construction of the intent and meaning of the opinion of this court was not a matter for the exercise of judicial discretion by the Circuit Court, and the case is a proper one for a mandamus by this court.

PETITION for mandamus. The case is stated in the opinion.

Mr. U. M. Rose, (with whom was Mr. G. B. Rose on the brief,) for Gaines, petitioner.

Mr. A. H. Garland, (with whom was Mr. John McClure on the brief,) for Rugg and Latta, opposing.

MR. JUSTICE BLATCHFORD delivered the opinion of the court.

These cases grow out of what is known as "the Hot Springs litigation," phases of which are reported in Hot Springs Cases, 92 U. S. 698; Rector v. Gibbon, 111 U. S. 276; Lawrence v. Rector, 137 U. S. 139; and Goode v. Gaines, 145 U. S. 141. Goode v. Gaines covered also fourteen other cases, one of which, Rugg v. Gaines, is involved in No. 13 original; and another of which, Latta v. Gaines, is involved in No. 12 original.

The case involved in No. 13 original was a bill in equity filed by William H. Gaines and Maria, his wife, in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Arkansas, against D. C. Rugg and George W. Barnes, in which a decree was entered by that court, on November 11, 1887, on the report of a special master. The decree overruled the exceptions of the defendant Rugg to the report, and decreed that there was due to the plaintiffs for rent, according to the terms of a certain lease, from the date of the award to the date of the filing of the bill, $1016.38; that there was due to them since that date and until the filing of the master's report, for the rental value of the property, and interest, $811.68; and for the amount of rent to the date of the decree, $245; amounting in the aggregate to $2073.06; from which were to be deducted the amount due the defendant Rugg for taxes paid, and interest, $298; the amount of purchase money paid by him to the United States for the land, and interest,

Opinion of the Court.

$158.40; and the present value of the improvements, $500; those sums amounting in the aggregate to $956.40, which, taken from the $2073.06, left the sum of $1116.66, which the court found to be the balance due to the plaintiffs; and it decreed that the plaintiffs recover from Rugg $1116.66 and all costs of suit, and have execution therefor; that the plaintiffs recover from the defendants the possession of lot 14 in block 77 in the Hot Springs reservation, Garland County, Arkansas; that a writ of possession issue; that serving a copy of the decree should be the writ; and that the special master be allowed $100 for his services as such. The decree further declared that the defendant Rugg prayed an appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States, which was granted, and it ordered that, on his filing a bond in $3616.66, and a bond for costs for $250, the decree be superseded pending the appeal. Maria Gaines, one of the appellees, subsequently died, and it was ordered that Albert B. Gaines, her executor, and seven other persons, her sole devisees and legatees, be made appellees.

The case was argued in this court on April 18, 1892, and decided May 2, 1892; and the decree of this court was that the decree of the Circuit Court be reversed, each party to pay one-half of the costs in this court. The mandate of this court, dated May 24, 1892, recited its decree and ordered that the cause be remanded to the Circuit Court "for further proceedings to be had therein in conformity with the opinion of this court," and commanded the judges of the Circuit Court "that such further proceedings be had in said cause, in conformity with the opinion and decree of this court, as, according to right and justice and the laws of the United States, ought to be had, the said appeal notwithstanding."

The bill of complaint of Gaines and his wife, which was filed May 23, 1884, against Barnes and Rugg and two other defendants, alleged in substance that, under the laws of the United States governing the entry and sale of lands in the reservation at Hot Springs, Arkansas, they were entitled to enter and purchase lot 14, in block 77, in Hot Springs; that the Hot Springs Commission, through a mistake of law, per

Opinion of the Court.

mitted Barnes, assignee of Mary Waldron, who had entered upon and held said lot as tenant of the plaintiffs, to enter the lot in his own right, over the application to enter it lawfully made by the plaintiffs; that, by virtue of that error, Barnes, as assignee of the tenant, had procured a patent for the lot from the United States; and that Rugg had succeeded to the title of said tenant and Barnes. The bill prayed that the defendants might be held to be trustees for the benefit of the plaintiffs; that an account be had of the rents received by the defendants on the lot, and a decree be made for such rents, and for the possession of the lot; and for all other proper relief. On December 6, 1884, Rugg filed his answer to the bill, setting up various defences. On November 10, 1886, the bill was dismissed as to the defendants other than Barnes and Rugg.

On the hearing of the case, the Circuit Court found and decreed that the commissioners, by error and mistake of law, had awarded the right to purchase the lot to Barnes, who had sold it to Rugg, who had notice of the plaintiffs' claim to it; that, under such erroneous ruling, a patent had issued to Barnes; and the Circuit Court decreed that the title of Rugg to the lot be divested out of him and be vested in the plaintiffs and their heirs and assigns forever; that a reference be made to a master to take an account of the rents on said lot, the taxes paid and improvements placed on it, with directions to report an account of the same; and that the plaintiffs recover all costs of suit. On a hearing on the report of the master, the final decree of November 11, 1887, was made, in the terms before stated. This court, in each of the fifteen cases, including the two involved respectively in No. 13 original and No. 12 original, held that no error was committed by the Circuit Court in any matter relating to the title or possession of the lands, but that error had been committed in allowing to the plaintiffs, according to the account taken by the master, for rents which accrued before the bills were filed. It therefore reversed the decrees below, and remanded the several causes with a direction for further proceedings in conformity with. the opinion of this court, the costs in this court to be equally