Opinion of the Court. and the right to sell intoxicating liquors is not one of the rights growing out of such citizenship. Bartemeyer v. Iowa, 18 Wall. 129. The amendment does not take from the States those powers of police that were reserved at the time the original Constitution was adopted. Undoubtedly it forbids any arbitrary deprivation of life, liberty or property, and secures equal protection to all under like circumstances in the enjoyment of their rights; but it was not designed to interfere with the power of the State to protect the lives, liberty and property of its citizens, and to promote their health, morals, education and good order. Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. S. 27, 31; In re Kemmler, 136 U. S. 436. Nor, in respect of taxation was the amendment intended to compel the State to adopt an iron rule of equality; to prevent the classification of property for taxation at different rates; or to prohibit legislation in that regard, special either in the extent to which it operates or the objects sought to be obtained by it. It is enough that there is no discrimination in favor of one as against another of the same class. Bell's Gap Railroad v. Pennsylvania, 134 U. S. 232; Home Insurance Co. v. New York, 134 U. S. 594; Pacific Express Co. v. Seibert, 142 U. S. 339. And due process of law within the meaning of the amendment is secured if the laws operate on all alike, and do not subject the individual to an arbitrary exercise of the powers of government. Leeper v. Texas, 139 U. S. 462. This statute affects all persons in Texas engaged in the sale of liquors in exactly the same manner and degree. Whether considered as imposing restrictions upon the sale in the exercise of the police power of the State, or as levying taxes upon occupations under authority of the legislature in that behalf, petitioner was not arbitrarily deprived of his property nor denied the equal protection of the laws. Repeated decisions of this court have determined that such legislation is not in violation of the Constitution. Crowley v. Christensen, 137 U. S. 86; Eilenbecker v. Plymouth Co., 134 U. S. 31; Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U. S. 1; Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623; Foster v. Kansas, 112 U. S. 201. The decree of the Circuit Court is Affirmed. Opinion of the Court. MARTIN v. SNYDER. APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS. No. 131. Argued and submitted March 9, 10, 1893. Decided April 10, 1893. A defendant residing within a State in which an action is commenced in a court of the State, is not entitled, under the act of March 3, 1887, 24 Stat. 552, c. 373, to have the suit removed to the Circuit Court of the United States. THE case is stated in the opinion. Mr. D. W. Voorhees and Mr. L. B. Hilles, (with whom was Mr. Reese H. Voorhees on the brief,) for appellants. Mr. G. W. Kretzinger also filed a brief for appellants. Mr. Allan C. Story for appellee. THE CHIEF JUSTICE: This was a bill of complaint filed by Samuel F. Engs, George Engs and Henry Snyder, Jr., of the city, county and State of New York, against Morris T. Martin and Carrie E. Martin, in the Circuit Court of Lake County in the State of Illinois, on the 27th of October, 1887. November 7, 1887, the defendants preferred a petition for the removal of the cause to the United States Circuit Court within and for the Northern District of Illinois on the ground of diverse citizenship, and the case was transferred accordingly. The petition stated "that the controversy in said suit is between citizens of different States, and that the petitioners were at the time of the commencement of this suit and still are citizens of the State of Illinois, and that all the plaintiffs were then and still are citizens of the State of New York." Under the act of Congress of March 3, 1887, 24 Stat. 552, c. 373, it is the defendant or defendants who are non-residents Names of Counsel. of the State in which the action is pending, who may remove the same into the Circuit Court of the United States for the proper district. The defendants here were not entitled to such removal, and the decree, which was in favor of complainants and from which the defendants prosecuted this appeal, must be reversed for want of jurisdiction, with costs against the appellants, and the case remanded to the Circuit Court with directions to render a judgment against them for costs in that court, and to remand the case to the state court. Torrence v. Shedd, 144 U. S. 527, 533. Judgment reversed and cause remanded accordingly. MEXIA v. OLIVER. ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS. No. 182. Submitted March 28, 1893.- Decided April 17, 1893. In Texas, a married woman, who owns land in her own right, cannot convey it by her husband, as her attorney, under a power of attorney from her to him, without herself signing and acknowledging privily the deed, although her husband joins in the deed individually. Where a suit is brought in Texas by a married woman and her husband, to recover possession of land, her separate property, and the petition is endorsed with a notice that the action is brought as well to try title as for damages, it is error to admit in evidence against the plaintiffs such a power of attorney and deed, although there is an issue as to boundary and acquiescence and ratification. It does not appear beyond a doubt that such error could not prejudice the rights of the plaintiffs. THE case is stated in the opinion. Mr. William S. Flippin and Mr. A. H. Evans for plaintiffs in error. Mr. S. L. Samuels and Mr. A. C. Prendergast for defendant in error. Opinion of the Court. MR. JUSTICE BLATCHFORD delivered the opinion of the court. This is an action at law, brought in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of Texas, by Sarah R. Mexia and her husband, Enrique A. Mexia, citizens of Mexico, against T. J. Oliver, a citizen of Texas, for the possession of a piece of land. The "first amended original petition" in the suit, filed November 30, 1888, is endorsed with a notice to the defendant that the action is brought as well to try title as for damages. The petition states that on January 1, 1878, the plaintiffs were seized and possessed in fee, in right of said Sarah R. Mexia, of the following described tract of land, situated in Limestone County, Texas, being some 4000 acres, more or less, out of 11 leagues of the land granted originally to Pedro Varella, "beginning at a stake and mound on the eastern boundary of the Pedro Varella 11-league grant, 2253 varas south, 45° east, from the northeast corner of said 11-league grant, said stake and mound being also the southeast corner of a 6000-acre tract in the name of Jose M. Cabellero out of said 11-league grant, as the same was originally surveyed and established in June, 1855, by G. H. Cunningham, surveyor, at the instance of E. A. Mexia, agent for J. M. Cabellero and plaintiffs' vendors, thence south 45° west with the south boundary line of said 6000-acre tract, (according to a block of surveys made by G. H. Cunningham in 1856 in sectionizing and subdividing said 11-league grant, and set apart to plaintiff Sarah R. Mexia by deed of partition between Adelaide M. Hammekin, George L. Hammekin, Sarah R. Mexia and E. A. Mexia dated March 30, 1874;)" thence proceeding with the boundary around said land to the place of beginning, "said boundaries including sections Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and a part of section No. 6, of the subdivision and partition of the said Pedro Varella 11-league grant, as shown on the records of the said Limestone County." The petition sets forth also that on February 11, 1850, "Adelaide M. Hammekin, joined by her husband George L. Hammekin, being at that time the owners of said 11-league grant, made, executed and delivered to one Jose M. Cabellero a conveyance for 6000 Opinion of the Court. acres of said 11-league grant, out of the northeast corner of same, before any actual survey was made of said 6000-acre tract, and that the same was never actually surveyed on the ground until the month of June, 1855, at which time said 6000-acre tract was actually surveyed on the ground and cut off from said 11-league grant, and the south or southwest boundary line thereof was well established on the ground in accordance with the field-notes as hereinbefore set forth, and the same has ever since been held and regarded and acquiesced in as the south boundary of said 6000-acre tract and as the division line between the same and the remainder of said 11-league grant on the south and west thereof, and from that time to the present said line and survey has been acquiesced in by the adjacent owners of the land north and south of said line"; that said survey was made, and said line thus established, by G. H. Cunningham, then surveyor of the land district in which said land was situated, and this was done by request and authority of said J. M. Cabellero and the said Hammekins, and said survey and lines were afterwards ratified, and ever since acquiesced in, by them and their vendees; that such title as the defendant claims under is derived from Cabellero under said conveyance for 6000 acres; that the defendant will claim and insist in this cause that the south boundary line of said 6000-acre tract, in the name of Cabellero, should be at a point about 277 varas further south than as heretofore established and as claimed by the plaintiffs; that on January 1, 1878, the defendant illegally entered on the land and ejected the plaintiffs therefrom, to their damage in the sum of $10,000; and that the land claimed is of the value of $20,000. The petition prays judgment for the land, damages and costs, for a writ of possession, and for other relief. The defendant filed a "first amended original answer" on April 17, 1889, by which he demurred to the plaintiffs' first amended original petition as insufficient in law, denied all the allegations of the petition, pleaded not guilty, and alleged that he had been in quiet, peaceable, continuous and adverse possession for more than three years before the filing of the suit, of so much of the land described in the petition as was |