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also be conveyed to trustees, to be held by them in trust for other creditors." Burrill on Assignments, 5th ed. sec. 122. Counsel urge that May and Hirsch were in fact trustees, the real creditor being the Carbonate Bank, because, as appears on the face of the paper, May and Hirsch had not at the time paid the bank, and had only assumed Rich's indebtedness to it. But this instrument proceeds upon the assumption that the burden of this indebtedness to the bank was transferred from Rich, the grantor, to May and Hirsch, the grantees, parties who were solvent, and whose assumption of liability was accepted by the bank, and the conveyance was to them and for their protection and benefit. Out of the proceeds of sales they were to pay these notes and interest and return the surplus to Rich. No other creditors were in terms interested in this conveyance. And, further, the defeasance clause provided for payment, not to the Carbonate Bank, but to May and Hirsch or their assigns. The conveyance was not for the benefit of the Carbonate Bank, but for that of May and Hirsch, who had assumed Rich's liabilities to that bank. Suppose, the day after this instrument had been executed, May and Hirsch had been paid by Rich the full amount due on these notes to the Carbonate Bank, can it be doubted that all rights under this conveyance would have been discharged? Could the Carbonate Bank have held May and Hirsch responsible for a breach of trust in surrendering the property under those circumstances to Rich? It is suggested by the Circuit Court, in its opinion, that there was no future day of payment named in the instrument, and that the mortgagees were to take possession and sell at once. But as the debts for the securing of which this conveyance was made were then due, the naming of a future day of payment was not to be expected, and might have suggested a suspicion as to the bona fides of the transaction, and the duty of immediate sale cast by this instrument upon the grantees was the duty cast upon chattel mortgagees. Within accepted definitions and settled rules of construction, this instrument was in form, at least, that which the parties, the counsel, and the court called it, a chattel mortgage.

Is there anything in the statutes or decisions of Colorado

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which transforms the character or denies validity to such an instrument, securing and intended to secure only one of many creditors? In 1881, there was passed by the legislature of Colorado (Laws 1881, p. 35,) an act to regulate assignments for the benefit of creditors. It consisted of but a single section, which provided that, "Whenever any person or corporation shall hereafter make an assignment of his or its estate for the benefit of creditors," the assignee should be required to pay certain specified debts in full; and then followed this clause : "All the residue of the proceeds of such estate shall be distributed ratably among all other creditors, and any preference of one creditor over another, except as above allowed, shall be entirely null and void, anything in the deed of assignment to the contrary notwithstanding." A case under that statute came before the Supreme Court, Campbell v. Colorado Coal &c. Co., 9 Colorado, 60, 64, and it was held that the word "estate " meant all the debtor's property, and hence that the statute was designed to cover general assignments; and in the opinion pronounced by Mr. Justice Helm it was said:

"A fundamental principle underlying this subject is that, so long as the debtor retains dominion over his property, in the absence of statute and of fraud, he may do with it as he pleases. He may transfer the whole of his estate in payment or in security of a single bona fide debt. He may assign, mortgage, or otherwise encumber his estate, or a part thereof, in favor of some of his creditors, excluding the rest; or he may make an assignment for the benefit of all his creditors, and therein give preferences to a selected few. It is only when, either by a general assignment or otherwise, the debtor has parted with the dominion over his property, that, in the absence of statute or fraud, the foregoing privilege is forfeited. To hold that debtors may not give preferences among their bona fide creditors, so long as they control their property, would greatly embarrass the transaction of nearly all kinds of business. Some of the authorities go so far as to say that such a rule would prevent the carrying on of business altogether."

.

The statute of 1881 was superseded by that of 1885, which

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was that in force at the time of these transactions. This statute may be found in the Laws of 1885, p. 43, and in the first volume of Mills' Annotated Statutes, p. 453. The only portions of that statute having any bearing on the matters here in controversy are sections 1 and 3 and the last half of section 18, which are as follows:

"Any person may make a general assignment of all his property, for the benefit of his creditors, by deed, duly acknowledged, which, when filed for record in the office of the clerk and recorder of the county where the assignor resides, or, if a non-resident, where his principal place of business is, in this State, shall vest in the assignee the title to all the property, real and personal, of the assignor, in trust, for the use and benefit of such creditors."

"No such deed of general assignment of property by an insolvent, or in contemplation of insolvency for the benefit of creditors, shall be valid, unless by its terms it be made for the benefit of all his creditors, in proportion to the amount of their respective claims."

“... But nothing in this act contained shall invalidate any conveyance or mortgage of property, real or personal, by the debtor before the assignment, made in good faith, for a valid and valuable consideration."

This statute, so far as we are advised, has not been before the Supreme Court of Colorado for construction; at least, not for any question involved in this case. The first section, it will

be perceived, gives permission to make a general assignment. There is no compulsion. There is neither in terms nor by implication any duty cast upon an insolvent to dispose of his property by a general assignment, or anything which prevents him from paying or securing one creditor in preference to others. On the contrary, the last half of section 18 plainly recognizes the right of a debtor to prefer by payment or security; and, in the light of this statute, the quotation which we have made from the Supreme Court of Colorado becomes pertinent, which clearly affirms the right of a debtor to do with his property as he pleases, except as in terms restrained by statute; and a statute which simply permits a debtor to

Opinion of the Court.

make a certain disposition of his property works no destruction of his otherwise unrestrained dominion over it.

And, further, when we look at section 3 we find that when a conveyance is made which is a general assignment, it is void unless by its terms it is made for the benefit of all creditors. The rule thus declared is not that the preferences fail and the assignment stands, but that the assignment itself fails unless it be in terms free from preferences. So, if this conveyance were in form unquestionably a general assignment, as it contemplated the payment only of May and Hirsch, it was not only not for the benefit of all creditors, but avowedly for the benefit of these two, and it would, therefore, have to be adjudged a void instrument, and could not be upheld under that rule which prevails in some jurisdictions of, in such cases, upholding the conveyance and avoiding the preferences. So it follows that either this is a chattel mortgage given as security to two creditors for their debts, a transaction in no manner forbidden by the statutes of Colorado, or, if it be a general assignment, then it was an assignment with preferences, which preferences by those statutes, avoid the conveyance. We think, therefore, the Circuit Court erred in the conclusions which it reached, so far at least as this aspect of the case is concerned.

As we have heretofore noticed, the burden of the complaint was that this conveyance was fraudulent and void because, as alleged, made in pursuance of a conspiracy between Rich, May, and Hirsch; a conspiracy by which Rich was to go east and buy goods, and, when those goods had been purchased and brought to Leadville, transfer them to May and Hirsch. So far as this charge is concerned, we agree with the Circuit Court that it is not established by the testimony. Rich evidently would like to convey that idea, and yet he does not directly testify to it; and May and Hirsch clearly deny it. Obviously there was no conspiracy between the parties, and all talk between them was only to the effect that, if Rich should succeed in buying what he talked of buying, May and Hirsch would help him to carry the burden. He largely failed in that; and they, when he became pressed by the bank,

Names of Counsel.

simply took measures for their own protection. It being conceded, as it is, that the debts from Rich to May and Hirsch were bona fide, the transaction amounted to this, and this only that the debtor used his property to prefer certain bona fide creditors. This, the laws of Colorado allowed, and therefore it cannot be avoided at the instance of the unpreferred creditors.

The decree of the Circuit Court is reversed, and the case remanded, with instructions to dismiss the bill.

LEHNEN v. DICKSON.

ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI.

No. 125. Argued February 2, 3, 1893. - Decided March 6, 1893.

When the record shows that the case was tried below by the court without a jury, and there is no special finding of facts, and no agreed statement of facts, but only a general finding, this court must accept that finding as conclusive, and limit its inquiry to the sufficiency of the complaint and of the rulings, if any be preserved, on questions of law arising during the trial.

No mere recital of the testimony, whether in the opinion of the court or in a bill of exceptions, can be deemed a special finding of facts within the scope of the statute.

In Missouri in an action of unlawful detainer, the defendant put in evidence a lease of the property by the then owner, who had since died, which had been assigned to him. The plaintiff offered evidence of a judgment cancelling and setting aside that lease, which was admitted under objection, and the admission excepted to. Held, that the ruling was right.

THE case is stated in the opinion.

Mr. D. P. Dyer, (with whom was Mr. David Goldsmith on the brief,) for plaintiff in error.

Mr. James O. Broadhead for defendant in error.