2. A statement that one Circuit Court of Appeals has arrived at a different
conclusion from another Circuit Court of Appeals on a question or
proposition, is not equivalent to the expression of a desire for instruc-
tion as to the proper decision of a specific question, requiring deter-
mination in the proper disposition of the particular case. Ib.
3. The fact that a Circuit Court of Appeals for one Circuit has rendered
a different judgment from that of the Circuit Court of Appeals for
another Circuit, under the same conditions, may furnish ground for a
certiorari on proper application. Ib.
CIRCUIT COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES.
CLAIMS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES.
1. The United States cannot be held liable in the Court of Claims for the
amount of registered bonds which the Register of the Treasury cancels
without authority of law, not being liable for non-feasances, or mis-
feasances or negligence of its officers. German Bank v. United States,
573.
2. The only remedy in such case is by appeal to Congress. Ib.
See JURISDICTION, C;
LETTER CArrier.
COLORADO.
See LOCAL LAW, 1, 2.
COLOR OF TITLE.
See PUBLIC LAND, 4.
COMMON CARRIER.
See RAILROAD.
CONFLICT OF LAWS.
See JURISDICTION, B, 5.
CONSPIRACY.
See INDICTMENT.
1. After the adoption of Article 233 of the Constitution of Louisiana,
declaring certain designated bonds void, the Treasurer of that State
fraudulently put them into circulation, and absconded. Payment
having been refused by the State to an innocent holder of such a
bond, which he had purchased for value, it is held, in a suit by him
to recover back the purchase money, that such refusal by the State
raises no federal question. Bier v. McGehee, 137.
2. In the proceedings taken under the act of August 11, 1888, 25 Stat.
pp. 400, 411, c. 860, to condemn lock and dam No. 7 of the Monon-
gahela Navigation Company, that company is entitled, under the
provisions of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution, to recover
compensation from the United States for the taking of the franchise
to exact tolls, as well as for the value of the tangible property taken.
Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 312.
3. The assertion by Congress of its purpose to take the property which
that company had constructed in the Monongahela River by authority
of the State of Pennsylvania did not destroy the franchise granted to
the company by the State. Ib.
4. The authority conferred by the act of the legislature of New York of
May 11, 1874, c. 430, p. 547, as amended by the act of June 2, 1876,
c. 446, p. 480, upon purchasers at a foreclosure sale of a railroad, to
organize a corporation to receive and hold the purchased property,
creates no contract with the State; and the imposition, under the
provisions of the act of the legislature of New York of April 16, 1886,
c. 143, of a tax upon a corporation so organized after the passage of
that act by purchasers who purchased at a foreclosure sale made before
its passage, for the privilege of becoming a corporation, violates no
contract of the State, and is no violation of the Constitution of the
United States. Schurz v. Cook, 397.
5. A fugitive from justice who has been surrendered by one State of the
Union to another State, upon requisition charging him with the com-
mission of a specific crime, has, under the Constitution and laws of
the United States, no right, privilege or immunity to be exempt from
indictment and trial, in the State to which he is returned, for any
other or different offence from that designated in the requisition,
without first having an opportunity to return to the State from which
he was extradited. Lascelles v. Georgia, 537.
6. The provisions in the legislation of the State of Texas respecting the
taxation of persons engaged in the sale of spirituous, vinous or malt
liquors, or medicated bitters do not violate the Constitution of the
United States. Giozza v. Tiernan, 657.
1. When one party to a special contract not under seal refuses to perform
his side of the contract, or disables himself from performing it by his
own act, the other party has thereupon a right to elect to rescind it,
and may, on doing so, immediately sue on a quantum meruit for any-
thing he had done under it previously to the rescission. Ankeny v.
Clark, 345.
2. This doctrine was supported by the Supreme Court of the Territory of
Washington in this case, and is now sustained by this court, notwith-
standing the decision of the Supreme Court of the State of Washington
in Distler v. Dabney, 23 N. W. Rep. 335, construing the code of that
State adversely to it. Ib.
3. A title derived from a land grant railroad company which has not
received a patent by reason of failure to pay the costs of survey-
ing, is not a title which a party who has contracted for a deed of
the land and has paid the purchase price therefor, is obliged to ac-
cept. lb.
4. When a contract is entered into to convey and to purchase a tract of
land, and title fails as to part of it, the purchaser may rescind the
contract as to all. Ib.
5. When part of a contract of purchase of land is that the purchaser shall
assume and pay a mortgage thereon, if the title to a part of it fails he
may rescind the contract without paying the mortgage. Ib.
6. When a contract to convey land permits the purchaser to enter and
occupy, and he does so and makes the payments prescribed by the
contract, and the seller fails to convey by the agreed title, the seller
cannot, in an action by the purchaser to recover back the purchase
money, set up as an offset a claim for the rent of the land during
the buyer's occupancy. 1b.
7. A contract being entered into for the sale of extensive ranch privileges
and of all the cattle on the ranches except 2000 steers reserved in
order to fulfil a previous contract, it is competent, in an action founded
upon it, to show that the steers contracted by the previous contract to
be sold were to be of the age of two years and upwards; and, that
being established, if there were not enough of that age to fulfil the
previous contract, the seller could not take animals of other age from
the rest of the herd to make up the requisite number. Lonergan v.
Buford, 581.
8. The contract further provided that payment of the larger part of the
consideration money was to be made in advance, and that delivery was
to be made on the purchaser's making the final payment on a given
day. On the day named, having made the previous payment, he made
the final one under protest that, inasmuch as the seller declined to
make any delivery without receiving the contract price in full, he
made it in order to obtain delivery, and with the distinct avowal that
it was not due. Held, that this was not a voluntary payment, which
could not be recovered back in whole or in part. Ib.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 4;
COURT OF CLAIMS.
See CLAIMS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES;
JURISDICTION, A, 5; C.
1. The proceedings, findings and sentence of a military court-martial being
transmitted to the Secretary of War, that officer wrote upon the record
the following order, dating it from the "War Department," and sign-
ing it with his name as "Secretary of War": "In conformity with the
65th of the Rules and Articles of War, the proceedings of the general
court-martial in the foregoing case have been forwarded to the Secre-
tary of War for the action of the President. The proceedings, findings
and sentence are approved, and the sentence will be duly executed."
Held, that this was a sufficient authentication of the judgment of the
President, and that there was no ground for treating the order as null
and void for want of the requisite approval. United States v. Fletcher, 84.
2. When a court-martial has jurisdiction, errors in its exercise cannot be
reviewed in an action against the United States by the officer court-
martialed to recover salary. Ib.
3. Runkle v. United States, 122 U. S. 543, questioned upon the ground that
the report of that case shows that the circumstances were so excep-
tional as to render it hardly a safe precedent in any other. Ib.
1. Cigarette paper, of suitable size and quality to be used in making
cigarettes, and pasteboard covers therefor, of corresponding size, im-
ported separately and entered together with the intention to combine
them with paste into cigarette books for the use of smokers, are subject
to a duty of seventy per cent ad valorem as "smokers' articles" under
schedule N, and not to a duty of fifteen per cent ad valorem as "manu-
factures of paper" under schedule M, of the Tariff Act of March 3,
1883, c. 121. Isaacs v. Jonas, 648.
2. Cigarette paper, made of a quality, and cut into a size, fit for wrapping
cigarettes, and which, in the condition and form in which it is imported,
can be used by smokers in making their own cigarettes, is subject to
the duty of seventy per cent ad valorem, imposed on "smokers' arti-
cles" by schedule N of the Tariff Act of March 3, 1883, c. 121, and
not to the duty of fifteen per cent ad valorem imposed on "manufac-
tures of paper" by schedule M of the same act. United States v.
Isaacs, 654.
1. The receipt of a quit claim deed does not of itself prevent a party from
becoming a bona fide holder; and the doctrine expressed in many cases
that the grantee in such a deed cannot be treated as a bona fide pur-
chaser does not rest upon any sound principle. Moelle v. Sherwood, 21.
2. A person holding under a quit claim deed may be a bona fide purchaser.
Oliver v. Piatt, 3 How. 333; Van Rensselaer v. Kearney, 11 How. 297;
May v. Le Claire, 11 Wall. 217; Villa v. Rodriguez, 12 Wall. 323; Dick-
erson v. Colgrove, 100 U. S. 578; Baker v. Humphrey, 101 U. S. 494;
and Hanrick v. Patrick, 119 U. S. 156, questioned on this point. United
States v. California and Oregon Land Co., 31.
3. A deed by which the grantor aliens, releases, grants, bargains, sells and
conveys the granted estate to the grantee, his heirs and assigns, to
have and to hold the same and all the right, title and interest of the
grantor therein, is a deed of bargain and sale, and will convey an after-
acquired title. lb.
See CONTRACT, 3;
EQUITY, 4;
LOCAL LAW, 4, 5.
1. An answer to a declaration on such bonds and coupons setting out the
statutory provisions under which the bonds were issued and averring
that the election under which they were claimed to have been author-
ized was not a free and fair election but was a sham "as shown by
papers filed with the county clerk," and reciting various irregularities
which were alleged to appear "by reference to certified copies of the
papers sent into the clerk's office" from some of the various precincts
of the county, and concluding "and so the county says that there was
in fact no election held in said county on February 27, 1872, to deter-
mine whether or not the county would subscribe to the capital of said
railroad company and issue bonds to pay the same " presents no issu-
able question of fact, going to the merits of the suit, and if demurred
to, the demurrer should be sustained. Chicot County v. Sherwood, 529.
2. While matters of fact, well pleaded, are admitted by a demurrer, con-
clusions of law are not so admitted. Ib.
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.
See HABEAS CORPUS;
JUDGMENT, 1.
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