5. No appeal from findings of fact and of law and the decision of the
Court of Claims thereon made upon a claim transmitted to it by the
head of a Department with the consent of the claimant, and reported
to that Department by the court under the provisions of the act of
March 3, 1887, 24 Stat. 505, c. 359, lies to this court on the part of the
claimant. In re Sanborn, 222.

6. When a manifestly defective petition for the removal of a cause from
a state court to a federal court is filed in the trial court of the State,
and that court denies it, and proceeds to trial and judgment on the
merits, and the cause is taken in error to an appellate court of the
State, where the judgment below is affirmed, no federal question
arises. Pennsylvania Co. v. Bender, 255.

7. A bill pending in a Circuit Court of the United States against a foreign
corporation and other defendants, citizens of the United States, for the
infringement of letters patent, was dismissed as to the foreign corpo-
ration, and, so far as appeared from the record in the appeal from the
judgment of dismissal, was still pending and undetermined as to the
codefendants. Held, that the decree in favor of the corporation was
not a final decree from which an appeal could be taken to this court,
and that this appeal must be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
Hohorst v. Hamburg-American Packet Co., 262.

8. The appeal in this case from a decree of the Circuit Court in a suit
against the United States brought under the act of March 3, 1887,
24 Stat. 505, c. 359, not having been taken before July 1, 1892, is
dismissed. Ogden v. United States, 390.

9. Findings of facts by the Court of Claims, in a suit which Congress has
authorized it to take jurisdiction of in equity, may be reviewed by this
court.

United States v. Old Settlers, 427.

10. A federal question, suggested for the first time in a petition for a
rehearing, after judgment in the highest court of a State, is not
properly raised so as to authorize this court to review the decision of
that court. Bushnell v. Crooke Mining and Smelting Co., 682.

11. The decision in the state court in this case clearly presented no federal
question, as no right, immunity or authority under the Constitution
or laws of the United States was set up by the plaintiffs in error, or
denied by the Supreme Court of the State, nor did the judgment of
the latter court necessarily involve any such question, or the denial
of any such right. Ib.

See CERTIORARI;

CIRCUIT COURTS OF APPEALS;

FINDING OF FACTS, 1;

HABEAS CORPUS;

JUDGMENT, 2;
MANDAMUS, 7;

PRACTICE, 2.

B. OF CIRCUIT COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES.

1. The act of June 10, 1890, "to simplify the laws in relation to the collec-
tion of the revenue," 26 Stat. 131, c. 407, confers no jurisdiction upon

Circuit Courts of the United States, on the application of dissatisfied
importers to review and reverse a decision of a board of general
appraisers, ascertaining and fixing the dutiable value of imported
goods, when such board has acted in pursuance of law, and without
fraud or other misconduct from which bad faith could be implied.
Passavant v. United States, 214.

2. A complaint which avers that the plaintiff was, at the several times
named therein, "and ever since has been and still is a resident of the
city, county and State of New York," is not sufficient to give the
Circuit Court of that Circuit jurisdiction on the ground of citizenship
of the parties, when the record nowhere discloses the plaintiff's citizen-
ship. Wolfe v. Hartford Life Ins. Co., 389.

3. Following Walter v. Northeastern Railroad Company, 147 U. S. 370, it
is again held that a Circuit Court of the United States has no juris-
diction over a bill in equity to enjoin the collection of taxes from a
railroad company, when distinct assessments, in separate counties, no
one of which amounts to $2000, and for which, in case of payment
under protest, separate suits must be brought to recover back the
amounts paid, are joined in the bill and make an aggregate of over
$2000. Northern Pacific Railroad v. Walker, 391.

4. As, perhaps, by amendment this bill might be retained as to some

one of the defendants, this court declines to dismiss the bill, and
reverses the Judgment and remands the cause to the court below for
further proceedings in conformity with this opinion. Ib.

5. An action will lie in a Circuit Court of the United States in the State
of Arkansas at the suit of a citizen of New York, against a county in
Arkansas, to recover on bonds and coupons issued by the county to
aid in the construction of a railroad and held by the citizen of New
York, notwithstanding the provisions in the act of the Legislature
of Arkansas of February 27, 1879, repealing all laws authorizing
counties within the State to be sued; requiring all demands against
them to be presented to the County Courts of the several counties for
allowance or rejection; and allowing appeals to be prosecuted from
the decisions of those courts. Chicot County v. Sherwood, 529.

See CIRCUIT COURTS OF APPEALS;

MANDAMUS, 3, 4, 5, 6;

PUBLIC LAND, 1.

C. JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF CLAIMS.

The owner of a well, on land near to but not on the line of the Washing-
ton aqueduct, which was destroyed in the construction of that work,
may recover its value from the United States in the Court of Claims
under the provisions of the act of July 15, 1882, 22 Stat. 168, c. 294.
United States v. Alexander, 186.

LACHES.

1. The mere institution of a suit does not of itself relieve a person from
the charge of laches, and if he fail in its diligent prosecution, the
consequences are the same as though no action had been begun.
Johnston v. Standard Mining Co., 360.

2. Where a question of laches is in issue the plaintiff is chargeable with
such knowledge as he might have obtained upon inquiry, provided the
facts already known to him were such as to put the duty of inquiry
upon a man of ordinary intelligence. Ib.

3. The duty of inquiry is all the more peremptory when the thing in
dispute is mining property, which is of an uncertain character, and is
liable to suddenly develop an enormous increase in value. Ib.

4. In this case it is clear that the plaintiff did not make use of that dili-
gence which the circumstances of the case called for. Ib.

LANDLORD AND TENANT.

See CONTRACT, 6.

LETTER-CARRIER.

1. Under the act of May 24, 1888, c. 308 (25 Stat. 157), which provides
"that hereafter eight hours shall constitute a day's work for letter-
carriers in cities or postal districts connected therewith, for which
they shall receive the same pay as is now paid as for a day's work of
a greater number of hours. If any letter-carrier is employed a greater
number of hours per day than eight he shall be paid extra for the
same in proportion to the salary now fixed by law," reference is not
had only to letter-carrier service, and a claimant is not required to
show not only that he has performed more than eight hours of service
in a day, but also that such eight hours of service related exclusively to
the free distribution and collection of mail matter, and that the extra
service for which he claims compensation was of the same character.
United States v. Post, 124.

2. Under § 647 of the Regulations of the Post-office Department, of 1887,
and the act of 1888, a claim for extra service and pay may include an
employment of the letter-carrier not only in the delivery and collec-
tion of mail matter, but also in the post-office, during the intervals
between his trips, in such manner as the postmaster directs, but not
as a clerk. Ib.

3. Such extra service is not an extra service within the meaning of §§ 1764
and 1765 of the Revised Statutes, payment for which is not authorized
by law. 1b.

4. Under the act of May 24, 1888, c. 308, (25 Stat. 157,) providing for
extra pay to letter-carriers in cities or postal districts connected there-
with, who are employed a greater number of hours per day than eight,

a letter-carrier whose salary is $1000 a year, and who is employed, in
a period of a little more than two months, 165 hours and 9 minutes
more than eight hours a day, is not required to deduct therefrom the
deficit of less than eight hours a day worked by him on Sundays and
holidays. United States v. Gates, 134.

LICENSE TAX.

See TELEGRAPH COMPANY, 1.

LOCAL LAW.

1. A chattel mortgage of the stock of goods in a store in Colorado, given
to secure the mortgagees for their liability as endorsers of notes of the
mortgagor, is held to be a chattel mortgage, and not a general assign-
ment for the benefit of creditors. May v. Tenney, 60.

2. In Colorado, a general transfer of property by a debtor for the benefit
of a preferred creditor, does not, if found to be in violation of the
policy of the State as expressed in its legislation, become a general
assignment for the benefit of all creditors, without preferences, but is
entirely void. Ib.

3. In Missouri, in an action of unlawful detainer, the defendant put in
evidence a lease of the property by the then owner, who had since died,
which had been assigned to him. The plaintiff offered evidence of a
judgment cancelling and setting aside that lease, which was admitted
under objection, and the admission excepted to. Held, that the ruling
was right. Lehnen v. Dickson, 71.

4. In Texas, a married woman, who owns land in her own right, cannot
convey it to her husband, as her attorney, under a power of attorney
from her to him, without herself signing and acknowledging privily
the deed, although her husband joins in the deed individually. Meria
V. Oliver, 664.

5. Where a suit is brought in Texas by a married woman and her husband,
to recover possession of land, her separate property, and the petition
is endorsed with a notice that the action is brought as well to try title
as for damages, it is error to admit in evidence against the plaintiffs
such a power of attorney and deed, although there is an issue as to
boundary and acquiescence and ratification. Ib.

6. It does not appear beyond a doubt that such error could not prejudice
the rights of the plaintiffs. Ib.

MANDAMUS.

1. Mandamus lies in behalf of a State to compel the remanding to one of
its courts of a criminal prosecution there commenced, and of which
the Circuit Court of the United States has assumed jurisdiction, at
the defendant's suggestion, without due proceedings for removal.
Virginia v. Paul, 107.

2. Mandamus does not lie to review an order on a writ of habeas corpus,
under sections 751-753 of the Revised Statutes, discharging a prisoner
from commitment under authority of a State, on the ground of his
being in custody for an act done in pursuance of a law of the United
States. Ib.

3. This court, in Goode v. Gaines, (145 U. S. 141,) on an appeal by the
defendant in a suit in equity, from a decree of the Circuit Court of
the United States for the Eastern District of Arkansas, reversed the
decree, and ordered that each party pay one-half of the costs in this
court, and the mandate recited the decree of this court, and remanded
the cause "for further proceedings to be had therein in conformity
with the opinion of this court," and commanded that such further
proceedings be had in the cause, "in conformity with the opinion and
decree of this court, as, according to right and justice and the laws of
the United States ought to be had, the said appeal notwithstanding."
The Circuit Court had decreed that the title of the defendant to a lot
of land be divested out of him, and be vested in the plaintiffs, and
that a master take an account of rents on the lot, taxes paid and im-
provements placed on it. This court held that no error was com-
mitted in any matter relating to the title or possession of the land,
but that error was committed, in acting on the report of the master,
in allowing the plaintiffs for rents which accrued before the filing
of the bill. On the presentation of the mandate to the Circuit Court,
with a proposed decree thereon, the defendant filed exceptions, and
the Circuit Court entered an order allowing the defendant to take
further testimony in support of his exceptions, "by way of defence
to the title to the land in controversy," and set the cause down upon
the issues formed by the pleadings and exceptions as to the title to the
land, and sustained the exceptions, and overruled a petition of the
plaintiffs for a writ of possession. This court awarded a mandamus
for the entry of the proposed decree, and for a writ of possession.
Gaines v. Rugg, 228.

4. This court had not disturbed the findings and decree of the Circuit
Court in regard to the title and possession, but only its disposition of
the matter of accounting. Ib.

5. The mandate and the opinion, taken together, although they used the
word "reversed," amounted to a reversal only in respect to the
accounting, and to a modification of the decree in respect of the ac-
counting, and to an affirmance of it in all other respects. Ib.