Bowman v. Griffith. scribed having been previously conveyed to H. S. Moore by deed, dated the 8th day of December; 1868." It is argued by defendant that the above record does not prove the error alleged in the first deed, inasmuch as Hyde did not reconvey the property in controversy to Brown but subsequently deeded it to Stanhope. Aside from the recital in the record set out above, there is in this case no evidence of any title, legal or equitable, in defendant or his grantor, Moore. His rights therefore depend upon the inference which is to be drawn from the recording of the second deed. If that instrument was delivered and accepted by the parties, and for the purpose expressed therein, that fact, it must be conceded, is evidence from which we should find that Moore was the equitable owner of the property in dispute, and that he should recover unless plaintiff's equities are superior by reason of having purchased without notice of the rights of the former, which will be considered hereafter. The general rule is that the registration of a deed is prima facie evidence of its delivery. (Devlin on Deeds, 292.) It is said by Judge Dillon in Robinson v. Gould, 26 Ia., 89, that "when a deed beneficial in its character to the grantee has been properly acknowledged and recorded, the presumption of law in favor of the grantee is that it has been delivered, and the burden of proof is upon the party claiming the nondelivery to clearly overcome that presumption." That the deed under consideration was beneficial to Hyde will not be questioned, since by it Brown conveys to him forty acres of land, the southeast quarter of the northeast quarter of the section aforesaid not included in the prior deed. The presumption is that he Hyde, took and holds title to the property last described under that conveyance. On the other hand, the deed was certainly not beneficial to Brown, who thereby conveyed the property last described. We think, therefore, that the acceptance of said deed by Hyde, the only beneficiary thereof, Bowman v. Griffith. should be presumed from the fact that it was subsequently filed for record, and that the record aforesaid was rightly admitted in evidence. That instrument fully proves the facts as alleged by defendant, viz., the mistake in the prior deed to Hyde and that Moore was, at the time of the execution thereof, the equitable owner of the property in controversy. Nor is the presumption aforesaid overcome by the fact that Hyde subsequently asserted title to said land by deeding it to Stanhope. He was required to accept or reject the said deed as an entirety. By taking title through it he must be held to have assented to the conditions upon which the property named therein was conveyed. In other words, as between Brown and Hyde, it is an admission by the latter that the land in dispute was in equity the property of the former and his grantees. We come now to the question, is plaintiff a bona fide purchaser? His contention is that he purchased the property without notice of any claim of the defendant thereto and that his equities are therefore superior and should prevail against those of the latter. A bona fide purchaser is one who purchases for value without notice of the equities of third parties. (Snowden v. Tyler, 21 Neb., 199.) The question of the equities of the respective parties is distinctly presented by the pleadings. And the plaintift while a witness in his own behalf testifies as follows: Q. You say you made no inquiry about the title before you bought it? A. No, sir; none whatever. It does not appear from his testimony that he relied upon the title of Smith, his grantor, or that he paid the consideration named without notice of the rights of the defendant. Nor does it appear that he was ever advised in whom the record title rested. This showing falls far short of establishing his claim to the rights of a subsequent purchaser in good faith. The burden was upon him and he was bound to prove both payment in ignorance of defend Bowman v. Griffith. ant's equities and that he relied upon the title of his grantor. (Shotwell v. Harrison, 22 Mich., 410; Sillyman v. King, 36 Ia., 207; Denning v. Smith, 3 Johns. Ch. [N. Y.], 332; Seymour v. McKinstry, 106 N. Y., 230.) In the last case cited it is held on the authority of Denning v. Smith, supra, that where a claim can be sustained only upon the ground that the person asserting it is an innocent purchaser he must positively deny the equitable rights of another, although not charged. It is claimed that defendant is estopped to now claim the land in controversy, because W. C. Griffith, his agent, stated to Mr. Hall, through whom plaintiff claims, that he, defendant, made no claim to said property. There are at least two sufficient reasons why the statement aforesaid will not work an estoppel as against the defendant O. K. Griffith: First-It is not shown that W. C. Griffith had any such authority as would bind his principal, O. K. Griffith, by a statement in disparagement of his title, Second-Hall, who was then negotiating for the property, accepted a quitclaim deed from Stanhope, his grantor. (Snowden v. Tyler, supra.) Finally, it is claimed that defendant is estopped to claim this forty acres for the reason that in the case of Coggswell v. Griffith, supra, his contention was that he had purchased two hundred acres from Moore. A sufficient answer to this claim is that the property now in controversy was not involved in that suit. Neither are the parties identical, hence defendant would not be concluded by any decree in that case, had the court therein assumed to determine the rights of the parties with respect to the property in controversy, which it is clear was not attempted. At most it can only be said that he, in that case, insisted upon a construction of his deed inconsistent with the one he now contends for. Whatever view we may feel constrained to take of his conduct in that case as a question of morals, it is apparent that plaintiff has not been misled thereby to his detriment, and that in legal contemplation he is not now Tippy v. State. estopped to demand the property which in equity he is entitled to recover. The judgment of the district court is THE other judges concur. AFFIRMED. WILLIAM TIPPY V. STATE OF NEBRASKA. [FILED OCTOBER 11, 1892.] 1. District Court: TERMS IN DIFFERENT COUNTIES OF SAME DISTRICT AT SAME TIME. The general rule is that a court cannot be held at a time when there is clearly no authority to hold it, and if there was no statutory authority to that effect the district court in those districts having but one judge could not be held in two counties of the same district at the same time, but, under the constitution and statutes of this state, terms of the district court may be held at the same time in different counties of the same judicial district, and, when necessary, the district court sitting in any county may be continued into and held during the term fixed for holding such court in any other county within the district, or, it may be adjourned and held beyond such time. 2. There is no material error in the record. ERROR to the district court for Saline county. Tried below before GASLIN, J. Shannon S. Alley, for plaintiff in error: Unless authorized by statute, terms of court cannot be held in different counties at the same time in any district having but one judge. (Bates v. Gage, 40 Cal., 183; People v. O'Neil, 47 Id., 109; Freeman, Judgments, sec. 121; Batten v. State, 80 Ind., 394; Dunn v. State, 2 Ark., 229; In re Millington, 24 Kan., 214; Grable v. State, 2 G. Greene [Ia.], 559; Archer v. Ross, 2 Scammon [Ill.], 303; Gregg Tippy v. State. v. Cooke, Peck [Tenn.], 82; Galusha v. Butterfield, 2 Scammon [Ill.], 227; Smithson v. Dillon, 16 Ind., 169; Samuels v. State, 3 Mo., 42; Cain v. Goda, 84 Ind., 209; McCool v. State, 7 Id., 378.) George H. Hastings, Attorney General, contra: A term of court may be held in one county of a district which laps onto the term of another county in the same district. (State v. Leahy, 1 Wis., 225; State v. Knight, 19 Ia., 94; State v. Stevens, 25 N. W. Rep. [Ia.], 777; State v. Peterson, 25 Id., 780; Brewer v. State, 6 Lea [Tenn.], 198; Cheek v. Bank, 9 Heiskell [Tenn.], 489; State v. Clark, 30 Ia., 168; Harris v. Gest, 4 O. St., 473; State v. Montgomery, 8 Kan., 351; Cook v. Smith, 54 Ia., 636.) MAXWELL, CH. J. The plaintiff in error was convicted of manslaughter in the district court of Saline county and sentenced to imprisonment in the penitentiary for ten years. He relies upon two errors for a reversal of the judgment. FirstThat there is but one judge in the seventh judicial district; that in 1891 the terms were fixed by law, viz., Saline county, September 15; Clay county, November 10; Fillmore county, November 24; that W. H. Morris was sole judge; that the term in Saline county which had been in session on November 9 was adjourned to the 17th of that month; that on the 17th of November, 1891, William Gaslin held court in Saline county, and the trial and conviction of the plaintiff in error took place before him; that while Judge Gaslin was holding court in Saline county, Judge Morris was holding the regular term of court in Clay county, and therefore the court in Saline county had no jurisdiction at that time to try and sentence the plaintiff in error. The general rule no doubt is that a court cannot be held at a time when there is clearly no authority to hold it, and |