with the terms, and that "a like construc-, tion was intended, and was expected, to be given" to them. Repetitio verborum indicat acceptationem in eodem sensu. Mason v. Fearson, 9 How. 248, 258, 13 L. ed. 125, 129; Reiche v. Smythe, 13 Wall. 162, 164, 20 L. ed. 566, 567; The Abbottsford, 98 U. S. 440, 444, 25 L. ed. 168, 169; Claflin v. Commonwealth Ins. Co. 110 U. S. 90, 93, 28 L. ed. 79, 80, 3 Sup. Ct. Rep. 507; New York, N. H. & H. R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 200 U. S. 361, 401, 402, 50 L. ed. 515, 525, 526, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 272; United States v. G. Falk & Bro. 204 U. S. 143, 152, 51 L. ed. 411, 414, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 191; United States v. Cerecedo Hermanos y Compañia, 209 U. S. 337, 339, 52 L. ed. 821, 822, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 532; White-Smith Music Pub. Co. v. Apollo Co. 209 U. S. 1, 14, 52 L. ed. 655, 660, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 319, 14 Ann. Cas. 628; Baltimore & O. S. W. R. Co. v. United States, 220 U. S. 94, 103, 55 L. ed. 384, 387, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 368. Just as in the case of previous judicial construction, a known construction made by the officers charged with the enforcement of the statute is treated as if read in the subsequent statute. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 200 U. S. 361, 401, 402, 50 L. ed. 515, 525, 526, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 272; United States v. G. Falk & Bro. 204 U. S. 143, 152, 51 L. ed. 411, 414, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 191. But in the case at bar we have something more than mere conscious repetition. We have, in the first place, an attempt to amend the law into the effect or sense in which it is now sought to be construed, and a deliberate rejection of that amendment. This should be conclusive. United States v. Press Pub. Co. 219 U. 8. 1, 10, 55 L. ed. 65, 67, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 212, 21 Ann. Cas. 942. This court has never failed to take into consideration "the genesis and development of the legislation" which the act in question embodies. It seeks to place itself in the light of "the situation as it existed and as it was pressed upon the attention of the legislative body." Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U. S. 463, 36 L. ed. 229, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 511. In so doing the amendments to which an act has been subjected before it reached its final legislative form are deemed to afford "a special. ly efficacious means for discerning its intent and purpose." United States v. Press Pub. Co. 219 U. S. 1, 11, 13, 55 L. ed. 65, 67, 68, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 212, 21 Ann. Cas. 942; Chesapeake & P. Teleph. Co. v. Manning, 186 U. S. 238, 243, 46 L. ed. 1144, 1146, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 881; Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U. S. 457, 463, 464, 36 L. ed. 226, 229, 230, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 511; Coosaw Min. Co. v. South Carolina, 144 U. 8. 559, 561, 36 L. ed. 541, 542, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 689; Platt v. Union P. R. Co. 99 U. S. 48, 64, 25 L. ed. 424, 429; Blake v. National City Bank, 23 Wall. 307, 319, 23 L. ed. 119, 120. We have, in the second place, the additional fact that the words as repeated in the new act of 1879 were immediately given the same construction as under the prior law, by the officers charged with their enforcement, notwithstanding that these officers had themselves endeavored to have the law changed. This is a contemporary interprctation of the most forcible nature. This practical exposition is too strong and obstinate to be shaken or controlled. Schell v. Fauché, 138 U. S. 562, 572, 34 L. ed. 1040, 1043, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 376; United States v. Hill, 120 U. S. 169, 180, 182, 183, 30 L. ed. 627, 631, 632, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 510; Hahn v. United States, 107 U. S. 402, 406, 27 L. ed. 527, 528, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 494; Butterworth v. United States, 112 U. S. 50, 67, 68, 28 L. ed. 656, 661, 662, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 25; United States v. Philbrick, 120 U. S. 52, 59, 30 L. ed. 559, 561, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 413; Bate Refrigerating Co. v. Sulzberger, 157 U. S. 1, 44, 45, 39 L. ed. 601, 614, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 508; United States v. Healey, 160 U. S. 136, 141, 145, 40 L. ed. 369, 371, 372, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 247; Hewitt v. Schultz, 180 U. S. 139, 157, 45 L. ed. 463, 472, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 309; Midway Co. v. Eaton, 183 U. S. 602, 609, 46 L. ed. 347, 352, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 261; United States v. Finnell, 185 U. S. 236, 244, 46 L. ed. 890, 893, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 633. An expression of opinion in debate is not appropriate evidence of legislative intent. United States v. Union P. R. Co. 91 U. S. 72, 79, 23 L. ed. 224, 228; United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Asso. 166 U. S. 293, 318, 41 L. ed. 1011, 1019, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 540. The refusal of Congress to accept the repeated recommendation of the Postoffice Department to restrict the second-class mailing privileges was equivalent to affirm. ative action in maintaining the status quo. Chiles v. Chesapeake & O. R. Co. 218 U. S. 71, 76, 54 L. ed. 936, 938, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 667, 20 Ann. Cas. 980; Welton v. Missouri, 91 U. 8. 275, 282, 23 L. ed. 347, 350. If, as we submit, the action of Congress shows conclusively what it intended the term to include, it would seem to follow that the decision in Houghton's Case, infra, cannot be taken in subsequent cases as authoritatively ascertaining the intent of Congress to be the reverse. Barden v. Northern P. R. Co. 154 U. S. 288, 322, 38 L. ed. 992, 1000, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1030; Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U. S. 176, 196, 199, 200, 26 L. ed. 388, 389, 390; Legal Tender Cases, 12 Wall. 457, 554, 20 L. ed. 287, 313. In any event, the decision in Houghton v. Payne, 194 U. S. 88, 48 L. ed. 888, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 590, should be rigidly limited to the precise facts of that case, and should not be extended by analogies to cases not strictly within its scope. Harriman v. Northern Securities Co. 197 U. S. 244, 291, 49 L. ed. 739, 761, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 493; Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & T. Co. 157 U. S. 429, 574, 39 L. ed. 759, 816, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 673. Self-completeness is no bar to periodical character, and it would be mere stultification for the Postmaster General so to assert, in view of the publications admitted by him as periodicals without question. The positive authority of a decision is coextensive only with the facts on which it is made. Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 213, 233, 6 L. ed. 606, 612; Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & T. Co. 157 U. S. 429, 574, 39 L. ed. 759, 816, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 673; Brooks v. Marbury, 11 Wheat. 78, 91, 6 L. ed. 423, 426; Carroll v. Carroll, 16 How. 275, 287, 14 L. ed. 936, 941; Wisconsin C. R. Co. v. Price County, 133 U. 8. 496, 509, 33 L. ed. 687 694, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 341; Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U. S. 1, 20, 33 L. ed. 842, 849, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 504; Cross v. Burke, 146 U. S. 82, 87, 36 L. ed. 896, 898, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 22; United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U. S. 649, 679, 42 L. ed. 890, 901, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 456; Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U. 8. 244, 259, 45 L. ed. 1088, 1095, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 770; Harriman v. Northern Securities Co. 197 U. S. 244, 291, 49 L. ed. 739, 761, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 493. Such a discrimination as is here sought to be made by mere administrative officers, between things substantially alike, would be even beyond the power of Congress itself. Public Clearing House v. Coyne, 194 U. 8. 497, 507, 48 L. ed. 1092, 1098, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 789. The right of a citizen to post his mail matter at the rates established by Congress is a fixed legal right which he cannot be deprived of by the act of an administrative officer. Payne v. United States, 20 App. D. C. 897; Smith v. Powdich, 1 Cowp. 182; Stock v. Harris, 5 Burr. 2711; Rowning v. Goodchild, 2 Wm. Bl. 907, 3 Wils. 413; Barnes v. Foley, 4 Burr. 2149; Jones v. Walker, Cowp. pt. 2, p. 624; Teal v. Felton, 12 How. 284, 13 L. ed. 990; American School v. McAnnulty, 187 U. S. 94, 47 L. ed. 90, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 33; Payne v. United States, 20 App. D. C. 581. The Postoffice Department is not, in strictness, a political department. Public Clearing House v. Coyne, 194 U. S. 497, 506, 48 L. ed. 1092, 1097, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 789. Any discretion, therefore, which may remain to the officials of the postal service in the classification of the mail, is not analogous in any way to the political discretion lodged in the head of the political department as such. Payne v. United States, 20 App. D. C. 581. In so far as the judgment rests simply upon a comparison of the publications themselves with the requirements of the statute, that is a question of law. Bates & G. Co. v. Payne, 194 U. S. 106, 107, 110, 48 L. ed. 894, 895, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 595. While there may be a discretion in an administrative officer to determine the existence and weight of matters of fact upon which his judgment may depend (all requirements as to hearing being, of course, complied with), there is no discretion to misconstrue the terms of a statute, or to amend it by reading into it limitations not already there. Payne v. United States, 20 App. D. C. 581; Morrill v. Jones, 106 U. S. 466, 467, 27 L. ed. 267, 268, 1 Sup. Ct. Rep. 423; Teal v. Felton, 12 How. 284, 291, 13 L. ed. 990, 992; American School v. McAnnulty, 187 U. S. 109, 47 L. ed. 96, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 33; Sanford v. Sanford, 139 U. S. 642, 647, 35 L. ed. 290, 291, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 666; Quinby v. Conlan, 104 U. S. 420, 426, 26 L. ed. 800, 802; Moore v. Robbins, 96 U. S. 530, 535, 24 L. ed. 848, 850; Shepley v. Cowan, 91 U. S. 330, 340, 23 L. ed. 424, 427; Johnson v. Towsley, 13 Wall. 72, 20 L. ed. 485; Silver v. Ladd, 7 Wall. 219, 19 L. ed. 138. It is Congress, and not the Postmaster General, who determines what shall constitute second-class matter and what thirdclass matter. Payne v. United States, 20 App. D. C. 597. The citizen and the court are both entitled to require the administrative officer to state the rule of law which he is acting on, in order to compare that rule with the statute on which it purports to be based. American School v. McAnnulty, 187 U. 8. 109, 47 L. ed. 96, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 33. The mere fact that any officer must read the law, and therefore, in a certain sense, in construe it, in order to form a judgment, ter General from revoking orders accordfrom its language as to the duty it directs, ing second-class mail privileges to the severdoes not give the officer a discretion to read al plaintiffs,-in the first-named case the statute as he pleases. respect of a series of publications issued Roberts v. United States, 176 U. S. 221, under the name of the Tip Top Weekly; 231, 44 L. ed. 443, 447, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 376; | in the second, in respect of a similar one United States ex rel. West v. Hitchcock, entitled Work and Win. The ground of 19 App. D. C. 333; Payne v. United States, 20 App. D. C. 581; Garfield v. United States, 211 U. S. 249, 261, 262, 53 L. ed. 168, 174, 175, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 62. The definition of a word of common speech used as a statutory term is a pure question of laaw. M'Culloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 413, 418, 4 L. ed. 579, 603, 604; State v. Stevens, 69 Vt. 413, 38 Atl. 80; Taylor v. Horst, 52 Minn. 303, 54 N. W. 734; Com. v. Sullivan, 146 Mass. 142, 15 N. E. 491; Marvel v. Merritt, 116 U. S. 11, 12, 29 L. ed. 550, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 207. Solicitor General Bullitt argued the cause and filed a brief for appellee: The decision of the Postmaster General is conclusive and should not be reviewed. Bates & G. Co. v. Payne, 194 U. S. 106, 48 L. ed. 894, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 595. A mere compliance with the statutory requirements does not make the publication a periodical. Houghton v. Payne, 194 U. S. 88, 48 L. ed. 888, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 590; Bates & G. Co. v. Payne, 194 U. S. 106, 48 L. ed. 894, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 595; Smith v. Payne, 194 U. S. 104, 48 L. ed. 893, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 595. The contents of the publication determine whether or not it is a periodical. Ibid. The reprinting feature was not the determining factor in Houghton v. Payne and Smith v. Payne, supra. Former Solicitor General Lehmann also filed a brief for appellee: The notice given and the hearing accorded the complainants fulfilled the requirements of the law. Den ex dem. Murray v. Hoboken Land & Improv. Co. 18 How. 272, 15 L. ed. 372; Reetz v. Michigan, 188 U. S. 505, 47 L. ed. 563, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 390; Japanese Immigrant Case, 189 U. S. 86, 47 L. ed. 721, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 611. The issues of "Tip Top Weekly" are books, and not periodicals. Houghton v. Payne, 194 U. S. 88, L. ed. 888, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 590; Bates & G. Co. v. Payne, 194 U. S. 106, 48 L. ed. 894, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 595. the bills is that the privileges were annulled without granting the hearing required by the act of March 3, 1901, chap. 851, 31 Stat. at L. 1099, 1107, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 2655, and that the publications are periodical publications within the meaning of the act of March 3, 1879, chap. 180, §§ 7, 10, 14, 20 Stat. at L. 358, 359, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 2646, and therefore must be carried as second-class matter, by the very terms of the law. We will take up the second question first. The facts are not in dispute and are alike in the two cases. The publications are weekly, each containing a single story com plete in itself, but the same character is carried through the series, and the reader is led by announcements to expect further tales after the one before him. Most of the stories are by the same author. The element of sequence may be indicated by a few of the titles in the Tip Top Weekly: Frank Merriwell in Arizona; or, the Mys teries of the Mine. Frank Merriwell's Friend; or, Muriel the Moonshiner. Frank Frank Merriwell Meshed; or, the Last of Merriwell's Double; or, Fighting for Life. the Danites. Frank Merriwell's Magic; or, the Pearl of Tangier. Frank Merriwell in London; or, The Grip of Doom, etc., etc. There is nothing else in a number except a roll of honor or list of some of those who have endeavored to increase the circu-[58 lation of the series, laudatory letters with insignificant comments, and a page or two of inquiries as to physical culture, purporting to come from readers, with short replies. all more or less incident to the muscular tenor of the tales. The publications measure about 11 by 8 inches on the outside, are said to contain about thirty thousand words, have thirty-two pages, including a page of advertisement, and exclusive of the cover, of which twenty-six are filled by the story. The front cover bears a colored illustration of some incident narrated within. Thus a question of law is raised, although, as suggested in Bates & G. Co. v. Payne, 48 194 U. S. 106, 108, 48 L. ed. 894, 895, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 595, we should not interfere with the decision of the Postmaster General unless clearly of opinion that it was wrong. Id. 110. American School v. McAnnulty, Mr. Justice Holmes delivered the opin- 187 U. S. 94, 106, 47 L. ed. 90, 95, 23 Sup. ion of the court: Ct. Rep. 33; Public Clearing House v. These are bills to restrain the Postmas-Coyne, 194 U. S. 497, 509, 48 L. ed. 1092, rders accord- ations issued question first. and are alike blications are gle story comcharacter is nd the reader expect further im. Most of author. The indicated by Top Weekly: or, the MysMerriwell's hiner. Frank ting for Life. the Last of e filled by the nt narrated ed, although, was wrong. 1098, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 789. We have no, attempting a definition, w The decision that these w shortens what needs to be sufficiency of the hearing. notified that they would be Postmaster General, Wash of Columbia, at a fixed d show cause why the admissi class should not be revoke It must be taken as established that not every series of printed papers published at definite intervals is a periodical publication within the meaning of the law, even if it satisfies the conditions for admission to the second class, set forth in § 14. Houghton v. Payne, 194 U. S. 88, 96, 48 L. ed. 888, 889, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 590. It is established by the same authorities that books that are expressly embraced in mailing at the office of the matter of the third class by § 17, and so made liable to a higher rate of postage, 59] *cannot be removed from that class and brought into the second by the simple device of publishing them in a series at reg-class rate of postage charge ular intervals of time. It was suggested, that the issues were not pe to be sure, that the distinction was between tions, but were books. Th reprints of well-known works and new mat- sentative to Washington wh ter, but we can see nothing in that; neither response in advance, ask do we find much weight in the identity of opportunity for argument i authorship, the retention of the name of were not satisfied, and wh the hero through successive tales, or the appointed time. He was ever-renewed promise of further wonders Chief of the Classification in the next. All these might co-exist and yet proper person. Rev. Stat each number might be a book, and if so, it Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 80; F goes into the third class. "Mail matter of Regulations, 1902 ed. §§ 6, the third class shall embrace books." § 17. He saw him and asked if th The noun "periodical," according to the received, was answered yes, nice shade of meaning given to it by popular if the other had any questi speech, conveys at least a suggestion, if not was answered no. He prese a promise, of matter on a variety of topics, "The Influence of the Dir and certainly implies that no single number departed, offering no fur is contemplated as forming a book by itself. seemingly somewhat aggrie But we can approach the question more ing seen the Third Assist profitably from the other end, and shall General in person. Subseq have gone as far as we need when we decide sistant Attorney General whether the numbers exhibited constitute fice Department was consul so many books. The word "book," also, of cials, and in accordance w course, has its ambiguities, and may have the order was issued whic different meanings according to the con- seek to restrain. nection in which it is used. For purposes of copyright the common monthly magazines may be books, yet they are not so under the present § 17. As books are not turned into periodicals by number and sequence, the magazines are not brought into the third class by having a considerable number of pages stitched together. Without 57 L. ed. The matter was argued t feeling, and it is not impo interview gave an impres indifference. But the plai their bills that the questi question of law; it was a qu they had a right to have have had reviewed in this clearly defined; the official was not called on to state reasons or to discuss,-his only duty was to hear; and beyond offering the printed brief, the plaintiffs' representatives showed no desire to be heard. This is not a case in which even by manner or indirection, the plaintiffs were prevented from offering material evidence. The facts and the question were as plain then as now. The conclusion reached was right; and in the circumstances disclosed, we are of opinion that the plaintiffs had no cause to complain. Decrees affirmed. 1. A combination which places railroads engaged in interstate commerce in such a relation as to create a single dominating control in one corporation whereby natural and existing competition in interstate commerce is unduly restricted or suppressed constitutes a restraint of interstate commerce forbidden by the Sherman anti-trust act of July 2, 1890 (26 Stat. at I.. 209, chap. 647, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 3200), whether accomplished through a holding company or through a direct transfer of a dominating stock interest from one company to the other. For other cases, see Monopoly, II. c, in Digest Sup. Ct. 1908.] Monopoly combination by carriers stock control. 2. A purchase by one railway company of a dominating stock interest in another, though legal in the state where made, and within corporate powers conferred by state authority, cannot escape condemnation under the Sherman anti-trust act of July 2, 1890, if it contravenes the prohibitions of that statute against combinations and conspiracies in restraint of trade, enacted by Congress in the exercise of its supreme authority over interstate commerce. [For other cases, see Monopoly, II. c, in Digest Sup. Ct. 1908.] 3. The acquisition by the Union Pacific Railroad Company, then operating a line NOTE. As to what relation a contract or combination must bear to interstate commerce in order to bring it within the scope of the Federal anti-trust act-see note to Loewe v. Lawlor, 52 L. ed. U. S. 488. As to illegal trusts under modern antitrust laws generally-see note to Whitwell v. Continental Tobacco Co. 64 L.R.A. 689. from Missouri river points to Portland, and thence to San Francisco by steamship connection, of 46 per cent of the outstanding capital stock of the Southern Pacific Company, with the intent and result, not only of securing the California connection at Ogden over the Central Pacific line, and thus effecting such a continuity of the Union Pacific and Central Pacific lines from the Missouri river to San Francisco, as was contemplated by the acts of July 1, 1862 (12 Stat. at L. 489, chap. 120), July 2, 1864 (13 Stat. at L. 356, chap. 216), and June 20, 1874 (18 Stat. at L. 111, chap. 331, U. S. Comp Stat. 1901, p. 3577), but of obtaining the dominating control of the entire Southern Pacific system, consisting of lines by water and rail, together forming a transportation system from New York and other Atlantic ports to San Francisco and Portland and other Pacific coast points, with various branches and connections, besides a steamship line from San Francisco to Panama, and from San Francisco to the Orient, and a half interest in another line between the two latter points, which system was actively competing with the purchasing road for interstate business, large in volume, though small in comparison with the total traffic carried, creates, contrary to the act of July 2, 1890, a combination in restraint of interstate trade. [For other cases, see Monopoly, II. c, in Digest Sup. Ct. 1908.] Injunction against monopolies scope of relief. 4. The Federal district court, in relieving against a combination in restraint of interstate trade, created contrary to the act of July 2, 1890, by the acquisition by the Union Pacific and Central Pacific lines from inant stock interest in the Southern Pacific Company, a competing railway system, should, by its decree, provide against the right to vote such stock while in the ownership or control of the Union Pacific Railroad Company, or any corporation owned by it, or while held for it by any corporation or person, and forbid any transfer or disposition thereof in such wise as to continue its control, and should enjoin the payment of dividends on the stock while so held, except to a receiver appointed by the court to collect and hold such dividends until disposed of by its decree. [For other cases, see Injunction, I. g, in Digest Sup. Ct. 1908.] Appeal ing remanding for further heardissolution of monopoly. 5. Any plan for the disposition of the shares of stock of the Southern Pacific Company, found by the Federal Supreme Court to have been acquired by the Union Pacific Railroad Company, contrary to the act of July 2, 1890, prohibiting combina tions in the restraint of interstate trade, must be such as effectively to dissolve the unlawful combination, and must be subject to the approval and decree of the district court, which shall proceed, upon the presentation of any plan, to hear the government and the defendants, and may bring in any |