sufficiency rate regulavaluation of property. 5. Broad estimates of the value of railway property are not sufficient to support a finding that railway rates, as fixed by the state, are confiscatory. [For other cases, see Evidence, XII. m, in Digest Sup. Ct. 1908.] Evidence sufficiency -rate regulation valuation of property. 6. A finding that railway rates as fixed by the state are confiscatory cannot be based upon an intrastate valuation of the railway property which, if extended to the entire railway system, would greatly exceed the railway company's total capitalization, in the absence of clear and convincing proof that the value actually existed, and that the different items of property were estimated respectively by correct methods and in accordance with proper criteria of value. 7. Concessions that the assessment of railway property by the state board of assessors was upon the basis of one third of what the board regarded as its value, and the use of estimates based upon those assessments by both parties in calculations submitted to the court on the issue of the reasonableness of state regulation of railway rates, do not prevent the state authorities from objecting on appeal to a valuation state regulation of rates apportionment of reasonableness interstate and intrastate valuation. 8. A division of the value of the property of an interstate carrier within a state according to gross earnings derived respectively from its interstate and intrastate business in such state does not give a sufficiently accurate measure of the value of the use of its property in intrastate business to serve as the basis of a judicial holding in a close case, that the intrastate rates, as fixed by the state, are confiscatory. [For other cases, see Carriers, III. d, in Digest Sup. Ct. 1908.] Evidence sufficiency -reasonablestate regulation of railway rates- extra cost of intrastate opera of the circuit court entered March 8, 1909. as amended April 17, 1909, adjudging the maximum freight rate acts passed by the legislature of the state of Missouri in 1905 and 1907, and the maximum *passen-[477 ger fare act passed in 1907, to be confiscatory, and enjoining their enforcement. 168 Fed. 317. Eighteen suits, brought by as many rail. road companies, were begun in June, 1905, assailing the act of April 15, 1905 (effective June 16, 1905), which prescribed maximum rates for intrastate transportation of certain commodities in carload lots. The members of the board of railroad commissioners, the attorney general of the state, and representative shippers, were made defendants. Preliminary injunction was granted in each case, demurrers to the bills were over ruled, answers were filed, and in March, 1906, the cases were referred to a master to take evidence and report. The master proceeded, by agreement, to take testimony in three of the cases. While this reference was pending, the legislature, in 1907, passed the following acts: (1) That of February 27, 1907, fixing a maximum passenger fare within the state of 2 cents a mile for railroads over 45 miles in length. (2) That of March 19, 1907, repealing the act of April 15, 1905, and prescribing new maximum intrastate rates for specified commodities in carload lots, the rates being higher in certain instances than those of the former act. It also repealed an act passed April 14, 1905 (not mentioned in the original bills), relating to rates on stone, sand, and brick, and made new rates therefor. It was provided that the repeal should not relieve any railroad company from liabilities and penalties previously incurred. (3) That of March 19, 1907, fixing maximum rates for fruit in carload lots. (4) That of April 4, 1907, requiring carriers of live stock in carload lots to carry APPEALS and CROSS APPEALS from the shipper or his agent free of nal be decrees of the Circuit Court of the United States for the Western District of Missouri, adjudging railway rate legislation to be confiscatory, and enjoining its enforcement. Decrees in Nos. 9, 12, 339, 340, 341, 342, 345, 346, 349, 350, 357, and 358 reversed and causes remanded, with directions to dismiss the bills without prejudice. Decrees in Nos. 351, 352, 365, 366, 367, and 368 modified, and as modified, affirmed. See same case below, 168 Fed. 317. Statement by Mr. Justice Hughes: Appeals and cross appeals from decrees (This statute was held unconstitutional by the state court, and needs no further notice. McCully v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. 212 Mo. 1, 110 S. W. 711.) *These acts took effect on June 14,[478 1907. On June 11, 1907, the complainant in each of the eighteen cases moved for leave to file an amended and supplemental bill, then presented to the court, which set forth the legislation of 1907, above-mentioned, and asked relief against its enforcement upon the grounds that these acts constituted an unwarrantable interference with interstate commerce and that they were Mr. Elliott W. Major, Attorney General of Missouri, and Messrs. Frederick W. Lehmann and Sanford B. Ladd et al. confiscatory. On June 13, 1907, the court made an order setting down the applications for argument, and meanwhile restraining the enforcement of the new rates. | argued the cause and filed a brief for Knott On June 17, 1907, upon hearing, leave to file was granted and a temporary injunction was allowed as to the freight rate laws of 1907, but not as to the passenger fare law. The latter was permitted to go into effect for three months without prejudice, and was thereafter continued in force until the final decrees. In the final analysis, we have two sovereign powers constantly in operation in each state, the powers of each being distinct, and the two together constituting a complete government. The Federal government exercises generally the powers which affect the people of all the states alike (Cardwell v. AmerMeanwhile on June 14, 1907, bills were ican River Bridge Co. 113 U. S. 210, 28 filed in the name of the state in the state L. ed. 961, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 423), while the court against the railway companies, seek-states exercise the powers that are local or ing an injunction requiring them to put in force both the freight and passenger rates as prescribed. The supplemental bills in the Federal courts were amended so as to show these proceedings. On demurrer to these bills, as amended, it was insisted that they were without equity; that the matters alleged were not germane to or supplementary of the original bills; and that the state court had jurisdiction of the proceedings therein instituted. The demurrers were overruled and the defendants answered. domestic in their application; and the extent of the jurisdiction of these two separate sovereignties was firmly fixed by the people in the adoption of the Constitution of the United States. Employers' Liability Cases (Howard v. Illinois C. R. Co.) 207 U. S. 463, 52 L. ed. 297, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 141; Sands v. Manistee River Improv. Co. 123 U. S. 295, 31 L. ed. 151, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 113; Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Maryland, 17 Wall. 470, 22 L. ed. 683; Re Debs, 158 U. S. 564, 39 L ed. 1092, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 900. Each state has the sole and exclusive au It was ordered (June 13, 1908) that the eighteen cases should be set down for hear-thority to prescribe reasonable maximum ing before the court upon the testimony theretofore taken before the master, and upon such further oral and documentary evidence as should then be offered in open court. And the cases were so heard. With respect to eight of the suits, it was stipulated that they should abide the result in other suits named. 479] *The case of the St. Louis, Kansas City & Colorado Railroad Company was consolidated with that of the Chicago, Rock Island, & Pacific Railway Company, the latter having acquired the property of the former, and the court ordered that the "findings, statements, and figures" of the two companies should be combined. In the suit brought by the Chicago, Burlington, & Quincy Railway Company, then the lessee of the property, the Chicago, Burlington, & Quincy Railroad Company was substituted as complainant on the cancelation | of the lease. passenger and freight rates on traffic wholly within the state. It is a legal impossibility for state rates on intrastate traffic to change interstate rates. If, however, it were legally possible for state rates to change or interfere with interstate rates, it is no objection to the validity of such laws that such rates incidentally affect in terstate commerce. Sands v. Manistee River Improv. Co. 123 U. S. 295, 31 L. ed. 151, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 113; Employers' Liability Cases (Howard v. Illinois C. R. Co.) 207 U. S. 463, 502, 52 L. ed. 297, 310, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 141; Covington & C. Bridge Co. v. Kentucky, 154 U. S. 209, 38 L. ed. 965, 4 Inters. Com. Rep. 649, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1087; Stone v. Farmers' Loan & T. Co. 116 U. S. 324, 29 L. ed. 642, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 334, 388, 1191; Northern P. R. Co. v. North Dakota, 216 U. S. 579, 54 L. ed. 624, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 423; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Kentucky, 183 U. S. 518, 46 L. ed. 306, 22 Sup. Ct. In the nine cases thus remaining, the Rep. 95; New York ex rel. Silz v. Hestercourt held that the rate acts, both of 1905 and 1907, were invalid, as confiscatory. The contention as to the invalidity of the acts by reason of interference with interstate commerce was not sustained. The costs were equally divided. And from the final decrees entered in these nine suits, the above entitled appeals and cross appeals were taken. berg, 211 U. S. 41, 42, 53 L. ed. 80, 29 1060; Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S. 520, 42 San Diego Land & Town Co. v. National L. ed. 839, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 418; Houston City, 174 U. S. 739, 754, 43 L. ed. 1154, & T. C. R. Co. v. Mayes, 201 U. S. 328, 50 1160, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 804; Knoxville v. L. ed. 775, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 491; Ames v. Knoxville Water Co. 212 U. S. 1, 8, 16, 17, Union P. R. Co. 64 Fed. 171; Oregon R. & 53 L. ed. 371, 378, 381, 382, 29 Sup. Ct. Nav. Co. v. Campbell, 173 Fed. 978; Wood-Rep. 148; Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. v. side v. Tonopah & G. R. Co. 184 Fed. 360; Tompkins, 176 U. S. 167, 173, 44 L. ed. Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Siler, 186 Fed. 417, 420, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 336; Cotting v. 198; Re Arkansas Rate Cases, 187 Fed. Kansas City Stock Yards Co. (Cotting v. 296; Saunders v. Southern Exp. Co. 18 Godard) 183 U. S. 79, 91, 97, 46 L. ed. 92, Inters. Com. Rep. 421; Hope Cotton Oil Co. 101, 104, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 30; Reagan v. v. Texas & P. R. Co. 12 Inters. Com. Rep. Farmers' Loan & T. Co. 154 U. S. 362, 395, 269; Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 194, 6 38 L. ed. 1014, 1022, 4 Inters. Com. Rep. L. ed. 69; Wabash, St. L. & P. R. Co. v. 560, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1047; Henderson Illinois, 118 U. S. 557, 565, 30 L. ed. 244, Bridge Co. v. Henderson, 173 U. S. 592, 247, 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 31, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 614, 615, 43 L. ed. 823, 831, 19 Sup. Ct. 4; Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. v. Minnesota, Rep. 553; St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. v. Gill, 134 U. S. 418, 459, 33 L. ed. 970, 982, 156 U. S. 649, 666, 667, 39 L. ed. 567, 573, 3 Inters. Com. Rep. 209, 10 Sup. Ct. 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 484; Chicago & N. W. Rep. 462, 702; Northern Securities Co. v. R. Co. v. Dey, 1 L.R.A. 744, 2 Inters. Com. United States, 193 U. S. 197, 350, 48 L. ed. Rep. 325, 35 Fed. 874; Louisville & N. 679, 705, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 436; Missouri P. R. Co. v. Kentucky, 183 U. S. 503, 511, R. Co. v. Kansas, 216 U. S. 262, 283, 284, 46 L. ed. 298, 303, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 95. 54 L. ed. 472, 481, 482, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 330; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Eubank, 184 U. S. 42, 46 L. ed. 422, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 277; Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. North Carolina Corp. Commission, 206 U. S. 1, 51 L. ed. 933, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 585, 11 Ann. Cas. 398. The mere raising or lowering of maximum passenger or freight rates by a state on intrastate commerce cannot, as a matter of law, change interstate rates. It is a legal impossibility. Intrastate and interstate commerce constitute two separate, distinct, and independent classes, and the rates of each are fixed and controlled by separate sovereignties. The change in the rates of one by the state and in the other by Federal authority only operates upon and affects its own separate, distinct, and inde pendent class of commerce. Ames v. Union P. R. Co. 64 Fed. 172; Woodside v. Tonopah & G. R. Co. 184 Fed. 360; Oregon R. & Nav. Co. v. Campbell, 173 Fed. 979; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Siler, 186 Fed. 198; St. Louis Southwestern R. Co. v. Allen, 187 Fed. 295; Southern P. Co. v. Campbell, 189 Fed. 182. The enforcement of the passenger and freight rate acts in question would not, in fact, have the effect of directly and substantially burdening interstate commerce. Chicago & G. T. R. Co. v. Wellman, 143 U. S. 339, 343, 36 L. ed. 176, 179, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 400; St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. v. Gill, 156 U. S. 649, 39 L. ed. 567, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 484. The legislature of Missouri was authorized to prescribe reasonable maximum rates on intrastate traffic. Stone v. Farmers' Loan & T. Co. 116 U. S. 307, 29 L. ed. 636, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 334, 388, 1191; Chicago & G. T. R. Co. v. Wellman, 143 U. S. 339, 36 L. ed. 176, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 400; Lehigh Valley R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 145 U. S. 192, 36 L. ed. 672, 4 Inters. Com. Rep. 87, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 806. The freight and passenger laws involved are presumptively valid. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. v. Tompkins, 176 U. S. 167, 173, 44 L. ed. 417, 420, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 336; Cotting v. Kansas City Stock Yards Co. (Cotting v. Godard) 183 U. S. 79, 91, 97, 46 L. ed. 92, 101, 104, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 30; Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & T. Co: 154 U. S. 362, 395, 38 L. ed. 1014, 1022, 4 Inters. Com. Rep. 560, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1047. The burden of proving that said laws are confiscatory rests upon the Chicago, Burlington, & Quincy Railroad Company. San Diego Land & Town Co. v. National City, 174 U. S. 739, 43 L. ed. 1154, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 804. The Burlington must establish that the rates are confiscatory clearly, unmistakably, and beyond all doubt, and by proof that is clear and convincing. Willcox v. Consolidated Gas Co. 212 U. S. 19, 53 L. ed. 382, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 192, 15 Ann. Cas. 1034; Louisville & N. R. Co. The law presumes that the Missouri acts v. Kentucky, 183 U. S. 503, 511, 46 L. ed. are valid, and that includes the presump-298, 303, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 95; Northern P. tion that they do not violate the commerce R. Co. v. North Dakota, 216 U. S. 579, 54 clause of the Constitution of the United L. ed. 624, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 423. States. All doubts must be resolved in favor of the validity of the freight act and passenger | 819, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 418; Chicago & G. fare law involved. T. R. Co. v. Wellman, 143 U. S. 339, 38 L. ed. 176, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 400; St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. v. Gill, 156 U. S. 649, 39 L. ed. 567, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 484. Henderson Bridge Co. v. Henderson, 173 U. S. 614, 615, 43 L. ed. 831, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 553. If the court is in doubt one way or the other as to the laws giving a fair return upon the reasonable valuation of the properties employed, then that doubt sustains the laws. Chicago & N. W. R. Co. v. Dey, 1 L.R.A./ 744, 2 Inters. Com. Rep. 325, 35 Fed. 874; Northern P. R. Co. v. North Dakota, 216 U. S. 579, 54 L. ed. 624, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 423. The case is heard and the questions determined de novo by this court, and without regard to how the questions were found and determined by the trial court. Knoxville v. Knoxville Water Co. 212 U. S. 1, 53 L. ed. 371, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 148. The rates, both freight and passenger, and business of the road in the state, may be considered in their entirety. San Diego Land & Town Co. v. National City, 174 U. S. 739, 43 L. ed. 1154, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 804. The road may be compelled to carry an article or articles at cost or even at a loss if the return on its entire business in the state affords it a reasonable compensation. Northern P. R. Co. v. North Dakota, 216 U. S. 579, 54 L. ed. 624, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 423. The road must affirmatively advise the court what it has done with the receipts and earnings of the company on its entire business in the state, and must not only give the amount showing the disposition of its revenues, but must give the items thereof; its expenses in general statements and in large sums will not be accepted, lest the court be misled into doing grievous wrong to the public. Chicago & G. T. R. Co. v. Wellman, 143 U. S. 339, 36 L. ed. 176, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 400. The service rendered by the road is an element which must be considered in determining the questions, because the road can only demand what the services rendered by it are reasonably worth. Minneapolis & St. L. R. Co. v. Minnesota, 186 U. S. 257, 46 L. ed. 1151, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 900; Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S. 466, 42 L. ed. 819, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 418. Each case must be heard and determined upon its own particular facts and evidence. Reduction in rates does not necessarily mean reduction in revenue. They may have increased business volume and therefore increased earnings. In three cases only has this court held that rates fixed by legislative bodies were invalid: Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & T. Co. 154 U. S. 362, 38 L. ed. 1014, 4 Inters. Com. Rep. 560, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1047; Covington & L. Turnp. Road Co. v. Sandford, 164 U. S. 578, 41 L. ed. 560, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 198; Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S. 466, 42 L. ed. 819, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 418. In thirteen cases at least has this court refused to sustain the action of the lower courts, holding rates fixed by legislative bodies unreasonable and confiscatory: San Diego Land & Town Co. v. National City, 174 U. S. 739, 43 L. ed. 1154, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 804; Chicago & G. T. R. Co. v. Wellman, 143 U. S. 339, 36 L. ed. 176, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 400; Stanislaus County v. San Joaquin & K. River Canal & Irrig. Co. 192 U. S. 201, 48 L. ed. 406, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 241; Dow v. Beidelman, 125 U. S. 680, 31 L. ed. 841, 2 Inters. Com. Rep. 56, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1028; St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. v. Gill, 156 U. S. 649, 39 L. ed. 567, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 484; San Diego Land & Town Co. v. Jasper, 189 U. S. 439, 47 L. ed. 892, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 571; Minneapolis & St. L. R. Co. v. Minnesota, 186 U. S. 257, 46 L. ed. 1151, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 900; Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Florida, 203 U. S. 256, 51 L. ed. 174, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 108; Sea Board Air Line R. Co. v. Florida, 203 U. S. 270, 51 L. ed. 178, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 109; Alabama & V. R. Co. v. Mississippi R. Commission, 203 U. 8. 496, 51 L. ed. 289, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 163; Knoxville v. Knoxville Water Co. 212 U. S. 1, 53 L. ed. 371, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 148; Willcox v. Consolidated Gas Co. 212 U. S. 19, 53 L. ed. 382, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 192, 15 Ann. Cas. 1034; Northern P. R. Co. v. North Dakota, 216 U. S. 579, 54 L. ed. 624, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 423. The court below should not have ascertained the value of the properties assignable to the state traffic, on the "Revenue Basis." Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. v. Tompkins, 176 U. S. 176, 44 L ed. 421, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 336. The court should not have divided the total freight expense between state and interstate traffic upon the basis of gross revenue; and should not have added 50 per cent to the expense of handling state freight in addition thereto. Ames v. Union P. R. Co. 64 Fed. 182; Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S. 466, 42 L. ed. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. v. Tompkins, |