stockholders, should be by bill in equity on behalf of such creditors as might come in. This provision was made operative as of July 1, 1907, and was to cause all actions at law of this kind brought since then to abate, saving the right to become party to a bill. On this statute the defendant moved to dismiss the suit. The motion was granted and the judgment was affirmed by the court of appeals, which sustained the constitutionality of the act as so applied. 113 Md. 77, 77 Atl. 255.

Of course the objection is that the law impairs the obligation of the plaintiff's contract. If the stockholder's liability were purely local, and no more than matter of remedy for the collection of the principal debt, still this objection would have to be considered. See Hawthorne v. Calef, 2 Wall. 10, 17 L. ed. 776; Brown v. Eastern Slate Co. 134 Mass. 590, 592. But the case was argued on the footing of a contract between the creditor and the stockholder; and as the statute seems to assume that the stockholder's liability may follow him into other jurisdictions, and the court of appeals affirmed that a contract between the parties is presumed, we in turn assume that view to be correct. Bernheimer v. Converse, 206 U. S. 516, 529, 51 L. ed. 1163, 1174, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 755. In either view the question put in the form most favorable for the plaintiff is the same; whether the remedy against the defendant is impaired so materially as to affect the plaintiff's rights. McGahey v. Virginia, 135 U. S. 662, 693, 34 L. ed. 304, 314, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep.

972.

has been found in practice an uncertain one, less efficacious than that which is substituted. There is nothing to contradict their statement as to what experience has taught. With that fact before us and also the absolute dependence of the creditor upon the will of the stockholder, we cannot go into nice speculation as to the probable result of this particular case, or say that the decision was wrong. The power of the state to make similar changes of remedy is asserted in more general terms than we have employed, in Fourth Nat. Bank v. Francklyn, 120 U. S. 747, 755, 30 L. ed. 825, 828, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 757. See also Henley v. Myers, 215 U. S. 373, 385, 54 L. ed. 240, 246, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 148.

A further objection is based upon the period of limitation established by the act. But as it does not appear that the plaintiff was hurt by it, this objection is not open. Darnell v. Indiana, Dec. 23, 1912 [226 U. S. 390, ante, 267, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 120.] Judgment affirmed.

*MARSHALL DENTAL MANUFAC-[460 TURING COMPANY, Plff. in Err.,

V.

STATE OF IOWA.

(See S. C. Reporter's ed. 460-462.)

Error to state court

title to bed

reversal of facts -concurrent findings below. of error to a state court, will not, even if 1. The Federal Supreme Court, on writ it can, go behind the successive findings of The plaintiff's supposed contract was sub- the courts below that a so-called lake was ject to peculiar infirmities. His right was an unnavigable body of water, proper to be shared equally by all other creditors of meandered, where such lake was meandered the corporation, and not only might some in the original government survey, and the other creditor by diligence have got in Secretary of the Interior has refused to have the land under water surveyed as ahead of the plaintiff and have exhausted the fund for which the defendant could be ciently that there was not a lake there, as swamp land, because it did not appear suffiheld, but the right depended on the stock-indicated at the time of the survey. 459] holder's *will. As was observed by [For other cases, see Appeal and Error, 2175Judge Rose, following the Maryland cases, in 2208, in Digest Sup. Ct. 1908.] Republic Iron & Steel Co. v. Carlton, 189 Waters riparian rights Fed. 126, 137, the statute does no more than the stockholder was free to do before. He could have paid the corporation or a receiver or other creditors. The question whether the remedy on this contract was impaired materially is affected not only by the precarious character of the plaintiff's right, but by considerations of fact,-of what the remedy amounted to in practice. It is admitted that bringing the action gave the plaintiff no lien, as it seems mistakenly to have been assumed to do in Myers v. Knickerbocker Trust Co. 1 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1171, 71 C. C. A. 199, 139 Fed. 111, 116. The court of appeals states that the remedy

of lake.

2. Grants by the United States of land adjoining an unnavigable lake did not convey the land under water, where, under the state law, riparian owners take title only to the water's edge.

[For other cases, see Waters, I. d, 2, a, în Digest Sup. Ct. 1908.]

NOTE. On what questions the Federal Supreme Court will consider in reviewing the judgments of state courts-see note to Missouri ex rel. Hill v. Dockery, 63 L.R.A. 571. On review of questions of fact by writ of Kansas, 49 L. ed. U. S. 546. error to a state court-see note to Smiley v.

As to title to land under water-see note to Goff v. Cougle, 42 L.R.A. 161.

Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U. S. 324, 24 L. [For other cases, see States, IX. a, in Digest ed. 224; St. Louis v. Myers, 113 U. S. 566, Sup. Ct. 1908.)

Pollard v. Hagan, 3 How. 212, 11 L. ed. Ct. Rep. 258; Cragin v. Powell, 128 U. S. 565.

691, 32 L. ed. 566, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 203; As to the land under navigable waters, Young v. Charnquist, 114 Iowa, 122, 86 there is no longer any question but what N. W. 205; Ogden v. Buckley, 116 Iowa, rights in the use of the water or the land' 352, 89 N. W. 1115; Barringer v. Davis,

141 Iowa, 419, 120 N. W. 65; Rood v. ant. Wallace, 109 Iowa, 5, 79 N. W. 449.

Grants of public lands by the United States, bounded upon waters, will be con. strued according to the law of the state in which the lands lie.

Frellsen v. Crandell, 217 U. S. 71, 54 L. ed. 670, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 490; Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U. S. 46, 93, 51 L. ed. 956, 973, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 655; McGilvra v. Ross, 215 U. S. 70, 54 L. ed. 95, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 27; Hardin v. Shedd, 190 U. S. 508, 47 L. ed. 1156, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 685; Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U. S. 371, 382, 35 L. ed. 428, 433, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 808, 838.

There is no decision of the supreme court of the state of Iowa which holds that the title to the beds of meandered non-navigable lakes passes under the swamp Land Act.

Rood v. Wallace, 109 Iowa, 8, 79 N. W. 449; Haight v. Keokuk, 4 Iowa, 199; Noyes v. Collins, 92 Iowa, 566, 26 L.R.A. 609, 54 Am. St. Rep. 571, 61 N. W. 250; Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U. S. 371, 35 L. ed. 428, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 808, 838; Carr v. Moore, 119 Iowa, 152, 97 Am. St. Rep. 292, 93 N. W. 52; State v. Thompson, 134 Iowa, 25, 111 N. W. 328.

If this were a case in which plaintiff in error was claiming through a title direct from the United States government,-in other words, if the United States government, in its plenary power to dispose of public lands, had conveyed the meandered lake in question, and the state was asserting title,- -a difficult problem might arise, but even then, the later decisions make it clear that the United States would waive its right in favor of the state.

United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co. 209 U. S. 447, 451, 52 L. ed. 881, 887, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 579; Kean v. Calumet Canal & Improv. Co. 190 U. S. 452, 47 L. ed. 1134, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 651; Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U. S. 371, 35 L. ed. 428, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 808, 838; Hardin v. Shedd, 190 U. S. 508, 47 L. ed. 1156, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep.

685.

Mr. Justice Holmes delivered the opin

ion of the court:

After a trial, the court of first in stance entered a decree for the plaintif and the decree was affirmed by the suprem court of the state. 143 Iowa, 398, 122 N W. 241.

The material facts are few. In the orig inal survey by the government in 1853 the lake was meandered, which meant under the instructions to surveyors then in force that it was a lake or deep pond, and no patent ever has issued from the United States. In 1903 the plaintiff in error applied to the Secretary of the Interior to have the land surveyed as swamp land, but the application was refused, on the ground that it did not appear sufficiently that there was not a lake there, as indicated, at the time of the survey. If the question of fact was open under Hannibal & St. J. R. Co. v. Smith, 9 Wall. 95, 19 L. ed. 599, the state courts found that Goose lake was an unnavigable body of water proper to be meandered, and we see no sufficient reason for going behind these successive findings, if we had power to do so. Cedar Rapids Gaslight Co. v. Cedar Rapids, 223 U. S. 655, 668, 56 L. ed. 594, 604, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 389. See French v. Fyan, 93 U. S. 169, 23 L. ed. 812; McCormick v. Hayes, 159 U. S. 332, 40 L. ed. 171, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 37. It follows that the plaintiff in error shows no title. By the law of Iowa the riparian owners took title only to the water's edge, and therefore the grants of the adjoining land by the United States did not convey the land under the lake. Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U. S. 371, 35 L. ed. 428, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 808, 838; Hardin v. Shedd, 190 U. S. 508, 47 L. ed. 1156, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 685; Whitaker v. McBride, 197 U. S. 510, 512, 49 L. ed. 857, 860, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 530. It follows that the bed of the lake either still belongs to the United States or must be held to have passed to the state.

The question as to the title to the bed is treated as open in Hardin v. Shedd, [462 190 U. S. 508, 519, 47 L. ed. 1156, 1157, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 685, and Whitaker v. McBride, 197 U. S. 510, 515, 49 L. ed. 857, 861, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 530, and there is no need to decide it now. It is enough to say that by virtue This is a petition brought by the state of of its sovereignty the state of Iowa has an Iowa to enjoin the defendant from draining interest in the condition of the lake suffithe waters of Goose lake, in Greene county, cient to entitle it to maintain this suit 461] Iowa. The defendant, now *plaintiff in against an intruder without title, whether error, set up title, on the ground that the the state owns the bed or not. This prinso-called lake, a tract of several hundred ciple has been affirmed and acted on by the acres, was swamp land and was granted to court so recently that it does not require the state by the act of September 28, 1850, further argument here. Georgia v. Tenneschap. 84, 9 Stat. at L. 520, Rev. Stat. see Copper Co. 206 U. S. 230, 237, 51 L. ed. 2479, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 1586; 1038, 1044, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 618, 11 Ann. that it passed to Greene county by an act of Cas. 488; Hudson County Water Co. v. Methe legislature of January 13, 1853, and Carter, 209 U. S. 349, 356, 52 L. ed. 828, thence by mesne conveyances to this defend-832, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 529, 14 Ann. Cas.

560; See also Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U. S. | koa v. Polyblank, 205 U. S. 349, 51 L. ed. 46, 93, 51 L. ed. 956, 973, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 655; McGilvra v. Ross, 215 U. S. 70, 79, 54 L. ed. 95, 100, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 27. Decree affirmed.

Error to Hawaiian supreme court-executor and that the plaintiffs allowed the scope of review - local practice.

An annual privilege tax levied by a municipality upon the business of an express company, expressly excluding commerce of

an interstate character and business done for the government, and covering solely the Memorandum opinion by direction of the local business done at that point in re

This is a suit on a deficiency judgment rendered upon foreclosure of the mortgage NOTE. On interstate character of transthat was under consideration in Kawanana-portation between points in same state over

packages to like points, is not invalid be- | Co. v. Minnesota, 223 U. S. 335, 56 L. ed. 459, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 211.

I State Kansas a judgment sylvania, L. 672, 4