G. W. R. Co. 141 Fed. 1015, 209 U. S. 108, 52 L. ed. 705, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 493.

The Carmack amendment did not abrogate this rule.

Bernard v. Adams Exp. Co. 205 Mass. 254, 28 L.R.A.(N.S.) 293, 91 N. E. 325, 18 Ann. Cas. 351; Greenwald v. Barrett, 199 N. Y. 170, 35 L.R.A. (N.S.) 971, 92 N. E. 218; Fry v. Southern P. R. Co. 247 Ill. 564, 93 N. E. 906; Travis v. Wells, F. & Co. 79 N. J. L. 83, 74 Atl. 444; Larsen v. Oregon Short Line R. Co. 38 Utah, 130, 110 Pac. 983; Fielder v. Adams Exp. Co. 69 W. Va. 138, 71 S. E. 99. See also Southern R. Co. v. Reid, 222 U. S. 424, 56 L. ed. 257, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 140; Robinson v. Baltimore & O. R. Co. 222 U. S. 506, 56 L. ed. 288, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 114.

The proviso cannot reasonably be given an effect which annuls the substantive rules established by the other sections of the commerce acts, which Congress enacted for the purpose of insuring equality of treatment and putting an end to discrimination.

Texas & P. R. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co. 204 U. S. 426, 446, 51 L. ed. 553, 561, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 350, 9 Ann. Cas. 1075; Latta v. Chicago, St. P. M. & O. R. Co. 97 C. C. A. 198, 172 Fed. 850.

Where Congress has acted within the scope of its constitutional powers, and its regulations come in conflict with the organic or statutory law of the state, the Federal regulations are controlling, and the state law must give way.

Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Hefley, 158 U. S. 98, 39 L. ed. 910, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 802; Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 197, 6 L. ed. 23, 70.

Messrs. Edwin E. Squires and H. M. Sullivan argued the cause, and, with Mr. Norris Brown, filed a brief for defendant in

error:

The Constitution of Nebraska is self-oper

ative and has the force of a statute. It is

not merely a limitation on the power of the legislature, but acts directly upon the parties and their contracts, and prevents a carrier from contracting to limit its liability to the shipper for damages. This is settled

law in Nebraska.

Missouri P. R. Co. v. Vandeventer, 26 Neb. 222, 3 L.R.A. 129, 41 N. W. 998; Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Gardner, 51 Neb. 70, 70 N. W. 508.

In Nebraska a contract limiting the liability of a common carrier is void, and cannot be the foundation of an estoppel of the shipper to collect damages.

Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. Witty, 32 Neb. 275, 29 Am. St. Rep. 436, 49 N. W. 183; Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Lawler, 40

391–393; The Kensington, 183 U. S. 263, 46 L. ed. 190, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 102.

While a carrier cannot exempt itself from some liability for damages it causes, neither can it limit the amount for which it will be liable. The measure of the amount recoverable by the shipper is the real extent of damage suffered, regardless of agreed value or stipulation of limitation named in the contract.

Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Gardiner, 51 Neb. 70, 70 N. W. 508; Miller v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. 85 Neb. 458, 123 N. W. 449; Missouri P. R. Co. v. Vandeventer, 26 Neb. 222, 3 L.R.A. 129, 41 N. W. 998; Union P. R. Co. v. Metcalf, 50 Neb. 460, 69 N. W. 961; Pennsylvania Co. v. Kennard Glass & Paint Co. 59 Neb. 435, 81 N. W. 372.

This rule is applicable alike to interstate and intrastate shipments.

St. Joseph & G. I. R. Co. v. Palmer, 38 Neb. 463, 22 L.R.A. 335, 4 Inters. Com. Rep. 494, 56 N. W. 957.

Under the Iowa statute, as construed by its courts, a carrier cannot by contract exempt itself from liability, or limit the amount of its liability to less than the real value of the property destroyed or injured. The shipper cannot be estopped by a special contract from recovering the full amount of damage he has suffered by the dereliction of the carrier.

Hart v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co. 69 Iowa, 485, 29 N. W. 597; Solan v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. 95 Iowa, 260, 28 L.R.A. 178, 58 Am. St. Rep. 430, 63 N. W. 692; Lucas v. Burlington, C. R. & N. W. R. Co. 112 Iowa, 594, 84 N. W. 673; Winn v. American Exp. Co. 149 Iowa, 259, 128 N. W. 663; 252, 129 N. W. 962; Cramer v. Chicago, Bette v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. 150 Iowa, R. I. & P. R. Co. 153 Iowa, 103, 133 N. W.

This rule in Iowa is applicable to both interstate and intrastate shipments, is an exercise of the police power of the state, and is in no proper sense a regulation of interstate commerce.

Hart v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co. 69 Iowa, 485, 29 N. W. 597; Solan v. Chicago, M. & | St. P. R. Co. 95 Iowa, 260, 28 L.R.A. 718, 58 Am. St. Rep. 430, 63 N. W. 692; Lucas v. Burlington, C. R. & N. W. R. Co. 112

Winn v. American Exp. Co. 149 Iowa, 259, 128 N. W. 663; Betts v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. 150 Iowa, 252, 129 N. W. 962; Cramer v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. 153 Iowa, 103, 133 N. W. 387; Latta v. Chicago, St. P. M. & O. R. Co. 97 C. C. A. 198, 172 Fed. 850; Miller v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. 85 Neb. 458, 123 N. W. 449; Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Rodgers, 16 N. M. 120, 113 Pac. 80; Chesapeake & O. R. Co. v. Pew, 109 Va. 288, 64 S. E. 35.

State statutes, such as the one in Iowa, and state rules of law of like nature, whether the same have been established by statute, Constitution, or judicial interpretation, prohibiting carriers in case of shipments, both interstate and intrastate, from limiting their liability to the shipper, have been passed upon by this court, and by it ratified and approved, and by it established as existing law.

Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. v. Solan, 169 U. S. 133, 42 L. ed. 688, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 289; Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Hughes, 191 U. S. 477, 48 L. ed. 268, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 132; Martin v. Pittsburg & L. E. R. Co. 203 U. S. 284, 51 L. ed. 184, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 100, 8 Ann. Cas. 87.

Such statutes and laws have been repeatedly held by this court to be within the police power of the state, and in no sense a regulation of interstate commerce.

Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. v. Solan, 169 U. S. 133, 42 L. ed. 688, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 289; Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Hughes, 191 U. S. 477, 48 L. ed. 268, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 132; Western U. Teleg. Co. v. Commercial Mill. Co. 218 U. S. 406, 54 L. ed. 1088, 36 L.R.A. (N.S.) 220, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 59, 21 Ann. Cas. 815.

The carrier is made liable by the Carmack amendment for "any loss, damage, or injury." The use of this word "any" is of paramount importance. "Any" in this context means "all."

1 Words & Phrases, 421; Monongahela Nav. Co. v. Coon, 6 Pa. 379, 47 Am. Dec. 474; 2 Cyc. 472 (note 21); Jones v. Whitworth, 94 Tenn. 602, 30 S. W. 736; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Mottley, 219 U. S. 479, 55 L. ed. 302, 34 L.R.A. (N.S.) 671, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 265.

If we are right in our construction of the Carmack amendment, then it is idle to talk about estoppel. There can be no estoppel by a contract which contravenes the statute. There can be no estoppel by a rule

applies to rates or anything else, when the statute says in effect that such rule or regulation shall not work an estoppel or exempt the carrier from full liability for loss caused by it.

16 Cyc. 720.

The carrier cannot, because it filed with the Commission a rate proportioned upon a declared valuation in this case, shield itself from full liability for loss caused by it.

Cramer v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. 153 Iowa, 103, 133 N. W. 387; Chesapeake & O. R. Co. v. Pew, 109 Va. 288, 64 S. E. 35.

The question of value as a basis of rates is no more a subject of contract than any other feature tending to make freight rates fixed and certain and to prevent discrimination. The value must be the true value, or so near such as to stamp the proceedings with bona fides. The Federal statute provides that there shall be no false classification and false billing. It further provides for penalties for false classification and false billing, whether done knowingly or not. To charge a rate upon a false value is to fix a false classification. Such a rate forbidden by law would bind neither carrier nor shipper.

Texas & P. R. Co. v. Mugg, 202 U. S. 242, 50 L. ed. 1011, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 628; Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Hefley, 158 U. S. 98, 39 L. ed. 910, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 802; Texas & P. R. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co. 204 U. S. 431, 51 L. ed. 553, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 350, 9 Ann. Cas. 1075.

In a situation where the rate was fixed at a definite amount, with limited liability in a proper case on the part of the carrier, and made 20 per cent higher with full liability, the Interstate Commerce Commission condemned the discrimination as unreasonable, and directed the carriers to revise their contracts, making the discrimination less. Re Released Rates, 13 Inters. Com. Rep. 565.

The alternative of rates presented is unreasonable, made so simply to force consent of the shipper to agree to limited liability, and therefore the contract must be construed as one designed not to procure a reasonable proportion between the risk assumed and

the freight charged, but to obtain a limitation of liability for negligence, and one

that is unreasonable and void.

Cramer v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. 153 Iowa, 103, 133 N. W. 387.

A reasonable alternative of fares, and an opportunity to contract, with full commonlaw liability at a reasonable differential rate, must be offered, or the contract will be construed as unreasonable and void. Little Rock & Ft. S. R. Co. v. Cravens, 57

Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Smith, 123 Tenn. 678, 134 S. W. 866; 6 Cyc. 401; 1 Hutchinson, Carr. 427; Southern R. Co. v. Jones, 132 Ala. 437, 31 So. 501; South & North Ala. R. Co. v. Henlein, 52 Ala. 606, 23 Am. Rep. 578.

As long as the Federal statute is not in conflict with the law of the state, the latter remains operative, and a carrier cannot limit its liability in the states of Iowa and Nebraska. The state statutes forbidding limitation of liability are enacted under the police power of the state, and, so long as the state and Federal statutes are not in conflict, both may stand.

Cramer v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. 153 Iowa, 103, 133 N. W. 387; Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. v. Solan, 169 U. S. 133, 42 L. ed. 688, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 289; Gulf C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Hefley, 158 U. S. 98, 39 L. ed. 910, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 802; Hennington v. Georgia, 163 U. S. 299, 41 L. ed. 166, 16 Sup. | Ct. Rep. 1086; Covington & C. Bridge Co. v. Kentucky, 154 U. S. 204, 38 L. ed. 962, 4| Inters. Com. Rep. 649, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1087; Parkersburg & O. River Transp. Co. v. Parkersburg, 107 U. S. 691, 27 L. ed. 584, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 732.

517] *Mr. Justice Lurton delivered the opinion of the court:

The question in this case, as in Adams Exp. Co. v. Croninger, 226 U. S. 491, ante, 314, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 148, just decided, is whether the provisions of § 20 of the act of February 4, 1887 [24 Stat. at L. 386, chap. 104], as amended by the act of June 29, 1906 (34 Stat. at L. 584, chap. 3591, U. S. Comp. Stat. Supp. 1911, p. 1288), constitute an exclusive regulation of contracts for interstate shipments of property by railroad common carriers, superseding all state regulations upon the same subject.

The action in this case was to recover the full value of a stallion shipped from a point in Iowa to a point in Nebraska, under a valued live-stock contract. loss occurred in the state of Nebraska through the negligence of the carrier, and the suit was in a court of that state.

The

The receipt or bill of lading placed a value upon the animal of $100, and was signed by the shipper's agent. It recited | that the schedules of rates and regulations filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission provide alternative rates of charges proportioned to the value of the stock de

rate.

The plaintiff's claim that the stallion was in fact of the value of $2,000, and that the limitation of recovery stipulated is void under a statute of Iowa, where the contract was made, and also illegal and invalid under a clause in the Constitution of Nebraska, the state in which the loss occurred, and of the forum.

The company relies upon the provisions of the act of 1906 as an exclusive rule regulating every contract for an interstate shipment, and declaring the liability of the carrier, and contends that the regulations provided by the 7th section of that act operate to supersede the legislation of both Iowa and Nebraska, in so far as they applied to interstate shipments.

*This defense was overruled in the[518 trial court, and the agreement in the plaintiff's bill of lading, limiting any recovery in case of loss or damage, to the value declared for the purpose of obtaining the lower or alternative rate of freight, was held to be illegal, both under the law of Iowa and Nebraska, and judgment was rendered for the full value of the animal. This judgment was affirmed by the supreme court of Nebraska, that court ruling that the case was controlled by the state regulations referred to, and that these regulations had not been superseded by acts of Congress regulating interstate commerce. For this the court cited and relied upon certain decisions by the Nebraska courts, and the cases of Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. v. Solan, 169 U. S. 133, 42 L. ed. 688, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 289, and Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Hughes, 191 U. S. 477, 48 L. ed. 268, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 132. Both of the cases decided by this court were decided prior to the extensive amend. ment of the act regulating interstate commerce of 1887 by the act of June 29, 1906.

In Adams Exp. Co. v. Croninger, supra, we reached the conclusion that by the provisions of the 7th section of the latter act, Congress had manifested a purpose to take possession of the subject of the liability of a carrier by railroad for interstate shipments, and that the regulations therein had superseded all state regulations upon the same subject. This case is therefore controlled by that judgment.

It follows that the supreme court of Nebraska erred in applying to the contract here involved the provisions of the Iowa statute, and of the Constitution of the state of Nebraska, and in refusing to apply the exclusive regulation prescribed by the