as we have seen, and of "also;" but, we have also seen, "may merely specify particularly that which belongs to the genus." Hiller v. United States, 106 Fed. Rep. 73, 74. It is the participle of the word "include," which means, according to the definition of the Century Dictionary, (1) "to confine within something; hold as in an inclosure; to inclose; to contain." (2) "To comprise as a part, or as something incident or pertinent; comprehend; take in; as the greater includes the less; the Roman Empire included many nations." "Including" being a participle is in the nature of an adjective and is a modifier. What, then, does it modify as used in § 8? Necessarily, we think the preceding substantive phrase "one hundred and ten thousand acres of land," and we have the meaning of the section to be that the saline lands are to be contained in or comprise a part of the 110,000 acres of land. We see no particular awkwardness in the expression of the purpose, and it well may be contended that it needs not for its support the rule of strict construction. And such purpose is in harmony with grants of saline lands to other States. It is also sustained by the reports of the committees of the House and Senate.

In the case of Barnard v. Darling, 132 Massachusetts, 218, it was held that a legacy of $100, "including money trusteed at a certain bank," could not be construed as meaning that the sum of $100 was in addition to the sum in bank.

In Henry's Executor v. Henry's Executor, 81 Kentucky, 342, a bequest of $14,000, “including certain notes," was held to mean that the notes formed a part of the $14,000 and were not in addition thereto.

In Neher v. McCook County, 11 S. Dak. 422, it was held that a certain section of the laws of the State which provided that the sheriff's fees should be $16 for summoning a jury, "including mileage," did not entitle him to mileage in addition to the $16.

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We have seen that the State urges that the word "and" is always employed to express the relation of addition, and it is said, with words of emphasis, that Congress cannot be supposed to have been ignorant of its meaning. The Supreme Court of the State also gave special significance to the use of "and," as adding something to that which preceded. The court also considered that the word "including" was used as a word of enlargement, the learned court being of opinion that such was its ordinary sense. With this we cannot concur. It is its exceptional sense, as the dictionaries and cases indicate. We may concede to "and" the additive power attributed to it. It gives in connection with "including" a quality to the grant of 110,000 acres which it would not have had-the quality of selection from the saline lands of the State. And that such quality would not exist unless expressly conferred we do not understand is controverted. Indeed, it cannot be controverted. Under the applicable statutes and uniform policy of the Government saline lands would not have been subject to selection in satisfaction of the 110,000 acre grant in the absence of a special provision authorizing their selection. Rev. Stat., § 2318; Act of January 12, 1877, 19 Stat. 221, c. 18; Morton v. Nebraska, 21 Wall. 660; Cole v. Markley, 2 L. D. 847; Salt Bluff Placer, 7 L. D. 549; Southwestern Mining Co., 14 L D. 597; Jeremy v. Thompson, 20 L. D. 299; A. H. Geissler, 27 L. D. 515.

Something is attempted to be made of the fact as militating against the selection of saline lands as part of the grant of 110,000 acres that no time limit was fixed, as in grants of such lands in other States. The fact has some force, and giving it and the other contentions of the State proper weight, they cannot prevail against the considerations to which we have adverted.

It is finally contended that if the saline lands are included in the 110,000 acres the State has the right to select

all of them, and that until it declares its intention no rights can be acquired by others under the mining laws. We are not called upon to discuss the contention. It is alleged in the answer that the State has selected and received grants from the United States for the full amount of 110,000 acres, "selected and located as provided in §§ 7 and 8 of the Enabling Act." As the State demurred to the answer, the truth of the allegation must be considered as admitted.

Judgment reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.

MR. JUSTICE HARLAN dissents.

FIFTH AVENUE COACH COMPANY v. CITY OF NEW YORK.

ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW

YORK.

No. 159. Argued April 27, 28, 1911.—Decided May 29, 1911.

The courts of a State are competent to construe the laws of the State and to determine what powers a corporation derives thereunder, and the use to which such corporation may employ its necessary property; and so held as to uses to which stages may be put by a transportation company.

Whatever the general rights as to corporate property may be, a State,

in granting a charter, may define and limit the use of property necessary to the exercise of the granted powers.

The rights of one to do that which if done by all would work public harm and injury are not greater because others refrain from exercising such rights.

Classification based on reasonable distinctions is not an unconstitutional denial of equal protection of the laws; and so held that an

Argument for Plaintiff in Error.

221 U. S.

ordinance of the city of New York prohibiting advertising vehicles in a certain street is not unconstitutional as denying equal protection to a transportation company operating stages on such street either because signs of the owners may be displayed on business wagons, or because another transportation company may display advertising signs on its structure. There is a purpose to be achieved, as well as a distinction, which justifies the classification.

This court may take judicial notice of the density of traffic on a well known thoroughfare.,

Where rights exist to one they exist to all of the class to which that one belongs.

The charter of this transportation company held not to contain any provisions giving it such contract right to use its vehicles for advertising purposes as rendered a subsequent ordinance prohibiting such use unconstitutional under the contract clause of the Constitution. A contract with a corporation is subject to the limitations of the charter rights of the corporation and is not impaired within the meaning of the contract clause of the Constitution by subsequent legislation that does not extend such limitations.

194 N. Y., 19, affirmed.

THE facts, which involve the validity of an ordinance of the city of New York prohibiting the display of advertisements under certain conditions, are stated in the opinion.

Mr. William H. Page, with whom Mr. Gilbert H. Crawford was on the brief, for plaintiff in error:

Plaintiff in error possesses a vested property right to rent space for the display of advertisements upon its stages, which is incidental to the ownership of the stages. The doctrine of ultra vires has no application.

The renting of space to be used for the display of advertisements is a property right belonging to the plaintiff in error, incidental to its ownership of the Fifth Avenue stages. Foster v. London &c. Ry. Co. (Ct. of App.), L. R. (1895) 1 Q. B. D. 711, 720; Nantasket Beach Steamboat Co. v. Shea, 182 Massachusetts, 147; Louisiana v. Warehouse Co., 109 Louisiana, 64; Benton v. City of Elizabeth, 61 N. J. L. 411; Coal Creek Co. v. Tenn. &c. Co., 106 Tennessee, 651; French v. Quincy, 3 Allen, 9; see also

221 U. S.

Argument for Plaintiff in Error.

Spaulding v. City of Lowell, 23 Pick. 71; Worden v. City of New Bedford, 131 Massachusetts, 23; People v. City of Platteville, 71 Wisconsin, 139; Forrest v. Manchester Ry. Co., 30 Beav. 40; Brown v. Winnisimmet Co., 11 Allen, 326. All the corporations, whose rights were considered in the cases cited, were alike subject to the rule that corporations have no powers except those expressly granted by the legislature, and in every case the particular power sustained was not given expressly by charter, but was upheld as an implied incidental or appurtenant property right. Jacksonville Railway & Navigation Co. v. Hooper, 160 U. S. 514, 525; N. Y. M. & N. Trans. Co. v. Shea, 30 App. Div. (N. Y.) 266; Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. R. Co., 51 Fed. Rep. 309; aff'd 163 U. S. 564; Interborough Co. v. New York, 47 Misc. 221; S. C., 53 Misc. 126. City v. Interborough R. T. Co. and N. Y. City Interborough R. Co., 125 App. Div. (N. Y.) 437; S. C., 194 N. Y. 528, upheld the right of the Interborough Rapid Transit Company to use ducts forming part of the construction of the subway, for the transmission of electric current sold by it to a surface railway company.

The right asserted by the plaintiff in error is an incidental right of property, which is independent of the question of corporate powers or franchises. Foster v. London &c. Railway Co., supra.

When an intrinsically harmless, natural and ordinary use of property is forbidden by law, the owner is deprived of his property within the meaning of the constitutional provision. People v. Green, 85 App. Div. 400, 406. An obvious, ordinary use of property, as is the renting it to advertisers, is within the protection of the constitutional provision. People v. Otis, 90 N. Y. 48. See also Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 13 Wall. 166, 179; Muhlker v. Harlem R. R. Co., 197 U. S. 544; Myer v. Adams, 63 App. Div. (N. Y.) 540, 544; Re Grade Commissioners, 6 App. Div. 327, 334; Belleville v. Turnpike Co., 234 Illinois, 428, 434.