"The people of the United States constitute one nation, under one government, and this government, within the scope of the powers with which it is invested, is supreme. On the other hand, the people of each State compose a State, having its own government, and endowed with all the functions essential to separate and independent existence. The States disunited might continue to exist. Without the States in union there could be no such political body as the United States."

To this we may add that the constitutional equality of the States is essential to the harmonious operation of the scheme upon which the Republic was organized. When that equality disappears we may remain a free people, but the Union will not be the Union of the Constitution.

Judgment affirmed.

MR. JUSTICE MCKENNA and MR. JUSTICE HOLMES dissent.

BAGLIN, SUPERIOR GENERAL OF THE ORDER OF CARTHUSIAN MONKS, v. CUSENIER COMPANY.

APPEAL FROM AND ON CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT.

No. 99. Argued March 14, 15, 1911.-Decided May 29, 1911.

While names which are merely geographical cannot be exclusively appropriated as trade-marks, a geographical name which for a long period has referred exclusively to a product made at the place and not to the place itself may properly be used as a trade-mark; and so held that the word "Chartreuse" as used by the Carthusian Monks in connection with the liqueur manufactured by them at Grande Chartreuse, France, before their removal to Spain, was a validly registered trade-mark in this country.

221 U.S.

Argument for Appellants and Petitioners.

The law of a foreign country has no extra-territorial effect to detach a trade-mark validly registered in this country from the product to which it is attached.

Non-user of a trade-mark, or the use of new devices, does not afford a basis for the penalty of loss of right thereto by abandonment; abandonment will not be inferred in the absence of intent, and a finding of intent must be supported by adequate facts.

While one may use the name of the place where he manufactures an article, in order to show where it is manufactured, and may state all the facts in regard to his succession, under the law of a foreign country, to property of parties formerly manufacturing an article similar in many respects, he cannot, in this country, use the name of the place to designate the article if that name has been validly registered as a trade-mark here; and so held that the liquidator appointed in France of the property of the Carthusian Monks could not, in this country, use the word "Chartreuse" to designate the liqueur manufactured by him at Grande Chartreuse, the Carthusian Monks having validly registered that name in the United States as a trademark of the liqueur manufactured by them.

A validly registered trade-mark cannot be used by anyone other than the owner, even with words explaining that the article to which it is attached is not manufactured by the owner of the trade-mark. Where the Circuit Court has sustained the trade-mark but the Circuit Court of Appeals has suggested a form of label that the defendant might use, defendant should not be punished for contempt for using such a form.

THE facts, which involve the validity of the word "Chartreuse" as a trade-mark and other questions in regard to the ownership thereof and the sale of cordials under that name, are stated in the opinion.

Mr. Philip Mauro, with whom Mr. C. A. L. Massie and Mr. Ralph L. Scott were on the brief, for appellants and petitioners:

The office of a trade-mark is to guarantee the origin of an article with which it has become identified in the public mind. Medicine Co. v. Wood, 108 U. S. 218, 223.

Defendant's use of the "Chartreuse" trade-mark vio

Argument for Appellants and Petitioners. 221 U.S.

lates the fundamental law of trade-marks. Defendant's liqueur is of recent origin, its formula having been devised in 1904. Defendant's business is not a continuation of complainants' business.

The French court at Grenoble has decided that the product sold by defendant is not genuine Chartreuse. There can be no dispute between the parties hereto as to the validity of the trade-mark "Chartreuse." That word does constitute a valid trade-mark as applied to liqueurs, cordials, etc. See Falk v. Trading Co., 180 N. Y. 445, 451; Grezier v. Girard, decided April 13, 1876; A. Bauer & Co. v. Order of Carthusian Monks, 120 Fed. Rep. 78; and see also Judgment of the English House of Lords.

The significance of the word "Chartreuse" is not geographical alone; but even if it were, geographical names may constitute lawful trade-names under some circumstances. Wotherspoon v. Currie, L. R. 5 H. L. 508; Lawrence Co. v. Tenn. Mfg. Co., 138 U. S. 537, 550; Scriven v. North, 134 Fed. Rep. 366, 377; Thompson v. Montgomery, 41 Ch. D. 35,50; "Stone Ale" Case, and Reddaway v. Banham, 1 Q. B. 286; "Camel Hair Belting" Case; Shaver v. Heller & Merz Co., 108 Fed. Rep. 821; Buzby v. Davis, 150 Fed. Rep. 275; Pillsbury v. Mills Co., 24 U. S. App. 395; S. C., 12 C. C. A. 432, and 64 Fed. Rep. 841; Kathreiner's Malzkaffee Fab. v. Pastor Kneipp Med. Co., 82 Fed. Rep. 321, 324; Siegert v. Gandolfi, 149 Fed. Rep. 100; S. C., 79 C. C. A. 142; Bauer v. Siegert, 120 Fed. Rep. 81.

The property involved in this suit is the good-will of the business which has come into existence in this country, being the outgrowth of transactions, extending over many years, between complainants and the American public. It was one of the objects of the French law of 1901 to confiscate this American business, and even if such were one of the objects of that law said business is not subject to the jurisdiction of the French laws and tribunals.

221 U.S. Argument for Appellees and Cross-Petitioners.

For definition of "good-will" see Washburn v. Wall Paper Co., 81 Fed. Rep. 17, 20.

The Monks owned the business in question during all the centuries they manufactured liqueurs in France, and had at any time the right to move their base of operations from one place to another. The right to transfer a business from place to place is an incident of ownership.

The attempt of the liquidator to exercise ownership over the foreign trade-marks has been disapproved by the French courts. The French law of 1901, and the decrees of the French courts give no color of authority to defendant to use the trade-marks of complainants in the United States.

The new labels employed by complainants do not in any way amount to an abandonment of the old tradename and trade-marks.

Mr. A. L. Pincoffs, with whom Mr. Roger Foster was on the brief, for appellees and cross-petitioners:

The bill cannot be maintained as a bill to enjoin infringements by the complainant of a trade-mark, as the primary meaning of the word "Chartreuse" is geographical and no use of the word as its trade-mark by defendant is proved. Elgin Co. v. Illinois Watch Co., 179 U. S. 665, 667; Ex parte Farmer Co., 18 Off. Gaz. 412; Pillsbury Co. v. Eagle Co., 86 Fed. Rep. 608; Waltham Watch Co. v. U. S. Watch Co., 173 Massachusetts, 85; Wolf v. Goulard, 18 How. Pr. 64, 66, 67; Lea v. Wolf, 46 How. Pr. 157, 158; Browne on Trade-marks, 2d ed., § 182, p. 193; Durham Smoking Tobacco Case, 3 Hughes, 111, 167.

There was no business or good-will vested in complainants in this country separate and apart from the business and good-will in France. Knoedler v. Boussod, 47 Fed. Rep. 465.

The disputed marks and the phrase "Chartreuse," as applied to a liqueur, are primarily significant of place of

Argument for Appellees and Cross-Petitioners.

221 U.S.

manufacture; the complainants have failed to prove that they have acquired a secondary meaning and refer merely to the fact that the article is of their manufacture. Wotherspoon v. Currie, L. R. 5 H. L. 508; Thompson v. Montgomery, L. R. 41 Ch. Div. 35; Bauer v. Carthusian Monks, 120 Fed. Rep. 78.

Complainants cannot maintain this suit, because the marks which they seek to enjoin defendant from using cannot be used by themselves. Atlantic Milling Co. v. Robinson, 20 Fed. Rep. 218; Dixon Crucible Co. v. Guggenheim, 3 Am. L. T. 228; Hudson v. Osborne, 39 L. J. Ch. (N. S.) 79; Shipwright v. Clements, 19 W. R. 599; Hall v. Barrows, 4 DeG., J. & S. 150; Monson v. Boehm, L. R. 26 Ch. Div. 398, 405.

Those who do not in any sense succeed to the business cannot claim the trade-mark. There is no such thing as a trade-mark in gross. It must be appendant to some particular business. Weston v. Ketcham, 51 How. Pr. 455; Kidd v. Johnson, 100 U. S. 617.

The complainants have failed to prove that this defendant falsely represents that the liqueur sold by it is made in accordance with any recipe of complainants, or that it is guilty of any misrepresentation in stating that its liqueur is identical with that formerly made by the Monks. Hostetter v. Hungerford, 97 Fed. Rep. 585.

As the product formerly manufactured by the Monks owed its reputation to its quality, due to certain advantages inseparably connected with the place of manufacture, defendant's principal, who, by decree of a competent French court, has been directed and authorized to carry on such business at the identical place under similar conditions, and who, owing to the advantages so enjoyed by him, has succeeded in making the identical article, has the right to the good-will attached to such business and to use the trade-name and labels connected with it.

Trade-marks or trade-names may be assigned with the