scarcely be any agreement or contract among business men that
does not directly or indirectly affect and possibly restrain com-
merce. (United States v. Joint Traffic Association, 171 U. S. 505,
568.) United States v. American Tobacco Co., 106.
15. Combination held within prohibition of act of 1890.
The combination of the defendants in this case is an unreasonable
and undue restraint of trade in petroleum and its products mov-
ing in interstate commerce, and falls within the prohibitions of
the act as so construed. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 1.
16. Combination held within prohibition of Anti-trust Act.
In this case the combination in all its aspects both as to stock owner-
ship, and as to the corporations independently, including foreign
corporations to the extent that they became coöperators in the
combination, come within the prohibition of the first and second
sections of the Anti-trust Act. United States v. American Tobacco
Co., 106.
17. Combination held within prohibition of act of 1890.
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, ante, p. 1, followed and reaffirmed
as to the construction to be given to the Anti-trust Act of July 2,
1890, c. 647, 26 Stat. 209; and held that the combination in this
case is one in restraint of trade and an attempt to monopolize the
business of tobacco in interstate commerce within the prohibitions
of the act. Ib.
18. Combination held within prohibition of Anti-trust Act.
The record in this case discloses a combination on the part of the de-
fendants with the purpose of acquiring dominion and control of
. interstate commerce in tobacco by methods and manners clearly
within the prohibition of the Anti-trust Act; and the subject-
matters of the combination and the combination itself are not
excluded from the scope of the act as being matters of intrastate
commerce and subject to state control. Ib.
19. Combinations involving production of commodities within State;
effect of application of Anti-trust Act as to.
The application of the Anti-trust Act to combinations involving the
production of commodities within the States does not so extend
the power of Congress to subjects dehors its authority as to ren-
der the statute unconstitutional. United States v. E. C. Knight
Co., 156 U. S. 1, distinguished. Standard Oil Co. v. United States,
1.
20. Combination over product of commodity; effect on application of Anti-
trust Act of exclusion of crude article from combination.
The fact that a combination over the products of a commodity such
as petroleum does not include the crude article itself does not
take the combination outside of the Anti-trust Act when it appears
that the monopolization of the manufactured products necessarily
controls the crude article. Ib.
21. Corporation a "person" within meaning of Anti-trust Act.
The word "person" in § 2 of the Anti-trust Act, as construed by
reference to § 8 thereof, implies a corporation as well as an in-
dividual. Ib.
22. Boycotts and blacklisting as unlawful combinations within meaning
of Anti-trust Act of 1890.
The Anti-trust Act of 1890 applies to any unlawful combination re-
sulting in restraint of interstate commerce including boycotts, and
blacklisting whether made effective by acts, words or printed
matter. Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 418.
23. Combinations which are unobjectionable.
Society itself is an organization and does not object to organizations
for social, religious, business, and all other legal purposes. Ib.
24. Presumption of illegal combination; what sufficient to raise.
The unification of power and control over a commodity such as pe-
troleum, and its products, by combining in one corporation the
stocks of many other corporations aggregating a vast capital gives
rise, of itself, to the prima facie presumption of an intent and pur-
pose to dominate the industry connected with, and gain perpetual
control of the movement of, that commodity and its products in
the channels of interstate commerce in violation of the Anti-trust
Act of 1890, and that presumption is made conclusive by proof of
specific acts such as those in the record of this case. Standard
Oil Co. v. United States, 1.
25. Universality of prohibition of contracts modified to exclude reason-
able ones.
The original doctrine that all contracts in restraint of trade were
illegal was long since so modified in the interest of freedom of
individuals to contract that the contract was valid if the result-
ing restraint was only partial in its operation and was otherwise
reasonable. Ib.
26. Standard of reason in interpretation of Anti-trust Act of 1890.
The Anti-trust Act contemplated and required a standard of inter-
pretation, and it was intended that the standard of reason which
had been applied at the common law should be applied in deter-
mining whether particular acts were within its prohibitions. Ib.
27. Rule of reason in construction of Anti-trust Act; effect of prior deci-
sions on application of rule.
In prior cases where general language has been used, to the effect that
reason could not be resorted to in determining whether a particular
case was within the prohibitions of the Anti-trust Act, the unrea-
sonableness of the acts under consideration was pointed out and
those cases are only authoritative by the certitude that the rule
of reason was applied; United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight
Association, 166 U. S. 290, and United States v. Joint Traffic Asso-
ciation, 171 U. S. 505, limited and qualified so far as they conflict
with the construction now given to the Anti-trust Act of 1890. Ib.
28. Rule of reason in construction of Anti-trust Act; effect of prior deci-
sions on application of rule.
In Standard Oil Co. v. United States, ante, p. 1, the words "restraint of
trade" as used in § 1 of the Anti-trust Act were properly construed
by the resort to reason; the doctrine stated in that case was in
accord with all previous decisions of this court, despite the con-
trary view at times erroneously attributed to the expressions in
United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Association, 166 U. S.
290, and United States v. Joint Traffic Association, 171 U. S. 505.
United States v. American Tobacco Co., 106.
29. Determination of what constitutes; scope of consideration.
Allegations as to facts occurring prior to the passage of the Anti-trust
Act may be considered solely to throw light on acts done after
the passage of the act. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 1.
30. Scope of words used in § 2 of Anti-trust Act.
The words "to monopolize" and "monopolize" as used in § 2 of the
Anti-trust Act reach every act bringing about the prohibited
result. Ib.
31. Commerce contemplated by § 2 of Anti-trust Act.
The commerce referred to by the words "any part" in § 2 of the Anti-
trust Act, as construed in the light of the manifest purpose of that
act, includes geographically any part of the United States and
also any of the classes of things forming a part of interstate or
foreign commerce. Ib.
32. Remedy in case of unlawful combination.
The remedy to be administered in case of a combination violating the
Anti-trust Act is two-fold: first, to forbid the continuance of the
prohibited act, and second, to so dissolve the combination as to
neutralize the force of the unlawful power. Ib.
33. Remedy in case of unlawful combination; considerations in deter-
mining.
In determining the remedy against an unlawful combination, the court
must consider the result and not inflict serious injury on the public
by causing a cessation of interstate commerce in a necessary com-
modity. Ib.
34. Remedy in case of unlawful combination; considerations in deter-
mining.
In giving relief against an unlawful combination under the Anti-trust
Act the court should give complete and efficacious effect to the
prohibitions of the statute; accomplish this result with as little
injury as possible to the interest of the general public; and have
a proper regard for the vested property interests innocently ac-
quired. United States v. American Tobacco Co., 106.
35. Remedy in case of unlawful combination; rights of constituents.
The constituents of an unlawful combination under the Anti-trust
Act should not be deprived of power to make normal and lawful
contracts, but should be restrained from continuing or recreating
the unlawful combination by any means whatever; and a dissolu-
tion of the offending combination should not deprive the constit-
uents of the right to live under the law but should compel them
to obey it. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 1.
36. Remedy in case of unlawful combination; application to be given
Anti-trust Act of 1890.
In order to meet such a situation as is presented by the record in this
case and to afford the relief for the evils to be overcome, the Anti-
trust Act of 1890 must be given a more comprehensive application
than affixed to it in any previous decision. United States v. Amer-
ican Tobacco Co., 106.
37. Remedy; injunction pending dissolution.
Pending the achievement of the result decreed all parties to the com-
bination in this case should be restrained and enjoined from en-
larging the power of the continuation by any means or device
whatever.
38. Remedy in case of unlawful combination; scope of decree in this
In this case the combination in and of itself, and also all of its con-
stituent elements, are decreed to be illegal, and the court below is
directed to hear the parties and ascertain and determine a plan or
method of dissolution and of recreating a condition in harmony
with law, to be carried out within a reasonable period (in this
case not to exceed eight months), and, if necessary, to effectuate
this result either by injunction or receivership. Ib.
REVENUE LAWS.
See CUSTOMS LAW.
1. Rights presumed in waters flowing through more than one State.
Where streams flow through more than one State, it will be presumed,
in the absence of legislation on the subject, that each allows the
same rights to be acquired from outside the State as could be ac-
quired from within. Bean v. Morris, 485.
2. Appropriation of waters; where doctrine prevails.
The doctrine of appropriation has always prevailed in that region of
the United States which includes Wyoming and Montana; it was
recognized by the United States before, and by those States since,
they were admitted into the Union and the presumption is that
the system has continued. Ib.
3. Appropriation of waters sustained..
In this case an appropriation validly made under the laws of Wyoming
is sustained as against riparian owners in Montana. Ib.
See NAVIGABLE WATERS;
RIPARIAN RIGHTS;
STATES, 5;
SALINE LANDS.
See PUBLIC LANDS, 3, 4.
SAVINGS BANKS.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 13, 16;
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, 4.
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