Opinion of the Court Commissioner in the case now before the court. It is a well settled doctrine that much weight will be given to a long continued construction of an indefinite or ambiguous statute by the executive department charged with its administration. National Lead Co. v. United States, 252 U. S. 140, 145. One important reason for this rule is that where the practice is long continued Congress must be presumed to be aware of the administrative practice and by failing to take any legislative action has evidenced that this practice was in accordance with the intention of the legislators. Subsequent to the enactment of the 1921 revenue act, the acts of 1924, 1926, and 1928 were passed, each making a practically complete revision of the income tax laws. During this period and as we have above noted, up to August 1930, the Bureau made no change in its administrative practice, and Congress has not altered the law up to the present time. While these facts are not conclusive, they furnish another support to the contentions of the plaintiff. Lastly it must be said that the decisions of the courts have also supported plaintiff's contention. The same issue as the one here involved was considered by the court in the case of F. W. Woolworth Co. v. United States, 91 Fed. (2d) 973 (certiorari denied), and the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in determining what credit should be given the plaintiff for taxes paid by its Canadian subsidiary also applied the rule which we have approved in what is stated above. The exact question involved in the case now before us was not considered in the case of Peavey & Co. v. United States, 73 C. Cls. 600. The court did, however, in a computation inade in one of its findings follow the rule which we have laid down above and in its opinion applied it in construing section 238 (e) of the 1921 act. In the argument on behalf of defendant attention is called to the case of Burnet v. Chicago Portrait Co., 285 U. S. 1, and it is correctly said that this case held that the object of legislation allowing individuals or domestic corporations to deduct credit for taxes paid to foreign countries was to avoid double taxation. The opinion rendered in that case calls attention to the fact that in computing the 167536-40--11 Opinion of the Court taxable income of a citizen of the United States he is credited with the amount of any income taxes paid to a foreign country and that in the same way the revenue act of 1921 allowed "a credit to a domestic corporation, against its income tax here upon dividends received from its foreign subsidiary, of a proportionate part, as defined, of the income taxes paid by that subsidiary to any foreign country'." [Italics ours.] We think the case last cited supports the plaintiff's contention rather than being against it. As we construe the statute it prevents double taxation. It must be admitted that the plaintiff, owning all the stock of the Canadian corporation, in effect paid all the Canadian taxes and its situation was no different in this respect than it would have been if it had conducted the Canadian concern as a branch establishment. If the plaintiff does not get full credit for the taxes paid in Canada it is doubly taxed as much as an individual would be who paid taxes in a foreign country and failed to get credit therefor. Our conclusion is that a comparison of the present statute with the act of 1918; a consideration of the language of the statute, especially the definition of "accumulated profits" contained therein; the legislative history of the section under consideration and the decisions of the courts, all sustain the contention of the plaintiff as to the manner in which its credit for foreign taxes should be computed. It follows from what has been stated above that the plaintiff is entitled to recover and the petition asks for judgment for $11,131.52 with interest. The parties to the action may file a stipulation as to the amount for which plaintiff is entitled to judgment under this opinion with interest from specified dates, if they can so agree. If not, the court will have the calculation made and judgment entered accordingly. WHALEY, Judge; WILLIAMS, Judge; and BOOTH, Chief Justice, concur. LITTLETON, Judge, is of opinion that in determining the allowable credit to the domestic corporation, in view of the statutory definition of the term "accumulated profits," the ratio of the dividends received by the domestic corporation Reporter's Statement of the Case to the accumulated profits of the foreign subsidiary is to be applied to the proportion of the tax paid by the subsidiary to the foreign country "upon or in respect to the accumulated profits of such corporation" rather than to the total tax paid by the foreign corporation to the foreign country upon or with respect to the total net taxable income of such foreign corporation-that is, that the tax paid by the foreign corporation to be used as a basis for the credit is the proportion of foreign tax attributable to the foreign corporation's "accumulated profits" available for distribution as dividends to the domestic corporation. IDENTIFICATION DEVICES, INC., JAMES M. RULONG v. THE UNITED STATES Patents; validity. [No. 43639. Decided May 29, 1939] On the Proofs It is held that the evidence shows that the plaintiff's patent is invalid for lack of invention for the reason that every element of the single claim of the patent has been met by disclosures in prior patents. Same; infringement.-It is held that the evidence establishes that the Certificates of Identification and the Continuous Discharge Book used by defendant and alleged to constitute an infringement of the Rulong patent do not respond to claim 1 of the patent in suit. Same; limitation of claim.-The claim must be limited to the device or structure specified in the claim; the patent statute requires a patentee to specify and point out the parts which he claims to be new. White v. Dunbar, 119 U. S. 47, 52, cited. Same; competence of evidence.-Where the prior art patents offered and received in evidence show when they were filed and granted, and they were so offered and received in evidence under a stipulation that certification thereof was waived, it is held that the Letters Patent Certificate of the Commissioner of Patents and the seal of the Patent Office were not necessary to make them competent as evidence. The Reporter's statement of the case: Mr. James M. Rulong for the plaintiff. Mr. J. F. Mothershead, with whom was Mr. Assistant Attorney General Sam E. Whitaker, for the defendant. Reporter's Statement of the Case Plaintiff sues to recover $50,000 as compensation for the alleged unauthorized use by the defendant of Letters Patent No. 1,910,476 granted to James M. Rulong May 23, 1933. On that date, by an assignment duly recorded in the Patent Office, the patent was assigned to Identification Devices, Inc. Rulong owned substantially all the stock of the corporation. The court, having made the foregoing introductory statement, entered special findings of fact as follows: 1. On May 18, 1932, James M. Rulong filed application, serial no. 612081, in the United States Patent Office for an identification device. On May 23, 1933, a patent on this application was issued, #1,910,476, and thereafter an assignment was made by the inventor to the Identification Devices, Incorporated, dated April 1, 1935, recorded in Liber D-163, page 630, in the United States Patent Office. A copy of the patent, plaintiff's exhibit no. 1, and a copy of the assignment, plaintiff's exhibit no. 3, are by reference made a part of this finding. 2. At the time of the alleged infringing acts upon which this action is founded, plaintiff, the Identification Devices, Inc., was a corporation duly organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the State of Florida. A certified copy of such articles of incorporation dated March 6, 1935, plaintiff's exhibit no. 2, is by reference made a part of this finding. Identification Devices, Inc., the plaintiff, is the owner of the legal title in and to the Rulong letters patent #1,910,476, the patent in suit. The plaintiff and its predecessor have never granted any licenses or other rights to anyone under the Rulong patent #1,910,476, nor has anyone ever been authorized to make, use, or sell devices made in accordance with said patent. 3. Neither plaintiff nor its predecessor has ever sold devices of the character shown in the patent in suit; a few samples have been made. 4. The Rulong patent in suit has for its object a device which carries identification data. It consists generally of two elements, to wit: 1, a container or holder; and 2, identification data contained therein. Reporter's Statement of the Case Figures 1, 3, 4, and 5 of the patent in suit, #1,910,476, are reproduced herewith. Figures 1, 3, 4, and 5 of the Rulong Patent in Suit #1,910,476 The device is designed to be carried on the person of its owner and is small and compact for convenience and may be carried in a pocket of the apparel. The chart upon which the identifying data is printed consists of a series of disks or leaves connected at one edge, which fold one upon the |