upon which it was based, must be one existing at the time the assessment is imposed. The value as assessed by the ward assessors several years before was shown. Assessments 1, 3, and 4, were less than one half the value as assessed by the ward assessors. Assessment 2 exceeded one half the value as proved, and the Court below reduced it accordingly. Charles E. Miller, for applts. J. A. Beall, for respt. Held, No error; that there is nothing in the Act of 1840 restricting the comparison of value to the year in which the assessment was made; that the petitioner having conceded that the assessment was valid up to one half of the assessed value, it was proper for the Court to reduce assessment number 2, and this assessment should be deemed valid from the date of the order reducing it. The petitioner ought not to be required to pay interest until the assessment was fixed according to law. Order of General Term, affirming order denying motion to vacate assessments, modified, and as modified affirmed. Opinion by Church, Ch. J. All concur, except Andrews and Miller, JJ., not voting. MARRIED WOMEN. SER- N. Y. COURT OF APPEALS. Eisenlord, applt., v. Snyder et al., ex'rs, &c., respts. Decided October 2, 1877. An agreement to charge the separate estate of a married woman must be included in the original contract in order to bind it. a married woman to recover for services rendered to her it is necessary to establish not only a promise to pay for such services, but that such services were for the benefit of her separate estate, and that they were to be a charge thereon. Neither declarations by deceased that she intended to provide for plaintiff by will, nor a provision therefor in the will itself, will make the claim a charge upon the estate. Affirming S. C., 2 W. Dig., 466. This action was brought to recover for services as housekeeper rendered to W., defendants' testatrix, who was a married woman having a separate estate. The referee found that W. and her husband, on two occasions, while plaintiff was living with them, assured her that she should be re warded for her services, but that nothing was said either time as to when or how she was to be paid, and W. did not intimate or promise that she would herself pay or reward plaintiff therefor, or that she would do so out of her own property or means. That during her last illness W., in plaintiff's presence, expressed her intention to provide for plaintiff in her will as a compensation for her services, and that she did in fact bequeath to plaintiff $1,000 which she stated in her will to be in full of plaintiff's claim for past services. Her estate proved insufficient to pay her debts. The referee further found that the testatrix was never engaged in any business on her separate account ; that she never for herself or on her own account employed or requested plaintiff to perform any of the services in question and never agreed to pay for such services out of her separate estate, or that she would charge the same with the pay To maintain an action against the executors of ment thereof, except by will; and held that plaintiff was not entitled to recover. cure the defect in the organization, or any facts that would estop a party sued as trustee from denying it. This action was brought against defendant as trustee of an alleged corporation to recover a debt alleged to be due from such corporation to plaintiff, on the ground that the company had failed to make and file an annual report, as required by statute. The answer denied the formation or existence of the alleged corporation, or that defendant was ever a trustee of it. It appeared that proceedings to form such a corporation were com Daniel S. Morrel, for applt. S. W. Jackson, for respt. Held, No error; that it was necessary for the maintenance of this action to establish not only that W. agreed to pay plaintiff for her services, but that such services were for the benefit of her separate estate, and that they should be a charge thereon; that neither the conversation about the legacy to plaintiff nor the provision of the will itself would have this effect; that an agreement to charge the separate estate of a mar-menced, on false and fraudulent repried woman must be included in the original contract, out of which the indebtedness is claimed to arise. 22 N. Y., 456; 58 Id., 82; 55 Id., 247. Judgment of General Term, affirm-without authority, to act for the coring judgment for defendants, affirm-poration. Defendant with others ed. resentations, and that the project was abandoned on discovery of the fraud. That thereupon certain individuals took up the affair and attempted, had signed articles of association Opinion by Rapallo, J. All con- which were acknowledged January cur, except, Folger, J., absent. CORPORATIONS. N. Y. COURT OF APPEALS. DeWitt et al., applts., v. Hastings, respt. Decided May 22, 1877. When articles of association for the formation of a corporation, under the law of 1848, were signed, and a copy thereof filed in the office of the Secretary of State, but the original was not filed in the County Clerk's office, and certificates of stock were issued and delivered, but before any capital was paid in or officers elected the project was abandoned on discovery of fraud in the representations on which the whole proceeding was based, and the certificates of stock returned, no business having been done at that time, and thereupon other parties attempted, without authority, to act for the corporation, Held, 'That there was no such user of the corporate franchise as would Vol. 5-No. 10* 4, 1865. They were never filed in the County Clerk's Office. A copy of them was filed February 25, 1865, in the office of the Secretary of State. Defendant was named as one of the trustees for the first year in these articles. Defendant testified that the agreement to form the corporation was based upon a proposition that it should purchase a certain patent, and the certificate was signed with that view. Certificates of stock were issued, which were delivered to defendant; no capital was paid in, no While affairs were in this condition by-laws adopted, or officers elected. it was discovered that the patent had been sold to others, and the whole enterprise was abandoned. Defendant immediately surrendered his certificates of stock, and gave notice, in writing, to the person who presided at the preliminary meeting, and who claimed to be president of the corporation, that he resigned all connection with the enterprise and would have nothing more to do with it. He further testified that by consent of a majority of those interested the whole concern was abandoned immediately after the issue of the certificate. No business had been transacted by the alleged corporation at this time. lated for in the agreement extending the time. On The action was brought for goods sold on commission by defendant, and for which he had not accounted. January 2d the plaintiffs obtained an order of arrest. On January 5th the plaintiffs entered into an agreement with one A., by which A. deeded to them certain real estate as collateral security for the defendant's debt, the defendant agreeing to pay a certain sum monthly to the plaintiffs, for thirty-eight months, until the whole amount was paid; and thereupon the plaintiffs agreed to deed back the property to A. The defendant failed to make the first monthly payment or any payment, and on March 26th the plaintiffs had the defendant arrested under the order of January 2d. A motion to vacate the order of arrest was denied, and from that order this John E. Parsons, for applts. Samuel Hand, for respt. Held, That defendant could not be held liable as a trustee of the alleged corporation; that there was no such user of the corporate franchises as would cure the defect in the organization of the company, or any facts which would estop defendant from denying it. Judgment of General Term, re-appeal is taken. versing judgment for plaintiffs, and granting new trial, affirmed, and judgment absolute against plaintiffs on their stipulation. Opinion by Rapallo, J. cur. ARREST. All con Ross & Jones, for applt. Held, That the conveyance from A. was a good consideration for the plaintiffs' agreement. There was an extension of time for one month, in any event; and for one month, therefore, at the least, the plaintiffs had no cause of action on which they could sue. An order of arrest granted before this extension ought not to be in force after the plaintiffs' right of action had thus been suspended. Nor should it be again in force after the suspension of the right of action had expired. The suspension was more than a stay of proceedings in an action. Order reversed, with $10 costs and printing disbursements, and motion to vacate granted, with $10 costs. HIGHWAYS. BRIDGES. Carpenter, applt., v. City of Co Reed, respt., v. Champagne, applt. hoes, respt. A receiver, in supplementary proceedings, ob- A receiver, in supplementary proceedings, of the defendant's property had been appointed. The receiver obtained an order ex parte, requiring the defendant to deliver and assign to him certain property. This order was served, the defendant refused to comply with it. An order was granted at Special Term adjudging him in contempt and fining him. The appeal is from that order. George W. Watkins, and Hale, Smith & Hale, for applt. Waldo, Tobey & Grover, for respt. Held, That the order adjudging the defendant in contempt must stand on the validity of the order directing the assignment. We do not think that order valid. The proceedings had been carried on to the appointment of a receiver. We cannot see any principle upon which an ex parte order requiring the transfer of specific property could be made. There was no jurisdiction of the person of the defendant, and he could not be held bound to obey the order. Where a public highway in a city crossed the Erie Canal, and the plaintiff's horse was injured from the dangerous condition of the approach to the bridge over said canal: Held, That the city was not liable, it appearing that the title to the land where the accident occurred was in the State. A bridge includes its approaches. The plaintiff's horse and wagon were injured on an icy approach to a canal bridge in the city of Cohoes. The bridge was on a public highway of the city, there was no railing or embankment to the approach, and the horse, falling, carried the wagon with him over the edge. This action is brought for negligence on the part of the city in suffering the approach to be in such condition. The referee found that the title to the land where the accident occurred was in the State, and dismissed the complaint. N. P. Hinman and C. F. Doyle, for applt. Samuel Hand and P. D. Niver, for respt. Held, That the place where the accident occurred being within the State lands, the plaintiff could not recover. There was no negligence on the part of the city in not repairing a structure belonging to the State. The approach to a bridge is a part of the bridge, 9 Hun, 63; and this rule is more evidently correct where the approach is on land owned by the owner of the bridge. Judgment affirmed with costs. Opinion by Learned, P. J.; Bockes, J., concurs. DAMAGES. N. Y. SUPREME COURT. TERM. THIRD DEPT. GENERAL bone was broken nor blow inflicted. No inability to work was occasioned, unless during the two weeks he suffered from the felon. We think the jury were prejudiced. A new trial must be granted on payment of costs by defendant. If, however, plaintiff prefer to stipulate to reduce the damages to $1,500 (Murray v. H. R. RR. Co., 47 Barb., 196, affirmed, 48 N. Y., 655), Cox, ex'r., &c., respt., v. New York then the motion for a new trial is deCentral RR. Co., applt. Decided September, 1877. The plaintiff was forcibly ejected from defendant's cars. The evidence showed that his hand and side were slightly hurt, and a felon came upon his finger, which was claimed to be a result of the force used to eject him. A verdict for $3,000, under this state of facts, held excessive. nicd, and the order denying a new trial affirmed, without costs to either party. Opinion by Learned, P.J.; Bockes, J., concurs. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. DRAINS. ejected from N. Y. SUPREME COURT. GENERAL TERM. THIRD DEPT. McCaffrey, respt., v. City of Albany, applt. The former plaintiff brought this Isaac S. Newton, for applt. Decided September, 1877. A municipal corporation is not bound to keep in repair a drain, which it has, in part, constructed and repaired, where the same passes over the land of private persons, without whose consent such repairs could not be made. It Action to recover damages for the improper condition of a drain in said city, whereby plaintiff's lot was injured. The drain ran through this lot, crossing it, was on plaintiff's land, and no portion of the drain touched the street, except at one place where the drain crossed the street. passed through the property of many owners. The city had, on petition of owners, built a portion of the drain and repaired it. The rest of the drain had been built by owners themselves, who made direct connections No with it, and also themselves repaired |