and would receive more if further time was lost. To combat the signed release, he says that he signed it without reading it himself, and that Ireland misread it to him. This is a serious charge, and should be substantiated by "trustworthy evidence consistent with undisputed circumstances."

But a careful study of the testimony, taken in connection with the circumstances, refutes all these charges. Mr. Ireland denies them, and says that he handed the release to the plaintiff, who took it and apparently

claim, during which the plaintiff testifies that he said he wanted his wages until he could work again, and Mr. Ireland says he wanted $40 or $50, Ireland consulted the general manager's office in Portland by telephone, and then made a counter offer of $35 in full settlement, which the plaintiff finally accepted, although, as Ireland testified, the plaintiff said it was not enough as he thought he would be laid up another week. Thereupon Ireland made out a check for $35 which he gave to the plaintiff, and wrote out a receipt and release discharging the Maine Central | read it; and Ireland's whole testimony bears Railroad Company and the Sandy River & Rangeley Lakes Railroad Company from all claims and demands of every kind growing out of the accident, and the plaintiff signed it, the names of both railroad companies being inserted, because there was some doubt as to which one was legally liable, a fact that was explained to the plaintiff at the time.

the impress of truth. Moreover, it is well nigh incredible that a man who had himself sought the settlement, and who was so care ful in his business transactions as to keep a carbon copy of all the letters he wrote to the company, as this man did, should sign a receipt without knowing its contents. That he did know them is proved by the fact that on November 16th he wrote to the general manager of the Maine Central Railroad Company, stating that his arm was not improving fast, that he had as yet no use of it, that it would probably be six weeks before he could work, expressed his thanks for what the company had already done, and asked further help-"enough more to bridge me over till I go to work." Then he adds these significant words: "Now if you can and are willing I will pay back what you loan me this time by working for the company when I get able." This statement, true when written, is utterly inconsistent with the plaintiff's contention at the trial.

When the settlement was made, the plaintiff undoubtedly thought he would soon recover. The event proved otherwise, either because the injury was more serious than he supposed or because he has allowed his arm to remain too long unused.

[1-3] The burden resting upon the plaintiff to escape the legal effect of a release such as this is a heavy one. Written documents duly signed are not to be lightly disregarded and set aside. Unless fraud exists, or such misrepresentations or suppression of truth as amount to fraud, or unless the parties are so situated that an unconscionable advantage is taken through lack of mental appreciation of the nature of the transaction or otherwise, such settlements stand; and they should stand. The law favors settlements, and, in the absence of the elements above stated, will enforce them. The fact that subsequent recovery is not so rapid as the injured party may have expected affords no reason for annulling them. If they are entered into freely, fairly, and with a full knowledge of their purport, the future must take care of itself. | [4] In the case at bar not one of the destructive elements is present. The plaintiff, and not the defendant, took the initial step. He wrote to the company, not the company to him. At the time of the conference the two parties met on an equality. The plaintiff, as the evidence discloses, was a man 33 years old, in excellent health except for his arm, intelligent, and capable From the verdict for the plaintiff we must of securing his rights. No unfair advantage assume that the jury found the plaintiff's was sought to be taken of him, and none was testimony true; but a careful study of the taken. No misrepresentations were made. evidence convinces us that the improbability The only statement which the plaintiff asserts and unreasonableness of the plaintiff's story Ireland made approaching such fraud was were overshadowed by sympathy for one to the effect that he claimed to have letters whose injury, as the result proved, did not from Dr. Linscott and Dr. Pratt stating that seem to be fully compensated by the amount the plaintiff's disability would be of only received. "Settlements are favored by the about three weeks' duration. Mr. Ireland law, but if they are to be set aside upon the emphatically denies this, and all the circum-uncorroborated .testimony of the claimant, stances corroborate his testimony.

The plaintiff further attempts to show that he was unaware of the fact that he was making a final settlement, and supposed that he was receiving $35 on account of lost time,

But the settlement itself was honestly effected on both sides, and must stand. This conclusion is in harmony with recent decisions of this court. Valley v. B. & M. R. R., 103 Me. 106, 68 Atl. 635; Barrett v. L. B. & B. St. Ry. Co., 104 Me. 479, 72 Atl. 308; Same v. Same, 109 Me. 85 Atl. 306.

though made in writing and signed by him,
there will be little use in making settle-
ments." Valley v. B. & M. R. R., supra.
Motion sustained.
Verdict set aside.

We think it was inadmissible, and that its Me. 156.

Applying the broadest test above given, we have no hesitation in saying that the testimony of the plaintiff's intestate given at the coroner's inquest was not admissible in the present action, brought against the defendant for alleged negligence.

R. S. c. 140, provides for the holding of coroner's inquests "on dead bodies of such persons only as appear or are supposed to have come to their death by violence, and not when it is believed their death was caused by casualty" (section 1), and then follow the steps to be taken. These proceedings are designed primarily to aid in the detection of crime. The inquest is ordinarily held immediately after the event has happened, and oftentimes before the perpetrator is known or even suspected. They are initiated by a public officer, there is no party defendant, and the country attorney, as the public prosecutor, usually elicits the evidence.

that the rule of admissibility requires. The inquest was not a former trial of the present action, nor a former action involving substantially the same issues. It was not between the same parties, nor between parties or privies sufficiently identified with the defendant; the defendant did not confront the witness, and she neither cross-examined nor had any opportunity to cross-examine him upon the points at issue here.

These are insuperable barriers to the admission of the testimony.

Many authorities are in harmony with the conclusion here reached.

Prof. Wigmore, after a discussion of the subject, says that in the United States "the proper conclusion has been reached that the lack of cross-examination, as an element in coroner's procedure, makes such testimony inadmissible." 2 Wigmore, Ev. § 1374. To the same effect are State v. Houser, 26 Mo. 436; Jackson v. Crilly, 16 Colo. 103, 26 Pac. 331; Petrie v. Ry. Co., 29 S. C. 303, 7 S. E. 515; Pittsburg, C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. McGrath, Adm'r, 115 Ill. 172, 3 N. E. 439. The entry must accordingly be: Plaintiff nonsuit.

The action under consideration is based upon a casualty, but a casualty alleged to have been brought about by the negligence of the defendant. It might well be doubted whether, under the strict terms of the statute, a coroner's inquest should have been held at all. But, waiving that point, it was, at best, an investigation concerning which this defendant had no notice, and with which she had no legal connection. The record contains an admission to the effect that "the defendant was not present by herself or counsel, when the testimony was given at the inquest and was not notified to be pres-1. ent." As to her, it was purely ex parte, and the testimony then given could no more be used against her in this action than could a deposition, of the taking of which she had received neither notice nor knowledge.

The counsel for plaintiff relies somewhat upon the fact that Mr. Hayes appeared as an attorney at the inquest and cross-examined the witness. But the admission proves that he was not acting as attorney for the defendant, and from the nature of the interrogatories it might perhaps be inferred that he was acting as attorney for the town, which at that time may have anticipated that a suit would be brought against it.

The learned counsel further contends that, because section 13 of chapter 140 provides that the evidence of all the witnesses taken at a coroner's inquest "shall be filed with the clerk of courts and there remain open for inspection," such evidence is rendered admissible in subsequent court proceedings. Far from it. This section is in harmony with the general purpose of the chapter. It perpetuates the testimony, and renders it accessible as an aid in further investigation. Had the Legislature intended to make such testimony admissible in all future cases of every sort that might grow out of the accident, it could and would have said so.

No one of the elements is present here

(11 Me. 332)

MANNING v. SHERMAN.

(Supreme Judicial Court of Maine. March 31,
1913.)

LANDLORd and Tenant (§ 167*)—InjuRIES
-NEGLIGENCE OF LANDLORD.

When defendant reconstructed an office building, he left the cellarway incomplete and without stairs, and had the door locked securely with a padlock the keys of which he placed in the cash register in his own store in an adjoining building, where they remained until about a week before the accident, when a tenant in defendant's block obtained the key from a clerk in defendant's store for the purpose of doing some plumbing in the cellar, and one of the plumbers went into the cellar and neglected to lock the door after him, and plaintiff, who was in the building on business with a tenant, mistook the door and walked into the cellarway entrance and fell therein. Held, that defendant was not negligent so as to make him liable for plaintiff's injuries.

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Landlord and Tenant, Cent. Dig. 88 668-674, 676-679; Dec. Dig. § 167.*]

2. LANDLORD AND TENANT (§ 167*) — LANDLORD'S DUTY.

A landlord need only use ordinary care to keep the premises safe for the access of all persons having occasion to come upon them by his invitation, and to provide a suitable entrance ous approaches thereto. to stores, offices, etc., guarding against danger

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Landlord and Tenant, Cent. Dig. §§ 666-674, 676-679; Dec. Dig. § 167.*]

3. LANDLORD AND TENANT (§ 167*) — LANDLORD'S LIABILITY.

results solely from the negligent acts of a third When an injury to one coming on premises

person, who does not stand in such relation to the landlord as to make applicable the doctrine

For other cases see same topic and section NUMBER in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key-No. Series & Rep'r Indexes

of respondeat superior, the landlord is not lia- | Rodick building, he left the cellarway incomplete and nonusable until such time as he might put in a cement floor and a heating plant. He therefore had a door constructed

The facts connected with the unlocked the transaction ceased. Of the subsequent cellar door are these: steps he had no knowledge whatever. Nor [1] When the defendant reconstructed the had he any reason to anticipate them. The

been procured by King and used, but without the consent or knowledge of the defendant or his agent, and that the neglect of King in unlocking the door and in leaving it unlocked had been the cause of the injury. But the act of King in obtaining a key without the knowledge of the defendant, and his subsequent carelessness, cannot be attributed to the defendant."

work to be done was not for him, and he dent. There was evidence that a key had had no knowledge that Brewer contemplated doing it. He did not know that the key had been taken away and given to Brewer or to the plumbers until after the accident. He continued to believe, and had reason to believe, that the door remained as he had left | it, securely fastened. He had given to Miss Paine no authority or permission to deliver the key to Brewer, or to any one else, and no such authority could be implied from the nature of her employment. She was simply a sales clerk in the defendant's store. She did not even have charge of the books. She had no more to do with the key to the Rodick Block than to the key to her employer's house or garage. In delivering the key to Brewer, without authority from the defendant, she was entirely outside the scope of her employment or agency. Her act was not the defendant's act; and the law does not hold one responsible for the unauthorized acts of third persons, who stand in no relation of agency to him.

[3] This principle is well stated in these words: "When the injury is the result solely of the negligent act of a third person, who does not stand in such a relation to the defendant as to render the doctrine of respondeat superior applicable, no liability attaches to defendant. The fact that the negligent act which caused the injury was done on a person's land or property will not render him liable, where he had no control over the persons committing such act, and the act was not committed on his account, nor where the third person, whose negligence caused the injury, assumes control of the owner's property without authority. An owner or occupant of premises, not in a defective or dangerous condition, is not liable for injuries caused by acts of third persons, which were unauthorized, or which he had no reason to anticipate and of which he had no knowledge." Cyc. vol. 29, pp. 477, 478.

See, also, Clapp v. La Grill, 103 Tenn. 164, 52 S. W. 134; Mahoney v. Libbey, 123 Mass.

20, 25 Am. Rep. 6.

In Handyside v. Powers, 145 Mass. 123, 13 N. E. 462, the plaintiff was injured by falling down an elevator well. The door to the well had been provided with a lock, had been locked, and the key deposited in the defendant's office. There was evidence that a key had been obtained by the plaintiff's employer and used, but without the knowledge or consent of the defendant or his agent. In sustaining a verdict which had been ordered for the defendant by the presiding justice, the court say:

"The door to the elevator had been provided with a lock, had been locked, and the key deposited in the defendant's office. This was the only key known by the defendant or his agent to exist, and it was found in its place in the defendant's office after the acci

This case is directly in point, because in in principle the defendant was no more liable for the use of the key procured from Miss Paine than for the use of one procured from any other third party.

The chain of causal connection was broken, the act of one or more third parties intervened (Maddox v. Brown, 71 Me. 432, 36 Am. Rep. 336), and without considering the question of contributory negligence, which was argued by counsel, it is sufficient for the purposes of this case to hold, as we must, that no liability attached to the defendant. Judgment for defendant.

(110 Me. 341)

GLEDHILL v. McCOOMBS. (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine. March 31, 1913.)

1. GIFTS (§ 28*) — INTER VIVOS - INSURANCE POLICIES.

An insurance policy running to one's estate may be the subject of a gift without any assignment; delivery with intent to pass title irrevocably being sufficient.

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Gifts, Cent. Dig. §§ 49, 51, 58-62; Dec. Dig. § 28.*] 2. GIFTS (§ 49*) — GIFTS INTER VIVOS - EVI

DENCE.

Where an insurance policy is claimed as a gift, the proof must be clear and convincing because the opportunity for fraud is so great. Dig. $$ 95-100; Dec. Dig. § 49.*]

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Gifts, Cent.

3. WITNESSES (§ 145*) - COMPETENCY - FORM OF ACTION.

In an action by a mother against her deceased son's wife to recover the proceeds of a life policy payable to his executors and administrators, which had been collected by the wife as administratrix, testimony by the mother as to the gift is not inadmissible on the ground that the action must be deemed against the debeing against the defendant as an individual; fendant in her representative capacity, the suit and consequently Rev. St. c. 84, § 112, making a party incompetent where the other party to the transaction is dead, has no application.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Witnesses, Dec. Dig. § 145.*]

4. GIFTS (§ 49*) - INTER VIVOS - EVIDENCESUFFICIENCY.

In an action by a mother against her deceased son's wife for the proceeds of a life policy, payable to his executors or administrators, evidence held sufficient to establish an executed gift.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Gifts, Cent. Dig. §§ 95-100; Dec. Dig. § 49.*]

5. EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS (§ 430*) -GIFTS INTER VIVOS-INSURANCE POLICIES -INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY.

Where a son gave his mother an insurance policy which ran to his executors or adminis

*For other cases see same topic and section NUMBER in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key-No. Series & Rep'r Indexes