Appeal from Court of Common Pleas, Al- car left the track, without, however, doing selegheny County.

Trespass for personal injuries by Charles Samarra and Rose Samarra, his wife, against the Allegheny Valley Street Railway Company. From a judgment for plaintiffs, defendant appeals. Affirmed.

The jury returned a verdict for plaintiff Rose Samarra for $2,500, and for Charles Samarra for $1,500. The court subsequently refused a motion for judgment n. o. v., and entered judgment on the verdict. Defendant appealed.

From the record it appeared that the court charged the jury, inter alia, as follows: "The husband is entitled to the services of his wife. If he loses those services or any part of them, through the negligence of another, then to the extent of his loss in money he is entitled to be compensated in money. And if you find that she is still suffering from an injury received in this accident, and will continue to suffer in the future, then, to the extent that he is damaged through the loss of her services, he is entitled to recover for loss in the future."

"As to damages which you may find he will suffer in the future, the reverse of that is true. He is entitled to be compensated today, you are compensating him to-day, for loss which he will sustain in the future. He is not entitled to recover the full amount of that loss which he may sustain some time in the future; but he is entitled to recover a sum which to-day will compensate him for that loss, taking into consideration the fact that he will have the use of that money from the day that he gets it on. It is an amount that we call the present worth of damages

suffered in the future."

"And if you find that she is still suffering pain, she is entitled to be compensated for the pain and suffering which she will endure in the future. As I have told you in other cases, and I call your attention to it again, we have no rule by which you may calculate that amount. I can give you very little instruction as to how you may arrive at that amount. The law leaves it to your sound judgment as to what she ought to receive in money, because the law only knows to compensate in money. What ought she to receive in money for the pain and suffering which she has endured, or will endure in the future?"

rious or special injury to any of the passen-
gers, except Mrs. Samarra. According to her
testimony, supported by that of her daughter,
who was also a passenger, she was thrown
violently to the floor of the car by the sudden
jar, and was for the time rendered uncon-
scious. She testified that her person, within
a very short time thereafter, showed exten-
sive marks of external violence, and that, in
consequence of the injuries she received,
physical disability to a large degree has re-

sulted. The character of her ailment it is
agreed is neuritis. There was nothing in the
evidence submitted on behalf of the defend-
ant to impeach her testimony as to the par-
ticulars of the actual occurrence. Her right
to recover was denied solely on the ground
that she had sustained no physical injury
whatever from the accident to which her
subsequent painful and disabled condition
could be referred; that, at most, the evidence
discloses nothing more than a case of nerv-
ous shock or fright from the unusual occur-
rence, unaccompanied with physical injury.
The testimony of the medical experts called
by the defendant very largely supported this
theory of the case; but, on the other hand,
the testimony of the plaintiff herself as to
the immediate occurrence and conditions
which immediately followed with respect to
her sufferings, which have continued remedi-
less to this time, supported as it was by the
testimony of her attending physician, who
gave it as his judgment that her disability
resulted from the injuries she received in the
On
accident, established a prima facie case.
this state of the evidence it would have been

clear error to have withheld the case from
the jury.

[2] It is next complained that the trial judge erred in his answer to the following points submitted on behalf of the defendant: "There can be no recovery for conditions produced by nervous shock or fright." The answer was: "There can be no recovery for nervous shock unaccompanied by physical injury. But, if the nervous shock follows as a result of physical injury, then the nervous shock is a part of the physical injury, and the plaintiff is entitled to recovery for that." Having regard to the admitted facts of the case, the There is instruction was entirely correct. nothing in the case of Chittick v. Philadelphia Rapid Transit Company, 224 Pa. 13, 73 Atl. 4, 22 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1073, relied upon, that points to other conclusions. cases have no resemblance on their facts. In that case there was no pretense of external violence; the plaintiff there was not a passenger, but was sitting in her own home, 300 feet away from the tracks of the company, when an electric explosion occurred upon the STEWART, J. [1] Rose Samarra, one of company's right of way which affrighted her. the plaintiffs, wife of Charles Samarra, the The case disclosed no external violence to the other, was a passenger in one of the defend-person, and no injury was asserted, except

Argued before FELL, C. J., and BROWN, MESTREZAT, POTTER, and STEWART,

JJ.

Wm. A. Stone, of Pittsburgh, for appellant. Rody P. Marshall and Thomas M. Marshall, both of Pittsburgh, for appellees.

The two

The assignments of error are overruled, of premiums; that he wanted his sister to and the judgment is affirmed.

[1] The question here presented for determination is whether the proceeds of the policy on Hale's life belonged to his estate or to that of his sister, Mrs. Phillips. Counsel for appellant contend that the assignment, which was absolute on its face, was in realIn the matter of the estate of Elizabeth |ity intended only as collateral security for H. Phillips, deceased. From a decree dis- the premiums to be paid by Mrs. Phillips missing exceptions to adjudication, the Fidelity Title & Trust Company, administrator of the estate of William Hale, deceased, appeals. Affirmed.

"For other cases see same topic and section NUMBER in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key-No. Series & Rep'r Indexes 86 A.-19

assignment, that "he was not able to keep up this insurance; that he had taken this policy out for Bess; and that he wanted, in case of his death, for Bess to get the money, and she was willing, or her husband was willing, to continue this insurance, and therefore he wanted to secure her." Evidently by this he meant to say that he wanted to secure to his sister the payment of the proceeds of the policy. We see in it nothing to indicate an intention that the assignment should be merely collateral security for the money advanced in the payment| of the premiums. The policy at that time was so new that it had little, if any, surrender value, and there would be very little advantage to Mrs. Phillips in merely securing to her repayment of her outlay. We think the evidence fully sustains the interpretation placed upon it by the auditing judge, and that the fair import of the statements made by Mr. Hale was that he intended the assignment to be that which it purported to be an absolute transfer of the policy.

Etna Life Insurance Company v. France, 94 U. S. 561, 24 L. Ed. 287: "As held by us in the case of Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Schaefer, supra, any person has a right to procure an insurance on his own life, and to assign it to another, provided it be not done by way of cover for a wager policy; and where the relationship between the parties, as in this case (brother and sister), is such as to constitute a good and valid consideration in law for any gift or grant, the transaction is entirely free from such imputation."

[3] The main question as to whether or not brothers and sisters have an insurable interest in each other's lives, upon the ground of relationship alone, does not seem to have been decided by the appellate courts of our state. In Mullen v. Insurance Co., 182 Pa. 150, 37 Atl. 988, the question was raised, but the decision was placed upon another ground. Outside of Pennsylvania, the authorities are not in harmony. In the case of Lord v. Dall, 12 Mass. 115, 7 Am. Dec. 38, it was held that a sister, who was supported [2] But counsel for appellant contend and educated by her brother, had an insurthat, even if the assignment was absolute, able interest in his life. Decisions favoring it cannot be sustained for the reason that the principle that the interest may arise Elizabeth H. Phillips, as a sister, had no in- from relationship merely are found in Hossurable interest in the life of her brother. mer v. Welch, 107 Mich. 470, 65 N. W. 280, Even if this were true, it would not in it- 67 N. W. 504; Williams v. Fletcher, 26 Tex. self have been sufficient to exclude her own- Civ. App. 85, 62 S. W. 1082; Trenton Mut. ership of the fund, for she may have been Life & Fire Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 24 N. J. Law, a creditor of her brother. The claimant 576; Lane v. Lane, 99 Tenn. 639, 42 S. W. offered no evidence whatever to show that 1058; Equitable Life Ins. Co. v. Hazelwood, she was not, although, under the circum-75 Tex. 338, 12 S. W. 621, 7 L. R. A. 217, 16 stances, the burden in this respect was upon Am. St. Rep. 893. That relationship is suffithe plaintiff. Lenig v. Eisenhart, 127 Pa. cient to support an insurable interest was 59, 17 Atl. 684; Vanormer v. Hornberger, 142 denied in cases of which Lewis v. Ins. Co., Pa. 575, 21 Atl. 887. This suit is not against 39 Conn. 100, Masonic Benev. Ass'n v. Bunch, the insurance company, as it made payment 109 Mo. 560,. 19 S. W. 25, are illustrations. of the amount of the policy to the estate of Undoubtedly the leading case upon the subMrs. Phillips, thus, in so far as it was con- ject is that of Etna Life Insurance Co. v. cerned, recognizing her right to the policy. France, 94 U. S. 561, 24 L. Ed. 287, above It was taken out by the insured, and by cited. It is, indeed, authority of the highest him made payable to his sister, if she should type, sustaining the proposition that a sister survive him. Afterwards the policy was as- has an insurable interest in the life of her signed to her absolutely. The claim of the brother, upon the ground of relationship sister to the policy, under these circumstanc- alone. It is there said, referring to the ines, would be good, under the rule that a pol-sured: "He had a right to take out a policy icy issued to the insured for the benefit of on his own life for his sister's benefit; and another is valid, irrespective of interest. In she had a right to advance him the necesCorson's Appeal, 113 Pa. 438, page 447, 6 sary means to do so. As between strangers Atl. 213, page 217 (57 Am. Rep. 479), Mr. or persons not thus nearly connected, such a Justice Clark said: "The law seems to be transaction would be evidence to go to the well settled that it is wholly unnecessary to jury, from which, according to the circumprove an insurable interest in the life of the stances of the case, they might or might not assured at the maturity of the policy, if it infer that it was mere gambling. But as bewas valid at its inception." And in Conn. tween brother and sister, or other near re Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Schaefer, 94 U. S. 457,lations, desirous of thus providing for each 461 (24 L. Ed. 251), Mr. Justice Bradley said: "We do not hesitate to say, however, that a policy taken out in good faith, and valid at its inception, is not avoided by the cessation of the insurable interest, unless such be the necessary effect of the provisions of

other, and, as said by Chief Justice Shaw, presumed to be actuated by 'considerations of strong morals, and the force of natural affection between near kindred operating often more efficaciously than those of positive law' (Loomis v. Eagle Life & Health Ins. Co., 72

of that gambling aspect which is presented where there is nothing but a speculative interest in the death of another, without any interest in his life to counterbalance it. On this ground we hold that where, as in this case, a brother takes out a policy on his own life for the benefit of his sister, it is totally Immaterial what arrangement they choose to make between them about the payment of the premiums. The policy is not a wager policy. It is divested of those dangerous tendencies which render such policies contrary to good morals."

Under the rule thus indicated, the affection naturally to be regarded as prevailing between brothers and sisters, and the wellgrounded expectation that, in case of need, they will render each other pecuniary aid, is considered sufficient to support an insurable interest. In the present case the auditing judge was guided by this principle, and applied it to the facts before him. We agree with the conclusion which he reached in stating that: "There is nothing in this record showing bad faith or any attempt to evade the law against wagering contracts. Hale was fond of his sister; he was childless; the ties of blood and affection impel to the belief that his continued life was for her benefit; as such, her insurable interest cannot be doubted." The evidence shows that the policy was taken out by the insured in good faith, under the influence of a strong desire to make provision in this way for his sister. Upon both reason and authority, we conclude that the relationship between him and his sister constituted in her at that time what should fairly and properly be regarded as an insurable interest in his life. We can see in the facts of this case nothing which violates in any way the purpose of the rule which condemns wager policies.

The assignments of error are overruled, and the decree of the court below is affirmed.

(238 Pa. 440)

In the matter of the estate of Elizabeth M. Bradley, deceased. From a decree dismissing exceptions to an adjudication, Rebecca M. Morrow appeals. Affirmed.

Hawkins, P. J., filed the following opinion in the court below:

"The question raised in this case is what part of the estate the codicil carries. After certain special legacies, Mrs. Bradley made a general residuary disposition of her estate; but there was no specification of any property. She afterwards made this codicil: 'I make this codicil to my last will on this 11th day of June, nineteen hundred nine. I, Lizzie Bradley, dispose of my personal property not mentioned in my will as follows: I give my furniture, bed and bedding, my sewing machine and pictures and dishes cooking, clothes, jewelry and silverware, all the money I have in bank and stocks that I have on interest to my sister Rebecca Morrow; I also give my watch and chain to Lydia Shaw Best.' Mrs. Bradley owned at the time of making her will and her death stock in the Wilkinsburg Real Estate & Trust Company, which were paying dividends and also in the United Wireless Telegraph Company, on which the evidence does not show whether or not any dividends were being paid when the will was made. There was also a mortgage bearing interest which it was claimed was embraced in the phrase 'stocks that I have on interest.'

"It must be assumed that when testatrix used the expression, 'property not mentioned in my will,' she meant property not specifically mentioned, for there is no specification of any property in the original will, and the residuary disposition is general. The personal property is there presumptively treated as cash, although, in fact, it consisted in part at least of securities. It has been suggested that by the codicil Mrs. Bradley undertook to dispose of all her personal property; but this is a mistake. She disposes of 'my personal property as follows,' and then immediately gives a specification of items which are to form the subject of this codicillary gift. The simple question then is whether or not there was property on hand answering the description of 'stocks I have on interest.' It is insisted that this form of expression In a will reading, "I give * was intended to embrace any sort of investthat I have on interest to my sister,' the ment bearing interest, and therefore the phrase, "stocks that I have on interest," re- mortgage which Mrs. Bradley had on hand. ferred only to dividend paid shares of corporate stock, and did not include a mortgage or non- But the primary meaning of the word 'stocks' dividend paying shares; the word "stocks" is shares in a corporation or commercial meaning shares in a corporation or commercial company, and the phrase, "stocks interest," meaning productive stocks. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Wills, Cent. Dig. 1243; Dec. Dig. § 570.*

In re BRADLEY'S ESTATE.
Appeal of MORROW.

(Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Jan. 6,
1913.)

WILLS (570*)-CONSTRUCTION-"STOCKS”— "STOCKS ON INTEREST.

*

stocks

*

on

For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, vol. 7, pp. 6662-6664; vol. 8, p. 7804.] Appeal from Orphans' Court, Allegheny County.

company. Webster's Dict. Bouvier. On the face of the will there is nothing to show its intended use in a different sense. The gift is of 'stocks,' with their incidental product; and it is immaterial what this product may be called, whether by its ordinary name of dividends, or an equivalent, such as income, or interest. Reed v. Head, 88 Mass. (6 Allen)

For other cases see same topic and section NUMBER in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key-No. Series & Rep'r Indexes

136 U. S. 549, | 4. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS ( 764*)-CARE OF STREETS-RUNAWAYS.