Frank Bergen, of Newark, and E. A. Armstrong, of Camden, for plaintiff in error. Edwin G. C. Bleakly, of Camden, for defendant in error. City of Camden, and brings error. Af- the ordinance of 1910 cannot, however, be firmed. justified by the contract of 1894. If valid, For opinion of Supreme Court, see 82 Atl. it must be because the later ordinance is a 609. valid exercise of the police power; and, while this is conceded when the regulation is to secure the public safety, it is urged that the requirement that through cars from Moorestown and Merchantville stop at every street corner in Camden for passengers is obviously not for the public safety, but merely for the convenience of passengers. The term "police power" is not altogether a satisfactory one. It connotes, perhaps, more than the word "police" in its ordinary use, and embraces certain powers reserved to be exercised by the public authorities for the public benefit. The right to regulate the stopping of railroad trains is within this reserved power. Gladson v. Minnesota, 166 U. S. 427, 17 Sup. Ct. 627, 41 L. Ed. 1064. Even where the train is engaged in interstate commerce. Lake Shore & Mich. South. Railway v. Ohio, 173 U. S. 285, 19 Sup. Ct. 465, 43 L. Ed. 702. We see no reason for doubting that an ordinance of a city, acting under power given by its charter, that requires street cars to stop at the intersection of all cross streets is an exercise of the police power. SWAYZE, J. [1] The railway company was required by the ordinance of 1910 to stop its cars in the city of Camden on the near side of every street crossing to take on or let off passengers. The power of the city to pass this ordinance is derived from the charter, which authorizes the city council to pass ordinances to regulate the streets of the city, and to prescribe the manner in which corporations shall exercise any privilege granted to them in the use of any street. It is not questioned that the charter authorizes the council to pass ordinances on this subject intended to secure the safety of the public. It follows that, if necessary for that purpose, cars may be required to stop at the intersection of every street. The argument is that the present ordinance is unreasonable, because unnecessary, if meant to secure the public safety, and that, in fact, it is not meant for that The question remains whether it was a purpose, but is intended to secure the mere reasonable exercise of this power to require convenience of passengers and intending through cars running to the Philadelphia passengers. It is not denied that the coun- Ferry from Merchantville and Moorestown, cil has power to prescribe the points at for the especial accommodation of citizens which street cars shall stop. In view of the of those towns, to stop in Camden. It is character of street cars as public convey- urged that there is nothing to show that the ances and the special privileges accorded railway company did not run cars enough, them in order that they may subserve the aside from the through cars, to accommoconvenience of the public, they obviously date the local traffic within the limits of stand on a different footing from the ordi- Camden. This, however, is not the precise nary private vehicle, and are subject to pub-question to be determined. Passengers from lic regulation as to the points at which they Merchantville or Moorestown might wish to shall be required to stop. The common cus- alight at points in Camden long before the tom of frequent stops and at street corners car reached its terminus at the ferry; and is enough to demonstrate that the require- passengers from Camden to Merchantville ment is not, in itself, unreasonable. If there or Moorestown might wish to board the car were doubt on this point, it would be re- at points in the city without going to the moved by the contract made by the railway ferry or the other points within the city at company in accepting the ordinance of 1894, which the through cars stop. We know no which required that all cars should stop at reason why the city council might not regustreet crossings, clear of said crossings, on late the stops of street cars with a regard signal to let off and take on passengers. to the interest and need of such passengers. This contract, of itself, requires all cars to Indeed, in view of the fact that one of the stop. The ordinance of 1910 adds only the peculiar characteristics of street railroads requirement that the stop shall be on the is frequent stops for the reception and disnear side, and the sanction of a penalty in charge of passengers along its route, usualcase the ordinance is violated. The regula- ly at every street corner (36 Cyc. 1345tion as to the side at which the car shall 1347), in return for which service they are stop is obviously a matter for the city coun- allowed special privileges in the public highcil. ways, it may be doubted whether, in the absence of legislation conferring the authority, a street railroad is entitled to these privileges for cars that do not purport to serve the municipality whose highways they use. This question was not argued, and we need not express an opinion thereon. We The burden imposed on the company is apparently the same, whether the car is required to stop on the near or the far side. Such an ordinance was sustained by the Supreme Court. Cape May R. R. Co. v. Cape May, 59 N. J. Law, 404, 36 Atl. 678, the street railway, in return for its privi- | satisfied that it is erroneous, and hence to releges in the highways of Camden, may weigh the evidence on which the assessment is based. properly be required to stop all cars, wheth[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Taxation, er local or through cars, at the usual stop- Cent. Dig. §§ 876-883; Dec. Dig. § 493.*] ping places within the city limits. Error to Supreme Court. Action by the Millville Gaslight Company From the against the City of Millville. judgment (86 Atl. 449), plaintiff brings error. Affirmed. Herbert C. Bartlett, of Vineland, for plaintiff in error. Albert R. McAllister, of Bridgeton, for defendant in error. PER CURIAM. We agree in the views expressed in the opinion of the Supreme Court, except so far as the opinion intimates that the Supreme Court will not reweigh the evidence. Under the present statutes it is the duty of the Supreme Court in cases of taxation to amend the assessment, when satisfied that the value of the taxable property for which the taxpayer is assessed is errone [2, 3] A question remains whether the present case shows a violation of the ordinance. The refusal to stop the car was upon the signal of a policeman acting as a detective for the purpose of securing evidence of a violation of the ordinance, and it is urged he had no bona fide desire to become a passenger. We think this is not important. He was not merely an informer seeking to make a case, in order that he might obtain or share the penalty, but a public official acting for a public purpose in pursuance of his official duty. Under such circumstances his motive is of no more importance than the motive of one pursuing his We have legal right in a court of justice. said that the legal pursuit of one's right, no matter what may be the motive, is neither illegal nor inequitable. Davis v. Flagg, 35 N. J. Eq. 491, 494; Roberts v. Tompkins, 75 N. J. Eq. 576, 73 Atl. 505; Crocheron v. Sav. age, 75 N. J. Eq. 589, 73 Atl. 33, 23 L. R. A. (N. S.) 679. The case of Bull v. New York City Ry. Co., 192 N. Y. 361, 85 N. E. 385, 19 L. R. A. (N. S.) 778, differed from the present case, because the penalty in that case went to the party aggrieved, and the court (Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey. held that an attorney who was merely seeking to secure evidence to support penal actions by his clients was not a party aggrieved. The other cases cited are similar. We find no error, and the judgment is affirmed, with costs. (84 N. J. L. 405) CITY OF CAMDEN v. BARRETT. (Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey. March 3, 1913.) Error to Supreme Court. Samuel W. Barrett was convicted of violating an ordinance of the City of Camden. From a judgment of the Supreme Court (82 N. J. Law, 242, 82 Atl. 609) affirming the conviction, he brings error. Affirmed. Frank Bergen, of Newark, and E. A. ArmEdstrong, of Camden, for plaintiff in error. win G. C. Bleakly, of Camden, for defendant in error. PER CURIAM. The important question in this case is disposed of in the opinion in Camden v. Public Service Railway Co., 86 Atl. 447. The only additional question is whether Barrett came within the provisions of the ordinance. We agree with the Supreme Court that he did. The judgment is affirmed, with costs. (84 N. J. L. 409) MILLVILLE GASLIGHT CO. v. CITY OF MILLVILLE. ous. Royal Mfg. Co. v. Rahway, 75 N. J. Law, 416, 67 Atl. 940. (84 N. J. L. 411) MILLVILLE WATER CO. v. CITY OF MILLVILLE. March 3, 1913.) Error to Supreme Court. Action by the Millville Water Company against the City of Millville. From the judgment (86 Atl. 450), plaintiff brings error. Af firmed. Herbert C. Bartlett, of Vineland, for plaintiff in error. Albert R. McAllister, of Bridgeton, for defendant in error. PER CURIAM. The judgment is affirmed, with costs, for the reasons stated in the judgment of the Supreme Court, with the qualification set forth in our memorandum in the case of Millville Gaslight Co. v. Millville, supra, decided at this term. (84 N. J. L. 409) MILLVILLE GAS LIGHT CO. v. BOARD TAXATION (8 493*)-ASSESSMENT-EQUALIZA- Action of the state board of equalization on an assessment should not be disturbed, unless manifestly erroneous. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Taxation, Cent. Dig. §§ 876-883; Dec. Dig. § 493.*] Certiorari by the Millville Gas Light Com (Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey. pany against the Board of Equalization of March 3, 1913.) TAXATION (§ 493*)-ASSESSMENT-REVIEW. Taxes of New Jersey and another to review a tax assessment. Affirmed. For opinion of Court of Errors and ApIt is the duty of the Supreme Court in reviewing a tax assessment to amend it, when peals affirming judgment, see 86 Atl. 449. For other cases see same topic and section NUMBER in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key-No. Series & Rep'r Indexes 86 A.-29 Argued February term, 1912, before TREN-[3. TAXATION (§ 496*)-ASSESSMENTS-EQUALICHARD, PARKER, and MINTURN, JJ. ZATION-REVIEW. Herbert C. Bartlett, of Vineland, for prosecutor. Albert R. McAllister, of Bridgeton, for respondents. PER CURIAM. This is a certiorari to the judgment of the state board of equalization of taxes in determining the value of the property of the prosecutor, a gas company, for purposes of taxation. The valuation fixed by the municipal assessors was $150,000. There was an appeal to the county board of taxation, which reduced the valuation to $87,000. The city of Milville appealed to the state board of equalization, and after a full hearing that board readjusted the valuation at $106,000. After these two reviews the gas company, being dissatisfied with the result, desires this court to review further the findings of these several state agencies, complaining particularly that the valuation necessarily includes the gas company's franchise, which is taxable under the Franchise Act of 1900. There is no direct evidence as to this; it is simply an inference claimed to arise from an analysis of the figures. The practical proposition is that this court is asked to reweigh and pass upon the effect of evidence taken before a body specially organized for this very purpose, and to set aside its action as not justified by the weight of evidence. There is nothing to show that the board of equalization has not carefully discharged the duties imposed upon it by law, and its finding should not be disturbed, unless it is manifestly erroneous. Colonial Trust Co. v. Scheffey, 69 Atl. 455; Clark v. State Board, 79 N. J. Law, 454, 75 Atl. 748; Kearny v. State Board, 81 N. J. Law, 106, 78 Atl. 1050. Findings of the state board of equalization in equalizing an assessment will not be disturbed unless clearly wrong. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Taxation, Cent. Dig. §§ 890-910; Dec. Dig. § 496.*] Certiorari by the Millville Water Company against the Board of Equalization of Taxes of New Jersey and another to review a tax assessment. Affirmed. For memorandum decision of Court of Errors and Appeals affirming judgment, see 86 Atl. 449. Argued February term, 1912, before TRENCHARD, PARKER, and MINTURN, JJ. Herbert C. Bartlett, of Vineland, for prosAlbert R. McAllister, of Bridgeton, ecutor. for respondents. PER CURIAM. This case is very similar in its main features to the certiorari of Millville Gas Light Company against board of equalization of taxes, argued by the same counsel at the present term. A local assessor fixed the valuation of $150,000, the county board one of $64,644, and the state board of equalization, after appeal by the city, made this valuation $127,653, including an item called "Water and water rights, $33,000." The complaint is generally that the valuation fixed by the board of equalization is not justified by the evidence, and especially that the item of $33,000 is based upon water rights conferred by a certain deed of the Millville Manufacturing Company to the Millville Water Company in 1878, and conveying, among other things, the right and privilege of laying the water company's pipe through lands of the manufacturing company and taking water for the purpose of feeding the pumps of The judgment of the state board of equal- the water company to supply the consumpization will be affirmed. (84 N. J. L. 411) MILLVILLE WATER CO. v. BOARD OF (Supreme Court of New Jersey. June 18, 1. TAXATION (§ 375*)-WATERWORKS PROPER TY-VALUED AS GOING CONCERN. In assessing the property of a waterworks company, it may be valued as a going concern, so long as the item of public franchise, which is taxable under the Voorhees Act (P. L. 1900, p. 502), is not included. tion of its customers; in other words, the right of using water to supply the city of Millville. [1, 2] With regard to the general claim of overvaluation, it is urged that the property has been valued as a going concern. If so, that was the correct way in which to value it, so long as the item of public franchise is not included. The franchise is taxable under the act known as the Voorhees Act (P. L. 1900, p. 502). We find nothing in the evidence to indicate that the board of equalization included such valuation. On the other hand, the valuation of the industrial concern as a live rather than a dead plant would seem to be entirely proper. Royal Mfg. Co. v. State Board, 76 N. J. Law, 402, 406, 70 Atl. 978, affirmed 78 N. J. Law, 337, 74 Atl. 525. As to the claim that the item of $33,000 should not be included, the situation is this: The Millville Manufacturing Company owned certain land covered with water, with the [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Taxation, right of using more. It conveyed to the waCent. Dig. §§ 625, 629-631; Dec. Dig. § 376.*1 ter company the right of using a certain [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Taxation, Cent. Dig. §§ 624, 631, 671; Dec. Dig. § 375.*1 2. TAXATION (§ 376*)-WATERWORKS PROPERTY-RIGHTS TAXABLE. Right of a waterworks company to take water from the supply of a manufacturing company is taxable as a part of the water company's property. AND SERVANT (§ 11*)-DUE PROCESS-EM- amount of water from this supply that it [ 3. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW ( 301*)-MASTER owned. This water right has been regarded by the assessor and by the board of equalization as part of the plant of the water company. This is manifestly correct. The cases cited by counsel for the prosecutor as holding in his favor are found, on examination, to hold against his position, and it has been held that, where the water supply was in one taxing district, and the plant owning a right to draw from that supply was in another taxing district, the right to draw the supply was annexed to the plant and properly taxable in the district where that plant was situated. Lowell v. Commissioners, 6 Allen (Mass.) 131. [3] There is nothing to indicate that the finding of the board of equalization is not fully justified by the evidence, and on the authorities cited in the gas company case the finding of fact should not be reviewed unless clearly wrong. Nor does the board appear to have made any error of law in its finding. This judgment will accordingly be affirmed, with costs. (84 N. J. L. 85) Section 2 of the Employer's Liability Act of April 4, 1911 (P. L. p. 136), provides that compensation shall be made "without regard to the negligence of the employer" when the emexpress or implied, accept the provisions of secployer and employé shall by agreement, either tion 2, and where the personal injury or death for which compensation is sought is the result of an accident arising out of and in the course of the employment, in all cases except when the injury or death is intentionally self-inflicted, or when intoxication is the natural and proximate cause of injury. The section further provides after the act becomes effective, it shall be prethat, with respect to contracts of hiring made sumed that the parties are acting under section 2 if one or the other does not then or before the accident expressly elect to operate under section 1. Held, that such provisions of section 2 are not in violation of the "due process of law" provision of the fourteenth amendment of the federal Constitution. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Constitution al Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 848-850, 857; Dec. Dig. § 301; Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 11.*] MASTER 4. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (§ 175*) SEXTON V. NEWARK DISTRICT TELE that it shall take effect on the 4th day of July GRAPH CO. AND SERVANT (§ 11*; 8 872, New, vol. 16 Key-No. Series)-EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTCONSTRUCTION-EMPLOYER'S LIABILITY ACT. The supplement of May 2, 1911 (P. L p. 763), was approved May 2, 1911, and provides next succeeding its passage and approval. On May 23, 1911, Floyd Sexton was employed by the prosecutor. On July 4, 1911, at 5 o'clock in the afternoon, he was killed whilst engaged in that employment. Proceedings were subsequently begun under section 2 of the Employ 1. CERTIORARI (8 68*)-REVIEW-FINDINGS-er's Liability Act of April 4, 1911 (P. L. p. EVIDENCE. When a judgment of the court of common pleas, awarding compensation in case of death under section 2 of the Employer's Liability Act of April 4, 1911 (P. L. p. 136), is removed to the Supreme Court by certiorari, the Supreme Court accepts the findings of the common pleas court upon the facts if there be any legal evidence to warrant them. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Certiorari, Cent. Dig. §§ 180-182; Dec. Dig. § 68.*] 2. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (§§ 166, 245, 301*)MASTER AND SERVANT ( 179, 204*)-DUE PROCESS EQUAL PROTECTION-EMPLOYER'S LIABILITY ACT. Section 1 of the Employer's Liability Act of April 4, 1911 (P. L. p. 134), allows a recovery only in cases where the employé can show that his injuries were caused by an accident "arising out of and in the course of his employ. ment, of which the actual or lawfully imputed negligence of the employer is the natural and proximate cause," and "provided the employé was himself not willfully negligent," and abolishes the common-law defenses of assumption of risk and the fellow-servant rule. Held that, in modifying or abolishing such defenses to an action for an injury sustained after the act became effective, the section does not violate the "due process of law" and "equal protection of the law" provisions of the fourteenth amend ment of the federal Constitution, nor does it impair the obligation of contracts, in violation of the state and federal Constitutions. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Constitutional Law, Cent. Dig. $$ 482, 483, 702, 848850, 857; Dec. Dig. 88 166, 245, 301; Master and Servant, Cent. Dig. §§ 354-358, 544 546; Dec. Dig. §§ 179, 204.*] 136), to recover compensation for his death. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Constitution- the court of common pleas awarding compensaIn reviewing by certiorari a judgment of tion on account of the death of an employé under section 2 of the Employer's Liability Act of April 4, 1911 (P. L. p. 136), an allegation that the provision of paragraph 9 of the act that "in the employment of minors section 2 shall be presumed to apply unless the notice be given by or to the parent or guardian of the minor" is void, will not be considered by the Supreme *For other cases see same topic and section NUMBER in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key-No. Series & Rep'r IndexRS Court when it appears that decedent was 34 | by section 1 of this act shall not be defeated years old at the time of his death. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Constitutional Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 43-45; Dec. Dig. § 46.*] 6. JURY (§ 28*)-RIGHT INVIOLATE-CONSTITUTIONAL LAW Аст. EMPLOYER'S LIABILITY Section 2 of the Employer's Liability Act of April 4, 1911 (P. L. p. 136), does not violate article 1, § 7, of the New Jersey Constitution, providing that "the right of a trial by jury shall remain inviolate.' [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Jury, Cent. Dig. §§ 176-196; Dec. Dig. § 28.*] (Additional Syllabus by Editorial Staff.) 7. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (§ 48*)-CONSTRUCTION-VALIDITY. A statute will not be declared void unless its unconstitutionality is so manifest as to leave no room for reasonable doubt, and any consideration of its constitutionality must be limited to the question whether it violates the rights of the parties in the case at hand. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Constitutional Law, Cent. Dig. § 46; Dec. Dig. § 48.*] Certiorari to Court of Common Pleas, Essex County. Proceedings by Lizzie Alida Sexton on behalf of herself and next of kin against the Newark District Telegraph Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings certiorari. Affirmed. Argued November term, 1912, before TRENCHARD, PARKER, and MINTURN, JJ. George W. Hubbell, of New York City, for the prosecutor. Harry V. Osborne, of Newark, for defendant in certiorari. Frank H. Sommer and Kinsley Twining, both of Newark, for Employer's Liability Commission. TRENCHARD, J. This writ brings up for review a judgment of the Essex county common pleas court against the prosecutor in an action under the Employer's Liability Act, approved April 4, 1911 (P. L. p. 134), and the supplement thereto approved May 2, 1911 (P. L. p. 763). The act of April 4, 1911 (the main act) is divided into three sections. The first six paragraphs are included within section 1, which is entitled "Compensation by Action at Law." These paragraphs, so far as they are pertinent to this case, are as follows: "Section 1. Compensation by Action at Law. "(1) When personal injury is caused to an employé by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment, of which the actual or lawfully imputed negligence of the employer is the natural and proximate cause, he shall receive compensation therefor from his employer, provided the employé was himself not willfully negligent at the time of receiving such injury, and the question of whether the employé was willfully negligent shall be one of fact to be submitted to the jury subject to the usual superintending powers of a court to set aside a verdict rendered contrary to the evidence. upon the ground that the injury was caused in any degree by the negligence of a fellow employé; or that the injured employé assumed the risks inherent in or incidental to or arising out of his employment or arising from the failure of the employer to provide and maintain safe premises and suitable appliances; which said grounds of defense are hereby abolished. "(4) The provisions of paragraphs one, two and three shall apply to any claim for the death of an employé arising under an act entitled 'An act to provide for the recovery of damages in cases where the death of a person is caused by wrongful act, neglect or default,' approved March third, eighteen hundred and forty-eight, and the amendments thereof and supplements thereto. "(5) In all actions at law brought pursuant to section 1 of this act, the burden of proof to establish willful negligence in the injured employé shall be upon the defend ant. Paragraphs 7 to 22, inclusive, are included within section 2, which is entitled "Elective Compensation," and, so far as pertinent, are as follows: "Section 2. Elective Compensation. "(7) When employer and employé shall by agreement, either express or implied, as hereinafter provided, accept the provisions of section 2 of this act, compensation for personal injuries to or for the death of such employé by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment shall be made by the employer without regard to the negligence of the employer, according to the schedule contained in paragraph eleven, in all cases except when the injury or death is intentionally self-inflicted, or when intoxication is the natural and proximate cause of injury, and the burden of proof of such fact shall be upon the employer. "(8) Such agreement shall be a surrender by the parties thereto of their rights to any other method, form or amount of compensation or determination thereof than as provided in section 2 of this act, and an acceptance of all the provisions of section 2 of this act, and shall bind the employé himself and for compensation for his death shall bind his personal representatives, his widow and next of kin, as well as the employer, and those conducting his business during bankruptcy or insolvency. "(9) Every contract of hiring made subsequent to the time provided for this act to take effect shall be presumed to have been made with reference to the provisions of section 2 of this act, and unless there be as a part of such contract an express statement in writing, prior to any accident, either in the contract itself or by written notice from either party to the other, that the provisions of section 2 of this act are not intended to “(2) The right to compensation as provided |