Eluded-Defeated.- The court will endeavor so to shape the meaning of a statute that it can neither be eluded1 nor its purposes defeated."

The parts, and other laws and acts, together. All its parts,' and all acts, "though made at different times or even expired "5 or repealed, and the entire system of laws,' and the common law, touching the same matter, must be taken together; and,

2 Thompson v. S., 20 Ala. 54; Cook use them in their common-law meanv. Hamilton, 6 McLean, 112.

ing. W. U. Tel. Co. v. Scircle, 103 Ind. 227, 2 N. E. R. 604; Heiskell v. Baltimore, 65 Md. 125, 4 Atl. R. 116.]

91 Bac. Abr., Statute, I. 3; Dwar. Stat. (2d ed.) 569; Duck v. Addington, 4 T. R. 447, 450; Ex parte Drydon, 5 T. R. 417, 419; Ailesbury v. Pattison, 1 Doug. 28, 30; Mendon v. Worcester, 10 Pick. 235, 242; Goddard v. Boston, 20 Pick. 407, 409; Wilde u Com., 2 Met. 408; Howlett v. S., 5 Yerg. 144; Holland v. Makepeace, 8 Mass. 418, 423; Holbrook v. Holbrook, 1 Pick. 248, 254; S. v. Baldwin, 2 Bailey, 541; S. v. Fields, 2 Bailey, 554; Thayer v. Bond, 3 Mass. 296; White v. Johnson, 23 Miss. 68; Rex v. Morris, 1 B. & Ad. 76

if one part standing by itself is obscure, it may be aided by another which is clear.1

32 Inst. 308.

6

Prior law-Mischief - Remedy.-The interpreter should consider and take into the account what was the law before,2 which Coke says is "the very lock and key to set open the windows of the statute;" the mischief against which the law did not provide; the nature of the remedy proposed, and the true reason of the remedy. It has been said that we may learn the mischief" from our knowledge of the state of the law at the time, and of the practical grievances generally complained of."5 Public and private interests. Great public interests will not needlessly be put at hazard by the interpretation; and even private hardships will, when they may, be avoided.' And441; S. v. Wilbor, 1 R. L. 199, [36 Am. do so when necessary to construe D. 245;] De Ormas Case, 10 Mart. doubtful language. U. S. v. Bowen, (La.) 158, 172; P. v. Hart, 1 Mich. 467; 100 U. S. 508, 25 L. ed. 631; Cambria S. v. Garthwaite. 3 Zab. 143; The Co. v. Ashburn, 118 U. S. 54, 30 L. ed. Harriet, 1 Story, 251; Scott v. Searles, 60; Deffeback v. Hawke, 115 U. S. 1 Sm. & M. 590; S. v. Mister, 5 Md. 392, 29 L. ed. 423; U. S. v. Averill, 130 11; U. S. v. Freeman, 3 How. (U. S.) U. S. 335, 32 L. ed. 977; U. S. v. Lacher, 556; Hayes v. Hanson, 12 N. H. 284; 134 U. S. 624, 33 L. ed. 1080.] Berry v. S., 10 Tex. Ap. 315; Goodrich u Russell, 42 N. Y. 177; [Peterson v. Gittings, 107 Iowa, 306, 77 N. W. R. 1056; U. S. v. Goldenburg, 168 U. S. 95, 42 L. ed. 394; Scaife v. Stovall, 67 Ala. 237; Freeman v. P., 4 Denio, 9, 47 Am. D. 216; Hamilton v. Rathbone, 175 U. S. 419; Heydon's Case, 3 Fed. R. 76; Platt v. R. R. Co., 99 U. S. 48, 25 L. ed. 424; Thornly v. U. S., 113 U. S. 310, 28 L. ed. 999; Lake Co. v. Rollins, 130 U. S. 662, 32 L. ed. 1060.] 1Rex v. Palmer, 1 Leach (4th ed.), 352, 355; Com. v. Slack, 19 Pick. 304; Crespigny v. Wittenoom, 4 T. R. 790. 1Ante, § 6; Bac, Abr., Statutes, I. 4; Dwar. Stat. (2d ed.) 563, 564. [Prior acts may be cited to solve but not to create an ambiguity. Hamilton v. Rathbone, 175 U. S. 419; U. S. v. Hirsch, 100 U. S. 33, 25 L. ed. 539; U. S. v. Bowen, 100 U. S. 508, 25 L. ed. 631. When the meaning in the revision is plain the court cannot consult the old statutes to see if congress has erred in the revision; but may

4 Heydon's Case, 3 Co. 7; Winslow v. Kimball, 25 Me. 493; Pray v. Edie, 1 T. R. 313; Rex v. Hodnett, 1 T. R. 96, 100; 1 Bl. Com. 87; Jortin v. Southeastern Ry. Co., 3 Eq. Rep. 281, 1 Jur. (N. S.) 433, 31 Eng. L. & Eq. 320; P. v. Greer, 43 Ill. 213; Huffman v. S., 29 Ala. 40; Parkinson v. S., 14 Md. 184, [74 Am. D. 522.]

Lyde v. Barnard, 1 M. & W. 101, 114. And see S. v. Smith, Cheves, 157.

6 P. v. Illinois, etc. Canal, 3 Scam. 153; Burbank v. Fay, 65 N. Y. 57; Van Loon v. Lyon, 4 Daly, 149; [S. v. Garrett, 76 Mo. Ap. 295; Rector v. U. S., 92 U. S. 698, 23 L. ed. 690; Coosaw Co. v. S., 144 U. S. 550, 36 L. ed. 537.]

7 Collins v. Carman, 5 Md. 503; Broadbent v. S., 7 Md. 416; Metropolitan Asylum Dist. v. Hill, 6 Ap. Cas. 193; P. v. Hodgdon, 55 Cal. 72, [36 Am. R. 30;] Keeran v. Griffith, 34 Cal. 580. And see S. v. Bank of the State, 1 S. C. 63; Chapin v. Persse,

Public policy. Considerations of public policy are always pertinent in the interpretation.1

Title- Preamble-Outside of statute.- For these several purposes, we may take into view, as already seen,' what is said in the title and preamble; and may consult any other source3 of a nature proper for the cognizance of the courts.

etc. Paper Works, 30 Conn. 461, [79 Am. D. 263;] Pittsburg, etc. R. R. Co. v. South West Pa. Ry. Co., 77 Pa. St. 173; Randolph v. Middleton, 11 C. E. Green, 543.

1 Baxter v. Tripp, 12 R. L. 310; Mobile v. Stein, 54 Ala. 23; Probasco v. Moundsville, 11 W. Va. 501. And see S. v. Clarke, 54 Mo. 17, [14 Am. R. 471; Yale v. New Haven, 71 Conn. 316, 42 Atl. R. 87; Jersey Gas Co. v. Consumers' Co., 40 N. J. Eq. 427, 2 Atl. R. 922; Glass v. Cedar Rapids, 68 Iowa, 207.]

Ante, §§ 44-51; [S. v. Robinson, 32 Oreg. 43, 48 Pac. R. 357; Garrick v.

R. R. Co., 53 S. C. 448, 31 S. E. R. 334;
South Park Com. v. Bank, 177 Ill.
234, 52 N. E. R. 365; Choctaw R. R. Co.
v. Alexander, 7 Okl. 579, 52 Pac. R.
944; Re Boston Co., 51 Cal. 624; Ter.
v. Hopkins (Okl.), 59 Pac. R. 976. A
recital of a fact in the title is con-
clusive. Hare v. Kennedy, 83 Ala.
608, 3 S. R. 683. The operation of the
act clear in its terms cannot be re-
strained by preamble. Tripp v. Goff,
15 R. I. 299, 3 Atl. R. 591.]

U. S. v. Webster, Daveis (D. C.), 38.
Ante, §§ 74-77; 1 Greenl. Ev.,

78

CHAPTER X.

PROSPECTIVE AND RETROSPECTIVE LEGISLATION AND INTERPRETATION.

§ 83. All legislation, in a sense, prospective.-There is a sense in which, in the nature of things, no legislation is or can be other than prospective. The records of the past cannot be reversed; the present can in no way deal otherwise than with itself and the future. But this is not the sort of view of things with reference to which we speak of prospective and retrospective legislation. In the practical sense,

Prospective and retrospective, defined. As the terms are commonly used in the law, prospective legislation is such as provides rules for facts thereafter to transpire; retrospective, for those which have partly or fully occurred. Prospective interpretation restricts the application of the new law to facts arising after its enactment; retrospective, applies it to the past and present facts as well as the future.

§ 83a. Distinctions-(Constitutional - Politic and probable And the reverse).- Under our written constitutions, some forms of retrospective legislation are by their terms or construction forbidden;1 and then a statute embodying it will be, to this extent, inoperative, and no question can arise as to what the legislature intended. To be distinguished from these

1 Crim. Law, L, § 279; post, § 85. 2 Strong v. Clem, 12 Ind. 37, [74 Am. D. 200;] Logan v. Walton, 12 Ind. 639; Frantz v. Harrow, 13 Ind. 507; Strong v. Dennis, 13 Ind. 514; Douglass v. Pike, 101 U. S. 677; Hoagland v. Sacramento, 52 Cal. 142; Dequindre v. Williams, 31 Ind. 444; Lathrop v. Brown, 1 Woods, 474; Hart v. S., 40 Ala. 32, [88 Am. D. 752;] Finn v. Haynes, 37 Mich. 63; Jordan v. Wimer, 45 Iowa, 65; Brothers v. S., 2

Cold. 201; Cook v. Mutual Ins. Co., 53 Ala. 37; S. v. Doherty, 60 Me. 504; Dubois v. McLean, 4 McLean, 486; Grammar School v. Burt, 11 Vt. 632; Dash v. Van Kleeck, 7 Johns. 477, [5 Am. D. 291;] Gunn v. Barry, 15 Wall. 610; Union Iron Co. v. Pierce, 4 Bis. 327; Houston v. Bogle, 10 Ire. 496; Lambertson v. Hogan, 2 Pa. St. 22; Ahl v. Rhoads, 84 Pa. St. 319; [Purdy v. R. R. Co., 56 N. E. R. (N. Y.) 508.]

cases are those wherein, while a retrospective construction is not prohibited, it is a question whether or not the legislature meant its act to be so applied;1 and whether such application would accord with sound policy, and with the other rules of interpretation. Then it will be construed the one way or the other as these considerations require.

§ 84. Rule for interpretation, in general.— In the absence of any special indication or reason, and as the common rule, a statute will not be applied retrospectively, even where there is no constitutional impediment. Some of the cases appear to