1 the true rule. Said a learned judge: "Instances are not lacking ist upon the mind of the court a reasonable doubt, that doubt § 91a. Particular provision.-No mere general considerations will authorize a court to nullify a statute as unconstitutional. Therefore he who asks such judgment should point out the particular provision or clause violated. "It will not do," said Wallace, J., "to talk about the 'spirit of the constitution' as imposing a limitation upon the legislative power."4 1 Cotten v. Leon, 6 Fla. 610, 613, opinion by Dupont, J.; Cheney v. Jones, 14 Fla. 587; Cutts v. Hardee, 38 Ga. 350; P. v. San Francisco, etc. R. R. Co., 35 Cal. 606; Lafayette v. Jenners, 10 Ind. 70; Gillespie v. S., 9 Ind. 380; S. v. Cooper, 5 Blackf. 258; Santo v. S., 2 Iowa, 165, [63 Am. D. 487;] Baltimore v. S., 15 Md. 376; Tyler v. P., 8 Mich. 320; Rich v. Flanders, 39 N. H. 304; Boston v. Cummins, 16 Ga. 102; Inkster v. Carver, 16 Mich. 484; Astor v. New York, 62 N. Y. 567, 575; Kerrigan v. Force, 68 N. Y. 381; Pennsylvania R. R. Co. v. Riblet, 66 Pa. St. 164, [5 Am. R. 360;] Territory v. Lee, 2 Mont. 124; Chicago, etc. R. R. Co. v. Smith, 62 Ill. 268, [14 Am. R. 99;] Gutman v. Virginia Iron Co., 5 W. Va. 22; Osburn v. Staley, 5 W. Va. 85, [13 Am. R. 640;] Smithee v. Garth, 33 Ark. 17; In re Clinton Street, 2 Brews. 599; Coyne v. Weaver, 84 N. Y. 386. In a California case Sanderson, J., observed: "It is well settled that every act de liberately passed by the legislature must be regarded by the courts as valid, unless it is clearly and manifestly repugnant to some provision of the constitution." P. v. Sassovich, 29 Cal. 480, 482. Said Frazer, J., in Indiana: "The courts should never strike down a statute unless its conIflict with the constitution is clear. Then, too, the judiciary ought to accord to the legislature as much purity of purpose as it would claim for itself; as honest a desire to obey the constitution, and, also, a high capacity to judge of its meaning. Hence, its action is entitled to a respect which should beget caution in attempting to set it aside." Brown v. Buzan, 24 Ind. 194, 197; [Life Ins. Co. v. Ray, 50 Tex. 519; Lawton v. Waite, 79 N. W. R. 321 (Wis.); McGovern v. Hope, 42 Atl. R. 830 (N. J.); Wentworth v. Racine Co., 99 Wis. 26, 74 N. W. R. 551; Cummings v. Hyatt, 54 Neb. 635, 74 N. W. R. 313; Lyman v. Gramercy Club, 50 N. Y. Sup. 1004; S. v. Marion Co., 128 Mo. 427, 30 S. W. R. 103.] 2 Ante, §§ 38-41. [A statute is not unconstitutional because it is unjust. Praigg v. Western Co., 143 Ind. 358, 42 N. E. R. 750. The burden is on him who alleges unconstitutionality to prove it beyond a doubt. S. v. Addington, 77 Mo. 110. 3 Davis v. S., 3 Lea, 376, 378; Stockton, etc. R. R. Co. v. Stockton, 41 Cal. 147; Beyman v. Black, 47 Tex. 558; Brown v. Fifield, 4 Mich. 322. 4 Stockton, etc. R. R. Co. v. Stockton, supra, p. 162; [Lommen v. Minneapolis Co., 65 Minn. 196, 68 N. W. R. 53.] $92. Interpreted similarly to statutes.-Our constitutions, being, like statutes, written instruments and laws,' are, in the main, similarly interpreted. There are minor differences sometimes recognized; as, 3 Less technical.-Partaking more of the nature of popular writings, it is not unfrequently observed that meanings less technical may be given to their words and phrases." State and United States, contrasted. The constitution of the United States consists chiefly in a grant of enumerated powers; hence, in interpreting it, the courts presume the existence of no power not expressly or impliedly conferred. On the other hand, a state constitution proceeds on the idea that all legislative functions are in the legislature; therefore, in its interpretation, the powers not taken away by the United States constitution are presumed, except as expressly or by implication denied. In reason, these propositions require, at least, the limitation that, where the power in controversy relates to international intercourse, to jurisdiction on the high seas, or to any other thing beyond the state territory, its existence among the functions of 1 Ante, SS 4, 11a, 89. Morrison v. Bachert, 112 Pa. St. 322, 5 Atl. R. 739; Com. v. Clark, 7 W. & S. 127; Henshaw v. Foster, 9 Pick. 312; St. Louis R. R. Co. v. Evans, 85 Mo. 307.] 2P. v. Potter, 47 N. Y. 375; Springfield v. Edwards, 84 Ill. 626, 643; P. v. Fancher, 50 N. Y. 288, 291; Daily v. Swope, 47 Miss. 367; Hess v. Pegg, 7 Nev. 23; Leavenworth v. Miller, 7 Kan. 479, [12 Am. R. 425;] Walker v. Cincinnati, 21 Ohio St. 14, [8 Am. R. 24;] Brown v. Fifield, 4 Mich. 322; P. v. Wall. 88 Ill. 75; P. r. Gardner, 45 N. Y. 812. 'Carroll v. S., 58 Ala. 396. See Wol- ette, etc. R. R. Co. v. Geiger, 34 Ind. cott v. Wigton, 7 Ind. 44. Manly v. S., 7 Md. 135; Greencastle Township v. Black, 5 Ind. 557: S. v. Mace, 5 Md. 337; P. v. Fancher, supra; Cronise v. Cronise, 54 Pa. St. 255. [Narrow and technical reasoning is not to be applied to constitutions, inasmuch as they are instruments framed by the people for themselves, "upon which," as charts, "every man, learned or unlearned, may be able to trace the leading principles of government." Cooley, Const. Lim. 59; P. v. Flagg, 46 N. Y. 401; Page v. Allen, 58 Pa. St. 338, [98 Am. D. 272;] Bushnell v. Beloit, 10 Wis. 195; P. v. Coleman, 4 Cal. 46, [60 Am. D. 581;] McMillen v. Lee, 6 Iowa, 391; In re Clinton Street, 2 Brews. 599; Lafay 185; Leavenworth v. Miller, 7 Kan. 479, [12 Am. R. 425;] Walker v. Cincinnati, 21 Ohio St. 14; Cotten v. Leon, 6 Fla. 610, 619; Woods' Appeal, 75 Pa. St. 59. [Unlike that of the United States, the constitution of the state is not a grant of power. The state legislature is to be regarded as possessing inherently all power, and the constitution is a limit, not a grant. Henley v. S., 98 Tenn. 681; Stratton v. Morris, 98 Tenn. 511; R. R. Co. v. Hicks, 9 Bax. 446.] the United States, and non-existence among those of the state, should be the prima facie presumption. § 92a. Instances of same rules as for statutes.- Some instances of interpreting a constitution by the same rules as a statute are · Retrospective.-Commonly a constitutional provision is not applied to annul what a prior statute, valid when enacted, had established, however contrary to its newly-ordained rule.' Yet often — doubtless more frequently than with statutes spective application will be required to carry out the evident intention of the makers, or the obvious reason for a clause, and then such application will be made.' And a retro Intent of makers — History, etc.- The rule that the intent of the makers, as appearing on the face of the particular provision and the entire instrument, illumined by pertinent historical facts and surroundings, yet not by individual declarations, such as the debates in the convention which framed it, shall prevail over the latent meanings of words and phrases, but not to the disregard of the true import of what is plain," is applied to constitutions the same as to statutes. § 92b. Requiring legislation or not.-As already seen,' some constitutional provisions bind only the legislative conscience until statutes to carry them out are enacted, and others operate at once as laws. The question depends on their terms and the subject. A plain instance is a declaration that "the privilege of the debtor to enjoy the necessary comforts of life 1Indiana v. Agricultural Soc., 85 Pa. St. 357; Herman v. Phalen, 14 How. (U. S.) 79; League v. De Young, 11 How. (U. S.) 185. And see Com. v. Collis, 10 Phila. 430; Doddridge v. Stout, 9 W. Va. 703. 2 In re Lee & Co.'s Bank, 21 N. Y. 9. [The rule that a law is, in the absence of clearly apparent intent to the contrary, prospective only, applies to constitutions. S. v. Greer, 78 Mo. 188; Leete v. State Bank, 115 Mo. 184, 21 S. W. R. 788.] v. Balph, 111 Pa. St. 365, 3 Atl. R. 220; 5 Hills v. Chicago, 60 Ill. 86; Springfield v. Edwards, 84 Ill. 626, 643. 6 P. v. Potter, 47 N. Y. 375; S. v. Parsons, 11 Vroom, 1; S. v. Newark, 11 Vroom, 71, 550. [The same rules of construction apply to constitutions as to statutes. P. v. Potter, 47 N. Y. 375; In re N. Y. District R. R. P. v. Gies, 25 Mich. 83; P. v. Fan- Co., 42 Hun, 621; Oakland Co. v. Hilcher, 50 N. Y. 288. ton, 69 Cal. 479, 11 Pac. R. 3.] 7 Ante, §§ 11a, note, 14. ♦ Beardstown v. Virginia, 76 Ill. 34; Taylor v. Taylor, 10 Minn. 107; [Com. shall be recognized by wholesome laws;" the courts that enforce laws, not make them, cannot give effect to this provision without legislative aid. On the other hand, it is equally plain that no legislation is necessary to enable the supreme court of the United States to take original jurisdiction of a suit between two states, under the clause of the constitution that the judicial power shall extend "to controversies between two or more states." If some other cases are less clear, still the principle which controls these will determine how the result should be." § 92c. Other doctrines,- applicable to the interpretation alike of statutes and constitutions,-appear in the discussions in other chapters. The foregoing are sufficient here as explaining the similarities and differences. 1 Green v. Aker, 11 Ind. 223. 2 Const. U. S., art. 3, § 2; Kentucky v. Ohio, 24 How. (U. S.) 66. Jackson v. Collins, 16 B. Monr. 214; S. v. Weston, 6 Neb. 16; Com. v. Harding, 87 Pa. St. 343; Ex parte S., 52 Ala. 231; Com. v. Collis, 10 Phila. 430; Doddridge v. Stout, 9 W. Va. 703, 705. See, as illustrative, ante, 95 § 14; Gilbert v. U. S., 8 Wall. 358; Parish v. U. S., 8 Wall. 489. [Constitutional provisions which are prohibitive are self-executing, proprio vigore, and requiring no legislative action to execute them. Oakland Co. v. Hilton, 69 Cal. 479, 11 Pac. R. 8; Householder v. Kansas City, 83 Mo. 488.] CHAPTER XIII. THE MEANINGS OF THE LANGUAGE. § 92d. Flexibility of language.-The possible forms of thought are, like the source whence the thinking mind proceeds, or the universe it is fashioned to mirror, infinite. If hitherto the actual in thought has had its limit, the reason is simply that the end of the progress of the mind through eternity is not reached. Language is the offspring of the past, but its life is in and for the ever opening and progressive future. Its principal mission is to convey, from one mind to another, the new thoughts as they arise; for the old is continually dying, while the new is being born. If each word had a single fixed and unchanging meaning, and if there were simply certain established collocations of words, each with its one signification, the powers of language would be very limited, and it could never express a new idea. It would be completely unadapted to human use. As things are, it is one of the most marvelous of the mysteries attendant on human life. "There is," said a learned judge, "no word in the English language which does not admit of various interpretations." And no bound can be set to the ever-varying combinations of words, conveying both the old thoughts and the new,- thoughts which the inventors of the words had, and those which they had not. Thus wonderfully flexible is language! Hence, § 93. Statute as words in combination.- In interpreting a statute we do not contemplate it as a series of words, each with its particular signification, but as words combined to convey what they could not singly. While we do not shut our eyes to the letter, we look most of all for the spirit—the effect of the combination in the circumstances and connections wherein it was made. "The letter killeth, but the spirit giveth life."2 Says an old maxim, qui hæret in litera hæret in cortice, if we 1 Pollock, C. B., in Reg. v. Skeen, 22 Cor. iii. 6 Bell C. C. 97, 134. |