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Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co. (X. Y.) Right State Trust Co. v. Turner (Iowa) Corporation-Liabil.
ity of Stockholders-Payment for Stock in Prop.
erty, R. D. 183.
Spead v. Bonnoil (N. Y.) Arrest upon Suspicion, Ed.l.
Trevett v. Prison Association (Va.) Charitable Cor.
porations Liability for Torty Pollution of
Standard Furniture Co. v. Van Alstive (Wasb.) Condi.
Turk v. Carpahan (Ind.) Conditional Sales-Recovery
of Price-Election of Remedies, ann. cage, 248.
Tuscaloosa Ice Mfg. Co. v. Williams (Ala.) Contract-
Court, Ed. 221.
Ward v. Ward (onio) Fraudulent Conveyance in Antic-
ipation of Marriage, Ed. 399.
Warren v. Abbett (N. J.) Statute of Frauds-- Agree-
State v. III (N. Car 1 Validity of City Ordinance Pro West Chicago Street Railway Co. v. Liderman (11.)
Question of contributory Negligence on the Part of
Mother in Attempting to kescue Her Child from
Wingert v. Zeigler (Md.) Validity of Instruments Re.
quiring Revenue Stamps Wnich llave Not Been
No. 3. The Regulation of Trusts. By Darius
H. Pingrey, 45.
Vo.7. Municipal Liability for Breach of Public
Duties. By Francis J. Kearful, 126.
Personal Injuries or Death. By W. B. Morris,
Officers Not Taxable by the Federal Govern-
ment. By Hayes & Wells. 165.
No. 12. Constitutional Limitations of the Police.
Power. By S. S. Merrill, 225.
No. 16. Labor Organizations-The Right to Con-
trol the Price of Labor- The Right to Strike.
No. 19. The Law of Surface Water as Applica-
ble to Missouri and States Bounded by Large
No. 21. Release by Mortgagor to Mortgagee. By
W. A. Coutts, 101.
pose the cost of a Public Improvement Upon
Determine the Amount of Special Benefit of ::
Central Law Journal.
could not have availed them had they then charged the plaintiff with the misdemeanor.”
ST. LOUIS, MO., JULY 6, 1900.
The legislature of Rhode Island recently enacted a statute having for its object the
suppression of what is known in commercial An exchange calls attention to a novel de circles as "trading stamps,” whereby it was cision of the New York Supreme Court with made unlawful for any person or corporation respect to the rights of citizens, particularly to sell, give, or distribute any stamp, coupon, with regard to their immunity from arrest by or other device which shall ențitle the purpolice officers, who are acting under no more chaser of property to demand or receive from definite authority or motive than that of sus any person or corporation other than the venpicion. The case is Snead v. Bonnoil. It dor, any article of merchandise other than appeared that while the plaintiff was emerg that actually sold to said purchaser, and for ing from a pawn shop with a bag filled with
any person or corporation other than the venjewelry and silverware, two policemen, one dor, to deliver to any person any article of of whom was the defendant, arrested him, mercbandise other than that actually sold saying in explanation of their conduct, that upon presentation of any such stamp, coupon they wished to ascertain what he had in the or other device; provided, however, that this bag. In reply he said that the property, as act shall not affect any existing contract. he could prove, belonged to bim. He was, The Supreme Court of Rhode Island, in the nevertheless, taken to the station-house and case of State v.. Dalton, 46 Atl. Rep. 234,
When a search was made of his considered the validity of the act holding person it was found that he bad a loaded re that, whatever the powers of a legislature to volver. After having him remanded for prohibit the "trading stamps” system in twenty-four hours in order to find out whether proper cases may be, the statute under conthe charge of being a "suspicious person," sideration was so general in its terms as to wbich is a misdemeanor, could be sustained, amount to an infringement of constitutional the officers decided to change this charge to liberty. The court relies to a material exthe carrying of concealed weapons, which is tent upon the decision of the New York Court a felony. Although the appellate court, to of Appeals in People v. Gilson, 109 N. Y. wbich the case was carried, thought that the 389. In all cases of this character the turucircumstances might justify the belief that ing point is whether there is a lottery—that Mr. Snead was a suspicious person, he could is, an essential element of chance-or whether not be held on a charge different from the the additional benefit to a purchaser is in the one for which he had been arrested. "There nature of a “cbromo,” or gift. The Rhode can be no general right," it said, “to arrest Island court cites and analyzes a large number a citizen for an undisclosed offense. The of previous authorities bearing upon this genpolice officer cannot arrest a man for one eral question. The substance of the deciscause, and when that is exploded, justify for ion may be better understood by quoting the another. Such a doctrine would be an in- following from the opinion of the court: centive to the loosest practices on the part of “This inalienable right is trenched upon and police officers, and a dangerous extension of impaired whenever the legislature prohibits a their sufficiently great powers.” Again the man from carrying on his business in his own court said concerning the detention of Mr. way, provided, always, of course, that the Snead without bail: “Thus the officers business and the mode of carrying it on are utilized the felony charge to detain the not injurious to the public, and provided, plaintiff for at least twenty-four hours beyond also, that it is not a business which is affected the time he was entitled to his discharge upon with a public use or interest. Now, it was bail upon the misdemeanor charge. Beyond certainly within the constitutional right of the peradventure the police officer was liable for defendant in this case to sell tobaccomit be. every hour he detained the plaintiff after he ing presumed, of course, that he had ob. and his associate officer had secured the re tained the necessary authority to deal in that mand from the magistrate for a reason which article; and, as an inducement to people to
the books and records of the corporation; that the right to inspect does not depend upon the motive or purpose of the stockholder in demanding such inspection, and a petition wbich shows that the plaintiff is a stockholder, that he has requested the defendant to allow him to inspect the books and records of the corporation, and fix a reason. able time for the same, wbich request has been refused, states a cause of action; and that as incident to such right is the right to bave such inspection by a proper agent, and to take copies from such books and records.
trade with him, it was also bis right to give to each purchaser of a certain quantity of tobacco, either directly or through a third per. son, some other designated article of value, by way of premium. The statute in question, however, steps in to prevent him from adopting such a course to procure trade, and from it to secure an income and livelibood; and he is thus restrained in the free enjoyment of his faculties to which he is constitutionally entitled, unless such restraint is necessary for the common welfare, in one of the ways heretofore mentioned, and we cannot see that it is. In other words, the statute says that A shall not sell to B a barrel of flour, and, in connection with and as a part of the contract of sale, give to B a coupon which will entitle him to receive from C a pound of tea, a pitcher, a lamp, a clock, a door mat, or some other specified article of merchandise. If the act had prohibited the giving away of any stamp or device in connection with the sale of an article, which would entitle the holder to receive, either directly from the vendor, or indirectly through another person, some indefinite and undescribed article, the nature and value of which were unknown to the purchaser, there would then be introduced into the prohibited transaction enough of the element of uncertainty and chance to condemn it as being in the nature of a lottery.”
GARNISHMENT-SITUS OF DEBT.-In National Fire Ins. Co. v. Wing, 60 Pac. Rep. 720, decided by the Supreme Court of Arizona, it appeared that plaintiff, a resident of Arizona, sued in that territory on an insurance policy; and defendant pleaded that, after receipt of plaintiff's proof of loss, plaintiff had been sued in California by creditors there,-service being had by publication, and that funds for the payment of plaintiff's claim in the hands of defendant's general agent in Cal. ifornia were garnished, and thereafter, under the garnishment proceedings, paid by defendant to plaintiff's creditors. It was held that as defendant's debt to plaintiff would sustain an action in rem against plaintiff, and as defendant had funds in California which plaintiff could have attached in an action on his policy in that State, the situs of the debt was there, for the purpose of garnishment, and defendant's payment under the garnishment proceedings was a defense to plaintiff's action.
NOTES OF IMPORTANT DECISIONS.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION VALIDITY ORDINANCE UNREASONABLE INTERFERENCE WITH LIBERTY.-In Gastenan v. Commonwealth, 56 S. W. Rep. 705, decided by the Court of Appeals of Kentucky, it was held that a city ordinance declaring that it sball be unlawful for any woman to go in and out of a building where a saloon is kept for the sale of liquor, or “to frequent, loaf or stand around said building within fifty feet thereof," and providing for the punishment of any saloonkeeper who shall permit a violation of that provision of the ordinance, is void, as being an unreasonable interference with individual liberty.
TRADE-NAMES SURNAMES - RIGHT TO USE ONE'S OWN NAME.—Two cases have recently been decided which illustrate the general doctrine that a person has the right to use his own name in bis own business; that one cannot make a trade. mark of his name and so debar others having the same name from using it, although it be in the same business. In Harson v. Halkyard, 46 Atl. Rep. 271, decided in the Supreme Court of Rbode Island, it appeared that the principal point of resemblance between the signs, labels and advertisement of complainant and respondent was the prominence given to the name “Harson," which is the surname of complainant and one of the respondents. It further appeared that there was nothing in the respondent's advertisement, except the use of such name, which would deceive the public into buying the goods of respondents when they intended buying complainant's goods. It was held that the respondents would not be enjoined from using such advertising matter, as the respondent in question had the right to so use his own surname. In National Starch Mfg. Co. v. Duryea, 101 Fed. Rep. 117, decided by the United States Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, it appeared that one Duryea was for many years the president and a stockholder in the Glen Cove Manufacturing Company, which made and sold starch in packages having thereon the name
CORPORATION-STOCKHOLDERS — INSPECTION OF BOOKS INJUNCTION.-It is held by the Supreme Court of Ohio, in Cincinnati Volksblatt Co. v. Hoffmeister, 56 N. E. Rep. 1033, that injunction is the proper form of remedy to enforce the right of a stockholder in a private corporation, given by section 3254, Rev. St., to inspect
“Duryea's Starch,” in prominent letters, and also a picture of the manufacturing buildings, and the name of the company. After the starch bad been sold for many years, and had become identified with the company, the latter sold its business, trade-marks, and good will to another corporation, which continued the use of the package containing the name and picture, with its own name as manufacturer; Duryea agreeing not to go into the starch business for five years. At the expiration of this time he furnished capital to his sons, who formed a partnership with others, and procured other starch to be made for them, and sold it as “Starch Prepared by Duryea & Co.," but used strikingly different labels and packages. Their starch was in fact prepared in accordance with directions given by them, or Duryea, Sr., who subsequently purchased the assets of the firm, and continued the business. It was held that this was a proper use by Duryea and his sons of their own name, and could not be enjoined.
EVIDENCE-USAGE AND CUSTOM-SALE—"DRY Goops.”—The Supreme Court of Iowa bold, in Wood v. Allen, 82 N. W. Rep. 451, that it is error to exclude evidence that the term “dry goods," used in a written contract, bears a meaning, according to the usage of the locality, under which notions, clothing, hats and caps are excluded, since such evidence does not contradict the terms of the contract, but merely applies them to its subject-matter; and the error is not cured by an instruction that “dry goods” means, in a commercial sense, such fabrics as are made by weaving." The court calls attention to the fact that evidence has been admitted to explain the words “fur," Astor v. Insurance Co., 7 Cow. 202; "roots,” Coit v. Insurance Co., 7 Johns. 385; “barrels," Miller v. Stevens, 100 Mass. 518; “C. 0. D.," Collender v. Dinsmore, 55 N. 'Y. 200; "screened coal,”' Manufacturing Co. v. McKee's Admr., 77 Pa. St. 170; “1,000 shingles," Soutier v. Kellerman, 18 Mo. 509; "thousand feet," Brown v. Brooks, 25 Pa. St. 210; "fancy goods and Yankee notion store,” Barnum v. Insurance Co., 97 N. Y. 188; “product," Stewart v. Smith, 28 III. 397 ; "outstanding accounts,'' McCulsky v. Klosterman, 20 Oreg. 108, 25 Pac. Rep. 366, 10 L. R. A. 785; "furniture and fixtures,” Brody v. Cbittenden, 106 Iowa, 524, 76 N. W. Rep. 1009; "top buggies with poles," Manufacturing Co. v. Randall, 62 Iowa, 245, 17 N. W. Rep. 507.
In the recent case of Everett v. Indiana Paper Co., 57 N. E. Rep. 281, decided by tbe Appellate Court of Indiana, it was held that a contract for the delivery of 53,000 pounds paper, on the basis of 37x48, 53 lbs. 500 sheets,” is not so plain as to the manner of weighing the paper that there could be but one conclusion. It was, therefore, held that evidence of a custom or usage in the paper business, that an order for 53,000 paper, "37x48, 53 lbs. 500 sbeets," means that the weight of wrapping necessary to safely transport it is to be included in the specified weight, is admissible
to show what is meant by the terms lised, and does not contradict the express terms of the contract. The court said in part: “Nor can it be said that such a usage is unreasonable, contrary to law, or opposed to public policy. In Morningstar v. Cunningham, 110 Ind. 328, 11 N. E. Rep. 593, it is said: 'Parties who are engaged in a particular trade or business, or persons acciistomed to deal with those engaged in a particular business, may be presumed to have knowledge of the uniform course of sucb business. Its usage may, therefore, in the absence of an agreement to the contrary, reasonably be supposed to have entered into and formed part of their contracts and understandings in relation to such business as ordinary incidents thereto. Railway Co. y. Jobpston, 75 Ala. 596, 51 Am. Rep. 489; Mooney v. Insurance Co., 138 Mass. 375, 52 Am. Rep. 277; Machine Co. v. Daggett, 135 Mass. 582; Fitzimmops v. Academy, 81 Mo. 37; Cooper v. Kane, 19 Wend. 386; Kelton v. Taylor, 11 Lea, 264, 47 Am. Rep. 284, 7 Cent. L. J. 383.'?
RECEIVER JUDGMENT AGAINST INSOLVENT. CORPORATION POWER TO REOPEN.-It is held by the Supreme Court of Illinois, two of the members of the court dissenting, viz., the case of Peabody v. New England Waterworks Co., 56 N. E. Rep. 957, that the receiver of an insolvent corporation authorized by the corporation act to sue and to do all things necessary to close up its affairs, as commanded by decree of court, occupies such a relation that, for tbe protection of the corporation and its creditors, he may appear and move to reopen judgments against it obtained by fraud and collusion, and be allowed to defend, if their effect would be to diminish the estate which should properly come to him for distribution. The court says in part:
“Tbe provisions of section 25 are not intended to limit the powers of a receiver appointed under the chancery practice, but to extend the powers of the court in the matter of the causes which shall be deemed sufficient to authorize the appointment of a receiver, and the causes for which the affairs of a corporation may be closed up. A receiver is to be regarded as the representative, not only of the corporation, having power of asserting its rights, taking its title and subject to its liabilities, but occupies a still broader position, for he represents not only the corporation, but also its creditors; and under his duties as the representative of the latter class he is invested with powers and may do acts that could not be done by a mere representative of the corporation. It is said in Gluck & B. Rec. p. 177: "The receiver of an insolvent corporation, while, as a general rule, he is to be regarded as the representative of the corporation, asserting its rights, taking its title, and subject to its liabilities, in one respect occupies a broader position, and represents not only the corporation, but also the creditors; and when, in any proceeding, he occupies exclusively the latter status, he may do, and under some circumstances must do, many things which, if his