the requests of the Chief Signal Officer of the Army for their immediate and efficient cooperation. From Lieutenant Stamford came the first official information, beyond the mere fact of a battle and Colonel Liscum's lamented death, of the condition, necessities, and prospects of the small American force then on duty in China; also information as to the very trying conditions under which cable and other communication were had. It appeared that the only way of sending a cablegram was by its transmission by means of a small boat to the American squadron, which lay 10 miles offshore, after which the cablegram had to await the sending of a manof-war to Chefoo, from which point the cablegram experienced its vicissitudes over the Chinese land lines to Shanghai. From Lieutenant Stamford came, after the long silence and great period of anxiety when news from the besieged legations in Pekin was lacking in Europe and throughout the world, the first cheering assurance of their safety. On July 23 Lieutenant Stamford sent a cablegram, received July 27, as follows: * With reference to your telegram of 18th, just received, conditions, prospects, health command good. * * Fairly reliable reports state our minister and people in Pekin all well on the 20th. After General Chaffee's arrival in China, Lieutenant Stamford remained as signal officer of the division until the arrival at Taku carly in August of Major Scriven, from Iloilo. On August 3, Lieutenant Stamford cabled that he had commenced the construction of a Signal Corps telegraph line from Tientsin to Pekin, coincident with the advance of the allied army toward the capital of China. On his arrival, Major Scriven continued Lieutenant Stamford in his field command of the Signal Corps force. Col. James Allen, realizing the absolute necessity of field transportation for the construction of a telegraph line, had obtained an army wagon for the exclusive use of the Signal Corps detachment which took it along from Manila. Unfortunately, and under most urgent necessity, this transportation was taken away from the corps, leaving it to put up a telegraph line of 150 miles without means of land transportation. In this emergency Lieutenant Stamford followed the example of the armies of eight nations which were levying upon all carts, mules, horses, coolies, and other local means of transportation. By dint of great energy he succeeded in pressing into service a motley variety of carts and mules, together with a considerable number of Chinese laborers. Lieutenant Stamford carried with him all indispensable instruments, and as much wire, lances, and insulators as was possible. He was, however, obliged to rely on the courtesy of the officers of the British army, who supplied him with many lances and also transported his surplus wire by lighters up the river to Matow. Until Matow was reached Lieutenant Stamford, by extraordinary exertions, had succeeded in keeping Chaffee's division in communication with Tientsin and scarcely a night passed without the establishment of a Signal Corps telegraph office at American headquarters. At Matow, however, the wire gave out, and Lieutenant Stamford found himself obliged to wait two days for the arrival of the extra wire by lighters, but by most extraordinary exertions he succeeded in covering the ground lost by two days' marches and brought Chaffee's command again in communication with Tientsin. The conditions under which these operations were conducted in the field were most trying. They entailed not only marching as fast as the army and the construction of a telegraph line equal in length to the daily marches, but also the establishment of telegraph stations at night, their dismantling in the morning, and the dispatch of telegrams during a considerable part of the night. The difficulties were greatly enhanced by the fact that for days at a time the detachment was obliged to work without escort or any protection other than reliance on its own members. Most unfortunately, this labor, exhausting at the best, was done under most unfavorable climatic conditions, the heat being so excessive as to frequently disable for hours the most energetic men of the Signal Corps. Many of the Chinese laborers were prostrated, and in one day two of them dropped dead from heat and overexertion. Lieutenant Stamford was alive to the necessities of the occasion, realizing that the nearest telegraphic force was two days behind him. This was the military telegraph organization of the Japanese army, which, being near home, not only had its full equipment, but also a force of 100 enlisted men and 20 or more army carts. As it was, all telegraphic reports of advance operations of the allied armies in the march to Pekin necessarily passed over the Signal Corps line. The occupation of Pekin was thus reported. It is to be added that during the advance the first information as to the capture of Yangt-sun, on August 6, was received from Major Scriven, Signal Corps, although his telegram of that day was delayed three days in transmission-doubtless owing to the demoralized and congested condition of the Chinese land lines between Chefoo and Shanghai. In view of the trying and unfavorable conditions recited, it is a source of gratification that the Signal Corps detachment justified the confidence placed in it by General Chaffee and by the Chief Signal Officer. Through the labors of Lieutenant Stamford's men the American army carried the first telegraphic wire into Pekin, where the first telegraph office was installed in the house of Minister Conger. Fortunately, this action permitted General Chaffee, in Pekin, to extend courtesies, in the way of transmitting telegrams, to officials of the British, Russian, French, German, Italian, and even Chinese governments, and likewise to the press. So strenuous were the labors of the enlisted Signal Corps men, both before and after their arrival at Pekin, that it was with difficulty that telegraphic work was maintained at Pekin, owing to the large number of operators incapacitated by sickness. It should not be unrecorded that the United States, so active and efficient in the relief of the legations at Pekin, used every effort to carry out the unanimous request of the foreign consuls in China looking to the prompt supplementing of cable communications by connecting Shanghai with Chefoo and Taku by an international line. Under the instructions of the Secretary of War the Chief Signal Officer made every effort to bring about the end desired. While no international cable was laid, there is no doubt that the energetic exertions of the United States facilitated the prompt solution of the question. The outcome was the extension of commercial cables-the Eastern Extension and Great Northern companies have laid cables from Shanghai to Chefoo, from Chefoo to Port Arthur, from Chefoo to Weihaiwei, and from Chefoo to Taku. In other words, the finality of the cable question in China was on lines in keeping with the march of events in other directions. As a final outcome, Great Britain and Russia have enlarged the sphere of their influence by extending their cable systems to important Chinese stations previously inaccessible, while Germany is likewise engaged. From the present outlook the entire Asiatic coast will continue to be tied up by European cable corporations, to the utter exclusion of facilities entirely American. MILITARY DIVISION OF CUBA. The telegraph lines and Signal Corps work connected with the Military Division of Cuba have remained throughout the year in charge of Col. H. H. C. Dunwoody, Signal Corps, who was assigned to this important duty in December, 1898, and under whom the telegraph system of Cuba has been developed to a high degree of efficiency. Colonel Dunwoody's interesting annual report is printed in full as an appendix to the report of the commanding general, Military Division of Cuba. In consequence, the Chief Signal Officer of the Army confines himself to a brief résumé of operations of the Signal Corps in Cuba, supplemented by extracts from reports (Appendix 3) made by Colonel Dunwoody under paragraph 1541, Army Regulations, on matters of current interest or special importance. As pointed out in previous reports, the first action taken in Cuba was to construct a military telegraph line of a temporary character, so as to promptly place Maj. Gen. John R. Brooke, the commanding general, in direct communication with the garrisons on the island. This labor was performed by the Signal Corps of the Army, and at the expense of the United States. Such energy and application were shown under Colonel Dunwoody's direction as resulted in the establishment, within less than three and one-half months, of a telegraph line from Habana to Santiago. The system was shortly afterwards extended east and west, so that telegraphic communication was had from Baracoa, the extreme eastern end of the island, to San Juan y Martinez at the western end. The line was scarcely up before the entire Signal Corps force in Cuba-a body of able, energetic, and skilled volunteers-was disbanded and replaced by recruits enlisted in the regular Signal Corps. Large withdrawals of skilled men, and the heavy rains of the wet season immediately following, caused more or less line interruptions between Habana and Santiago. The native linemen, who were necessarily employed to replace the Signal Corps men, by their incompetency and indifference contributed to the inefficient working of the line. The rainy season over, Colonel Dunwoody took active steps to correct this condition of affairs. Capt. Samuel Reber, Signal Corps, made general superintendent of the lines, inspected the whole system from Habana to Santiago, located defects, and indicated remedies. Capt. Carl F. Hartmann, signal officer, Department of Santiago, initiated a system of repairs in his department calculated to remove the unfortunate results arising from the heterogeneous collection of telegraph wires of different gauges and material, which arose from the urgent necessity of throwing into one circuit, immediately after the surrender of Santiago, all field and permanent lines. Later, this work was continued with skill and energy by his successor, Lieut. John J. Ryan. Meanwhile, with the revival of business it became necessary to place the Cuban telegraph system on a permanent basis, so that the increas ing commercial business, which had been handled by the Signal Corps of the Army, could be made thoroughly efficient. Colonel Dunwoody, alive to the situation, took proper steps to accomplish the desired end, in which he was heartily supported by Maj. Gen. Leonard Wood. It should be understood that the amounts received for the handling of commercial business were merged with the insular funds of the island, and that monthly allotments were made from these funds by the commanding general, Military Division of Cuba. It thus follows that the military telegraph lines in Cuba, while constructed, operated, and maintained by the Signal Corps of the Army, have been in some ways aided by the insular funds. The signal corps military telegraph system in Cuba now comprises 3,256 miles, which is distributed in detail as shown in Appendix No. 3. This mileage is divided as follows: Department of Habana and Penar del Rio. Miles. 569 1,366 1,321 The main features of the system show main lines lengthwise through the center of the island, from the extreme east to the western end, with thirteen intersecting cross lines from north to south, covering the entire island with a network of telegraph lines of which almost every mile is in excellent condition. The bulk of the business, on the line between Habana, Matanzas, and Santa Clara, the great commercial centers, has a thoroughly reliable, excellent service by three separate wires. To the eastward from Santa Clara to Santiago there are two complete wires. The efficiency of the service is shown by the record of Government telegrams passing between the United States and Porto Rico, which are routed via Habana and Signal Corps lines, and from Porto Rico via Santiago and Signal Corps lines. The orders require that whenever the telegraph service between Habana and Santiago is interrupted the Government messages shall be turned over to the Cuba Submarine Telegraph Company. For several months not one Porto Rican message, as shown by Washington records, has been transferred to the Cuba Submarine Telegraph Company. The messages between Habana and Santiago are usually handled in twenty minutes, including booking, copying, etc. To perfect the general system the principle of alternative routes has been adopted, and fully three-fourths of all the Cuban stations can be reached by two different routes, thus maintaining telegraphic communication constantly even in the worst of weather. As an illustration of the present efficient service, Colonel Dunwoody states that at a few moments' notice the commanding general at Habana can be put in direct communication with any body of troops in the island. The problem of direct communication between Habana and Santiago, which was never possible under Spanish management, has been thoroughly solved, and the ordinary business between Habana and Santiago is now carried on direct. Messages are transmitted ordinarily with one set of repeaters at Puerto Principe, which in very bad weather is supplemented by a second set at Santa Clara. Every effort has been made by Colonel Dunwoody to locate errors, with a view to the elimination of incompetent and indifferent employees. It should be said that the reconstruction, repairs, and additional work in connection with the system has been done under very great difficulties. Railway facilities were extremely limited, and unfortunately the greater part of the work lay to the east of Santa Clara where the use of a railway was not possible. Most of the work was done over country where the use of wagons was impracticable, so that the slow and tedious methods consequent on the use of pack trains were necessitated. In certain sections of the country iron poles have been used, especially where a wood line was subject to destruction owing to the burning over of cultivated fields. The very great advantages that have arisen from the military telegraph system to the Cuban public are plainly evident. Not only are many points now reached which were before without telegraphic communication, but at the most important coast points the cost of the service has been very greatly reduced. This is illustrated by the fact that the Cuba Submarine Telegraph Company has reduced its HabanaSantiago tariff from a minimum charge of $2.50 a message, for a minimum of ten words, to the minimum charge of 50 cents per message, based on a minimum of five words. The military telegraph system has, however, made no attempt to solicit business, and has established an amicable and satisfactory working arrangement with the Cuba Submarine Telegraph Company for the joint handling of telegrams between military and cable lines. The commercial rate from Washington to all points in Cuba beyond Habana ranged from 44 to 94 cents per word prior to the SpanishAmerican war. Any point on the island beyond Habana can now be reached over the military telegraph lines by commercial messages at rates varying from 22 cents per word, at a minimum, to 26 cents maximum. There is a gradual increase in the commercial business, which will undoubtedly grow with the revival of industries. As an illustration of this may be noted the fact that the receipts for August, 1900, amounted to $6,031.58, being an excess of $2,429.30, or 42 per cent, over the receipts for the corresponding month of 1899. There were handled during the year 345,470 messages, about equally divided between governmental and commercial messages. There have been collected as "this line" receipts for commercial messages sent during the fiscal year $57,062.04, and there was transferred to cable companies for commercial business done by them, for which the Signal Corps received the funds in trust, $20,433.55. As the value of the governmental business to different points in the island aggregates $134,974.86, the grand aggregate of business done amounts to $212,470.45. The direct benefits that have accrued to the military administration by the reconstruction and extension of military telegraph lines in Cuba have been many. As an illustration may be quoted the communication of Lieut. Col. Eugene T. Wilson, commissary of subsistence of volunteers, Department of Santiago, who says: It gives me great pleasure to testify to the great aid afforded the commissary department in the Departinent of Santiago by your rehabilitation of the telegraph lines in this department. Before we had telegraphic communication, on account of long distances by water over which the mails passed and the slowness of transmission of mail by pack train, great difficulty was experienced in packing emergency orders for distant points. Ships would come in bringing mail with tremendous orders for commissaries, which would have to be shipped on the return of the same steamer. Now I can call up all supply points in this department by telegraph and find out how they stand in the matter of rations. |