Actors

the meaning of § 13 of the Compensation Act, and that therefore when such medical officer was killed, his dependents were not entitled to compensation. Murphy v. Enniscorthy Board of Guardians (1908), 42 Irish L. T. 246; 2 B. W. C. C. 291.

The relation of master and servant does not exist between an inmate of a charitable institution, even though the inmate does work about the building in which he has a home, and the institution receives a small sum each month under the agreement by which the institution cares for such person. Cunningham v. Sheltering Arms, 61 Misc. 501; 115 Supp. 576; aff'd 135 App. Div. 178; 119 Supp. 1033.

13. Policeman injured while acting as fireman.

Where a police constable was acting as a fireman under an Act of Parliament, it was held that he was acting as a member of a police force, and was not a workman within the meaning of § 13 of the Act. Sudell v. Blackburn Corporation (1910), 3 B. W. C. C. 227.

14. National guardsmen.

Applicant was a member of a company of Infantry in the Wisconsin National Guard. While in the course of his duties in the annual encampment of his regiment he sustained injuries which caused hernia. The Attorney General of Wisconsin held that the applicant was an employé of the State and was entitled to compensation, and the Board sustained the opinion and granted compensation. Hanson v. State of Wisconsin, Wisconsin Industrial Accident Board, February 4, 1913.

15. Actors.

"It is very doubtful whether actors and vaudeville artists are employés within the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation Act. Most of their employments would undoubtedly be outside the relation of master and servant, and be that

Shareworkers on vessels

of independent contractors not covered by the Act. The status of employment in some classes of vaudeville might, however, be an exception, owing to the circumstances of service and to the direct control exercised by the employer over the performers." Massachusetts Industrial Accident Board, Bulletin No. 2, Jan., 1913, page 5.

Of course the doctrine announced in the foregoing case would not apply to all actors as most of them are employed on a salary and doubtless would come within the meaning of the term employé. A more serious question arises as to the law which governs when actors are engaged in one State to travel in a dozen or more other States. See page 34.

16. Partners.

When partners entered into an agreement that one of their number should act as a working foreman and he received 33s. a week for his services as such in addition to his share of the profits, it was held that his widow was not entitled to compensation from the other partners because of the death of such foreman partner by accident, as he was not a workman within the meaning of the Act. Ellis v. Ellis & Co. (1905), 92 L. T. 718; 7 W. C. C. 97.

17. Shareworkers on vessels.

Two decisions of the Court of Appeal in England in which different conclusions were reached by the same judges, have left in some doubt the question whether the master of a ship who sails the same on shares with the owners, is an employé of the owners. In the case of Boon v. Quance, No. 1 (1909), 102 L. T. 443; 3 B. W. C. C. 106, the Court of Appeal of England held that the master was not the employé of the owner. In that case the captain, who sailed a small vessel with a crew of three under the thirds or sharing system, was at liberty to take any cargoes to any place he pleased, the owner receiving one-third of the gross receipts and doing necessary repairs to the ship. The captain received the re

Shareworkers on vessels

maining two-thirds, and had to pay and feed the crew (whom he engaged) and also pay harbor dues. The vessel went down with all hands and the captain's dependents claimed compensation. It was held that there was no contract of service between the captain and the owners and consequently the dependents were not entitled to compensation.

In the subsequent case of Jones v. Owners of the Ship "Alice and Eliza" (1910), 3 B. W. C. C. 495, the crew of a small schooner consisted of the captain, a mate and sometimes a boy. The master, in returning to the schooner at night, fell from the dock and was drowned. The claimant's evidence was that the captain received two-thirds of the income from the operation of the vessel for his services. The owner did not submit any evidence, but contended that under the doctrine announced in the case of Boon v. Quance, No. 1, supra, there was no contract of hiring and that therefore the captain's dependents could not maintain a right to compensation. The court awarded compensation nevertheless, distinguishing the two cases. The line of demarcation between them seems to be that in the Boon case the evidence was that the captain had full control of the ship and paid to the owner one-third of the receipts. While in the Jones case the only evidence before the court was that the master was remunerated by the payment to him of two-thirds of the gross receipts. The court commented on the failure of the owner to give any evidence at the trial and said that under the testimony given there was a distinction between the two cases.

In a later case the doctrine of the decision in Boon v. Quance is reaffirmed. Thus a vessel was sailed under the "sharing system." The captain had authority to trade between any ports he pleased, the owner having no control over him in this matter. The owner received one-half of the gross receipts, after deducting port charges, etc., and the captain retained the remainder, out of which he paid the crew's wages. It was held that there was no contract

Shareworkers on vessels

of service between the owner and the captain, and that the latter's widow was not entitled to compensation. Hughes v. Postlethwaite (1910), 4 B. W. C. C. 105.

A firm of fish-curers engaged A to work a "flitboat" belonging to them, and authorized him to find another man to go along with him. A engaged B to work under him on the boat, which was not in any sense a fishing boat, but was used for carrying cargo between the curing stations and vessels lying off shore and landing goods from steamers. A and B were to be remunerated by one-third each of the gross earnings of the boat, the remaining third going to the owners. The boat was maintained by the owners, and both the men and the boat were subject to their orders. When not required by the owners he worked for other curers, such work being undertaken by A as skipper on behalf of the boat, and the rates charged being the same as those paid by the owners to the boat for similar work. When the men were not employed afloat, the owners, whenever possible, supplied them with work ashore. No part of the capital embarked was supplied by A or B, nor were they liable for any loss that might be incurred. In the course of his employment as boatman, B was drowned, and it was held that he was not a partner but a workman in the sense of the Act, and therefore his dependents were entitled to compensation. Jamieson v. Clark (1908), 46 Scotch L. R. 73; 2 B. W. C. C. 228.

A member of the crew of a trawler, which is worked on shares, and who is therefore a co-adventurer, is not entitled to compensation where he does some other act voluntarily which is in connection with his regular work. Whelan v. Great Northern Steam Fishing Co. (1909), 100 L. T. 912; 2 B. W. C. C. 235.

A

person who owned ten sixty-fourth shares of a trading schooner was employed as a master by the managing owner and met his death while in the course of his employment. It was held that in the absence of any proof of partnership

Shareworkers on vessels

or joint-adventure in a course of trading, the master was a workman and his dependents were entitled to recover compensation from the managing owner. Carswell v. Sharpe and Others (1910), 47 Scotch L. R. 335; 3 B. W. C. C. 552.

An engineer, on a steam fishing vessel, who was injured, was remunerated by 1/24 share of the net profits of a catch, with a guarantee, by the owners of the vessel, that should his profit fall short of 30s. a week, they would make it up to that amount. It was held that the workman was "remunerated by a share," and therefore not entitled to compensation, as the word "solely" is not to be read into § 7 (2) of the Act. Admiral Fishing Co. v. Robinson (1910), 102 L. T. 203; 3 B. W. C. C. 247.

Where one G, a member of a fishing vessel, was injured while the vessel was at sea and engaged in fishing, and it appeared that he was compensated by a share of the receipts from the trip, based as follows: From the gross price of the fish sold after any trip the owners of the vessel were entitled to deduct commission, discount, and other expenses pertaining to the trip, and the net balance remaining was then divided into fourteen shares, of which G received one-eighth share. While in port and employed in cleaning or making repairs he was paid a daily wage of 5s. It was held that G was remunerated by a share of the profits of the gross earnings of the working of the fishing vessel, and was not entitled to a recovery of compensation under § 7 (2) of the Act. Aberdeen Steam Trawling & Fishing Co. v. Gill (1907), 45 Scotch L. R. 247; 1 B. W. C. C. 274.

The mate of a coasting vessel, who is a co-adventurer in the enterprise is not entitled to compensation from the owners of the vessel. Hoare v. Barge "Cecil Rhodes" (1911), 5 B. W. C. C. 49.

A vessel was worked on shares. expenses were deducted from gross

Tonnage and pilotage freights, and the cap

tain took two-thirds of the residue, paying therefrom all other expenses. He made all contracts for freight and en