Brief review of the American laws thus far passed Employers' Liability Cases, were printed in full in the first edition of this work. They are omitted from this edition for the reason that they are now easily obtainable in the regular reports and the space they occupied was badly needed for important new material. The Ives case and the Second Employers' Liability Cases have been discussed in the preceding pages. Digests of the decisions in Massachusetts, Ohio, Washington and Wisconsin are appended. Opinions of the Justices, 209 Mass. 607; 96 N. E. Rep. 308; Bradbury's Workmen's Compensation L., 1st Ed., p. 650; 1 N. C. C. A. 557. The principal points decided by the Court were the following: 1. The rules of law relating to contributory negligence and assumption of risk and the effect of negligence by a fellow servant were established by the courts, not by the Constitution, and the legislature may change them or do away with them altogether, as defenses, as in its wisdom in the exercise of powers intrusted to it by the Constitution it deems will be best for the "good and welfare of this Commonwealth." 2. There is nothing unconstitutional in the provision of the Compensation Act that it shall not apply to domestic servants and farm laborers, nor in the provision that an employé shall be deemed to have waived his right of action at common law if he shall not have given notice to his employer as in the act provided. 3. As the Compensation Act does not contain any legal compulsion to an acceptance by an employer or an employé of the provisions for compensation in lieu of damages, it is not in conflict with the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution prohibiting the taking of property without due process of law, and constitutes a valid exercise of the power of the legislature of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. State ex rel. Yaple v. Creamer, as Treasurer, 85 Ohio St. 349; 97 N. E. Rep. 602; Bradbury's Workmen's Compensa Brief review of the American laws thus far passed tion L., 1st Ed., p. 764; 1 N. C. C. A. 30. The Court decided that: 1. The Workmen's Compensation Act providing for a classification of certain industries where five or more workmen are employed, establishing a State insurance fund by premiums to be paid at the rate of ninety per cent by the employers and ten per cent by the workmen and creating a State Liability Board of Awards to administer such fund and providing that as to employers who do not accept the compensation principle that certain common-law defenses shall be abolished in actions by their workmen, is a valid exercise of the police power of the Legislature and is not unconstitutional as taking private property without due process of law contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution; nor is it invalid as violating the right to a trial jury, nor that it deprives parties of the freedom of contract or impairs the obligation of contracts, nor that it makes an unjust and arbitrary classification of industries for the purpose of the statute. State, ex rel. Davis Smith Co. v. Clausen, 65 Wash. 156; 117 Pac. Rep. 1101; Bradbury's Workmen's Compensation L., 1st Ed., p. 703; 3 N. C. C. A. 599. The following are the points decided: 1. The test of the validity of a law which creates a liability without fault is not found in the inquiry: Does it do an objectionable thing? But is found rather in the inquiry: Is there no reasonable ground to believe that public safety, health or general welfare is promoted thereby? 2. The Legislature cannot declare a particular industry commonly engaged in by the people, to be unlawful, which under all circumstances, must necessarily be harmless and innocent; but it can regulate and control and prohibit any industry, however innocent it may have been at its inception, whenever it becomes a menace to the employés engaged in it, the people surrounding it, or to any considerable number of people at large, no matter from whatsoever cause Brief review of the American laws thus far passed the menace may arise. This it does under the police power. 3. As the act in question has a reasonable relation to the protection of the public health, morals, safety and welfare, it will not be set aside because it may incidentally deprive some person of his property without fault or take the property of one person to pay the obligations of another. 4. That portion of the act which permits certain sections to stand even though others are declared to be invalid does not render the act unconstitutional. 5. Classifying industries for the purpose of collecting premiums and distributing compensation does not render the act invalid as class legislation. 6. The act is not invalid as creating taxation which is not uniform. 7. The statute is not unconstitutional as infringing the right of trial by jury. Borgnis v. Falk Co., 147 Wis. 327; 133 N. W. Rep. 209; Bradbury's Workmen's Compensation L., 1st Ed., p. 656; 3 N. C. C. A. 649. The Court decided the following points: 1. Where a constitution contains on a particular subject no express command but only general language or policy, the conditions prevailing at the time of its adoption must have their due weight; but the changed social, economic and governmental conditions and ideals of the time as well as the problems which the changes have produced, must also logically enter into the consideration and become influential factors in the settlement of problems of constitutional interpretation. 2. The term "public policy" is frequently used very vaguely, and evidently is so used in the Compensation Law. It is, however, quite a definite thing. Public policy on a given subject is determined by the Constitution itself or by statutes passed within constitutional limitations. Only in the absence of such constitutional or statutory determination may it be determined by the decisions of the courts. Brief review of the American laws thus far passed 3. The classification of employers into those who do and those who do not elect to come under the compensation feature of the statute and giving to each different rights and remedies is not unlawful. 4. The provisions of the statute making it applicable only to employers who employ four or more workmen does not constitute an unlawful classification. 5. The provision that if one section or portion of the law shall be declared to be invalid other portions shall not be affected, or shall be affected in a particular way, is not unconstitutional. 6. There is no greater right to abolish the common-law defenses as applicable to actions growing out of injuries in the hazardous industries than there is to abolish those defenses in relation to the non-hazardous occupations. 7. The statute is not unconstitutional as coercing employers to accept its provisions by abolishing their commonlaw defenses if they refuse to elect to be bound by the compensation principle. 8. The Industrial Commission is not a court within the meaning of article 7, § 16, of the constitution of Wisconsin and therefore the statute creating such commission is not unconstitutional. 9. The right to bring an action in the future for a tort not yet committed can in no way affect the contract of employment between an employer and his employés, and, therefore the Compensation Act is not unconstitutional as violating the obligation of the contract between an employer and his workmen. There has been much discussion as to the constitutionality of the New Jersey Act. So far it has been sustained by the Supreme Court of that State, although there is an appeal pending to the Court of Errors and Appeals in New Jersey. Sexton v. Newark District Telegraph Company, 2 Bradbury's Pl. & Pr. Rep. 221; 3 N. C. C. A. 569. The constitutionality of the New Jersey law has also been discussed in two cases in Extra-territorial effect of compensation statutes New York courts. Albanese v. Stewart, 2 Bradbury's Pl. & Pr. Rep. 189; Pensabene v. Auditore Co., Ibid. 197; and the same case in the Appellate Division, Ibid. 212. ARTICLE B--TWO FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS ESPECIALLY IMPORTANT IN AMERICA 1. Extra-territorial effect of workmen's compensation statutes. The question of the extra-territorial effect of the workmen's compensation acts naturally is subdivided into two parts: I. When may the authorities of a State enforce the compensation act of their own State in relation to accidents which happen beyond the borders of their own State? II. When may the courts of one State enforce the compensation laws of another State, in relation to accidents which happen, (a) Within the boundaries of the State the law of which is sought to be enforced; (b) Within the boundaries of the State where the proceeding is brought; or (c) Within the boundaries of a third State? I The answer to the question in subdivision I, appears to depend, very largely at least, upon the provisions of the statute which is thus sought to be enforced. Up to this time it has been held by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, the Michigan Industrial Accident Board, the Industrial Commission of Wisconsin and the Courts of Great Britain, that a statute of this character has no extra-territorial effect, and that where an accident happens outside of the State, or of the country, as the case may be, that a claim for compensa |