Unnecessarily going to other portion of employer's premises and on attempting to cross the trestle, it gave way, and the conductor was killed. It was held that considering the emergency and that the conductor was exercising such ordinary care as was necessary for the safe movement of the train, he was acting within the scope of his employment. (E. L.) Terre Haute & I. R. Co. v. Fowler, 56 N. E. Rep. 228; 154 Ind. 682; 48 L. R. A. 531. The Factory Act of Kansas (Laws 1903, ch. 356, § 4), providing that every person owning or operating any manufacturing establishment in which machinery is used, shall furnish and supply for use therein certain specified safeguards for machinery and appliances, is not limited in application to workmen engaged in their ordinary duties, but is designated to protect persons employed in manufacturing establishments while in the performance of any duty, whether ordinary and general, or exceptional and occasional. (E. L.) Caspar v. Lewin, 109 Pac. R. 657; 82 Kans. 604. Where a logging company also ran a railroad, and the plaintiff, an employé of the company, was directed to act as a brakeman on the railroad, it was held that he was an employé of both the railroad and the logging company, as respects injuries he received while acting as such brakeman. (E. L.) Barrow v. B. R. Lewis Lumber Co., 95 Pac. Rep. 682; 14 Idaho, 698. 16. Going to portions of employer's premises other than those necessarily used by the workman, for his own convenience or pleasure.1 A master's duty to furnish his servant a safe place for work extends to such parts of his premises only as he has prepared for their occupancy while doing his work, and to such other parts as he knows, or ought to know, they are accustomed to use while doing it, and when a servant goes to some other part for his own convenience, the general rule is that he is regarded as a licensee merely. (E. L.) Connell v. See paragraphs 4 and 10, ante, in this Article. Unnecessarily going to other portion of employer's premises New York Central & H. R. R. Co., 144 App. Div. 664; 129 Supp. 666. Where a servant is injured in a place where he has no right to be, or if he goes out of his employment for some private purpose, and not on his employer's business, he has no cause of action against the employer for injuries. (E. L.) Pioneer Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Talley, 43 So. Rep. 800; 000 Ala. 000. The rule that the master owes a duty to furnish his servant with a reasonably safe place to perform his work can have no application where the servant, when injured, has completed the work and, for his own convenience, goes to a place where his work does not call him, to seek a place of shelter. (E. L.) Sutton v. Wabash R. Co., 152 Ill. App. 138. An employé after quitting his day's work, instead of leaving his employer's premises by the usual means of egress, remained upon the premises and went to a part thereof remote from the part where he was employed, for the purpose of seeing an employé of another department of his employer, on some personal matter of interest to himself, and while so doing was injured. It was held that the injury did not occur in the course of the employment. Re A. V. Mitchell, Claim No. 3834, Ohio State Lia. Bd. Awd., June 2, 1913. Where a servant voluntarily and without any necessity growing out of his work, and for his own convenience, goes to a position or some place where it is not necessary or proper that he should be, either in going to or returning from his services, he thereby suspends the relation of master and servant as between his master and himself. (E. L.) Lynch v. Texas & P. Ry. Co., 133 S. W. Rep. 522; 000 Tex. Civ. App. 000. In the last mentioned case the plaintiff was in the defendant's employ as a hostler, his duties being to watch for the arrival of engines in the yard, and be at the place where they stopped to take charge and control of them when they were disconnected from the train, and operate them to the turn table or round house. On the night he was injured a Unnecessarily going to other portion of employer's premises long freight train came into the yard and the plaintiff attempted to climb to the top of one of the cars to walk forward to the train toward the engine, so as to be near it when it stopped. In this position he was crushed between the car and a box standing on an adjacent track. Hostlers sometimes got on to the cars to traverse the yard to the point where the engine stopped. The yard master knew of this habit and had forbidden it. It was held that the plaintiff was a mere licensee and could not recover. An employé who was killed on a freight elevator, was on the elevator at the time not as an employé of the defendant discharging duties within the scope of his employment, but at best under an implied license for his own pleasure and convenience, and he was familiar with its construction and operation. It was held that the only duty that such use could impose on the defendant would be to operate it with ordinary care in view of such use. (E. L.) O'Brien v. Western Steel Co., 13 S. W. Rep. 402; 100 Mo. 182. Although a servant's regular duties required him to go upon the roof of a mill in which he worked, yet if, at the time he was injured by the falling of the roof, he was on the roof not in the discharge of a duty within the scope of his employment, the master is not liable although he was negligent in permitting the roof to be defective. (E. L.) Mitchell-Tranter Co. v. Ehmett, 65 S. W. Rep. 805; 23 Ky. Law Rep. 1788; 55 L. R. A. 710. A stevedore worked on a lighter which was reached by passing from a rear hatch of a ship through a port-hole in the side. He went from the hatch to the fore part of the ship and left his coat, which could have been left at some other place more convenient to his place of employment. In the evening he got his coat and without attempting to reach the rear hatch, he fell into an unguarded hatchway lying entirely outside of the direct line between the rear hatch and the port-hole. It was held that his employer was not liable as the workman's duties did not require him to be where he Unnecessarily going to other portion of employer's premises was when he was injured. (E. L.) Kennedy v. Chase, 52 Pac. Rep. 33; 119 Cal. 637. A coal mine employé who left the part of the mine in which he was hired to work and went to another part of the mine to get a tool, which he had loaned to another employé, was struck while returning, by a piece of slate which fell from the roof, and it was held that he could not recover for his injury, as the master's duty to furnish a safe place for work did not apply while the employé was outside of the place of his employment and in a place where he was neither invited nor expected to go. (E. L.) Brown v. Shirley Hill Coal Co., 94 N. E. Rep. 574; 47 Ind. App. 354. The deceased employé had gone to another part of the mine in which he was employed to visit a fellow laborer, during the noon hour. When returning he stopped on two occasions to pick slate from the roof of the mine and while so doing he came in contact with a live wire and was killed. It was held that he was not engaged in the business of his employer at the time of the injury, while returning from a visit undertaken upon his own volition, outside the part of the mine in which he was employed, and that therefore he could not recover from his employer. (E. L.) Ellsworth v. Metheny, 104 Fed. Rep. 119. The plaintiff was employed in unloading a gondola car and when the engine started to take the car to a switch, the plaintiff, who was then on the ground, jumped from the ground to ride down to the switch and back, although there was no work for him to do at the switch, and he merely rode down there to pass away the time until the car was returned. He was knocked off the car while it was in motion, by an overhanging tree limb. It was held that the plaintiff was not acting within the line of his employment when injured and that therefore the company was not liable. (E. L.) Southern Railway Co. v. Bentley, 56 So. R. 249; 1 Ala. App. 359. The plaintiff's intestate, who was a bridge foreman on the defendant's railroad, living at the time in an outfit car on Unnecessarily going to other portion of employer's premises a siding, went with his family on a velocipede car one afternoon to a spur track some two and a half miles distant, near which his father-in-law resided. The car was returned and in the evening, at about 7 o'clock, some of the men, by his direction, came after him with a hand car. He was then at his father-in-law's house, where he had been visiting since 5 o'clock, by which time his business for the defendant at the spur, if any, had been finished. At about 8:30 o'clock he started back with the men, having no light on the car, and while on the way was killed in a collision with a special train. It was held that at the time he was engaged in his own private affairs, and the relation of master and servant did not exist between him and the defendant, so as to make the defendant liable for injuries to their employés through the negligence of fellow servants. (E. L.) Russell v. Oregon Short Line R. Co., 155 Fed. Rep. 22. While resting, under a rule permitting him to do so, an employé may not needlessly wander from the proper sphere of his work into other departments of the establishment and be within the scope of his employment. But if no resting place is prescribed and no boundaries fixed, he may use his discretion in selecting a place to rest and may with due circumspection occupy any of the vacant places near his machine and in touch with his work. (E. L.) Pittsburg Vitrified Pav. & Build. Brick Co. v. Fisher, 100 Pac. Rep. 507; 79 Kan. 576. Where in an action for the death of a miner by the fall of a part of the roof, there was evidence that the injury occurred not in a passageway, but in a dangerous portion of the mine where decedent had no right to be, the court properly charged that if the accident did not occur in the passageway, but in a chamber where he was not required to be, that the defendant was not bound to keep such place reasonably safe, and plaintiff could not recover. (E. L.) Northern Coal & Coke Co. v. Allera, 104 Pac. Rep. 197; 46 Colo. 224. In the last mentioned case it was further held that a coal miner being killed |