Texas The Act is not entirely consistent, however. The provision which specifies the amount of compensation which shall be paid provides that "if any workman while he is subject to this Act and in the service of an employer who is thus bound to contribute to the Industrial Accident Fund, shall sustain a personal injury by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment caused by violent or external means, he, or his beneficiaries or dependents, if the injury result in death, shall receive compensation according to the following schedule:" § 21. It will be seen from the above that the words "caused by violent or external means' are added to § 21 and are not contained in § 12. "If the injury or death results to a workman from the deliberate intention of the workman himself to produce such injury or death" compensation shall not be allowed. § 22. RHODE ISLAND The compensation feature of the Rhode Island Act provides that compensation shall be paid if an employé "receives a personal injury by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment." Art. II, § 1. It will be observed that the word "accident" is omitted from the Rhode Island Act. "No compensation shall be allowed for the injury or death of an employé where it is proved that his injury or death was caused by his wilful intention to bring about the injury or death of himself or of another, or that the same resulted from his intoxication while on duty." Art. 2, § 2. TEXAS The Texas Act employs the term "personal injury sustained by an employé in the course of his employment.' Part 1, § 1. It will be observed that the word "accident" is omitted as is also the term "arising out of." It is a defense that "the injury was caused by the wilful Wisconsin intention of the employé to bring about the injury." Part I, § 1, subd. 3. WASHINGTON The Washington Act provides that "each workman who shall be injured whether upon the premises or upon the plant or, he being in the course of his employment, away from the plant of his employer," shall receive compensation. § 5. "The words injury or injured, as used in this act, refer only to an injury resulting from some fortuitous event as distinguished from the contraction of disease." §3. "If injury or death results to a workman from the deliberate intention of the workman himself to produce such injury or death," compensation shall not be paid. § 6. WEST VIRGINIA The State Insurance Fund is disbursed to employés who shall "have received injuries in this State in the course of and resulting from their employment." § 25. Compensation is denied where the injury is self-inflicted or caused by "the wilful misconduct or the intoxication of such employé." § 28. WISCONSIN Under the Wisconsin Act compensation is paid for "any personal injury accidentally sustained *** where at the time of the accident, the employé is performing service growing out of and incidental to his employment where the injury is proximately caused by accident and is not intentionally self-inflicted." § 2394-3. It is further provided in the same section that "every employé going to and from his employment in the ordinary and usual way, while on the premises of his employer, shall be deemed to be performing service growing out of and incidental to his employment." CHAPTER VII LIABILITY OF PRINCIPALS FOR INJURIES TO WORKMEN OF CONTRACTORS AND SUB It will be noted from the pages which follow that a majority of the compensation acts have special provisions on this subject. A clear distinction must be drawn between cases arising under these specific statutory provisions and those wherein the courts, under various sets of circumstances, have determined that workmen, ostensibly employed directly by a contractor or a subcontractor, were in fact employés of the principal or the contractor. Under the statutes the principal is held liable not on the ground that the relation of master and servant exists between him and the employés of his contractor or subcontractor, but solely Decisions under British Act by force of the statute. This provision was inserted to prevent principals, particularly in building operations, from escaping all liability by a series of contracts and subcontracts with dummy corporations without financial responsibility. 2. Decisions under British Act. A somewhat similar provision is contained in the British Act under which the decisions cited below were made. By an agreement entered into between the defendant and one Lovelace, the latter was to keep an airship on exhibition on the defendant's grounds, and pay the wages of the turnstile man who was to be a servant of the defendant corporation. Admission to the inclosure to view the airship was only to be obtained by ticket and the moneys collected daily by the turnstile man were to be paid, one-half to Lovelace, who agreed to pay the persons engaged by him, the defendant receiving the remainder of the receipts. For the purpose of carrying out the agreement Lovelace engaged a lecturer whose duties were to explain the various parts of the airship and the exploits of Lovelace. After the airship had been on exhibition for some time it exploded and the lecturer was so severely burned that he died as a result of the injuries. In a proceeding by the widow of the lecturer for compensation, it was held that the lecturer was not a "workman" within the meaning of § 13 of the Compensation Act of 1906; and even assuming that the lecturer was a workman, his remedy was against Lovelace and not against the defendant. Waites v. Franco-British Exhibition (Incorporated) (1909), 2 B. W. C. C. 199. Two men named Jones and Acocks determined to open a skating rink. They bought an existing iron building and contracted with Howarth to remove it for them to its new position. In the course of the work, a man employed by Howarth was injured and claimed compensation from Jones and Acocks, as principals, within the meaning of § 4 of the Decisions under British Act Act. It was held that Jones and Acocks were not principals within the meaning of the section mentioned and the application was dismissed. Skates v. Jones & Co. (1910), 3 B. W. C. C. 460. The deceased was a farm laborer who was in the habit of working for different farmers at 2s. 6d. a day, coming and going when and as he wished. He came to work for the respondent at hay harvest in June, 1907, and worked for him until July 4th of that year, when he worked for another farmer for a week; after which he came back and worked for the respondent until October 10, 1908, except on three days at different times, when he absented himself without notice, getting no wages for the days when he was away. On the morning of October 12th, 1908, the deceased came to the respondent's house with another laborer of the same kind prepared to work, and was told by the respondent's servant to go to a neighboring farmer, Andrews, who had sent a message to the respondent asking him to lend him a man to help in threshing, to which the respondent had answered that the deceased could go. The deceased therefore went to Andrews, and while threshing met with an accident which caused his death. It was held that the deceased's employment was of a casual nature, that he was a workman withing the meaning of § 13 of the Act, but that there was no contract of service between the workman and the respondent at the time of the accident, and therefore dependents were not entitled to compensation from the respondent. Boswell v. Gilbert (1909), 2 B. W. C. C. 251. A municipal corporation being desirous of clearing land of old buildings for the purpose of extending a market advertised for bids to remove the buildings and accepted the proposition of one Todd who offered to remove the buildings and pay £15, provided he could have the bricks in the buildings. This offer was accepted. During the progress of the work a man employed by Todd was killed. It was held that the widow of the deceased could recover compensation |