Ability to do light work after accident; exaggeration of injury ployer was directed to pay additional compensation amounting to $74.96. Superior Terminal Elevator Co. v. F. A. Ball, Wis. Indus. Com., Feb. 24, 1913.

A workman fell down a stairway and sustained injuries which resulted in an immediate attack of appendicitis. Disinterested physicians testified as to the possibility of such an attack following an injury. The workman's average weekly wages amounted to $13.81. He incurred expenses of $186.80 for medical and surgical treatment and a hospital bill of $36.80. The Commission directed that the employer pay the medical expenses and compensation in the sum of $71.84 for the period of disability. Harry Harris v. Milwaukee Dustless Brush Co., Wis. Indus. Com., March 12, 1913.

ARTICLE E-TEMPORARY PARTIAL DISABILITY

1. Ability to do light work after accident; exaggeration of injury.

A workman was injured in a colliery and drew compensation for about four years. It was then alleged he was fit for light work, but he said he could not do it on account of pain. The arbitrator found, as a fact, that the workman was exaggerating and that he could do light work. It was held that there was evidence upon which the arbitrator could so find. Price v. Burnyeat, Brown & Co. (1907), 2 B. W. C. C. 337.

Applicant injured his right leg while in the employ of defendant. X-ray plates failed to show any injury to the bone and that there was no abrasion of the skin, although the flesh was considerably bruised. At no time was applicant forced to take to his bed or to use a crutch or cane in locomotion. Three weeks after the injury he was offered light work, but refused. While the law considers the accident as of the time of disability, yet it was considered proper to take into consideration the declination to work in determining the amount of compensation due. Applicant pretended that

Inability to obtain employemnt in district where workman lives

he was seriously injured and despite expert medical testimony. Held that the case belongs to that class of malingering or simulation which causes very great suffering to those who are skeptical in regards to the merits of compensation as a system for dealing with industrial injuries. Further held that such cases are to compensation what arson is to fire insurance and fraud to life insurance. The award for applicant for temporary injury was $24.43, but defendant had paid $38.10, and consequently applicant received nothing in addition to the amount already paid. Goncalves v. Standard Oil Co., Cal. Indus. Acc. Bd., May 29, 1913.

Applicant was employed as a common laborer on the docks at Superior. While he was storing bags of wool in the hold of the boat, he was struck by one of the bags weighing 330 pounds. Through a misunderstanding he was not examined by a physician until three weeks after the accident when it was found that he had a fever and some affection of the left lung. After this examination he tried to return to his former work but was unable to stand it and later he secured employment picking cranberries at $2.25 a day. He continued this work to the time of the hearing. A medical examination initiated by the commission showed the workman to be suffering from pleurisy and that he could not continue the work of a stevedore. At the time of the accident the applicant was earning $14.42 a week. He was totally disabled for five weeks and it appeared from the evidence that partial disability would continue for twenty weeks. His weekly loss of earning capacity amounted to $1.44. The award was the sum of $65.65. John Maki v. Superior Stevedore Co., Wis. Indus. Com., Dec. 10, 1912.

2. Inability to obtain employment in district where workman lives.

Employers of a workman who was partially incapacitated by accident, gave him light work to do, and under an agreement received certain compensation. Eighteen months later

Workman receiving same wages after as (or higher than)before injury

the workman was dismissed with others, owing to a reduction of force. The man was unable, on account of his partial incapacity to find work in the district and applied for a review of the award of compensation. It was held by the House of Lords that as "incapacity for work" includes inability to obtain employment in the district where the workman lives, and the occurrence of this inability to obtain work was such a change of circumstances that it entitled the workman to a review. McDonald or Duris v. Wilson's & Clyde Coal Co. (1912) 5 B. W. C. C. 478.

3. Wages and compensation after accident need not equal wages before injury.

An injured workman who had previously earned 32s. 6d. per week, earned 25s. per week after the accident. He claimed 7s. 6d. per week, and the judge awarded him 3s. 9d. He appealed. It was held that there was no misdirection and the judge was not compelled to give the full difference between the earnings before and after the accident. Humphreys v. City of London Electric Lighting Co. (1911), 4 B. W. C. C. 275.

4. Workman receiving same wages after as (or higher than) before injury.

If a workman earns after the accident the same amount of wages as he had previously earned, he is not at that time entitled to receive compensation. In such a case the workman is entitled to an award fixing the employer with liability, but the assessment of compensation may be adjourned until such time as the workman suffers loss through disability. Chandler v. Smith & Son (1899), 1 W. C. C. 19.

Where a workman is able to earn a greater sum after the injury than he was before it happened, no compensation should be awarded. In such a case it is proper to record a declaration of liability should the injury result at a later date in causing disability. Hains & Strange v. Corbet (1912), 5 B. W. C. C. 372.

Wages and compensation in excess of wages before accident

The purpose of the workmen's compensation act being to compensate an injured employé for the impairment of his earning capacity and not to compensate him for pain, suffering, disfigurement, etc., a workman who receives an injury in the course of his employment resulting in temporary disability, and who enters other employment before he has fully recovered, at a wage equal to or greater than he was receiving at the time of his injury, is not entitled to compensation after engaging in such latter employment, even though he was not at that time able to resume the employment in which he was engaged at the time of his injury. Re David Burns, Claim No. 3, Ohio Indus. Acc. Bd., May 22, 1912.

An unskilled workman who is able to do other work than that which he was doing before he was injured, is not entitled to compensation merely because he is unable to do such former work. Cammell, Laird & Co. v. Platt (1908), 2 B. W. C. C. 368.

2

The Wisconsin Act, granting to an employé partially disabled a percentage of his weekly earnings, representing the proportionate impairment of earning capacity in the employment in which he was engaged when injured, was held to authorize an allowance of the statutory amount without deduction of such sums as the employé might be able to earn in other employments. Mellen Lumber Co. v. Indus. Com. of Wis., 000 Wis. 000; 142 N. W. Rep. 187. The statute was amended in 1913 so as to award compensation only when the employé was disabled for work in any employ

ment.

5. Wages and compensation in excess of wages before accident.

Where an injured workman to whom compensation is being paid secures other employment whereby his wages and compensation exceed his wages before the injury the compensation should be reduced so he shares the loss with

Disability made more serious by illness or other contributing cause

his employer. Anley's Executors v. Neale (1907), 9 W. C. C. 34.

6. Clumsiness due to injury as ground of incapacity.

A waitress had an injury to her finger, which, becoming stiff, prevented her from working as efficiently as before. She received compensation for some time, and then returned to her old work at her old wages. She could not work as well as she did before, and her employers complained of her clumsiness. She left this work of her own accord, and, without any attempt to find other work, claimed compensation. The County Court judge found that she could not work as well as before, and that she was therefore partially incapac itated, and he awarded her compensation. It was held on appeal that there was evidence to support this finding. Ward v. Miles (1911), 4 B. W. C. C. 182.

7. Disability by disease accelerated by accident; basis of compensation.

Where it is proved that apart from accident a disease would have caused incapacity for work on a given day in the future, and that an accident has accelerated the progress of the disease so as to cause present incapacity, the award should limit the time during which compensation is to be paid to the period during which incapacity is caused by the acceleration of the progress of the disease. Ward v. London and North Western Ry. Co. (1901), 3 W. C. C. 192.

8. Disability made more serious by illness or other contributing cause.

Where the accidental injury causes disability the injured employé is entitled to compensation even though the disability is made more serious by reason of illness or other contributing cause, but the compensation awarded is to be measured by the disability directly traceable to the accident and when such disability ceases the compensation terminates,