§§ 566, 567. RECEIPTORS. 193 it includes profits; and damages to the plaintiff's business from such seizure are not to be taken into account;(*) but damages may be recovered for detention of goods. kept for sale until the season for sale is lost. () In an action of replevin against a sheriff, damages sustained from depositing a sum of money with a third party to induce him to become surety in the replevin bond, are altogether too remote and consequential to be considered. (©) In Mississippi the damages for wrongful attachment are declared by statute to be attorney's fees, hotel bills, travelling expenses, loss of trade, and special injury to business. No allowance for counsel fee can be made except for defending the attachment suit, i. e., none for defending the main action, and no damage can be given for loss of trade where it appears that the parties were winding up their business, and none for credit where they were insolvent. (d) 8566. § 566. Suits between different officers.-* Questions of the kind we are now considering frequently arise in suits brought by one officer against another, to test the relative priority of different processes; and in such a case it has been said, in Vermont, that damages are never given beyond the actual value of the property.1 ** $567. Receiptors.-* In some of the States of the Union, property, when levied on, is sometimes delivered by the attaching officer to a third party, called a receiptor, who holds it during the litigation, and promises to redeliver it to the officer on demand. In a case of 1 Goodrich v. Church, 20 Vt. 187. (*) Nightingale v. Scannell, 18 Cal. 315. Contra, as to the latter point, Kane v. Johnston, 9 Bosw. 154 (semble). () Knapp v. Barnard, 78 Ia. 347. (c) Wilson v. Hillhouse, 14 Ia. 199. (d) Roach v. Brannon, 57 Miss. 490; Marqueeze v. Sontheimer, 59 Miss. 430; see Comer v. Mackintosh, 48 Mich. 374. VOL. II.-13 this kind, in Vermont, the plaintiff, whose property had been unduly levied on, instead of that of the real debtor, brought his action of trespass, and, pendente lite, assigned his claim to the receiptor. Judgment was afterwards obtained and execution issued in the suits in which the attachment had been issued, and the officer demanded the property of the receiptor; but he refused to deliver it. It was held that the defendants, on the trial of the action of trespass, were not entitled to give in evidence, in mitigation of damages, such refusal on the part of the receiptor, they never having offered to surrender to him. his receipt, or discharge him from his liability thereon ;1 and the same point has been similarly decided in Massachusetts." In another case of this kind, it has been decided in Vermont, that where the value of all the property attached and receipted for is expressed in the receipt at one entire sum, and a portion of it has been withdrawn. from the custody of the receiptor, so as to discharge his liability, the damages in an action on the receipt are to be determined by assuming the whole value of the property receipted for to be the sum specified in their receipt, and by then ascertaining, on the basis of that assumed value, the just proportion which the property retained by the receiptor would bear to the property for which he is not liable.*** So, in New Hampshire, where property attached by 1 Ellis v. Howard, 17 Vt. 330. Robinson v. Mansfield, 13 Pick. 139. Parsons v. Strong, 13 Vt. 235; Allen v. Carty, 19 Vt. 65. In Connecticut, where the plaintiff, an officer who had, by virtue of an execution, levied on goods belonging to the judgment debtor, and delivered them to the defendants on their receipt or promise to redeliver, which not being done, suit was brought; it was objected that, as it was not stated in the declaration that the officer was commanded, in the writ against the original debtor, to attach to any certain amount, the plaintiff could only recover nominal damages; but the Supreme Court held otherwise, and that the omission did not preclude the plaintiff from a recovery to the amount of the execution. Jones v. Gilbert, 13 Conn. 507. § 567. RECEIPTORS. 195 the sheriff in two suits was delivered to a third party, who gave two receipts for it at the same value, which did not, however, state that one was subject to the other, and the receiptor, after judgment and execution, on a demand in the first suit, paid the amount due on the execution, it was held, after a subsequent judgment in the second suit against the owner, that the receiptor was liable to the officer only for the amount of the value receipted for over that paid in the first suit. (*) Where the receiptor has allowed the attached property to go. into the owner's possession, and judgment is recovered against him, in an action by the officer on the receipt, the amount of the judgment and interest, with the fees on execution, not exceeding the value of the property, are the usual measure of damages.() But if, while the action is pending, the receiptor refuses to deliver the property to the officer, the latter may recover its full value, with interest from the demand. () Where, in an action of trover, the goods for the value of which the action was brought had been attached and delivered to the defendant on his receipt, and he had retained them, this was held no reason for reducing the damages below their value.(4) The valuation stated in the receipt is usually conclusive on the receiptor;() but where the goods were returned to the sheriff and sold by him for a less sum than that stated in the receipt, and he brought action, alleging that they were damaged, it was held that the valuation in the receipt was not conclusive, and the sheriff must prove the amount of his loss. (') Where (*) Haynes v. Tenney, 45 N. H. 183. () Foss v. Norris, 70 Me. 117. (c) Clement v. Little, 42 N. H. 563. (4) Luckey v. Roberts, 25 Conn. 486. () Healy v. Hutchinson, 20 Atl. Rep. 332 (N. H.). the property receipted for is an animal which dies in the receiptor's possession without his default, he is not liable for its value.(*) § 568. Property sold illegally.-* In New York it has been held, that where the property of a party is sold under illegal process, and the sum demanded is raised by a bid at the sale of the property, made by an agent of such party, who purchases for the benefit of his principal, and pays for the same with the money of the principal, the measure of damages, in an action of trespass against trustees of a school district, in such case, is the amount of the bid and the interest thereof, and not the value of the property sold.1 ** $569. Exclusion from office.-Where a public officer is wrongfully excluded from his office, the measure of damages is the amount of his salary during the period of exclusion, () deducting, however, if the defendant acted in apparent right and good faith, his reasonable expense in earning it. (©) In United States v. Addison() it was contended that the rule requiring diligence in seeking employment ought to be extended to the case of a public officer wrongfully ousted from his office. But the court held that "no such rule can be applied to public offices of personal trust and confidence." 'Baker v. Freeman, 9 Wend. 36. See, to same point, Clark v. Hallock, 16 Wend. 607. () Arris v. Stukely, 2 Mod. 260; Rule v. Tait, 38 Kas. 765; People v. Nolan, 32 Hun 612. () Mayfield v. Moore, 53 Ill. 428. (d) 6 Wall. 291. CHAPTER XVIII. THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES FOR THE DEATH OF A $570. No recovery for death at com- | § 578. Services of a wife or husband. mon law. 571. Statutes. 572. General principles. 573. Present loss. 574. Prospective pecuniary loss. 575. Services of a child. 576. Services after majority. 577. Care and services of a parent. 579. Next of kin. 580. Evidence Family stances. 581. Probable duration of life. § 570. No recovery for death at common law. (")-*At common law, and independently of statutory provision, the death of a human being is not the ground of an action for damages. () In a case where the plaintiff brought an action against the proprietors of a stagecoach for negligent driving, by which his wife was killed, Lord Ellenborough said that, "in a civil court, the death of a human being cannot be complained of as an injury." And so it has been held in Massachusetts, in a case where a widow sued a railroad company for negligence, by which her husband had been killed.' 8 In New York, in an action on the case for negligently running over and killing the plaintiff's son, a lad of ten years of age, the judge charged that the plaintiff 1 Baker v. Bolton, 1 Camp. 493. Carey v. Berkshire R.R. Co., I Cush. 475. Ford v. Monroe, 20 Wend. 210. (*) It is scarcely necessary to say that what is said here did not apply during the existence of slavery to an action for the death of a slave. (*) Insurance Co. v. Brame, 95 U. S. 754, and cases cited. |