pecuniary aid that the plaintiff would have derived from his deceased son, calculated on the basis of all accessible facts, including probable duration of life. But the amount of recovery is not necessarily restricted to such a sum.(*)

577. Care and services of a parent.-The case of the death of the parents, where the death occasions actual pecuniary loss to the child, present or prospective, falls within the class of cases already considered; and a minor may recover for loss of support during minority.(') Where there is no present pecuniary loss, but where the services of the parent are such as to place the children in a better position in life, damages may be recovered under the rule as laid down in Tilley v. Hudson R. R. R. Co.() In Howard Co. v. Legg (1) Elliott, J., said: "The care, training, and education which a father can give his children may justly be regarded as increasing their capacity to make their way in the world, and this capacity, surely, may be valuable even in a pecuniary sense." In Baltimore & O. R. R. Co. v. Wightman () it was said that recovery could be had for the value of the parent's services in the superintendence, attention to, and care of his family and the education of his children, of which they have been deprived by his death.(') But a child can recover for the loss of such advice only as would have had pecuniary value, in estimating which the age and situation of

(*) International & G. N. R. R. Co. v. Kindred, 57 Tex. 491.

() Baltimore & R. T. v. State, 71 Md. 573; McPherson v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co., 97 Mo. 253.

() 24 N. Y. 471.

(d) 93 Ind. 523, 530.

(*) 29 Gratt. 431.

() Acc. Stoher v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co., 91 Mo. 509; Searle v. Kenawha & O. Ry. Co., 32 W. Va. 370; St. Lawrence & O. Ry. Co. v. Lett, 11 Can. 422.

the parties is to be considered; (") and where there is no proof that the deceased was fitted by nature or education, or by disposition, to furnish to his children instruction, or moral, physical, or intellectual training, it has been said that it is erroneous to allow the jury to consider the loss of instruction and moral training by the children.(")

A married adult daughter with whom the deceased mother lived may recover the value of the services which the deceased was in the habit of performing.()

§ 578. Services of a wife or husband.—A husband may recover the value of the services of his deceased wife, though he can recover nothing for the loss of her companionship. (4) So a widow may recover compensation for loss of support of her deceased husband.() A widow may recover for loss of support though separated from her husband at the time of his death. He still owed her his support; and an inquiry into the question whether he meant to support her is irrelevant.()

The Georgia statute (*) gives to the widow the right to recover the full value of her husband's life. This statute was meant to alter the rule that the family could only recover the value of the life to it, i. e., the support they would derive from it. Hence the jury is to give, under the new statute, the entire prospective value of the life; the sum which would produce an annuity corresponding

(*) Demarest v. Little, 47 N. J. L. 28.

() Illinois C. R.R. Co. v. Weldon, 52 Ill. 290; Chicago, R. I. & P. R.R. Co. v. Austin, 69 Ill. 426. But it would seem that proof of such unfitness should come from the defendant.

(c) Baltimore & O. R.R. Co. v. State, 63 Md. 135.

(d) St. Lawrence & O. Ry. Co. v. Lett, 11 Can. 422.

(*) Baltimore & R. T. v. State, 71 Md. 573; Nichols v. Winfrey, 90 Mo. 403.

(') Dallas & W. Ry. Co. v. Spicker, 61 Tex. 427.

(8) Code, § 2972.

to the probable prospective income and earnings of the deceased.(*)

§ 579. Next of kin.-Where, as formerly in the N. Y. statute, it is provided that the amount recovered shall be for the exclusive benefit of the widow and next of kin, questions arise which do not need to be considered where the action is given, as in the English statute, for the benefit of "the wife, husband, parent, and child." Thus it was held in New York, prior to the amendment of 1870 (L. of 1870, c. 78), by which the husband was included among those entitled to recover, that under the wording "next of kin," the husband could not recover.(") Under what circumstances the "next of kin" may recover for the death of a relative under the statute is considered in Chicago & A. R.R. Co. v. Shannon,() where the court says: "If the next of kin are collateral kindred of the deceased, and have not been receiving from him pecuniary assistance, and are not in a situation to require it, it is immaterial how near the degree of relationship may be, only nominal damages can be given, because there has been no pecuniary injury. If, on the other hand, the next of kin have been dependent upon the deceased for support, in whole or in part, it is immaterial how remote the relationship may be, there has been a pecuniary loss, for which compensation under the statute must be given." It would seem, however, that nominal damages at least may, whenever the action is given, be recovered.(4) To entitle the

(*) Georgia R.R. Co. v. Pittman, 73 Ga. 325.

(*) Dickins v. New York C. R.R. Co., 23 N. Y. 158; Drake v. Gilmore, 52 N. Y. 389; Green v. Hudson R. R.R. Co., 2 Keyes 294; Lucas v. New York C. R.R. Co., 21 Barb. 245. A contrary view of this question is taken in Steel v. Kurtz, 28 Oh. St. 191.

(C) 43 Ill. 338.

(4) Chicago v. Scholten, 75 Ill. 468; Atchison, T. & S. F. R.R. Co. v. Weber, 33 Kas. 543; Johnston v. Cleveland & T. R.R. Co., 7 Oh. St. 336.

plaintiff to recover, it is not necessary that he should have had a legal claim for support on the deceased.(*)

$580. Evidence-Family circumstances.-That the conditions and circumstances of the plaintiff cannot be shown to increase or diminish the damages is the doctrine approved by the best authorities. The question is ably considered by Cooley, C. J., in Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. v. Bayfield, (b) where the learned judge said: "The damages recoverable in a case of this nature are by the statute to be assessed with reference to the pecuniary injuries resulting from such death to the wife and next of kin of such deceased person. They have no regard to the needs of the person designated, or to any moral obligation which may have rested upon the deceased to supply their wants. What the family would lose by the death would be, what it was accustomed to receive, or had reasonable expectation of receiving, in his lifetime; and to show that the family was poor has no tendency towards showing whether this was or was likely to be large or small." In Illinois C. R. R. Co. v. Baches () it was held erroneous for the court below to refuse to instruct the jury that the pecuniary circumstances of the plaintiff and her infant daughter, and the fact that the plaintiff had a deformity of her hand, could not increase or diminish the amount of damages under the statute, the court saying: "How she has lost more money by being crippled than if she had not been, by the death of her husband, is not to our minds in any wise apparent. The question is how much has she lost in a pecuniary view, and the jury should be required to assess damages in this class of cases alone on

(*) Railroad Co. v. Barron, 5 Wall. 90; Grotenkemper v. Harris, 25 Oh. St. 510.

() 37 Mich. 205, 214.

(55 Ill. 379, 389.

that basis." (*) But in Wisconsin it has been held that a widow, suing as administratrix of her deceased husband, may show the number of children dependent upon her,(") and that she had no other means of support than the deceased. () An apparent exception to this principle exists in the rule, which permits, in the case of the death of minors, the condition of the parents to be given in evidence; (d) and in the case of the death of a mother, the poor health of minor children.() But the evidence in this latter class of cases is admitted, it would seem, to assist the jury in determining the probability of pecuniary loss to the plaintiff: thus, if the father is poor, the probability is great that he would have required the services of the son; if well-to-do, the probability is equally great that he would have derived no pecuniary benefit from the service of his son; and if the children are in poor health the mother's services are the more requisite. (')

581. Probable duration of life.-As the probable duration of the life of the deceased is one of the elements to be considered by the jury in their award of damages under the statute, mortality tables may be introduced in evidence. (*) But they must be allowed no more effect than

(*) See to the same effect Chicago & N. W. R.R. Co. v. Moranda, 93 Ill. 302; Pennsylvania R.R. Co. v. Butler, 57 Pa. 335; Mansfield Coal Co. v. McEnery, 91 Pa. 185. A contrary ruling in Kansas P. Ry. Co. v. Cutter, 19 Kas. 83, cannot be regarded as well considered.

() Mulcairns v. Janesville, 67 Wis. 24; acc. in Nebraska, Kerkow v. Bauer, 15 Neb. 150.

(*) Annas v. Milwaukee & N. R.R. Co., 67 Wis. 46.

(1) Barley v. Chicago & A. R.R. Co., 4 Biss. 430; Chicago v. Powers, 42 Ill. 169; Opsahl v. Judd, 30 Minn. 126; Ewen v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 38 Wis. 613.

() McKeigue v. Janesville, 68 Wis. 50.

(But see the remarks of Cooley, C. J., upon the admission of this kind of evidence in this class of cases, in Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. v. Bayfield, 37 Mich. 205, 215.

(F) Rowley v. London & N. W. Ry. Co., L. R. 8 Ex. 221; David v. South