of 25 cents for each of the following increments in excess of the maximum allowances (par. 3), as to each of the following elements:

5. Sales to the Government-The Government's offer to purchase tungsten concentrates may be accepted by notice in the form of letter or telegram to the General Services Administration, Emergency Procurement Section, Washington 25, D. C., of the seller's intention to sell to the Government. The notice shall include the following information:

(a) Character of tungsten concentrates offered (scheelite, synthetic scheelite, ferberite, hubernite, wolframite).

(b) Amount of tungsten concentrates offered.

(c) Location of tungsten concentrates.

(d) Origin of tungsten concentrates.

(e) Name and address of person making offer and whether acting as owner or as agent.

(f) An analysis of the tungsten concentrates offered, certified by a reputable analytical laboratory.

6. Purchase orders-Upon determination that the laboratory analysis and information furnished by the seller appears to meet the requirements of this program, a purchase order shall be placed with the seller, together with instructions as to packaging and delivery.

7. Acceptance of deliveries-Acceptance of the laboratory analysis and issuance of the purchase order shall constitute an obligation on the Government only to the extent that each delivery conforms to specifications and requirements of this program. Deliveries which do not conform to specifications and requirements will not be accepted by the Government and shipments thereof shall be at the seller's expense and responsibility.

8. Deliveries.-(a) Tungsten concentrates in quantities of less than 1 short ton shall not be accepted.

(b) Deliveries shall be f. o. b. public carriers conveyance. In the event the shipment is less than the minimum weight required to obtain the lowest transportation rate, the difference between the lowest transportation rate and the rate paid by the Government shall be a charge against the seller and such charge shall constitute a proper adjustment in the minimum base price.

9. Special conditions.-The Government may by negotiations establish a higher price for guaranteed deliveries of tungsten concentrates in substantially large lots, or for deliveries under special circumstances and conditions.

10. Definitions.-(a) "Tungsten concentrates," defined as tungsten concentrates produced in the United States, its Territories and possessions.

(b) "Ferberite" defined as containing tungsten primarily as FeWO, with not more than 20 percent of the tungsten as MnWO,.

(c) "Hubernite" defined as containing tungsten primarily as MnWO, with not more than 20 percent of the tungsten as FeWO..

(d) Wolframite" defined as containing tungsten as both FeWO, and MnWO, in any proportions from 80 percent FeWO, and 20 percent FeWO, and 80 percent MnWO4.

(e) "Scheelite" defined as containing, in nature, tungsten as CaWO4.

(f) "Synthetic Scheelite" defined as chemically precipitated scheelite produced from any natural type of ore, and shall be chemically precipitated scheelite produced from any original type of ore, further processed so that not over 10 percent of any lot shall pass a 35-mesh Tyler Standard Screen.

11. Limitations.-The Government's commitments and guaranty under this program shall cease and terminate as of December 31, 1956, and no person shall be reimbursed or entitled to reimbursement for tungsten concentrates not covered by a Government purchase order issued not later than December 31, 1956. The Government shall not be liable or assume any responsibility to any person participating in this program except and to the extent of the Government's commitments covered by purchase orders issued prior to the aforesaid date, and no person shall have recourse against the Government for the development or production of tungsten commenced during the guaranty period which was not offered and accepted by the Government prior to December 31, 1956.

Dr. BOYD. The Price Administration has now announced or is about to announce a ceiling price for tungsten which should be sufficiently high to encourage production of virtually all of the tungsten mines of fairly good grade-not the very lowest grade mine. The Defense Administration on our recommendation has certified to the General Services Administration a plan for supporting the price of tungsten at $63 for a period of 5 years. In other words, the Government will announce that for a period of 5 years any tungsten that may be offered at the market, that cannot be sold above $63, will be bought by the Government.

Mr. REGAN. What is it selling for now?

Dr. BOYD. The price is quite varied. The ceiling price was established in the general freeze in January. Some of it was selling at around $20 or more and others up around $70, so there is a number of different prices. This will settle the price for the time being at least at $65. That will give anybody who wants to produce tungsten. an assurance of a market for that period of time.

We think that that is a general program that will save a lot of individual negotiation and we are working on other programs that will cover the smaller mining areas in the same way.

Mr. D'EWART. Will you give the ceiling price again?

Dr. BOYD. The ceiling price is to be $65 and the floor price $63.
Mr. REGAN. Over a period of 5 years.

Dr. BOYD. There will be a little leeway for action of the industry. The exporation program, recently announced and now before the Bureau of the Budget for final clearance, should encourage exploration on smaller properties. The simplification of this program required major effort, but in the meantime many cases have been screened in readiness for final negotiations as soon as the contract forms are available.

We have ordered the contract forms from the printers and they should be distributed the latter part of this week or the early part of next week.

In the meantime, we have organized and maintained a staff to assure the continuation of existing mines by assisting them to obtain machinery supplies and equipment. Inasmuch as general control orders: have not yet been put into effect, this has had to be done on a case by case basis and our staff has handled virtually thousands of individual expediting actions.

Manpower for the mining industry has also been a problem with which the Defense Minerals Administration has had to cope. Military manpower requirements began to tap the personnel of the industry almost immediately after the opening of the Korean conflict. Defense Minerals Administration entered the manpower discussions at their very beginning early last fall, and in presenting the case for the minerals industry was able to establish before the Department of Labor the necessity for including the underground metal miner on the list of critical occupations. Furthermore, a large number of cases involving individual Reserve officers have been presented to the military authorities and the Defense Minerals Administration has in many instances been able to secure stays and deferments for irreplaceable men in key positions.

Again, such cases have often been handled on an individual basis.

In addition to all of this we have had a constant stream of inquiries: from the public and Congress-the mail has risen to 300 pieces a day,. nearly all of it requiring careful attention.

I know that you and your constituents are impatient with us. I myself am perhaps even more impatient, but I think that in view of what I have so briefly outlined you can see that seeming slowness has in fact been real progress. I can only say that I have never worked with a more devoted and patriotic staff-they have worked day and night. virtually every day of the week to achieve the results to date. We have cultivated the ground, planted the trees, treated them, watered them, and now expect them to bear their fruit. I should like to state that I know also of the vast amount of correspondence that Members of Congress have had on these matters and to express our appreciation for your forbearance.

REASONS GIVEN FOR DELAYS IN EXECUTING PROGRAMS

Now you have asked the reasons for delays in executing the necessary programs. I may have already covered a lot of this but there are other reasons that require understanding.

The first of these is the programs themselves. Naturally in a defense program the military and essential civilian requirements are the first to be considered. In the case of most materials, those have not yet been crystallized. There is no individual or organization to blame for this; we are all in it together. First, the Congress had to determine where we were going and take appropriate action through legislation and appropriations. Then the military services and other agencies had to convert these policies into military programs and from these military programs calculate the requirements in terms of weapons and supplies, and finally break down those material items into amounts of copper, lead, zinc, and other metals and minerals that will be needed.

I, from personal experience, know the enormity of that task; but while this is going on, it is our job to determine the magnitude of present supply and also the magnitude of the potential supply. The first has been relatively simple; the second has required careful evaluation of all information made known to us by industry and by other

sources.

It is attempting to bring the anticipated requirements, both military and civilian, and the expected supplies in balance, that creates the great difficulties. As much as we in Defense Metals Administration and members of this committee would like it if all our mineral commodities came from within our own borders, such is not the case. We have had to contend with problems of international trade, of world prices, tariffs, and other international aspects. Defense Metals Administration has only a minor part to play in this as there are other agencies more directly involved, but inasmuch as we are the mineral experts for the Administration, we play an important advisory role.

Since international supply contributes to a high degree to our needs, many of these matters must be resolved before we can formulate our mineral supply programs, and determine fairly accurately the increased production that must be expanded at home.

I have listed the number of agencies we must deal with as their activities affect ours, and vice versa. There is an inevitable and unavoidable delay in the execution of our programs, because of necessary

review by the approving authorities. I can only say that such review is imperative to evaluate the effect of Defense Minerals' proposals on all other programs and policies. There is no use expanding mineral supplies if by doing so we preempt facilities, manpower, or equipment required to convert them into usable products, or create serious inflationary pressures.

I have found it difficult to separate items (c) and (d) in your memorandum of purposes for this hearing from those I have covered in (a) and (b). It is the coordinating responsibility that is timeconsuming. Since the Secretary of the Interior delegated his authority derived from the Director of the Defense Production Administration on March 6, the only major policy direction over Defense Minerals Administration comes from Defense Production Administration. We clear with the Secretary broad policy and programs which we initiate, and we attempt to do that concurrently as we develop them to avoid delay. There are questions of budget, personnel actions, et cetera, that the Secretary had to retain in his own hands, and also matters of coordination between agencies of his own Department and outside agencies. These matters do not interfere with program execution.

In answer to your last purpose of discovering policies formulated and decisions reached by agencies having authority over Defense Minerals Administration, I have attached such policy determinations as we have received. Inasmuch as we attempt to determine policy in advance of recommended action, our recommendations are no more than slightly modified prior to execution.

That is the end of the summary, Mr. Chairman.

(SUBCOMMITTEE NOTE.-The statement above, as well as the remainder of Dr. Boyd's prepared statement which was not read to the committee and is presented below, together with the statements of 11 Defense Minerals Administration officials which are printed immediately following Dr. Boyd's testimony of April 5, were submitted in response to the following letter from the committee chairman :)

LETTER TO SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR REQUESTING APPEARANCE OF DEPARTMENT AND DMA OFFICIALS AT HEARINGS AND INFORMATION DESIRED FROM EACH

Hon. OSCAR L. CHAPMAN,

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS, Washington, D. C., March 22, 1951.

Secretary of the Interior, Washington 25, D. C.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: The Subcommittee on Mines and Mining of this committee has scheduled hearings on the defense minerals production program for April 4, 5, and 6.

The purpose of the hearings is to determine

(a) What has been accomplished and is being done or proposed under the Defense Production Act of 1950 to stimulate the exploration, development, and production of strategic and critical minerals and metals from domestic sources; (b) The reasons for the delays in executing the necessary program; (c) The authority and responsibilities of each unit of the Government having any jurisdiction over various phases of the defense minerals production program; and

(d) The policies formulated and decisions rendered by each such unit in reference to such program.

The subcommittee requests that the individuals listed below appear as witnesses. It is expected that the witnesses will be called in the order named. Unless afternoon hearings can be arranged, it probably will not be possible to hear more than the first eight or nine witnesses on April 4, in which case the remaining witnesses from the Department of the Interior will be heard on the morning of April 5. Testimony is desired from the following:

1. Julian Feiss, Assistant to the Administrator, Defense Minerals Administration.

2. Tom Lyon, Director, Supply Division, DMA.

3. Arthur B. Parsons, Assistant Director, Supply Division, DMA, in charge of programing.

4. Philip R. Bradley, Chief, Ferro Alloys Branch, Supply Division, DMA.

5. Otto Herres, Chief, Lead-Zinc Branch, Supply Division, DMA.

6. Gunner Johnson, Acting Chief, Copper Branch, Supply Division, DMA.

7. James Barr, Chief, Industrial Minerals Branch, Supply Division, DMA.

8. S. H. Schurr, chief economist, Office of Economic Analysis, DMA.

9. H. A. Montag, Director, Requirements Division, DMA.

10. Thomas C. Baker, Director, Foreign Division, DMA.

11. C. O. Mittendorf, Director, Production Expansion Division, DMA.

12. Dr. James Boyd, Administrator, Defense Minerals Administration.

13. An assistant from the Office of the Secretary, Department of the Interior; one who has been engaged in and is thoroughly familiar with activities concerning the Defense Minerals Administration and the defense minerals production program in general; such individual to be designated by the Secretary.

Please have each witness designated above prepare and submit a written statement for the record. Each statement should contain a brief résumé of the witness' past employment or business activities during recent years and his present title, duties, and responsibilities. In addition, the statements should contain the information requested below.

1. The statement submitted by Mr. Feiss should present a complete picture of the defense minerals production program and include

(a) The functions, responsibilities, organization, and activities of the Defense Minerals Administration.

(b) A correlation of all offices or units of the administrative branch of the Government whose functions and activities directly or indirectly affect (i) the defense minerals production program and (ii) the policies, programs, and procedures of the Defense Minerals Administration. Describe how and why each such office or unit has effected or can effect (i) and (ii) above.

(c) A tabulation of each type of assistance available to the mining and minerals industries through the DMA.

(d) With respect to (i) production contract commitments, (ii) incentive payments or subsidies for production, (iii) purchase programs, (iv) loans, (v) participation in exploration and research projects, (vi) access roads, and (vii) advances against future production, a description giving the extent of and limitations on each type of assistance available or to be made available.

(e) Information as to the types of assistance listed in (d) above that will be made available for the exploration, development, and mining of each strategic and critical mineral and metal from (i) domestic sources and (ii) foreign sources; (iii) the qualifications required of applicants; (iv) and the terms and conditions under which each type of assistance has been or is to be made available.

(f) Complete information as to the routing and procedures followed or to be followed in the processing of applications for each type of assistance listed under item (d) above, from the time the applicant files his application until he is issued a denial or is granted the assistance requested.

(9) A statement enumerating and explaining all policies and programs that have been established or are being proposed by the Defense Minerals Administration, the Office of the Secretary of the Interior, and other administrative units of the Government (specifying which organization) in regard to each type of assistance listed in (d) above. State which office or unit of the Government formulated each policy and program and whether or not and to what extent such policy or program was recommended by the Defense Minerals Administration; if not, present the policy or program as was proposed or recommended by DMA and state the reasons given for its nonacceptance in whole or in part.

2. Each of the four division directors should include in his statement a description and explanation of the functions, activities, accomplishments, and 82354-52-3