of mind, however eloquent, erudite, or ingenious, are not to be accepted as the oracles of reason or the enunciations of an impartial law.

1752. The office of the judge of the prize-court is well described by Lord Stowell in the case of the Maria :—" "In forming that judgment, I trust that it has not escaped my anxious recollection for one moment what it is that the duty of my station calls for from me,-namely, to consider myself as stationed here, not to deliver occasional and shifting opinions to serve present purposes of particular national interest, but to administer with indifference that justice which the law of nations holds out without distinction to independent states, some happening to be neutral, and some to be belligerent. The seat of judicial authority is indeed locally here, in the belligerent country,-according to the known law and practice of nations; but the law itself has no locality. It is the duty of the person who sits here to determine this question exactly as he would determine the same question if sitting at Stockholm; to assert no pretensions on the part of Great Britain which he would not allow to Sweden in the same circumstances; and to impose no duties on Sweden as a neutral country which he could not admit to belong to Great Britain in the same character. If, therefore, I mistake the law in this matter, I mistake that which I consider, and which I mean should be considered, as the universal law upon the question; a question regarding one of the most important rights of belligerent nations relatively to neutrals." The judgment which the eloquent judge delivered in that case was a melancholy illustration of his description.

1753. THE ENEMY's ship and the cargo on board belonging to the enemy are confiscated to the use of the captors. 1754. The proper course is to ascertain who is the real owner of the ship by ascertaining her true national character, and if she is hostile, to ascertain not merely who is the owner of the whole, but of every part of the cargo; and

there the inquiry should end. For if the ship belonged to the enemy, she, and so much of the cargo as belonged to the enemy, belong to the captor, and what belonged to the neutral cannot consistently with law be taken from him. If the ship belonged to the neutral, the cargo is exempt from inquiry, for, although it belonged to the enemy, it is protected by the right of the neutral.

1755. Even municipal courts for many purposes inquire into the real ownership of the vessel and recognize equitable interests, although for other purposes they regard only the ostensible title. (3 M. S. A. 3. Hackwood v. Lyall. Myers v. Willis.) The inquiry in the prize court should be confined to the veritable title, not as to particular interests, but to ascertain to what nation she in fact belongs; for the ship is a unity; if she belongs to the adverse belligerent, it matters not that shares of her or claims upon her belong to neutrals; all interests are bound up in the nationality of the vessel, all the owners have embarked in a common adventure. The cargo is not a unity; it has no common character, it has no nationality of its own; the character and nationality of every parcel depends upon that of the particular owner. There may, however, be joint interests of belligerents and neutrals in the whole or portions of the cargo. Whatever portions of the cargo on board a hostile vessel belong to neutrals are exempt, whatever shares or interests in a cargo owned jointly by neutrals and enemies appertain to the neutrals, are exempt. If the neutral and enemy owners are partners, the question becomes more difficult, for their veritable interests depend on the state of their respective accounts with the partnership, and not on their nominal shares; but to deal justly in the question of capture their interests in the cargo should be regarded as corresponding with their shares in the partnership concern.

1756. Such are the principles which ought to prevail, and which, in consequence of the declaration of Paris, may hereafter be adopted; but the precedents of prize courts, while

some nations confiscated neutral cargo in the hostile vessel, and others confiscated the goods of the enemy on board the neutral vessel, were in some respects accordant with, and in others unconformable to, these principles. We shall exhibit some, but have not space for many, of the opinions of prize courts on those subjects.

1757. "It is," says a venerable judge, "one of the most honourable distinctions which exist between a prize court and a municipal court, that a prize court looks at that which is bonâ fide true, while a court of law is sometimes bound by formality, which prevents real justice being done." How well the prize court deserves this high encomium, how many honourable distinctions there are in its favour in the administration of real justice, how much more impartial it is than municipal tribunals, must, we fear, be gathered from its practice rather than from its self-laudation.

1758. To protect herself against detention the ship should never sail without her sea-pass, or some similar document, showing the nation to which she really belongs, what flag she is entitled to bear, from which, if neutral, her character may be at once ascertained. Caroline.

1759. A neutral possessed the legal title to the whole of the ship and was beneficial owner of part, others were interested in other parts, therefore the "real justice" of the court condemned her. Nina. Aina.

A Russian had taken the oath of allegiance to the King of Denmark, his ship was exempt from capture by the Order of Council, he claimed her as a Danish subject, the "real justice" of the court condemned her, because the claim was made in the wrong character. Ernst. Soglasie.

1760. The court refused to recognize the lien of a neutral on an enemy ship, correctly, but with this observation,—“It is a different question whether lenity should be shown to British merchants when the captured vessel has been lying in a British port, and whether the court should allow an alien to put in a claim to defeat the right of captors."

(Aina.) The international court, the impartial judge sitting at Stockholm, would hardly recognize this distinction between a British and a neutral lien, and would hardly recognize as a defeat of it the non-existence of a captor's right.

1761. It is to be expected that belligerents will sell such of their vessels as are in critical situations on the eve of war, to the sad disappointment of captors. "It will be a very nice question for consideration," says the judge, "whether it is competent for a British merchant, immediately antecedent to hostilities, to purchase shipping belonging to the subjects of that state likely to become hostile, and legally to hold it"! (Baltica.) Is it a greater contravention of the law of nations that it should be paid for by the merchant, than that it should be seized by the privateer?

1762. It has been held that an agreement for sale of an enemy's ship to a neutral, on the eve of war, is put an end to by the declaration of war. By what process of reasoning can this be maintained? the neutral and the belligerent are still competent to contract, and liable to perform, their reciprocal engagements. It is true that there are likely to be collusive arrangements, and the prize court therefore is "astute to protect the rights and interests of captors." It therefore holds that a contract for sale of an enemy's ship to a neutral, not completed by payment, is void as against the captor, whether made on the eve of or during war; (Sechs Geshwistern) and that a transfer of a ship in transitu from an enemy to a neutral during war is illegal, and a fraud on belligerent rights! (Jan Frederick.) If this doctrine is to prevail, the contract for sale of a neutral, in transitu, or on the eve of war, to an enemy, is equally void. It was held that the sale of a single ship, not in a blockaded port or in transitu, by an enemy to a neutral during war might be lawful, if the purchase-money was paid, the title of the vendor divested, and no interest of any kind left in him! (Baltica.) On all purchases from the enemy during or on the eve of war, the prize court requires strict proof of

payment of the purchase money, and of the bona fides of the transaction. Johan. Rapid. Christine.

1763. The court, with extraordinary intelligence and liberality, held that a bonâ fide donation which would pass property in the time of peace, would pass it in time of war, and that the gift of a ship, in the enemy's country by a father to his son, as the advance of a portion bonâ fide, did pass the title to the son, and that the son becoming a neutral was entitled to his own property, subject to the captor's expenses! Benedict.

1764. Property in transitu, if consigned unconditionally to the consignee, is his property, notwithstanding the mercantile right of stoppage; but if retained under his actua control, it belongs to the consignor.

1765. Goods hostile at the time of shipment are deemed hostile during the voyage,—that is, the property of the enemy, notwithstanding its sale in the passage to a neutral or a subject of the capturing nation; but if the property, neutral at the time of shipment, is sold to the enemy on the voyage, the prize court, for the benefit of captors, ratifies the sale. Boede's Lust.

1766. The owner ascertained is assumed in the prize court to take his national character from the place where he carries on his trade. (Nina.) It was said that a neutral, resident and carrying on his business in the enemy's country, is to be considered as " adhering to the enemy," and therefore his merchant ship is to be confiscated as an enemy's ship. (Aina.) But the occupation of a neutral state by an enemy does not deprive the people of their neutral character until the state is completely subdued. Gerasimo.

1767. The neutral merchant carrying on ordinary trade with the enemy's country has been held not to lose his neutral character by having a commercial agent there; but the prize court does not extend "this indulgence" to a privileged trade, and it unceremoniously condemns the cargo of a firm of which a member resides in the land of the foe; it condemns