Opinion of the Court. panies of 1902 and 1903, or of one of them. Thomas Coleman du Pont is also president of both of them. Edmond G. Buckner is an active director of the International Smokeless Powder & Chemical Company. It is clear that these 28 defendants are associated in a combination for carrying on interstate commerce in powder and other explosives. 3. We come, therefore, to the consideration of the second question, which is: Second. Is the combination which we have found to exist one that is obnoxious to the provisions of the Anti-Trust Act? The act declares that every combination, in the form of a trust or otherwise, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several states, is illegal, and that it is a crime for any person to monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine with others to monopolize, any part of such trade or commerce. From early times it has been a rule of the courts not to construe a legislative act in a literal manner, where it is clear that by such construction the legislative purpose will be defeated. A statute which treats of "deans, prebendaries, parsons, vicars, and others having spiritual promotion," if literally construed would apply to bishops; but by the application of the "rule of reason" bishops are excluded from the terms of such an act because, being of a higher order than any of the functionaries specifically mentioned, it is concluded that the legislative purpose does not extend to bishops. "If an act of Parliament gives a man power to try all causes that arise in his manor of Dale, yet if a cause should arise in which he himself is party, the act is construed not to extend to that, because it is unreasonable that any man should determine his own quarrel," 1 Black. Com. 91. In Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U. S. 457, 12 Sup. Ct. 511, 36 L. Ed. 226, the Supreme Court had before it the construction of the act which declares it to be“unlawful for any person, company, partnership or corporation, in any manner whatsoever, to prepay the transportation, or in any way assist or encourage the importation or migration of any alien or aliens, foreigner or foreigners, into the United States, its territories, or the District of Columbia, under contract or agreement, parol or special, express or implied, made previous to the importation or mi Opinion of the Court. gration of such alien or aliens, foreigner or foreigners, to perform labor or service of any kind in the United States, its territories, or the District of Columbia." The question was whether the act was applicable to a contract between Holy Trinity Church and an alien, by which the alien agreed to remove from England to New York and enter into the service of the church as its rector and pastor. Mr. Justice Brewer, speaking for the court, said: "It must be conceded that the act of the corporation is within the letter of this section, for the relation of rector to his church is one of service, and implies labor on the one side with compensation on the other. Not only are the general words 'labor' and 'service' both used, but also, as it were to guard against any narrow interpretation and emphasize a breadth of meaning, to them is added of any kind,' and further, as noticed by the Circuit Judge in his opinion, the fifth section, which makes specific exceptions, among them professional actors, artists, lecturers, singers, and domestic servants, [150] strengthens the idea that every other kind of labor and service was intended to be reached by the first section. While there is great force to this reasoning, we cannot think Congress intended to denounce with penalties a transaction like that in the present case. It is a familiar rule that a thing may be within the letter of the statute, and yet not within the statute, because not within its spirit. nor within the intention of its makers. This has been often asserted, and the reports are full of cases illustrating its application. This is not the substitution of the will of the judge for that of the legislator, for frequently words of general meaning are used in a statute, words broad enough to include an act in question, and yet a consideration of the whole legislation, or of the circumstances surrounding its enactment, or of the absurd results which follow from giving such broad meaning to the words, makes it unreasonable to believe that the legislator intended to include the particular act." A number of bills were introduced in the Fiftieth Congress (in August and September, 1888), designed to make unlawful every combination "to prevent competition" and "to prevent full and free competition" in the sales of articles transported from one state to another. None of them was enacted into law. On December 4, 1889, Mr. Sherman introduced into the Senate of the Fifty-First Congress a bill which declared unlawful every combination "to prevent full and free competition" in such sales. After much debate the bill was, on March 27, 1890, referred to the committee on judiciary, and on April 2, 1890, that committee reported it Opinion of the Court. back to the Senate with an amendment, drawn by the late Senator Hoar, striking out all after its enacting clause and substituting therefor the act as we now have it. As enacted, it does not condemn every combination "to prevent competition." What it condemns is every combination in restraint of trade or commerce among the several states, etc. When the bill went from the Senate to the House, the latter body amended it by inserting a provision extending the scope of the act to all agreements entered into for the purpose of "preventing competition" either in the purchase or sale of commodities; but the amendment was disagreed to. While there is a "general acquiescence in the doctrine that debates in Congress are not appropriate sources of information from which to discover the meaning of the language of a statute passed by that body" (United States v. Freight Association, 166 U. S. 318, 17 Sup. Ct. 540, 41 L. Ed. 1007), that rule “in the nature of things is not violated by resorting to debates as a means of ascertaining the environment at the time of the enactment of a particular law; that is, the history of the period when it was adopted" (Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U. S. 50, 31 Sup. Ct. 512, 55 L. Ed. 619, decided May 15, 1911). There is a distinction between restraint of competition and restraint of trade. The latter expression had, when the Anti-Trust Act was passed, a definite legal signification. Not every combination in restraint of competition was, in a legal sense, in restraint of trade. Two men in the same town engaged in the same business as competitors may unite in a co-partnership, and thereafter, as between themselves, substitute co-operation for competition. Their combination restrains competition, and if their town is located near the line between two states, and each has been trading in both states, their combination restrains competition in interstate trade. But it does not necessarily follow that such restraint of competition is a restraint of interstate [151] trade and commerce. The determination of whether it be so must depend upon the facts and circumstances of each individual case. It is undoubtedly the policy of the statute that competitive conditions in interstate trade should be maintained wherever Opinion of the Court. their abolition would tend to suppress or diminish such trade. But this being true does not read into the statute a denunciation of all agreements that may restrain competition without regard to their purpose or direct effect to restrain "trade or commerce among the several states." To what extent the Anti-Trust Act condemns combinations that restrain full and free competition in interstate trade is a question that has been much debated. For a dozen years, at least, it has been settled that it does not condemn combinations which only indirectly, remotely, or incidentally restrain interstate trade. The recent decisions of the Supreme Court in Standard Oil Co. v. United States, and American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 221 U. S. 106, 31 Sup. Ct. 632, 55 L. Ed. 663, make it quite clear that the language of the Anti-Trust Act is not to receive that literal construction which will impair rather than enhance freedom of interstate commerce. As we read those decisions, restraint of interstate trade and restraint of competition in interstate trade are not interchangeable expressions. There may be, under the AntiTrust Act, restraint of competition that does not amount to restraint of interstate trade, just as before the passage of the act there might have been restraint of competition that did not amount to a common-law restraint of trade. This fact was plainly recognized in United States v. Joint Traffic Association, 171 U. S. 505, 567, 19 Sup. Ct. 25, 31, 43 L. Ed. 259, where Mr. Justice Peckham said: "We might say that the formation of corporations for business or manufacturing purposes has never, to our knowledge, been regarded in the nature of a contract in restraint of trade or commerce. The same may be said of the contract of partnership. It might also be difficult to show that the appointment by two or more producers of the same person to sell their goods on commission was a matter in any degree in restraint of trade. We are not aware that it has ever been claimed that a lease or purchase by a farmer, a manufacturer, or merchant of an additional farm, manufactory, or shop, or the withdrawal from business of any farmer, merchant, or manufacturer, restrained commerce or trade within the legal definition of that term." While all this is true, the recent decisions of the Supreme Court make it equally clear that a combination cannot escape the condemnation of the Anti-Trust Act merely by the form Opinion of the Court. it assumes or by the dress it wears. It matters not whether the combination be "in the form of a trust or otherwise," whether it be in the form of a trade association or a corporation, if it arbitrarily uses its power to force weaker competitors out of business, or to coerce them into a sale to or union with the combination, it puts a restraint upon interstate commerce, and monopolizes, or attempts to monopolize a part of that commerce, in a sense that violates the AntiTrust Act. 4. The record of the case now before us shows that from 1872 to 1902, a period of 30 years, the purpose of the trade associations had been to dominate the powder and explosives trade in the United States, by fixing prices, not according to any law of supply and demand, for they arbitrarily limited the output of each member, but according to [152] the will of their managers. It appears, further, that although these associations were not always strong enough to control absolutely the prices of explosives, their purpose to do so was never abandoned. Under the last of the trade association agreements the one dated July 1, 1896, and which was in force until June 30, 1904-the control of the combination was firmer than it had before been. Succeeding the death of Eugene du Pont in January, 1902, and the advent of Thomas Coleman du Pont and Pierre S. Du Pont, the attempt was made to continue the restraint upon interstate commerce and the monopoly then existing by vesting, in a few corporations, the title to the assets of all the corporations affiliated with the trade association, then dissolving the corporations whose assets had been so acquired, and binding the few corporations owning the operating plants in one holding company, which should be able to prescribe policies and control the business of all the subsidiaries without the uncertainties attendant upon a combination in the nature of a trade association. That attempt resulted in complete success. Much the larger part of the trade in black and smokeless powder and dynamite in the United States is now under the control of the combination supported by the 28 defendants above named. That combination is the successor of the com |