ing a suit in equity to enjoin such infringement. General Electric Co. v. Wise, 119 F., 922.

2-205

30. Recovery on Collateral Contract.-The act of July 2, 1890, section 1, known as the Sherman Anti-Trust Act," does not invalidate, or prevent a recovery for the breach of a collateral contract for the manufacture and sale of goods by a member of a combination formed for the purpose of restraining interstate trade in such goods. Hadley Dean Plate Glass Co. v. Highland Glass Co., 143 F., 242. 2-995

4. By illegal combinations.

31. Can Not Enforce Illegal Contract.-An illegal combination or trust can not resort to equity to enforce a contract or sale calculated to perpetuate the illegal features of the combination. Amer. Biscuit & Mfg. Co. v. Klotz, 44 F., 71.

1-2

32. May Recover on Collateral Contracts the Price of Goods Sold.A violation of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, by the formation of a combination in restraint of trade, by which a penalty is incurred under the statute, does not preclude the company thus illegally formed from recovering on collateral contracts for the purchase price of goods. Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U. S., 540. 2-118 33. Same.-Nor does the illegality, at common law, of such a combination formed by corporations and persons in restraint of trade, preclude it from recovering the purchase price of goods sold in the course of business. Ib. 2-119

34. Illegality of Contract Defense to Action to Recover for Goods Sold.-Plaintiff corporation formed an illegal combination of manufacturers and wholesalers of wall paper in the United States which constituted a restraint of interstate commerce and a violation of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. Under the contract between plaintiff and the manufacturers, plaintiff was the nominal seller of all the wall paper manufactured by the combination, though it was actually purchased from various jobbers or mills within the combination. Defendants, wholesalers of wall paper, having been compelled to enter the combination and agree to purchase and sell wall paper in accordance with the monopolistic terms of the contract, purchased paper from various members of the combine, for which plaintiff brought suit. Held that, since plaintiff was bound to rely on the combination contract to show its capacity to sue, the illegality thereof constituted a defense to the action. Continental Wall Paper Co. v. Voight & Sons Co., 148 F., 950. 3-60

85. When Recovery can not be had.-A recovery upon an account for goods sold and delivered by a corporation created to effectuate a combination of wall-paper manufacturers, intending and having the effect directly to restrain and

monopolize trade and commerce, in violation of the AntiTrust Act, can not be had where the account is made up, within the knowledge of both buyer and seller, with direct reference to, and in execution of, the agreements which constitute the illegal combination. Continental Wall Paper Co. v. Voight, 212 U. S., 262. 3-513 36. When Defendants Entitled to Judgment.-Defendants in an action for goods sold and delivered are entitled to judgment on a demurrer admitting the allegations of a defense set up by way of answer, which in substance disclose that plaintiff is the selling agent of a combination of wall-paper manufacturers which offends against the Anti-Trust Act; that, in carrying out such combination, defendants were virtnally compelled to sign a jobber's agreement which, in effect, bound them to buy from the plaintiff all the wall paper needed in their business at certain fixed prices, and not to sell at lower prices or upon better terms than those at which plaintiff itself sells to dealers other than jobbers; that the goods in question were ordered pursuant to such agreement and at the prices fixed; that such prices were unreasonable; and that all the transactions between the parties were in furtherance of the illegal combination. Ib. 3-517 37. Vendee can Plead Illegality of Combination as Defense to Recovery of Purchase Price of Goods.-While a voluntary purchaser of goods at stipulated prices under a collateral, independent contract can not avoid payment merely on the ground that the vendor was an illegal combination (Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U. S., 540), a vendee of goods purchased from an illegal agreement can plead such illegality as a defense. Ib. 3-513

38. Same.-The court can not lend its aid in any way to a party seeking to realize the fruits of an illegal contract, and, while this may at times result in relieving a purchaser from paying for what he has had, public policy demands that the court deny its aid to carry out illegal contracts without regard to individual interests or knowledge of the parties Ib. 3-513 39. Same-Effect of Refusal.-The refusal of judicial aid to enforce illegal contracts tends to reduce such transactions. Ib. 3-514

5. By the United States.

40. The right to bring suits in equity for violations of the AntiTrust Act is vested in the district attorneys of the United States. Pidcock v. Harrington, 64 F., 821. 1-377

41. The right to bring suits for injunction under section 4 of the act is limited to suits instituted on behalf of the Government. Greer, Mills & Co. v. Stoller, 77 F., 1. 1-620

42. Same. The only party entitled to maintain a bill of injunction for an alleged breach of the Anti-Trust Act is the United States, by its district attorney, on the authority of the Attorney General. Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Miami S. S. Co., 86 F., 407. 1-823

43. The intention of the Anti-Trust Act was to limit direct proceedings in equity to prevent and restrain such violations of the Anti-Trust Act as cause injury to the general public, or to all alike, merely from the suppression of competition in trade and commerce among the several States and with foreign nations, to those instituted in the name of the United States, under section 4 of the act, by district attorneys of the United States, acting under the direction of the Attorney General; thus securing the enforcement of the act, so far as such direct proceedings in equity are concerned, according to some uniform plan, operative throughout the entire country. Minnesota v. Northern Securities Co., 194 U. S., 48. 2-533

6. By States.

44. A State can not maintain an action in equity to restrain a corporation from violating the provisions of the act on the ground that such violations by decreasing competition would depreciate the value of its public lands and enhance the cost of maintaining its public institutions, the damages resulting from such violations being remote and indirect and not such direct actual injury as is provided for in section 7 of the act. Minnesota v. Northern Securities Co., 194 U. S., 48. 2-533 45. Municipal Corporation May Maintain Action for Damages Under Section 7.-A municipal corporation engaged in operating water, lighting, or similar plants, from which a revenue is derived, is, in relation to such matters, a business corporation, and may maintain an action under section 7 of the Anti-Trust Act for injury to its "business" by reason of a combination or conspiracy in restraint of interstate trade or commerce made unlawful by such act. City of Atlanta v. Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works, 127 F., 23. 2-299

7. At common law-Damages.

46. Action for Damages Must Show that Plaintiff is Engaged in Interstate Commerce.-An action to recover damages alleged to have been caused by acts done in violation of the AntiTrust Act can not be maintained when the complaint fails to show that plaintiff is engaged in interstate commerce, and no such showing is made by an averment that plaintiff is engaged in "manufacturing watch cases throughout all

the States of the United States and in foreign countries." Dueber Watch Case Mfg. v. Howard Watch, etc., Co., 55 F., 851. 1-178 47. Same-Must Show Intention to Control Market, or a Large Portion of It.-An agreement by a number of manufacturers and dealers in watch cases to fix an arbitrary price on their goods, and not to sell the same to any persons buying watch cases of plaintiff, is not in violation of the statute; and a complaint which, on the last analysis, avers only these facts. without averring the absorption or the intention to absorb or control the entire market, or a large part thereof, states no cause of action. Ib. 48. Action Alleged to be in Violation of the Statutes of a State and of the United States Held to be Founded upon the AntiTrust Act.-An action brought in the United States Circuit Court for southern New York by a manufacturing company against competitors in various States, alleging the formation of a combination and an attempt to create a monopoly, "in violation of the statutes of this State and the United States," whereby plaintiff's business was injured, and alleging the formation of the combination on and prior to November 16, 1887, but that, after the passage of the act of July 2, 1890, defendants ratified, renewed, and confirmed their previous contracts, combinations, etc., and judgment being demanded for treble damages "under and by virtue of the statute." Held, that the action must be deemed to be founded upon the said act of July 2, 1890. Dueber Watch Case Mfg. Co. v. Howard Watch, etc., Co., 66 F., 637. 1-421. 49. Same-A Cause of Action not Stated.-Where, in the above action, complaint alleged that previous to November 16, 1887, it sold all its goods to a great number of dealers "throughout the United States and Canada;" that prior to that date defendants had agreed with each other to maintain arbitrary and fixed prices for their watch cases; that, for the purpose of compelling plaintiff to join with them therein, defendants on said date mutually agreed that they would not thereafter sell any goods to persons who bought or sold goods manu factured by plaintiff; that they caused notice thereof to be served upon the many dealers in such goods throughout the United States and Canada, who had formerly dealt in plaintiff's goods, whereupon many of such dealers withdrew their patronage from plaintiff; that after the passage of the act of July 2, 1890, defendants ratified, renewed, and confirmed their previous agreements, and served notice of such ratification upon all said dealers in plaintiff's goods, whereby said dealers were compelled to refuse to purchase plaintiff's watch cases. Held, that the complaint failed to state a cause of action under the statutes.

Ib.

50. Same.—Held, that no monopolizing or combination to monopolize interstate commerce, contrary to the second section of the act, was shown, for the reason that the allegations did not preclude the inference that each defendant may have sold his entire product in the State where it was manufactured. IV. 51. Same.-Held, that the contracts did not produce an unlawful restraint of trade, under the first section, because the combination and agreement to fix arbitrary prices did not appear to include all manufacturers of watch cases, but was only a partial restraint in respect to an article not of prime necessity, and therefore came within the recognized limits of lawful contracts. Ib. 52. Same.-Held, that the further agreement not to sell to customers of plaintiff was a lawful means of enlarging and protecting the business of the defendants.

Shipman, Cir. J., concurring, on the ground—

Ib.

53. That the acts of the defendants, whether viewed as an attempt to create a monopoly or as a contract in restraint of trade. were not shown to concern interstate commerce, because there were no allegations showing the residence of any dealers who withdrew their patronage from complainant, and it therefore did not directly appear that any of them resided outside of the State where plaintiff's goods were manufactured. Ib.

Wallace, Cir., dissenting, on the ground—

54. That the allegations were sufficient to show that the attempts to monopolize and restrain did operate upon interstate comIb.

merce.

55. That, while the contracts might not be unlawful in themselves, yet the purpose for which they were alleged to be made, namely, to compel plaintiff to join in the agreement for fixing arbitrary prices, and to injure and destroy its business if it refused to do so, was oppressive and unjust, and rendered the acts of defendants unlawful under both sections of the statute. Ib. 56. The Only Remedy to Party Other Than the United States is a Suit for Damages.-Under the Act of July 2, 1890, entitled "An act to protect trade and commerce against unlawful restraints and monopolies," the only remedy given to any other party than the Government of the United States, is a suit for three-fold damages, costs, and attorney's fees. Gulf. C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Miami S. S. Co., 86 F., 407. 1-823 57. The only remedy of a private individual to restrain acts forbidden by the Anti-Trust Act is an action at law for damages. Pidcock v. Harrington, 64 F., 821. 1-377

58. The remedy of a private party under the Anti-Trust Act is an action at law for damages. Southern Ind. Exp. Co. v. U. S. Exp. Co., 88 F., 659. 1-862