276. Same. Even if there is some interference with interstate commerce, a contract is not necessarily void under the Sherman Act if such interference is insignificant and merely incidental and not the dominant purpose; the contract will be construed as a domestic contract and its validity determined by the local law. See U. S. v. Trans-Mo. Ft. Assn., 166, U. S., 290, 329; U. S. v. Joint Traffic Assn., 171 U. S., 505, 568; and Bement v. National Harrow Co., 186 U. S., 70, 92. Ib. 277. Same. A contract for sale of vessels, even if they are engaged in interstate commerce, is not necessarily void because the vendors agree, as is ordinary in case of sale of a business and its good will, to withdraw from business for a specified period. Ib.

278. The Anti-Trust Act does not apply to a contract or combination relating to the business of manufacturing within a State. Robinson v. Suburban Brick Co., 127 F., 804.

2-312 279. Agreements not to Engage in Business-Contracts in Partial Restraint of Trade.-A covenant in a contract by which the owners of brick-making plants conveyed them to a corporation in exchange for its stock, binding the sellers not to engage in competing business within a radius of 50 miles from the place of business of the corporation for a term of ten years, is valid, and may be enforced in a court of equity by a suit to enjoin its violation. Ib. 280. A combination to restrain competition in proposals for contracts for the sale of certain articles which are to be delivered in the State in which some of the parties to the combination reside and carry on business is not, so far as those members are concerned, in violation of the Anti-Trust Law of Congress, although the contract may be awarded to some party outside the State as the lowest bidder. Addyston Pipe and Steel Co. v. U. S., 175 U. S., 211. 1-1009 281. Same-Jurisdiction of Congress.-Although the jurisdiction of Congress over commerce among the States is full and complete, it is not questioned that it has none over that which is wholly within a State, and therefore none over combinations or agreements so far as they relate to a restraint of such trade or commerce; nor does it acquire any jurisdiction over that part of a combination or agreement which relates to commerce wholly within a State by reason of the fact that the combination also covers and regulates commerce which is interstate. Ib.

282. An association of manufacturers of shingles within a particular State, formed for the purpose of securing concerted action between its members to prevent overproduction and establish uniform prices and grading, is not an illegal combination in restraint of interstate or foreign commerce, within the meaning of the Anti-Trust Law, or subject to Federal control; and the fact that through the action of the association

the mills of its members were closed for a certain time, and the price of shingles was raised, but not to an extent alleged to be unreasonable or exorbitant, does not give a dealer in shingles for export a right of action against it or its members under such law. Gibbs v. McNeeley, 102 F., 594. 2-25 283. A combination controlling not only the manufacture of an article in the State, but also the sale of the manufactured article, is not one in restraint of interstate commerce, so as to give a right of action against it, under the Anti-Trust Law, to one injured by a resolution passed and circulated by it denouncing him for cutting prices, its sales being within the State, and any transportation and sale of the article in other States being by other agencies. Gibbs v. McNeeley, 107 F., 210. 2-71

Reversed by Circuit Court of Appeals, 118 F., 120 (2-194).

10. Labor combinations.

284. Combination Between Local Labor Union and Labor Organization Covering Many States-Boycott on Goods Sent to Other States. The action of the members of a labor union in attempting to compel a hat manufac.urer to unionize his factory by leaving his employment and preventing others from taking employment therein, and also, with the assistance of the members of affiliated organizations, by declaring a boycott upon his goods in other States into which such goods have been shipped for sale at retail, does not have such relation to interstate commerce as to constitute a combination or conspiracy in restraint of such commerce in violation of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. Loewe v. Lawlor, 148 F., 924. Reversed by Supreme Court, 208 U. S., 274 (3—324).

11. Municipal contracts-State monopolies.

285. Contract Limiting Character of Material to be Used to that Controlled by a Single Corporation.-Where the contract for the paving of a street with asphalt limited the kind of asphalt to be used to Trinidad asphalt, such fact, and the further fact that such asphalt was controlled by a single corporation was not violative of the commerce clause of the Constitution or of the Federal Anti-Trust statutes, and did not affect the validity of the contract. Field v. Barber Asphalt Pav. Co., 117 F., 925. 2-193 286. Same. The specification in an ordinance by a municipal council that Trinidad Lake asphalt shall be used for street improvement, does not violate the commerce clause of the Federal Constitution or the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, notwithstanding this particular kind of asphalt is the product of a

foreign country and competitive bidding was thereby rendered impossible. Field v. Barber Asphalt Paving Co., 194 U. S., 618.

2-555 287. Same. The necessity of an improvement of streets is a matter of which the proper municipal authorities are the exclusive judges and their judgment is not to be interfered with except in cases of fraud or gross abuse of power. Ib.

288. State Monopoly of Liquor Traffic.-The act of July 2, 1890, is not applicable to the case of a State which, by its laws. assumes an entire monopoly of the traffic in intoxicating liquors (act S. C., Jan. 2, 1895). A State is neither a person nor a corporation," within the meaning of the act of Congress. Lowenstein v. Evans, 69 F., 908. 1-598

66

66

COMMERCE. See INTERSTATE COMMERCE

COMMON CARRIERS. See CARRIERS.

COMMON LAW.

1. Common-Law Offenses-Definitions.-There are no common-law offenses against the United States, and the offenses cognizable in the Federal courts are only such as the Federal statutes define, provide a punishment for, and confer jurisdiction to try; but when Congress adopts or creates a common-law offense the courts may properly look to the common law for the true meaning and definition thereof, in the absence of a clear definition in the act creating it. In re Greene, 52 F., 104. 1-55

2. Common-Law Offense Adopted by Congress-Presumption-Interpretation. Where Congress adopts or creates a commonlaw offense, and in doing so uses terms which have acquired a well-understood meaning by judicial interpretation the presumption is that the terms were used in that sense, and courts may properly look to prior decisions interpreting them for the meaning of the terms and the definition of the offense where there is no other definition in the act. U. S. v. Trans-Mo. Ft. Assn., 58 F., 58. 1-186

Case reversed, 166 U S., 290 (1-648).

3. Common-Law Rule.-The ground on which certain classes of contracts and combinations in restraint of trade were held illegal at common law was that they were against public policy. Ib. 4. Public Policy-How Determined. The public policy of the nation must be determined from its Constitution, laws, and judicial decisions. Ib.

5. Railroad Companies-Arrangements for Through Billing.-There is no principle of common law which forbids a single railroad corporation, or two or more of such corporations, from selecting, from two or more other corporations, one which

they will employ as the agency by which they will send freight beyond their own lines, on through bills of lading, or as their agent to receive freight, and transmit it on through bills to their own lines, and without breaking bulk; and the right to make such selection is not taken away by the Interstate Commerce Law. New York & N. Ry. Co. v. New York & N. E. R. Co., 50 F., 867, explained. Prescott & A. C. R. Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co., 73 F., 438. 1—604 6. Prepayment of Freight.-A common carrier engaged in interstate commerce may at common law, and under the Interstate Commerce Law, demand prepayment of freight charges, when delivered to it by one connecting carrier, without exacting such prepayment when delivered by another connecting carrier, and may advance freight charges to one connecting carrier without advancing such charges to another connecting carrier Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Miami S. S. Co., 86 F., 407. 1-823

7. Same. The rules of the common law do not require a carrier to receive goods for carriage, either from a consignor or a connecting carrier, without prepayment of its charges if demanded, nor to advance the charges of a connecting carrier from which it receives goods in the course of transportation; nor can it be required to extend such credit or make such advances to one connecting carrier because it does so to another. Southern Ind. Exp. Co. v. U. S. Exp. Co., 88 F., 659. 1-862

8. Contracts in Restraint of Trade-At Common Law.-Contracts that were in unreasonable restraint of trade at common law were not unlawful in the sense of being criminal, or as giving rise to an action for damages to one prejudicially affected thereby, but were simply void, and not enforceable. U. S. v. Addyston Pipe and Steel Co., 85 F., 271 1-772 9. Same. No contractual restraint of trade is enforceable at common law unless the covenant embodying it is merely ancillary to some lawful contract (involving some such relations as vendor and vendee, partnership, employer and employee), and necessary to protect the covenantee in the enjoyment of the legitimate fruits of the contract, or to protect him from the dangers of an unjust use of those fruits by the other party. The main purpose of the contract suggests the measure of protection needed, and furnishes a sufficiently uniform standard for determining the reasonableness and validity of the restraints. But where the sole object of both parties in making the contract is merely to restrain competition, and enhance and maintain prices, the contract is void. Ib. See also CONTINENTAL WALL PAPER Co. v. LEWIS VOIGHT & SONS Co., 148 F., 939 (3-44); 212 U. S., 227 (8-480).

10. The illegality, at common law, of a combination formed by corporations and persons in restraint of trade, does not preclude it from recovering the purchase price of goods sold in the course of business. Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U. S., 540. 2-118

11. Note to Trust-Avoidance.-A note made for a balance due on goods bought from a corporation can not be avoided merely because the latter is a trust organized to create and carry out restrictions in trade contrary to the common law.

Sewer Pipe Co., 99 F., 354.

Affirmed, 184 U. S., 540 (2—118).

COMPETITION. See STATUTES, 22, 23, 26, 27, 33.

CONGRESS.

Union 2-1

1. Debates in Congress are not appropriate sources of information from which to discover the meaning of the language of a statute passed by that body. U. S. v. Trans-Mo. Ft. Assn., 166 U. S., 290. 1-648

2. Power to Prohibit Combinations to Establish and Maintain Railroad Rates.-Congress has the power to prohibit, as in restraint of interstate commerce, a contract or combination between competing railroad companies to establish and maintain interstate rates and fares for the transportation of freight and passengers on any of the railroads parties to the contract or combination, even though the rates and fares thus established are reasonable. U. S. v. Joint Traffic Assn.,

171 U. S., 505.

1-869

3. Same Combinations by Means of Which Competition is Prevented. Congress has the power to forbid any agreement or - combination among or between competing railroad companies for interstate commerce, by means of which competition was prevented. Ib. 4. The Anti-Trust Law is a legitimate exercise of the power of Congress over interstate commerce, and a valid regulation thereof. Ib. 5. Power to Legislate Upon the Subject of Private Contracts in Respect to Interstate Commerce. The power of Congress to regulate interstate or foreign commerce includes the power to legislate upon the subject of private contracts in respect to such commerce. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U. S., 211. 1-1009

6. Same. Congress may enact such legislation as shall declare void and prohibit the performance of any contract between individuals or corporations where the natural and direct effect of such a contract shall be, when carried out, to directly and not as a mere incident to other and innocent purposes, regulate to any substantial extent interstate or foreign commerce. Ib.