producing evidence in any proceeding, suit, or prosecution
under said acts.

Ib.

23. Corporations can not Claim Immunity because of Testimony
Given or Evidence Furnished by its Officers or Agents.-A
corporation, whether State of Federal, can not claim im-
munity from prosecution for violation of the interstate
commerce or Anti-Trust Laws of the United States because
of testimony given or evidence produced by its officers or
agents before the Interstate Commerce Commission or the
Commissioner of Corporations, or in any proceeding, suit, or
prosecution under such laws; the right to immunity on ac-
count of eivdence so given in the several cases granted by
act of February 11, 1893 (27 Stat., 443), and acts of Febru-
ary 14 and 25, 1903 (32 Stat., 827, 904), being limited to
individuals who as witnesses give testimony or produce evi-
dence. United States v. Armour & Co., 142 F., 808. 2-951
24. Immunity to Witness-Construction of Statute.-The Immunity
Act of February 11, 1893, 27 Stat., 443, which relates to evi-
dence given in Government investigations, and provides that
no person shall be prosecuted or subjected to any penalty o
forfeiture for or on account of any transaction, matter, or
thing concerning which he may testify or produce evidence,
was enacted to satisfy the demand of the fifth
constitutional amendment, and does so by affording the
witness absolute immunity from future prosecution for any
offense arising out of the transactions to which his testi-
mony relates, and which might be aided, directly or indi-
rectly, thereby, so as to leave no ground on which the con-
stitutional privilege may be invoked. It operates as an act of
general amnesty for all such offenses; but it is not intended
to be, and cannot be made, a shield against prosecution for
offenses committed after the testimony is given or the evi-
dence furnished, since a person cannot be said to have been
a witness against himself in respect to an offense which
had not been committed when the testimony was given.
U. S. v. Swift, 186 F., 1017.
4-76
25. Immunity to One Furnishing Evidence-Effect of Statute.—
Defendants were indicted in 1905 for conspiracy to monopo-
lize interstate commerce in fresh meats, in violation of the
Sherman Anti-Trust Act, but an acquittal was directed, on
the ground that they were immune from prosecution because
of testimony given and evidence furnished by them before
the Commissioner of Corporations in relation to the trans-
actions which formed the basis for the indictments. Held,
That such immunity did not extend to a subsequent prose-
cution for continuing the same conspiracy thereafter, nor
did it obliterate the facts testified to, which, if legally com-
petent and relevant, might be shown in the subsequent
prosecution. Ib.
4-76

26. Not Extended to Witnesses Called by Defense in Civil Suit.-
The Immunity Act of February 25, 1903, c. 755, 32 Stat.,
904, as amended by act of June 30, 1906, c. 3920, 34 Stat., 798,
provides that for the enforcement of the provisions of the
act a specified sum was appropriated to employ special
counsel to conduct proceedings, suits, and prosecutions
thereunder; provided, that no person shall be prosecuted
or subjected to any penalty or forfeiture for or on account
of any transaction, matter, or thing concerning which he
might testify in any proceeding, suit, or prosecution under
the act, etc. Held, that though the act applies to wit-
nesses, whether called in a criminal or a civil suit, it did
not extend immunity to witnesses called by the defense in
a civil suit to restrain alleged violations of the act, espe-
cially to defendants called by co-defendants, the effect of
which would be to render the statute abortive. U. S. v.
Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co., 187 F., 236.
4-262
27. Filing of Sworn Answers Does Not Immunize Persons.-The
act of February 25, 1903, c. 755, 32 Stat., 904, as amended by
the act of June 30, 1906, c. 3920, 34 Stat., 798, prohibiting
prosecution for a transaction concerning which accused, in
obedience to a subpoena, gives testimony in a proceeding
under the Anti-Trust Law, does not immunize persons who
have filed answers under oath in such a proceeding. U. S.
V. Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co., 187 F., 230.
4-252

IN PARI DELICTO. See SALE, 6, 7.

INCIDENTALLY, INDIRECTLY, OR REMOTELY.

See COMBINATIONS,

ETC., 14, 15, 185, 186, 188, 189, 190, 205, 208, 240, 261; CON-
GRESS 7; STATUTES 7, 8, 14, 64, 69.

INCITING STRIKE. See COMBINATIONS, ETC., 168-172.

INCRIMINATING EVIDENCE. See WITNESSES; IMMUNITY.

INDICTMENTS.

1. Failure to Allege that Defendants Monopolized or Conspired to
Monopolize Trade and Commerce Among the Several States.
etc.-An indictment under section 2 of the Anti-Trust Act,
which fails to allege that defendants monopolized, or con-
spired to monopolize, trade and commerce among the several
States, or with foreign nations, fails to state an offense,
even though it does allege that they did certain acts with
intent to monopolize the traffic in distilled spirits among
the several States, and that they have destroyed free com-
petition in such traffic in one of the States and increased
the price of distilled spirits therein. U. S. v. Greenhut,
50 F., 469.
1-30

2. Failure to Charge a Crime.-An indictment under the act of
July 2, 1890, relating to monopolies, averred that defend-
ants in pursuance of a combination to restrain trade in dis-
tillery products between the States and monopolize the traffic
therein, acquired by lease or purchase, prior to the passage
of the act, some 70 distilleries, producing three-quarters of
the distillery products of the United States, and that they
continued to operate the same after the passage of the law,
and by certain described means sold the product at increased
prices. Held, That no crime was charged in respect to the
purchase or continued operation of the distilleries. since
there was no averment that defendants obligated the vendors
of the distilleries not to build others, or to withhold their
capital or experience from the business. In re Corning, 51
F., 33.
1-33
3. Same.—The indictment further averred that defendants, in pur-
suance of the combination, shipped certain of the products to
Massachusetts, and sold them there through their distribut-
ing agents to dealers, who were promised a rebate of 5 cents
per gallon on their purchases, provided such dealers pur-
chased their distillery products exclusively from the distrib-
uting agents, and sold them no lower than the prescribed
list prices, said rebate to be paid when such dealers should
signe a certificate at they had so purchased and sold for six
months; and that by this means defendants had controlled
and increased the price of distillery products in Massachu-
setts. Held, That no crime was charged with respect to such
sales, since there was no averment of any contract whereby
the purchasers bound themselves not to purchase from others,
or not to sell at less than list prices. Ib.
1-34
4. Failure to Charge a Crime.-An indictment under the act of
July 2, 1890, relating to monopolies, averred in the fourth
count that defendants, in pursuance of a combination to
restrain trade in distillery products between the States,
shipped certain whisky to Massachusetts and sold it there
through their distributing agents to dealers under a con-
tract whereby said dealers were promised a rebate of 5 cents
per gallon on their purchases, providing such dealers pur-
chased their distillery products exclusively from the dis-
tributing agents and sold them no lower than the prescribed
list prices; said rebate to be paid when such dealers should
sign a certificate that they had so purchased and sold for
six months; and that by this means defendants had con-
trolled and increased the price of distillery products in
Massachusetts. Held, That no crime was charged with re-
spect to such sales, since there was no averment of any
contract whereby the dealers bound themselves not to pur-
chase from others, or not to sell at less than list prices. In
re Corning, 51 F., 205, approved. In re Terrell, 51 F., 213.

5. Failure to Allege Contract or Means of Compulsion—Vague-
ness. In an indictment under section 1 of the act of July 2,
1890, to protect trade and commerce against monopolies, one
count alleged, in substance, that on a specified date de-
fendants, under the guise of the Distilling and Cattle Feed
ing Company, sold to certain persons in Boston a quantity of
alcohol, then in Illinois, and that, by reason of the fact that
said company controlled the manufacture and sale of 75 per
cent of all distillery products in the United States, defend-
ants fixed the price at which the purchasers should and did
sell such alcohol, and "did compel" said purchasers "to sell
said alcohol at no less price than that fixed" by them, but
there were no allegations as to the means of compulsion.
Held, That it could not be assumed from these allegations
that the means used was a contract with the purchasers, and
the count was bad, as being too vague to charge any contract
or restraint of trade between the States. In re Greene, 52
F., 104.
1-55
6. Indictments which Simply Follow the Language of the Stat-
ute-Tested by Specific Facts Alleged.-Under the act of
July 2, 1890, to protect trade and commerce against unlaw-
ful restraints and monopolies," an indictment simply follow-
ing the language of the statute would be wholly insufficient,
for the words of the act do not themselves fully, directly,
and clearly set forth all the elements necessary to constitute
the offense; and the indictment must, therefore, be tested by
the specific facts alleged to have been done or committed. Ib.
7. Indictment of Stockholders for Acts of Corporation-Omission
to State Relation Defendants Bore to the Corporation.-In
indictments of individuals under the said statute, where all
the acts alleged to constitute the offense are charged to have
been done by a corporation, an omission to state what rela-
tion defendants bore to the corporation, other than that of
stockholders, is fatal, since mere stockholders can not be held
criminally responsible for the acts of the corporation. Ib.
8. Must Contain Description of the Offense and a Statement of
the Facts Constituting Same-Words of Statute.-An indict-
ment under the act of Congress, "to protect trade and com-
merce against unlawful restraint and monopolies," must
contain a certain description of the offense, and a statement
of facts constituting same, and it is not sufficient simply to
follow the language of the statute. U. S. v. Nelson, 52 F.,
646.
1-77
9. An indictment under the Anti-Trust Law should describe some-
thing that amounts to a conspiracy under that act conform-
ably to the rules of pleading at common law, as perhaps
modified by general Federal statutes. U. S. v. MacAndrews
& Forbes Co., 149 F., 823, 831.

10. Must Show Means Whereby it is Sought to Monopolize.—In an
indictment under the Anti-Trust Act, it is not sufficient to
declare in the words of the statute, but the means whereby
it is sought to monopolize the market must be set out, so
as to enable the court to see that they are illegal. U. S. v.
Patterson, 55 F., 605.
1-133

Rehearing on general demurrer, 59 F., 280 (1—244).

11. Allegations of what was done in pursuance of an alleged con-
spiracy are irrelevant in an indictment under this statute,
and are of no avail either to enlarge or to take the place of
the necessary allegations as to the elements of the offense.
Ib.

12. Scope of the Statute.-The words "trade" and "commerce,"
as used in the Anti-Trust Act, are synonymous. The use
of both terms in the first section does not enlarge the mean-
ing of the statute beyond that employed in the common-
law expression, "contract in restraint of trade," as they are
analogous to the word "monopolize," used in the second sec-
tion of the act.
Ib.
13. The word "monopolize" is the basis and limitation of the
statute, and hence an indictment must show a conspiracy in
restraint by engrossing or monopolizing or grasping the
market. It is not sufficient simply to allege a purpose to
drive certain competitors out of the field by violence, annoy-
ance, intimidation, or otherwise.
Ib.
14. Acts of Violence.-Where counts in such indictment allege a
purpose of engrossing or monopolizing the entire trade in
question, acts of violence and intimidation may be alleged as
the means to accomplish the general purpose.
Ib.
15. Surplusage in an indictment can not be reached by demurrer
of any character; but, if it be assumed that a special de-
murrer will lie, it must point out the specific language ob-
jected to, and not require counsel and the court to search
through the indictment for what is claimed as demurrable.
U. S. v. Patterson, 59 F., 280.
1-244

16. An indictment for conspiracy to monopolize interstate com-
merce in cash registers need not negative the ownership of
patents by defendants, or aver that the commerce proposed
to be carried on is a lawful one.

Ib.
17. Averments. It is unnecessary to set out in detail the opera-
tions supposed to constitute interstate commerce, and in this
respect it is sufficient to use the language of the statute. Ib.
18. It is unnecessary to allege the existence of a commerce which
defendants conspire to monopolize, as the statute does not
distinguish between strangling a commerce which has been
born and preventing the birth of a commerce which does not
exist.
Ib.
19. The indictment need not show that the purpose of the con-
spiracy was to grasp the commerce into the hands of one of