dealers, and traders in various States and Territories to
the defendants, the Kansas City Live Stock Association,
was solicited by the latter chiefly through personal solicita-
tion of traveling agents, and through advertisements, the
course of business involving frequent loans to shippers in
other States, secured by chattel mortgages on herds, and
frequent drafts drawn by shippers on the defendants, and
discounted at their local banks in other States on the
strength of bills of shipment attached thereto, shipments
being made to Kansas City, and the loans or drafts paid
from proceeds of sale, and the balance remitted to the
shippers, and sales at Kansas City were made for shipment
to markets in other States, as well as for slaughter at pack-
ing houses near by, the traffic being of immense proportions,
and defendants active promoters, and frequently interested
parties, gathered in for sale and slaughter millions of cattle,
sheep, and hogs; and their rules and regulations covered the
entire business, and extended over the whole field of opera-
tion, held, that defendants were engaged in commerce be-
tween the States, and were subject to the provisions of the
law of July 2, 1890, against trusts and monopolies. U. S. v.
Hopkins, 82 F., 529.
1-725
Reversed, 171 U. S., 578 (1-941).
16. Same.-Live stock shipped from various States to the yards of a
stock-yards association in another State, by the solicitation
and procurement of the members thereof, to be there sold
or to be reshipped to other States, if the market should be
unsatisfactory, does not cease to be a subject of interstate
commerce as soon as it reaches such yards and is there un-
loaded, nor until it has been further acted upon so as to
become mingled with the mass of property in the State. Ib.
17. Same. The fact that the place of business of an association is
located upon both sides of the line dividing two States is
in itself of no material importance in determining whether
the business transacted by it is commerce between the
States.
Ib.
18. Foreign Commerce-Regulation of by Congress.-The transpor-
tation of passengers between this country and Europe forms
a part of the commerce of the United States with foreign
nations; and Congress has power to prohibit all contracts,
combinations, and conspiracies in restraint of such part of
such commerce. U. S. v. Hamburg-American Line, 192
4441
19. Same-Restraint by Citizens of Foreign Countries.-Citizens
of foreign countries are not free to restrain or monopolize
the foreign commerce of this country by entering into a com-
bination abroad, nor by employing foreign vessels to effect
their purpose. Ib.
4 442
20. Same. The business of buying and selling live stock at stock
yards in a city by members of a stock exchange as commis-
mission merchants is not interstate commerce, although most
of the purchases and sales are of live stock sent from other
States, and the members of the stock exchange are em-
ployed to sell by letter from the owners of the stock in
other States, and send agents to other States to solicit busi-
ness, and advance money to the cattle owners and pay
their drafts, and aid them in making the cattle fit for
market. Hopkins v. United States, 171 U. S., 578. 1-941
Reversing, 82 F., 578 (1—725).
21. Same. The fact that a State line runs through stock yards,
and that sales may be made of a lot of stock in the yards
which may be partly in one State and partly in another,
has no effect to make the business of selling stock interstate
commerce. Hopkins v. United States, 171 U. S., 578.
1-941
22. Same.-A by-law of the Kansas City Live Stock Exchange,
which regulates the commissions to be charged by members
of that association for selling live stock is not in restraint
of interstate commerce, or a violation of the act of July
2, 1890, to protect commerce from unlawful restraints. Ib.
23. Same.-A commission agent who sells cattle at their place of
destination, which are sent from another State to be sold,
is not engaged in interstate commerce; nor is his agreement
with others in the same business, as to the commissions to
be charged for such sales, void as a contract in restraint
of that commerce.
Ib.
24. Same. In order to come within the provisions of the statute,
the direct effect of an agreement or combination must be in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States
or with foreign nations.
Ib.
25. Same.-Restrictions on sending prepaid telegrams or telephone
messages, made by a by-law of a live-stock exchange, when
these restrictions are merely for the regulation of the busi-
ness of the members, and do not affect the business of the
telegraph company, are not void as regulations of interstate
Ib.
26. Same.--The business of agents in soliciting consignments of
cattle to commission merchants in another State for sale is
not interstate commerce, and a by-law of a stock exchange
restricting the number of solicitors to three does not re-
strain that commerce or violate the act of Congress. Ib.
27. Same. A combination of commission merchants at stock yards,
by which they refuse to do business with those who are not
members of their association, even if it is illegal, is not sub-
ject to the act of Congress of July 2, 1890, to protect trade
and commerce, since their business is not interstate com-
merce.
Ib.
28. Commerce Between Two Points in Same State-Vessels Passing
Over Soil of Adjoining States.-Where a contract relates to
commerce between points within a State, both on a bound-
ary river, it will not be construed as falling within the pro-
hibitions of the Sherman Act because the vessels affected
by the contract sail over soil belonging to the other State
while passing between the interstate points. Cincinnati,
etc., Packet Co. v. Bay, 200 U. S., 179.
2-867
29. Same. Even if there is some interference with interstate com-
merce, a contract is not necessarily void under the Sherman
Act if such interference is insignificant and merely inci-
dental and not the dominant purpose; the contract will be
construed as a domestic contract and its validity determined
by the local law.
Ib.
30. Same.-A contract for sale of vessels, even if they are engaged
in interstate commerce, is not necessarily void because the
vendors agree, as is ordinary in case of sale of a business
and its good will, to withdraw from business for a specified
period.
Ib.
31. What Acts are Not in Restraint.-The action of the members of
a labor union in attempting to compel a hat manufacturer
to unionize his factory by leaving his employment and pre-
venting others from taking employment therein, and also,
with the assistance of the members of affiliated organiza-
tions, by declaring a boycott upon his goods in other States
into which such goods have been shipped for sale at retail,
does not have such relation to interstate commerce as to
constitute a combination or conspiracy in restraint of such
commerce in violation of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act.
Lowe v. Lawlor, 148 F., 925.
Reversed by Supreme Court (208 U. S., 274).
32. Source of Power to Regulate.-The power of Congress to legis-
late on the subject of contracts and combinations in re-
straint of trade is derived from its constitutional power to
regulate interstate and foreign commerce, and the Sherman
Anti-Trust Act is to be so construed, and applies only to
contracts or combinations which directly, immediately, and
necessarily affect commerce among the States or with for-
eign nations. Bigelow v. Calumet & Hecla Mining Co., 167
F., 725.
3-624
33. Powers of the United States-Transmission of the Mails.-While
the United States is a Government of enumerated powers,
it has full attributes of sovereignty within the limits of
those powers, among which are the power over interstate
commerce and the power over the transmission of the mails.
In re Debs, 158 U. S., 564.
1-565
34. Same-The powers thus conferred are not dormant, but have
been assumed and put into practical exercise by Congres-
sional legislation.
35. Same-Removal of Obstructions. In the exercise of those
powers the United States may remove everything put upon
highways, natural or artificial, to obstruct the passage of
interstate commerce, or the carrying of the mails.
Ib.
36. Same-Executive Power May Appeal to Civil Courts.-While it
may be competent for the Government, through the executive
branch and in the use of the entire executive power of the
Nation, to forcibly remove all such obstructions, it is equally
within its competency to appeal to the civil courts for an
inquiry and determination as to the existence and the char-
acter of any of them, and if such are found to exist or
threaten to occur, to invoke the powers of those courts to
remove or restrain them, the jurisdiction of courts to inter-
fere in such matters by injunction being recognized from
ancient times and by indubitable authority.
Ib.
37. Same-Circuit Court had Power to Issue Injunction.-The com-
plaint filed in this case clearly shows an existing obstruction
of artificial highways for the passage of interstate commerce
and the transmission of the mails, not only temporarily ex-
isting, but threatening to continue, and under it the circuit
court had power to issue its process of injunction.
Ib.
38. Policy of Congress.—It is the declared policy of Congress, which
accords with the principles of the common law, to promote
individual competition in relation to interstate commerce,
and to prevent combinations which restrain such competition
between their members, or between such members as individ-
uals and outside competitors. U. S. v. Chesapeake & O. Fuel
Co., 105 F., 93.
2-34
Affirmed, 115 F., 610 (2-151).
39. Policy of the Nation in Regard to.-It has been the public
policy of this Nation, from the date of the passage of the
Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, to regulate that part of
interstate commerce which consists of transportation, and to
so far restrict competition in freight and passenger rates
between railroad companies engaged therein as shall be
necessary to make such rates open, public, reasonable, uni-
form, and steady, and to prevent discriminations and undue
preferences. U. S. v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n., 58
F., 58.
1-186
Decision reversed, 166 U. S., 290 (1-648).
40. The Anti-Trust Act embraces and declares to be illegal every
contract, combination, or conspiracy, in whatever form, of
whatever nature, and whoever may be parties to it, which
directly or necessarily operates in restraint of trade or
commerce among the several States or with foreign na-
tions. Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U. S.,
197. (Harlan, Brown, McKenna, Day.)
2-339
41. Combinations, even among private manufacturers or dealers,
whereby interstate or international commerce is restrained,
are equally embraced by the act.
42. Every combination or conspiracy which would extinguish com-
petition between otherwise competing railroads, engaged in
interstate trade or commerce, and which would in that way
restrain such trade or commerce, is made illegal by the act.
Ib.
43. Congress may, in the exercise of the power conferred upon it
by the commerce clause of the Constitution, prohibit private
contracts which operate directly and substantially to restrain
interstate commerce. U. S. v. Northern Securities Co., 120
F., 721.
2-216
44. The power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce com-
prises the right to enact a law prohibiting the citizen from
entering into those private contracts which directly and sub-
stantially and not merely indirectly, remotely, incidentally,
and collaterally, regulate to a greater or less degree com-
merce among the States. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v.
United States, 175 U. S., 211, 229.
1-1009
45. A State can not invest a corporation organized under its laws
with the power to do acts in the corporate name which would
operate to restrain interstate commerce. U. S. v. Northern
Securities Co., 120 F., 721.
2-215
46. Carriers-Connecting Lines-Prepayment of Freight.-A com-
mon carrier engaged in interstate commerce may at common
law, and under the Interstate Commerce Law, demand pre-
payment of freight charges, when delivered to it by one con-
necting carrier, without exacting such prepayment when
delivered by another connecting carrier, and may advance
freight charges to one connecting carrier without advancing
such charges to another connecting carrier. Gulf, C. & S. F.
Ry. Co. v. Miami S. S. Co., 86 F., 407.
1-823
47. Railroad Companies-Arrangements for Through Billing.-
There is no principle of common law which forbids a single
railroad corporation, or two or more of such corporations,
from selecting, from two or more other corporations, one
which they will employ as the agency by which they will
send freight beyond their own lines, on through bills of lad-
ing, or as their agent to receive freight, and transmit it on
through bills to their own lines, and without breaking bulk;
and the right to make such selection is not taken away by
the Interstate Commerce Law. (New York & N. Ry. Co. v.
New York & N. E. R. Co., 50 Fed., 867, explained.) Prescott
& A. C. R. Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R., Co., 73 F., 438.
48. Duty of Common Carrier to Furnish Transportation.-Where
plaintiff sought to establish his banana business in Central
America, and expended considerable money in his plant, it was
engaged in foreign commerce when it began to move men,
material, and supplies to and from the United States and
Central American ports in furtherance of its business,
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