United States Congressional Serial Set

unlawful act, although the attainment of other ends may
have been their primary object. U. S. v. Kirby, 7 Wall., 485,
cited.
Ib.
117. Section 5440-Conspiracy.-Construing several clauses of the
interstate commerce law recited in the opinion with section
5440 of the Revised Statutes it follows that a combina-
tion of persons, without regard to their occupation, which
will have the effect to defeat the provisions of the interstate
commerce law, inhibiting discriminations in the transporta-
tion of freight and passengers, and further to restrain the
trade or commerce of the country, will be obnoxious to the
penalties therein described. Waterhouse v. Comer, 55 F.,
149.
1-119
118. Same. The statute relating to conspiracies to commit offenses
against the United States (Rev. Stat., sec. 5440) contains
three elements which are necessary to constitute the offense.
These are: (1) The act of two or more persons conspiring
together; (2) to commit any offense against the United
States; (3) the overt act, or the element of one or more of
such parties doing any act to effect the object of the con-
spiracy. U. S. v. Cassidy, 67 F., 698.
1-449

IX. State Laws.

119. The Anti-Trust Law of Minnesota (Laws 1899, p. 487, c. 359)
making unlawful any contract or combination in restraint
of trade or commerce within the State, is in substantially
the same language as the Sherman Anti-Trust Law, and
must receive a similar construction. Minnesota v. Northern
Securities Co., 123 U. S., 692.

2-246
Decision reversed, 194 U. S., 38. Circuit court had no juris-
diction (2-533).

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION.

1. When Congress adopts or creates a common-law offense, the
courts may properly look to the common law for the true
meaning and definition thereof, in the absence of a clear
definition in the act creating it. In re Greene, 52 F., 104.
1-55
2. Where Congress adopts or creates a common-law offense, and in
doing so uses terms which have acquired a well-understood
meaning by judicial interpretation, the presumption is that
the terms were used in that sense, and courts may properly
look to prior decisions interpreting them for the meaning of
the terms and the definition of the offense where there is no
other definition in the act. U. S. v. Trans-Mo. Ft. Assn., 58
F., 58.
1-186
3. Every statute must be read in the light of the general laws
upon the same subject in force at the time of its enactment.
U. S. v. Trans-Mo. Ft. Assn., 58 F., 58.

1-186

4. The Anti-Trust Act should have a reasonable construction-one
which tends to advance the remedy it provides, and to abate
the mischief at which it was leveled. Whitwell v. Conti-
2-271
nental Tobacco Co., 125 F., 454.

5. Debates in Congress are not appropriate sources of information
from which to discover the meaning of the language of a
statute passed by that body. U. S. v. Trans-Mo. Ft. Assn..
166 U. S., 290.
1-648

6. The debates in Congress on the Anti-Trust Act show that one
of the influences leading to the enactment of the statute was
doubt as to whether there is a common law of the United
States governing the making of contracts in restraint of
trade and the creation and maintenance of monopolies in
the absence of legislation. Standard Oil Co. v. U. S., 221
4-121
U. S., 50.

7. Same.

While debates of the body enacting it may not be used
as means for interpreting a statute, they may be resorted
to as a means of ascertaining the conditions under which it
4-121
was enacted. Ib.

8. Same.

The Anti-Trust Act was enacted in the light of the
then existing practical conception of the law against re-
straint of trade, and the intent of Congress was not to re-
strain the right to make and enforce contracts, whether
resulting from combinations or otherwise, which do not
unduly restrain interstate or foreign commerce, but to pro-
tect that commerce from contracts or combinations by meth-
ods, whether old or new, which would constitute an inter-
ference with, or an undue restraint upon, it. Ib. 4-129
9. Same. The Anti-Trust Act should be construed in the light
of reason; and, as so construed, it prohibits all contracts
and combination which amount to an unreasonable or un-
due restraint of trade in interstate commerce. Ib. 4-129
10. Same.-The Anti-Trust Act contemplated and required a stand-
ard of interpretation, and it was intended that the standard
of reason which had been applied at the common law should
be applied in determining whether particular acts were
within its prohibitions. Ib.
4--130

11. Same.

The Anti-Trust Act generically enumerates the charac-
ter of the acts prohibited and the wrongs which it intends
to prevent and is susceptible of being enforced without any
judicial exertion of legislative power. Ib.
4-138

12. Rule of Construction.-In prior cases where general language
has been used, to the effect that reason could not be resorted
to in determining whether a particular case was within the
prohibitions of the Anti-Trust Act, the unreasonableness of
the acts under consideration was pointed out and those
cases are only authoritative by the certitude that the rule
of reason was applied; United States v. Trans-Missouri
Freight Association, 166 U. S., 290, and United States v.

Joint Traffic Association, 171 U. S., 505, limited and qualified
so far as they conflict with the construction now given to
the Anti-Trust Act. Standard Oil Co. v. U. S., 221 U. S., 67.
4-136

13. Same.-In Standard Oil Co. v. United States, the words re-
straint of trade," as used in § 1 of the Anti-Trust Act,
were properly construed by the resort to reason; the doctrine
stated in that case was in accord with all previous decisions
of this court, despite the contrary view at times erroneously
attributed to the expressions in United States v. Trans-
Missouri Freight Association, 166 U. S., 290, and United
States v. Joint Traffic Association, 171 U. S., 505. Ib.

4-232
14. Same. The Anti-Trust Act must have a reasonable construction,
as there can scarcely be any agreement or contract among
business men that does not directly or indirectly affect and
possibly restrain commerce. United States v. Joint Traffic
Association, 171 U. S., 505, 568. Ib.

4-233

15. Same. The public policy manifested by the Anti-Trust Act is
expressed in such general language that it embraces every
conceivable act which can possibly come within the spirit
of its prohibitions, and that policy can not be frustrated by
resort to disguise or subterfuge of any kind. Ib. 4-234
16. Same.-In order to meet such a situation as is presented by the
record in this case and to afford the relief for the evils to
be overcome, the Anti-Trust Act must be given a more com-
prehensive application than affixed to it in any previous
decision. Ib.
4-230

17. Extrinsic Aids to Construction.-In construing statutes the
courts should not close their eyes to what they know of the
history of the country and of the law, of the condition of
the law at a particular time, of the public necessities felt,
and other kindred things, for the reason that regard must
be had to the words in which the statute is expressed as
applied to the facts existing at the time of its enactment.
Mannington v. C. H. V. & T. Ry. Co., 183 F., 155. 3-858
18. Same-Legislative Intent.-In the construction of statutes the
intent of the lawmakers must be found in the statutes them-
selves. The presumption is that language has been employed
with sufficient precision to disclose the intent, and, unless
an examination overthrows the presumption, nothing re-
mains but to enforce the statute as written. Ib. 3-858

STATUTES OF LIMITATION.

1. The five year limitation in section 1047, Rev. Stat., does not
apply to suits brought under section 7 of the act of July 2,
1890, but by the silence of that act the matter is left under
section 721, Rev. Stat., to the local law. Chattanooga
Foundry & Pipe Co. v. Atlanta, 203 U. S., 397.

3-120

2. Same.—The three-year limitation in section 2773, Tennessee
Gode, for actions for injuries to personal or real property,
applies to injuries falling upon some object more definite
than the plaintiff's total wealth and the general ten-year
limitation in section 2776 for all actions not expressly pro-
vided for controls actions of this nature brought under
section 7 of the act of July 2, 1890. Ib.
3-121
3. Limitation of Criminal Prosecution.-A conspiracy in restraint
of interstate commerce, or to monopolize the same, în viola-
tion of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, by causing a manufac-
turing corporation to suspend business in the interest of a
competing concern, by obtaining control of its stock through
a contract, was complete at latest when its object was fully
accomplished by the making of the contract and the election
of a board of directors, who voted to cease business; and a
prosecution therefor is barred in three years from that
time, under Rev. St. section 1044. U. S. v. Kissel, 173
824.
3-746
4. Same. If a conspiracy to commit a crime has been carried out,
and the crime committed, those who committed it are sub-
ject to whatever penalties the law imposes and entitled to
whatever protection the law affords; and if the statute of
limitations is a bar to a prosecution for the crime, that bar
can not be lifted by a prosecution for a conspiracy to commit
that crime. Ib.
3-752

F.,

5. Same

Special Plea of Limitation.-The defense of the statute
of limitations may be raised in a criminal case by a special
plea before trial. Ib.
3-752
6. When Special Plea not Good.-A special plea of the statute of
limitations is not good as against an indictment charging a
conspiracy to restrain or monopolize trade, in violation of
the Sherman Act, by improperly excluding a competitor
from business, although the conspiracy is alleged to have
been formed on a specified date, which was more than three
years before the finding of the indictment, where such in-
dictment, consistently with the other facts, alleges that the
conspiracy continued to the date of its presentment. U. S.
v. Kissel, 54 L. ed., 1168.
3-825

7. Continuance of Conspiracy.-A conspiracy to restrain or monop-
olize trade, in violation of the Sherman Act, by obtaining
control of a competitor through a pledge of a majority of
its stock to secure a loan to a stockholder, and then voting
to suspend business until further order of the board of di-
rectors, continues, so far as the statute of limitations is
concerned, so long as any further action is taken in further-
ance of the conspiracy. Ib.
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