a final judgment, and an appeal will not lie therefrom to
this court. Alexander v. United States, 201 U. S., 117.

2-945
30. Same-But an Appeal from a Judgment of Contempt is Review-
able. If the witness refuses to obey and the court goes
further and punishes him for contempt there is a right of
review, and this is adequate for his protection without un-
duly impeding the process of the case. [See also Nelson v.
United States, 201 U. S., 92 (2-920).]
Ib.
CREDIBILITY. See JURY, 2.

IMMUNITY. See IMMUNITY.

WOODEN-WARE. See COMBINATIONS, ETC., 72, 206.

WORDS AND PHRASES.

1. "Boycott.”—A combination by employees of railway companies
to injure in his business the owner of cars operated by the
companies, by compelling them to cease using his cars by
threats of quitting and by actually quitting their service,
thereby inflicting on them great injury, where the relation
between him and the companies is mutually profitable, and
has no effect whatever on the character or reward of the
services of the employees so combining, is a boycott, and an
unlawful conspiracy at common law. Thomas v. Cin., N. O.
& T. P. Ry. Co., 62 F., 803.
1-267

2. "Combination" or "Conspiracy."-Sherman Anti-Trust Law
declares that every contract, combination, and form of trust
or otherwise, and conspiracy in restraint of trade or com-
merce in any Territory of the United States, or in restraint
of trade or commerce between any such Territory and
another, etc., are declared illegal, and that every person who
shall make any such contract or engage in any such "com-
bination or conspiracy" shall be deemed guilty of a misde-
meanor. Held, that the words "combination or conspiracy"
as so used were synonymous, and hence an indictment alleg-
ing that defendants entered into a "combination or con-
spiracy" in restraint of trade was not duplicitous as
alleging two distinct offenses. Tribolet v. U. S., 95 Pac.
Rep., 87.
3-320
Combination " and "Monopoly."-Where defendants were in-
dicted in separate counts, one for combination and the other
for monopoly, in violation of the Sherman Anti-Trust Law,
such offenses were not identical, but were legally distinct
and justified separate punishment on conviction. U. S. v.
MacAndrews & Forbes Co., 149 F., 838.
3-102

3.

4. Commerce.-The word commerce" in the statute is not
synonymous with “trade,” as used in the common-law phrase
66 restraint of trade," but has the meaning of the word in

that clause of the Constitution which grants to Congress
power to regulate interstate and foreign commerce. U. S.
v. Debs, 64 F., 724.

1-322
5. Same. The word "commerce," as used in the act of July
2, 1890, to protect trade and commerce against unlawful
restraints and monopolies, and in the Constitution of the
United States, has a broader meaning than the word " trade."
Commerce among the States consists of intercourse and
traffic between their citizens, and includes the transportation
of persons and property, as well as the purchase, sale, and
exchange of commodities. U. S. v. Cassidy, 67 F., 698.

1-452
6. Same.-Commerce is the sale or exchange of commodities,
but that which the law looks upon as the body of commerce
is not restricted to specific arts of sale or exchange. It
includes the intercourse all the initiatory and intervening
acts, instrumentalities, and dealings-that directly bring
about the sale or exchange. U. S. v. Swift & Co., 122 F., 529.
2-237
7. "Commerce."-The commerce referred to by the words "any
part" in section 2 of the Anti-Trust Act, as construed in the
light of the manifest purpose of that act, includes geograph-
ically any part of the United States and also any of the
classes of things forming a part of interstate or foreign
commerce. Standard Oil Co. v. U. S., 221 U. S., 61. 4-130
8. "Conspiracy."-The term "conspiracy" in section 1 of the act
of July 2, 1890, is used in its well-settled legal meaning, and
any restraint of interstate trade or commerce, if accom-
plished by conspiracy, is unlawful. U. S. v. Debs, 64 F.,
724.
1-322

9. Same. A conspiracy consists in an agreement to do something;
but in the sense of the law, and therefore in the sense of
this statute, it must be an agreement between two or more
to do, by concerted action, something criminal or unlawful,
or, it may be, to do something lawful by criminal or unlaw-
ful means. A conspiracy, therefore, is in itself unlawful,
and, in so far as this statute is directed against conspiracies
in restraint of trade among the several States, it is not neces-
sary to look for the illegality of the offense in the kind of
restraint proposed. Any proposed restraint of trade, though
it be in itself innocent, if it is to be accomplished by con-
spiracy, is unlawful.
Ib. (1-352)
10. Same. A conspiracy is a combination of two or more per-
sons by concerted action to accomplish a criminal or un-
lawful purpose, or some purpose not in itself criminal, by
criminal or unlawful means. Pettibone v. U. S., 13 Sup. Ct.,
542; 148 U. S., 203, cited. U. S. v. Cassidy, 67 F., 698.

1-449

11. Same.

12.

Unlike "combination,” “ conspiracy" is a term of art. In the Anti-Trust Law it is to be interpreted independently of the preceding words, and an indictment thereunder should therefore describe something that amounts to a conspiracy under the act conformably to the rules of pleading at common law, as perhaps modified by general federal statutes. U. S. v. Mac Andrews & Forbes Co., 149 F., 831. 3-89 Conspiracy."-The word conspiracy," as used in the Sherman Anti-Trust Act has substantially the same meaning as the word "contract." U. S. v. Kissel, 173 F., 827. 3-749 13. "Corner."-A "corner" is the securing of such control of the immediate supply of any product as to enable those operating the corner to arbitrarily advance the price of the product. It is ordinarily created by operations on boards of trade or stock exchanges, and by dealings in options and futures. U. 8. v. Patten, 187 F., 668. 4-280 14. Corner Not a Combination in Restraint of Competition.-While a corner is illegal because it is a combination which arbitrarily controls the prices of a commodity, it can not be called a combination in restraint of competition since the going up of the price incident to the creation of a corner necessarily increases competition. U. S. v. Patten, 187 F., 668. 4-281 15. "Due Process of Law."-The expressions "due process of law" and "the law of the land are synonymous. U. S. v. N. Y., N. H. & H. R. Co., 165 F., 746. 3-530

18.

16. Same." Due process of law" does not prohibit the establishment of special commissions or the assignment of special judges for the trial of a specific offender, so long as there is a compliance otherwise with the rules of the common law. Ib. 3-529 17. "Immunity."-" Immunity" does not mean that no acts in fact were ever done, but that there may be no prosecution in respect thereto. Immunity does not wipe out the history of events. U. S. v. Swift, 186 F., 1017. 4-75 Interstate Commerce."-" Interstate Commerce" comprehends intercourse for the purposes of trade in any and all of its forms, including transportation, purchase, sale, and exchange of commodities between the citizens of different States; and if any commercial transaction reaches an entirety in two or more States, and if the parties dealing with reference to that transaction deal from different States, then the whole transaction is a part of the interstate commerce of the United States, and subject to regulation by Congress under the Constitution. In re charge to Grand Jury, 151 F., 838. 3-162 19. "Mail Trains."-A mail train is a train as usually and regularly made up, including not merely a mail car, but such other cars as are usually drawn in the train. If the train

66

usually carries a Pullman car, then such train, as a mail train, would include the Pullman car as a part of its regular make-up. Therefore, if such a train is obstructed or retarded because it draws a Pullman car, it is no defense that the parties so delaying it were willing that the mail should proceed if the Pullman car were left behind. U. S. v. Clark, Fed. Cas. No. 14805, 23 Int. Rev. Rec., 306, followed. U. S. v. Cassidy, 67 F., 698. 1-449 20. Same. Any train which is carrying mail under the sanction of the postal authorities is a mail train in the eye of the law. Ib. 21. "Monopolize.”—The word “monopolize” can not be intended to be used with reference to the acquisition of exclusive rights under Government concession, but that the lawmaker has used the word to mean " to aggregate" or concentrate" in the hands of few, practically, and, as a matter of fact, and according to the known results of human action, to the exclusion of others; to accomplish this end by what, in popular language, is expressed in the word "pooling," which may be defined to be an aggregation of property or capital belonging to different persons, with a view to common liabilities and profits. Amer. Biscuit & Mfg. Co. v. Klotz, 44 F., 724. 1-7 Monopolizing, or Attempting to Monopolize."-To constitute the offense of “monopolizing, or attempting to monopolize," trade or commerce among the States, within the meaning of section 2 of said act, it is necessary to acquire, or attempt to acquire, as exclusive right in such commerce by means which will prevent others from engaging therein. In re Green, 52 F., 104. 1-55

22. "

23. Monopoly of trade embraces two essential elements: (1) The acquisition of an exclusive right to, or the exclusive control of, that trade; and (2) the exclusion of all others from that right and control. U. S. v. Trans-Mo. Ft. Assn., 58 F., 58, 84. 1-218

24. "Monopolized."-Trade and commerce are monopolized, within the meaning of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, prohibiting the same, when, as a result of efforts to that end, a few persons acting together obtain power to control the price of a commodity moving in interstate commerce, though such power is not exercised, its existence being sufficient. U. S. v. Patten, 187 F., 672. 4-286 25. Monopolize.-The words "to monopolize" and monopolize as used in section 2 of the Anti-Trust Act reach every act bringing about the prohibited result. Standard Oil Co. v. U. S., 221 U. S., 61. 4-130

26. "Municipal Corporation."-A municipal corporation engaged operating water, lighting, or similar plants, from which a revenue is derived, is, in relation to such matters, a business corporation, and may maintain an action under section 7 of

the Anti-Trust Act, for injury to its "business" by reason of a combination or conspiracy in restraint of interstate trade or commerce made unlawful by such act. City of Atlanta v. Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works, 127 F., 23.

2-299 27. "More or Less."-Where, in a contract for the manufacture and delivery of goods, the statement of quantity is qualified by the words "more or less," these, unless supplemented by language giving them a broader scope, apply only to such accidental or immaterial variations in quantity as would naturally occur in connection with such a transaction. Hadley Dean Plate Glass Co. v. Highland Glass Co., 143 F., 242. 2-994 28. "Pardon "-Nature of "Pardon "—"Amnesty."-A "pardon" or "amnesty" secures against the consequences of one's acts, and not against the acts of themselves. It involves forgiveness; not forgetfulness. U. S. v. Swift, 186 F., 1017. 4-75 29. "Patent."-A patent is a grant of a right to exclude all others from making, using, or selling the invention covered by it. U. S. v. Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co., 191 F., 190. 4-421 30. "Person."-The word " person" in section 2 of the Anti-Trust Act, as construed by reference to section 8 thereof, implies a corporation as well as an individual. Standard Oil Co. v. U. S., 221 U. S., 61. 4-130 31. "Restraint of Trade." The words "in restraint of trade," in section 1 of the act of July 2, 1890, have, in connection with the words "contract," and "combination," their common-law significance, but the term "conspiracy" is used in its well-settled legal meaning, so that any restraint of trade or commerce, if to be accomplished by conspiracy, is unlawful. U. S. v. Debs, 64 F., 724. 1-322 32. Same. The construction of the statute is not affected by the use of the phrase "in restraint of trade," rather than one of the phrase "to injure trade" or "to restrain trade.” Ib. 33. "Restraint of Trade."-The terms "restraint of trade," and "attempts to monopolize," as used in the Anti-Trust Act, took their origin in the common law and were familiar in the law of this country prior to and at the time of the adoption of the act, and their meaning should be sought from the conceptions of both English and American law prior to the passage of the act. Standard Oil Co. v. U. S., 4-121

221 U. S., 50.

34. Restraint of Trade.-The words "restraint of trade" at common law, and in the law of this country at the time of the adoption of the Anti-Trust Act, embraced only acts, contracts, agreements, or combinations which operated to the prejudice of the public interests by unduly restricting competition or by unduly obstructing due course of trade, and