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Opinion of the Court. to the organization or fundamental power of the grand jury to act; the other, granting that the grand jury was properly impaneled and had the power to proceed, involves the proposition that it acted upon incompetent evidence, and there fore reached an irrational conclusion.

The motions to quash will be denied, and the clerk will enter an order to that effect.

6. The pleas in this case raise an issue of fact as to what evidence was presented to the grand jurors. Grand jurors and witnesses before them are sworn not to disclose what takes place in the jury room. The authorities are conflict ing as to whether it is proper in a plea in abatement to raise an issue of fact as to matters which the policy of the law requires to be kept secret. The Supreme Court, however, in Hale v. Henkel, supra, used the following language:

“ The suggestion that a person who has testified compulsorily before a grand jury may not be able, if subsequently indicted for some matter concerning which he testified, to procure the evidence necessary to maintain his plea, is more fanciful than real. He would have, not only his own oath in support of his immunity, but the notes often, though not always, taken of the testimony before the grand jury, as well as the testimony of the prosecuting officer, and of every menber of the jury present. It is scarcely possible that all of them would have forgotten the general nature of his incriminating testimony, or that any serious conflict would arise therefrom." -indicating that such matters properly may be brought to the notice of the court by plea.

The motion to strike the pleas in abatement from the files will be denied, and a rule entered upon the government to reply. If, however, the government sees fit to file a demurrer to the pleas, inasmuch as all of the parties to this cause have indicated a desire to have the matter disposed of upon the merits, and inasmuch as I have treated the questions involved as if a demurrer had been interposed, such demurrer will be sustained as of course.

Syllabus. [1] THE STANDARD OIL COMPANY OF NEW JER

SEY, ET AL. V. THE UNITED STATES.

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR

THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI.

Argued March 14, 15, 16, 1910; restored to docket for re-argument April 11,

1910; re-argued January 12, 13, 16, 17, 1911.-Decided May 15, 1911.

[221 U, S., 1.)

The Anti-Trust Act of July 2, 1890, c. 647, 26 Stat. 209, should be con

strued in the light of reason; and, as so construed, it prohibits all contracts and combination which amount to an unreasonable or

undue restraint of trade in interstate commerce. The combination of the defendants in this case is an unreasonable ·

and undue restraint of trade in petroleum and its products moving in interstate commerce, and falls within the prohibitions of the act

as so construed. Where one of the defendants in a suit, brought by the Government in

a Circuit Court of the United States under the authority of § 4 of the Anti-Trust Act of July 2, 1890, is within the district, the court, under the authority of $ 5 of that act, can take jurisdiction and

order notice to be served upon the non-resident defendants. Allegations as to facts occurring prior to the passage of the Anti-Trust

Act may be considered solely to throw light on acts done after the

passage of the act. [2] The debates in Congress on the Anti-Trust Act of 1890 show that

one of the influences leading to the enactment of the statute was doubt as to whether there is a common law of the United States governing the making of contracts in restraint of trade and the cre

ation and maintenance of monopolies in the absence of legislation. While debates of the body enacting it may not be used as means for

interpreting a statute, they may be resorted to as a means of as

certaining the conditions under which it was enacted. The terms "restraint of trade," and “attempts to monopolize," as

used in the Anti-Trust Act, took their origin in the common law and were familiar in the law of this country prior to and at the time of the adoption of the act, and their meaning should be sought from the conceptions of both English and American law prior to the

passage of the act. The original doctrine that all contracts in restraint of trade were

illegal was long since so modified in the interest of freedom of in

a For opinion of Circuit Court (173 Fed. Rep., 177), see vol. 3, 696.

Syllabus and statements of arguments copyrighted, 1911, by the Banks Law Publishing Company.

b

Syllabus. dividuals to contract that the contract was valid if the resulting restraint was only partial in its operation and was otherwise rea

sonable. The early struggle in England against the power to create monopolies

resulted in establishing that those institutions were incompatible

with the English Constitution. At common law monopolies were unlawful because of their restriction

upon individual freedom of contract and their injury to the public and at common law; and contracts creating the same evils were brought within the prohibition as impeding the due course of, or

being in restraint of, trade. At the time of the passage of the Anti-Trust Act the English rule

was that the individual was free to contract and to abstain from contracting and to exercise every reasonable right in regard thereto, except only as he was restricted from voluntarily and unreasonably or for wrongful purposes restraining his right to carry on his

trade. Mogul Steamship Co. v. McGregor, 1892, A. C. 25. A decision of the House of Lords, although announced after an event,

may serve reflexly to show the state of the law in England at the

time of such event. This country has followed the line of development of the law of Eng

land, and the public policy has been to prohibit, or treat as illegal, contracts, or acts entered into with intent to wrong the public and which unreasonably restrict competitive conditions, limit the right of individuals, restrain the free flow of commerce, or bring about

public evils such as the enhancement of prices. [3] The Anti-Trust Act of 1890 was enacted in the light of the then

existing practical conception of the law against restraint of trade, and the intent of Congress was not to restrain the right to make and enforce contracts, whether resulting from combinations or otherwise, which do not unduly restrain interstate or foreign commerce, but to protect that commerce from contracts or combinations by methods, whether old or new, which would constitute an

interference with, or an undue restraint upon, it. The Anti-Trust Act contemplated and required a standard of inter

pretation, and it was intended that the standard of reason which had been applied at the common law should be applied in determin

ing whether particular acts were within its prohibitions. The word “person” in $ 2 of the Anti-Trust Act, as construed by

reference to $ 8 thereof, implies a corporation as well as an indi

vidual. The commerce referred to by the words “any part” in § 2 the

Anti-Trust Act, as construed in the light of the manifest purpose of that act, includes geographically any part of the United States and also any of the classes of things forming a part of interstate or

foreign commerce. The words “ to monopolize” and “monopolize” as used in $ 2 of the

Anti-Trust Act reach every act bringing about the prohibited result. Syllabus. Freedom to contract is the essence of freedom from undue restraint

on the right to contract. In prior cases where general language has been used, to the effect

that reason could not be resorted to in determining whether a particular case was within the prohibitions of the Anti-Trust Act, the unreasonableness of the acts under consideration was pointed out and those cases are only authoritative by the certitude that the rule of reason was applied; United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Association, 166 U. S. 290, and United States v. Joint Traffic A880ciation, 171 U. S. 505, limited and qualified so far as they conflict

with the construction now given to the Anti-Trust Act of 1890. The application of the Anti-Trust Act to combinations involving the

Troduction of commodities within the States does not so extend the power of Congress to subjects dehors its authority as to render the statute unconstitutional. United States v. E. C. Knight Co., 156

U. S. 1, distinguished. The Anti-Trust Act generically enumerates the character of the acts

prohibited and the wrongs which it intends to prevent and is susceptible of being enforced without any judicial exertion of legisla

tive power. The unification of power and control over a commodity such as pe

[4] troleum, and its products, by combining in one corporation the stocks of many other corporations aggregating a vast capital gives rise, of itself, to the prima facie presumption of an intent and purpose to dominate the industry connected with, and gain perpetual control of the movement of, that commodity and its products in the channels of interstate commerce in violation of the Anti-Trust Act of 1890, and that presumption is made conclusive by proof of specific

acts such as those in the record of this case. The fact that a combination over the products of a commodity such as

petroleum does not include the crude article itself does not take the combination outside of the Anti-Trust Act when it appears that the monopolization of the manufactured products necessarily controls

the crude article. Penalties which are not authorized by the law cannot be inflicted by

judicial authority. The remedy to be administered in case of a combination violating the

Anti-Trust Act is two-fold: first, to forbid the continuance of the prohibited act, and second, to so dissolve the combination as to

neutralize the force of the unlawful power. The constituents of an unlawful combination under the Anti-Trust

Act should not be deprived of power to make normal and lawful contracts, but should be restrained from continuing or recreating the unlawful combination by any means whatever; and a dissolution of the offending combination should not deprive the constituents of the right to live under the law but should compel them to obey it.

Argument for Appellants. In determining the remedy against an unlawful combination, the

court must consider the result and not inflict serious injury on the public by causing a cessation of interstate commerce in a necessary

commodity. 173 Fed. Rep. 177, modified and affirmed.

The facts, which involve the construction of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act of July 2, 1890, and whether defendants had violated its provisions, are stated in the opinion.

Mr. John G. Johnson and Mr. John G. Milburn, with whom Mr. Frank L. Crawford was on the brief, for appellants:

ness.

The acquisition in 1899 by the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey of the stocks of the other companies was not a combination of independent enterprises. All of the [5] companies had the same stockholders who in the various corporate organizations were carrying on parts of the one busi

The business as a whole belonged to this body of common stockholders who, commencing prior to 1870, had as its common owners gradually built it up and developed it. The properties used in the business, in so far as they had been acquired by purchase, were purchased from time to time with the common funds for account of the common owners. For the most part the plants and properties used in the business in 1899 had not been acquired by purchase but were the creation of the common owners. The majority of the companies, and the most important ones, had been created by the common owners for the convenient conduct of branches of the business. The stocks of these companies had always been held in common ownership. The business of the companies and their relations to each other were unchanged by the transfer of the stocks of the other companies to the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey.

The Sherman Act has no application to the transfer to, or acquisition by, the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey of the stocks of the various manufacturing and producing corporations, for the reason that such transfer and acquisition were not acts of interstate or foreign commerce, nor

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