ARGUED AND DECIDED IN THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE OF THE STATE OF VERMONT. CHITTENDEN COUNTY, JANUARY TERM, costs of prosecution on the original writ. Plea in abatement. That the plaintiff, under the statute, cannot enter himself as security for costs. enter himself as bail for costs of prosecution, on the original process in civil suits. Vermont Stat. S. 44. Judgment of Court. The writ does not abate, vol. 1. p. 71. The defendant, upon the issuing the original writ, is entitled to such sufficient security for costs of prosecution, as is satisfactory to the authority signing such Adams V. Davis. Ib. s. 45. process. If at any time while the suit is pending, he doubts the sufficiency of the bail to respond the costs, on motion the Court will order new bail, or direct a nonsuit. Comparison of hands, or con party on a for STEPHEN PEARL, Sheriff, Appellant, EBENEZER ALLEN, Appellee. CASE. On a receipt for property attached on mesne process. General issue. Trial per pais. The appellant offered a receipt in evidence, purporting to have been signed by the appellee, and offered to prove the execution of the receipt, First. By comparison of hand-writings. Secondly. By the concession of the party at the lower Court. Objected, That the subscribing witness is within process of the Court, and ought to be produced. By the Court. Comparison of hand-writings cancession of a not be admitted in evidence, or the concession of mer trial when the party at the lower Court, whilst the subscribing the record, can- witness resides within the process of the Court. The not be given in defendant must not in this way be deprived of cross not attached to evidence while witness to a contract is the subscribing examining the subscribing witness to the contract. The concession of a party on a former trial, when not attached to the record, must be considered as a concession for that trial only. within process. RICHARD BIDDLECOM, ex dem. DANIEL BIDDLE- session. Biddlecom V. Farwell. EJECTMENT. Common rule entered, and the general issue to the country. Defendant offered to read in evidence a deed from Vermont Stat. Nathan Spafford, constable, and collector of the sur- vol. 2. p. 215. veyor-general's tax, commonly so called, conveying the lands described in the declaration in fee to his ancestor, under a vendue sale for the non-payment of a tax. Daniel Chipman, on the part of the plaintiffs, objected. the surveyor act. tax The act does not directly levy a tax, but only Decision under authorises the governor and council to assess a tax general's in either of two modes; the one on the soil, the other on the town as a corporation. In the present case it was assessed upon the town, and therefore ought to have been collected by a tax on the polls and rateable estate as directed by the subsequent explanatory clause of the act. Second objection. That this land was holden in severalty, and the constable is not made collector of taxes on such land. By the Court. The constable's deed cannot be read in evidence. Biddlecom V. Farwell. HALL, Judge, observed, there was a more formidable objection. The whole original right is attempted to be conveyed by the deed. Verdict for the plaintiff. The deed of a feme covert conveying land held in her own right, must be executed and MARTIN HARMON, ex dem. SAMUEL FAY et al. against MOSES TAFT and SETH COGSWELL, Tenants. EJECTMENT for a right of land in Charlotte, to wit, the original right of John Southgate. Common rule entered. General issue joined and acknowledged put to the Jury. conformably to the lex loci, where the land lies. Plaintiff's evidence: First. Copy of the charter of Charlotte, recorded in the proprietor's records, dated 24th June, 1762. John Southgate, an original grantee. Secondly. Deed from John Southgate to Sarah Southgate, dated July 3d, 1762. Thirdly. Deposition of John Hopkins, proving the intermarriage of Sarah Southgate with Azariah Dickinson. Fourthly. A deed from Azariah Dickinson and Sarah his wife, late Sarah Southgate, to the lessor of the plaintiff, dated the 8th of October, 1773, and acknowledged by both in common form before a Justice of the Peace, Hampshire County, Commonwealth of Massachusetts. Daniel Chipman, counsel for the tenants, objected to this last deed. By common law, a feme covert cannot convey real estate, neither can her husband convey that which is held in the right of his wife. The conveyance, to be legal, must be predicated upon statute. The plaintiff shews no statute either from New-York, New-Hampshire, or this State, authorising this mode. HALL, Judge. By common law a feme covert can convey neither real or personal property. Before this deed can be read to the Jury, it must appear that there was some existing law authorising the conveyance of land by a feme covert in this mode, or that the acknowledgment of this deed is consonant with some statute of this State. At WOODBRIDGE, Chief Judge. The lex loci where the land is, ought to regulate the conveyance. the time this deed was executed and acknowledged, this territory was under the jurisdiction of NewYork, and the deed, to be operative, ought to have been executed and acknowledged agreeably to the existing laws of that then colony. The deed cannot be read to the Jury. Harmon V. Taft and Cogs well. Plaintiff nonsuited. NOTE. In this cause, after the rejection of the deed by the Court, it was moved to introduce it as a lease, conveying the life estate of the husband in the premises. |