Clark v. State, ex rel.-187 Ind. 276. which, in the judgment of said auditor and treasurer, from any other cause, there is no reasonable probability of being collected, shall be omitted from the current year's duplicate; such omissions shall be entered by the auditor upon a record to be known as the insolvent record and shall be kept in the office of the county treasurer as a public record." This section designates the taxes listed in this insolvent record as "dropped taxes" and provides that the aggregate amount thereof shall be stated in the final entry thereof each year and "such treasurer shall be relieved of the charge of the aggregate amount thus dropped each year"; and thereafter when it appears that any of such dropped taxes can be collected he shall notify the county auditor and "it shall be the duty of such auditor to restore such person's dropped taxes to the current tax duplicate"; and "it shall be the duty of such county treasurer to collect the same as other delinquent taxes are collected." * This lengthy review of the statutes relating to the treasurer's duties is only justified by the assertion so constantly made and acted upon that the treas9. urer's duties are so broad and continuous that under no circumstances can the county pay another for information upon which the treasurer and auditor can act and collect, but that it is the treasurer's duty to unremittingly search, although he have no reasonable clue to the existence of property liable. The statutes do not so provide, nor do our decisions. so hold. Dropped taxes are, of course, delinquent taxes and taxes carried to the insolvent record are lost, so far as any present human effort is concerned. The treasurer is credited with the same and thereafter is under no duty unless information comes to him of opportunity to collect. When so informed he is still not empowered or required to collect, but his first duty is to procure a Clark v. State, ex rel.-187 Ind. 276. transfer by the auditor of the same from the insolvent record to the current duplicate and thereupon and not until then is it made his duty to collect dropped taxes. Lack of information, or, in other words, the information the auditor and treasurer had, caused the taxes to be dropped. Information is the element essential to creation of an obligation upon the treasurer to act as to dropped taxes and the county officers would be remiss in their duties did they not acquire, for a reasonable compensation if demanded, information from one who knows or has ability and opportunity to learn. City of Richmond v. Dickinson, supra; Fleener v. Litsey (1902), 30 Ind. App. 399, 66 N. E. 82. Of course, neither a treasurer nor his deputy could properly be paid for such information, because the information of such officers belongs to the county without other compensation than the officer's salary, and because of their duty to use their information for the county's benefit. He who has such information may sell it and he who needs may, if otherwise unable to acquire, buy. An indispensable public necessity may well exist under such circumstances and the county commissioners be justified in finding and acting on the same. Board, etc. v. Weeks (1892), 130 Ind. 162, 29 N. E. 776; City of Richmond v. Dickinson, supra. The construction here placed on said statutes is consistent with the holding of several of our decisions to the effect that county officers have no duty to 10. search records of their predecessors in office or to perform uncompleted duties of their predecessors, unless by statute so required. City of Richmond v. Dickinson, supra; Garrigus v. Board, etc. (1901), 157 Ind. 103, 60 N. E. 948; State v. Atkisson (1861), 17 Ind. 26; Reeder v. State, ex rel. (1884), 98 Ind. 114. The decisions in City of Fort Wayne v. Lehr (1882), 88 Ind. 62, and Miller v. Embree (1882), 88 Ind. 33, are cited Griffin v. Pearce-187 Ind. 287. to the effect that it is the duty of the treasurer 11. to collect and that another may not be paid for collecting. This may be conceded. The furnishing of information to enable the treasurer to collect is, however, another matter. The court found as a fact that none of the taxes collected under the contract in question were charged on any duplicate at the time the same was delivered to treasurer Clark-in effect, a finding that all such taxes had been theretofore dropped-in other words, credited to some former treasurer, and that they appeared only on the insolvent record when delivered to Clark, as treasurer. The court does not find that there was a conspiracy between the treasurer and Mansfield as to the furnishing of such information; on the other hand, the court finds that the treasurer and the board acted in good faith, believing that said contract and all transactions thereunder were valid. The decision is contrary to law. The judgment appealed from is reversed, and the court directed to grant the motion for a new trial. NOTE.-Reported in 117 N. E. 965. GRIFFIN ET AL. v. PEARCE ET AL. [No. 23,148. Filed March 20, 1918.] 1. APPEAL. From Board of Commissioners.-Perfection of Appeal.-Dismissal.-A motion in the circuit court to dismiss an appeal from the board of commissioners on the ground that the appeal was perfected by only one of the parties and that he was not shown to be interested, was properly overruled, where the record shows that such party, although designated as the principal in the appeal bond, was not the only appellant and that some of his coappellants were affected by the proceeding. p. 289. 2. HIGHWAYS.-Public Utility.-Failure of Engineer to Report. -"Viewer."-Although it is the duty of the engineer to file a written report of his conclusions in a proceeding for the establishment of a free gravel road under §7712 et seq. Burns 1914 (Acts 1905 p. 521, as amended, Acts 1913 p. 418), his failure to file such report could not affect the report of the two viewers that a proposed highway would not be of public utility, since the engineer is not a "viewer" within the meaning of the statute. p. 290. 3. HIGHWAYS.-Report of Majority of Body.-Validity.-The report of two viewers that a proposed establishment of a highway would not be of public utility was not affected by the failure of the engineer to report as to his conclusions, since a report concurred in by a majority of any body is valid in the absence of legislative provision to the contrary. p. 290. 4. HIGHWAYS.—Establishment.-Report of Viewers.-Dissent of Engineer. Statute.-Since the statute relative to the establishment and construction of highways under §7712 et seq. Burns 1914 (Acts 1905 p. 521, as amended, Acts 1913 p. 418) provides for only two viewers, they must concur in any report in order to make it effective, and when they do concur their report is not affected by the dissent of the engineer, whether indicated in an affirmative or negative manner. p. 290. 5. HIGHWAYS.- Establishment.- Report of Viewers.- Jurisdiction of Commissioners.-Where the original viewers in a proceeding for the establishment and construction of a highway, under §7712 et seq. Burns 1914 (Acts 1905 p. 521, as amended, Acts 1913 p. 418) reported that the proposed highway would not be of public utility, the board of commissioners had no jurisdiction to proceed further. p. 290. From Henry Circuit Court; Robert M. Van Atta, Special Judge. : Petition by Henry E. Rader and others to establish a free gravel road. From an order of the board of commissioners establishing the highway and directing its construction, appeal was taken to the circuit court, where the motion of Frank G. Pearce and others to dismiss the proceeding was sustained, and the petitioners, Frank G. Griffin and others, appeal. Affirmed. Barnard & Jeffrey and Scotten & Hinshaw, for appellants. H. H. Evans, for appellees. Griffin v. Pearce-187 Ind. 287. SPENCER, C. J.-This proceeding has its origin in a petition filed by Henry E. Rader and others before the board of commissioners of Henry county asking for the establishment and construction of a certain free gravel road in said county under the provisions of §7712 et seq. Burns 1914 (Acts 1905 p. 521; Acts 1913 p. 418). The petition was regularly referred to an engineer and two viewers, of whom the latter subsequently filed a written report in which they stated that the proposed highway would not be of public utility. This report was not signed or concurred in by the engineer and, on motion of the petitioners, the board discharged said engineer and viewers from further consideration of the cause and appointed another engineer and two other viewers to consider the proposed improvement. Their report was favorable to the new road and such further proceedings were had as resulted in an order of the board of commissioners establishing the proposed highway and directing its construction. From this order an appeal was taken to the Henry Circuit Court, where appellees' motion to dismiss the proceeding was sustained on the ground that the board of commissioners had no jurisdiction to proceed further in the cause, nor to appoint other and subsequent viewers after the first viewers had determined that the construction of the proposed improvement would not be of public utility. Preliminary to a consideration of the question presented by this ruling, appellants insist that the appeal from the board of commissioners to the circuit 1. court was perfected only by Frank G. Pearce, and that, as he is not shown to be an interested party, the appeal to the circuit court should have been dismissed. It is apparent from the record, however, that Pearce, although designated as principal in the VOL. 187-19 |