Bills v. State-187 Ind. 721. prosecuting witness indicating that she was not chaste, and several instructions were presented by which the court was requested to instruct the jury in accordance with appellant's theory of the law. The court refused to adopt appellant's theory, and accordingly excluded the offered evidence and refused the tendered instructions. In the admission and rejection of evidence and by its instructions the court proceeded on the theory that the question as to whether or not the prosecuting witness was in fact chaste at the time of the alleged seduction was not in issue, but that the real point in issue under the statute was her reputation for chastity. There is a distinction in meaning between character and reputation. A person's character depends on the attributes which he in reality possesses, while his reputation depends upon the attributes which the people generally in the community believe him to possess. It is possible that a woman may be of good repute for chastity, when she is not, in fact, chaste. It must be presumed that the legislature advisedly employed the words "of good repute for chastity," instead of the words "of chaste character," or other words expressive of chastity as a reality. It is argued that the meaning of the word "seduce" is to draw aside from the path of virtue or rectitude, and that a woman cannot be enticed or drawn aside from the path of virtue unless she is at the time honestly pursuing such a course and is in fact virtuous. The logic of the proposition is apparent and numerous cases are cited to support it. It must be borne in mind, however, that this prosecution is based on a statute which defines the elements of the crime with such certainty as to leave no room for construction. Under this statute, if the female is of good repute for chastity and under twenty-one years of age, a male person who has carnal intercourse with her, in Bills v. State-187 Ind. 721. duced by a promise of marriage, is guilty of the offense defined. In many of the states the statutes provide that the female shall be "of previous chaste character." Under such a statute specific acts of unchastity may be shown. Kenyon v. People (1863), 26 N. Y. 203, 84 Am. Dec. 177; Polk v. State (1883), 40 Ark. 482, 48 Am. Rep. 17; People v. Brewer (1873), 27 Mich. 134. The rule, however, is different in states having statutes similar to ours. In such states the evidence must be confined to the general reputation of the 2. prosecuting witness for chastity, evidence of specific acts being excluded. State v. Bryan (1885), 34 Kan. 63, 8 Pac. 260; Bowers v. State (1876), 29 Ohio St. 542; Foley v. State (1896), 59 N. J. Law 1, 35 Atl. 105; Lyons v. State (1876), 52 Ind. 426; Williams v. State, ex rel. (1891), 3 Ind. App. 350, 29 N. E. 1079. In the case last cited it is said: "Under a statute like ours, using the word 'repute' instead of 'character,' specific acts of unchastity cannot be shown, but proof must be confined to that of reputation." The court did not err in excluding the offered evidence. In view of the construction placed on the statute the instructions given by the court stated the law correctly, and the instructions tendered by appellant were properly refused. Blanch Owens testified as a witness on the trial. Depositions of several witnesses were offered to prove that the general moral character of this witness was 3. bad in the neighborhood where she resided at a time twelve to sixteen years before the date of the trial. It is asserted that this evidence was competent as affecting the credibility of the witness. §529 Burns 1914, §505 R. S. 1881. The evidence as to the moral character of a witness as affecting his credibility should be limited to the time of the trial. Rucker Bills v. State-187 Ind. 721. v. Beaty (1851), 3 Ind. 70; Rogers v. Lewis (1862), 19 Ind. 405. Some latitude is allowed as to time and place where the reputation of the witness is involved. Memphis, etc., Packet Co. v. McCool (1882), 83 Ind. 392, 43 Am. Rep. 71; Pape v. Wright (1889), 116 Ind. 502, 509, 19 N. E. 459. It has also been held that where there is evidence relating to the time of the trial, evidence as to reputation at times more or less remote is competent. Pape v. Wright, supra; Hauk v. State (1897), 148 Ind. 238, 261, 46 N. E. 127, 47 N. E. 465. There was no evidence offered as to the moral character of this witness at or near the time of the trial, and no authority can be found which authorizes the introduction of evidence to show reputation at a time so remote. One of the grounds on which appellant relied for a new trial was that of newly-discovered evidence. The evidence which appellant claims he would be able 4. to produce on another trial could have no effect other than to show that the prosecuting witness was not a chaste woman at the time of the alleged seduction. As shown by the former part of this opinion, it is not material whether the prosecuting witness was, in fact, chaste or unchaste. In this particular, the material thing to be shown under our statute is that she was of good repute for chastity. The court did not err in refusing to grant a new trial on this ground. Finding no error, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. NOTE.-Reported in 121 N. E. 465. See under (2) 35 Cyc 1314. Pisarski v. Hunter-187 Ind. 726. KUHN V. NATIONAL CITY BANK. [No. 22,877. Filed April 5, 1918.] From Shelby Circuit Court; Alonzo Blair, Judge. Action by the National City Bank against August M. Kuhn. From a judgment for plaintiff, the defendant appeals. Reversed. William F. Elliott, Paul & Paul, and Elmer Bassett, for appellant. Leander J. Monks, John F. Robbins, Henry C. Starr and James P. Goodrich, for appellee. TOWNSEND, J.-This case being in all respects the same as Millikan v. Security Trust Co. (1918), ante 307, decided at this term, the judgment herein is reversed, with instructions to overrule the demurrer to the third paragraph of answer and to proceed according to that opinion. PISARSKI V. HUNTER, PROSECUTING ATTORNEY. [No. 23,442. Filed June 28, 1918.] From Lake Superior Court; Charles E. Greenwald, Judge. Proceeding by Valentine Pisarski against Clyde E. Hunter, prosecuting attorney. From a judgment for the defendant, the plaintiff appeals. Affirmed. W. J. McAleer, Francis J. Dorsey, Gerald A. Gillet, William H. Matthew, George B. Sheerer and John H. Gillet, for appellant. Ele Stansbury, Attorney-General, R. C. Minton, W. B. Wheeler and Dale F. Stansbury, for appellee. TOWNSEND, J.-Appellant, a licensed saloon keeper, sought to enjoin appellee, prosecuting attorney for Lake county, from enforcing the Prohibition Law (Acts 1917 p. 15). Appellee's demurrer to the complaint was sustained. The validity of the act, under the state and federal Constitutions, is brought in question. The points presented having been determined in the case of Schmitt v. F. W. Cook Brewing Company (1918), ante 623, 120 N. E. 19, 23, at this term, the judgment is affirmed. Equitable Surety Co. v. State, ex rel.-187 Ind. 727. ADAMS V. RECKER, TRUSTEE. [No. 23,495. Filed October 8, 1918.] From Knox Circuit Court; Benjamin M. Willoughby, Judge. W. A. Cullop and John Downey, for appellant. Louis A. Meyer, for appellee. MYERS, J.-The judgment is reversed, on confession of error, and a new trial is ordered. BENADUM ET AL. v. STATE OF INDIANA. [No. 23,406. Filed November 20, 918.] From Delaware Circuit Court; Alonzo L. Nichols, Special Judge. Proceedings by the State of Indiana against Charles Benadum and others. From a judgment rendered, the defendants appeal. Reversed. Edward R. Templer, Clarence E. Benadum and Walter Gray, for appellants. Ele Stansbury, Attorney-General, Elmer E. Hastings and Dale F. Stansbury, for the state. LAIRY, J.-Under the authority of Stipp v. State (1918), ante 211, 118 N. E. 818, recently decided by this court, the trial court erred in sustaining the demurrer of the state addressed to appellants' answer in abatement. On authority of the case cited, the judgment in this case is reversed, with instructions to overrule said demurrer. EQUITABLE SURETY COMPANY v. STATE OF INDIANA, [No. 23,294. Filed November 26, 1918.] From Hamilton Circuit Court; Meade Vestal, Judge. Action by the State of Indiana, on relation of the board of finance of the town of Cicero, against the Equitable Surety Company. From a judgment for the relator, the defendant appeals. |