Shipment to foreign territory.- Construing this Act, in a case wherein the indictment charged the defendants with the shipment of munitions of war from New Haven in the state of Connecticut to Tucson, Arizona, with the intent that they should be transhipped to the state of Sonora, Mexico, the court said: "The indictment, it is true, charges that the defendants caused the munitions of war to be shipped from New Haven, Conn., to Tucson, Ariz.; but the shipment of munitions of war from one point in the United States of America to another point within the United States of America cannot within itself be deemed to be an offense under the joint resolution of Congress quoted above, because that resolution distinctly makes the shipping of the forbidden goods from some point in the United States in the forbidden territory an offense, and nowhere does it prohibit the shipping of the goods from one point in the United States to another point in the United States, no matter how near the point of destination within the United States may be to the forbidden territory; so that, when this indictment is stripped of the surplusage which it contains, it charges nothing on its face except the intent to ship the goods into Mexico. A careful examination of the joint resolution of Congress above referred to discloses no provision, either in its express terms or which could follow from necessary implication, that the mere intent to ship the goods into the forbidden territory should be deemed an offense under the resolution, and so long as the defendants confine themselves to mere intent, they are guilty of no offense under the resolution; it is only when they put that intent into effect by causing an actual shipment to be made from some point in the United States to some point within the forbidden territory

that is, within the United States of Mexico that they become chargeable with an offense." U. S. v. Steinfield, (D. C. Ariz. 1913) 209 Fed. 904. To the same effect see U. S. v. Phelps-Dodge Mercantile Co., (D. C. Ariz. 1913) 209 Fed. 910.

Jurisdiction. The jurisdiction of the courts under this Act inheres in the district of the initial point of the offense. Thus where the indictment charged that the defendants made and caused to be made a certain shipment of munitions of war from the city of New Haven in the state of Connecticut, to the city of Tucson in the state and district of Arizona, the court in denying jurisdiction said: "The shipment of the goods is the thing forbidden by the statute, and not the mere ordering of a shipment to be made, if, indeed, an order was made, as does not clearly appear; and as the term ship

ment

means the act of shipping any

thing, or the act of putting the thing to be shipped on board of the means of transportation, it seems clear that the initial point of this shipment was New Haven, Conn., and not Tucson, Ariz., and, such being the case, it is plain that the jurisdiction of the initial point of the offense alleged was in the District Court of the United States for the District of Connecticut, rather than in the District Court of the United States for the District of Arizona." U. S. v. Steinfield, (D. C. Ariz. 1913) 209 Fed. 904. To the same effect see U. S. v. Phelps-Dodge Mercantile Co., (D. C. Ariz. 1913) 209 Fed. 910.

Indictment. An indictment, under this Act, must name the place of destination and the person or persons to whom the shipment is alleged to have been consigned; otherwise it is lacking in "that degree of certainty which is required in criminal pleadings in order to notify the defendant, as well as the court, of the nature of the offense charged and to enable the defendant to plead any judgment which may be rendered in the case as a bar to subsequent prosecution for the same offense." U. S. v. Steinfield, (D. C. Ariz. 1913) 209 Fed. 904. To the same effect see U. S. v. Phelps-Dodge Mercantile Co., (D. C. Ariz. 1913) 209 Fed. 910. Meaning of "export."-Accurately speaking, exportation in the complete sense consists of two essential ingredients, the sending of merchandise from this to a foreign country and its landing in such country. But as used in the statute "export includes a shipment to a foreign country which has not been landed. U. S. v. Chavez, (1913) 228 U. S. 525, 33 S. Ct. 595, 57 U. S. (L. ed.) 950, wherein the court said: Putting out of view the parenthetical clause in the text of the resolution concerning the proclamation of the President, it reads as follows: 'It shall be unlawful to export any arms or munitions of war from any place in the United States to such country,' that is, the country brought within the terms of the resolution by a proclamation of the President. Conceding for argument's sake that if the words to export' stood alone in the text, that is, were not accompanied by explanatory or defining words, they would have to be interpreted with reference to the meaning of export in the complete sense, that is, as including landing in the foreign country, such concession is not here controlling or persuasive. We say this because, as we have seen, the words 'to export are expressly qualified by a clause which serves, in a sense, to define their meaning, and, at all events, to make clear the nature and character of the acts intended to be embraced by the proIn other hibition against exporting.

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words, the resolution does not say it shall be unlawful to export, but it adds, any arms or munitions of war from any place in the United States to such foreign country.' In view of the accepted significance of the words 'to export' when used in their complete sense, and of the fact that in the preceding sentences of the resolution the causes leading to its adoption are expressly stated to be the violence and confusion sometimes promoted in foreign countries by the use of arms or munitions of war procured from the United States,' the insertion of words of definition and the omission from such words of all reference to landing of the prohibited merchandise would seem to make it clear that the prohibition of the resolution was directed against the act of sending from this to the foreign and prohibited country without reference to the completion of such act by the landing or delivery of the prohibited merchandise at its destination; in other words, that the object was to forbid the act of shipment from the United States of the prohibited munitions of war to a foreign country, without reference to the fulfillment of the complete act of export by the landing of the contraband goods. If there be room for hesitancy, that is to say, ambiguity, as to the correctness of this construction of the first section, we think there can be no ground for such doubt if the context of the resolution be considered, that is, if the second section be taken into view as illustrating and making clear the text of the first section. There can be no doubt that the object of the second section was to make the prohibition of the first section operative by punishing violations of its provisions. Now, the second section does not purport to punish the act of exporting, but in express terms it only punishes 'any shipment,' thus affixing the construction which we have given to the first section and causing it in reason to be impossible to say that the first section simply prohibits export in the completed sense. And this construction of the second section becomes irresistible when it is observed that for the purpose of preventing misconception the words any shipment are explained and their meaning made more emphatic by the declaration that they constitute the act hereby made unlawful,' thus again in express terms affixing a significance to the first section and confirming the meaning which we have given it.' See also U. S. v. Mesa, (1913) 228 U. S. 533, 33 S. Ct. 597, 57 U. S. (L. ed.) 953.

.

Meaning of arms and munitions of war. The words arms or munitions of war," within the meaning of the joint resolution of March 14, 1912, authorizing the President by proclamation to prohibit the export of arms or munitions of war to any American country in which conditions

3.

of domestic violence are found to exist, embrace weapons used for the destruction of life, together with ammunition and equipment useful in connection with them, and explosives and other equipment of a military character, or articles used for the construction of such equipment. The articles which come within the definition of arms and munitions of war are as follows: "1. Arms of all kinds, including arms for sporting purposes, and their distinctive component parts. 2. Projectiles, charges, and cartridges of all kinds, and their distinctive component parts. Powder and explosives specially prepared for use in war. 4. Gun mountings, limber boxes, limbers, military wagons, field forges, and their distinctive component parts. 5. Clothing and equipment of distinctively military character. 6. All kinds of harness of a distinctively military character. 7. Saddle, draft, and pack animals suitable for use in war. 8. Articles of camp equipment and their distinctive component parts. 9. Armor plates. 10. Warships, including boats, and their distinctive component parts of such a nature that they can only be used on a vessel of war. 11. Implements and apparatus designed exclusively for the manufacture of munitions of war, for the manufacture or repair of arms, or war material for use on land or sea." (1912) 29 Op. Atty.Gen. 375.

The exportation of saddles, bridles, canteens and carbine scabbards, by merchants in the United States to other merchants in Mexico falls within the purview of the President's proclamation of March 14, 1912, issued pursuant to the joint resolution of the same date, prohibiting the export of arms or munitions of war to that country. (1912) 29 Op. Atty.-Gen.

394.

Foodstuffs, ordinary clothing, and ordinary articles of peaceful commerce, are not included in the prohibition. (1912) 29 Op. Atty.-Gen. 375.

Question of fact.- The question of what articles would be considered within the President's proclamation of March 14, 1912, issued pursuant to the joint resolution of the same date, prohibiting the export of arms or munitions of war to Mexico, is one of fact, dependent upon the character of the articles sought to be imported. Thus paper caps for toy pistols could hardly be considered within the prohibition, whereas air rifles might well be regarded within the prohibition. (1912) 29 Op. Atty.-Gen. 570.

The validity of this section has been recognized in the following cases: U. S. v. Chavez, (1913) 228 U. S. 525, 33 S. Ct. 595, 57 U. S. (L. ed.) 950; U. S. v. Mesa, (1913) 228 U. S. 533, 33 S. Ct. 597, 57 U. S. (L. ed.) 953; Talbott v. U. S., (C. C. A. 5th Cir. 1913) 208 Fed. 144, 125 C. C. A. 360.