established by the courts for certain words before the adoption of a standard policy should be given to the same words in a standard policy.14 § 622. Secondary rules: Written matter in a contract is given greater effect than printed matter. Where part of the contract is in writing and part is in printing, the writing will be given effect if there is repugnancy between the two portions of the instrument.15 "This rule is applied with greater liberality where it appears that the printed matter is in obscure type or placed where it would not be likely to be seen or where the printed matter was evidently not intended to be incorporated in the contract. In such cases the printed matter has been accorded little influence in changing the clear and explicit language of a contract;" 16 but of course 14 Davis v. Insurance Co., 115 Mich. 382, 73 N. W. 393. 15 Robertson v. French, 4 East, 130, 136; Joyce v. Realm Ins. Co., L. R. 7 Q. B. 580, 583; Magee v. Lavell, L. R. 9 C. P. 107, 113; Dudgeon v. Pembroke, 2 App. Cas. 284; Glynn v. Margetson, [1893] App. Cas. 351; Breyman v. Ann Arbor R. Co., 85 Fed. 579; Lipschitz v. Napa Fruit Co., 223 Fed. 698, 139 C. C. A. 228; Augusta Factory v. Mente, 132 Ga. 503, 64 S. E. 553; Chicago v. Weir, 165 Ill. 582, 46 N. E. 725; Urbany . Carroll, 176 Iowa, 217, 157 N. W. 852; Mansfield Machine Works v. Common Council, 62 Mich. 546, 29 N. W. 105; Sprague Electric Co. v. Board of Commissioners, 83 Minn. 262, 86 N. W. 332; Eager v. Mathewson, 27 Nev. 220, 74 Pac. 404; Collins v. Knuth, 51 N. Y. App. Div. 188, 64 N. Y. S. 549; Fagan v. Ulrich, 166 N. Y. App. D. 342, 152 N. Y. S. 37; Eighme v. Holcomb, 84 Wash. 145, 146 Pac. 391. In Baumvoll Manufactur von Scheibler v. Gilchrest, [1891] 2 Q. B. 310, 317, Charles, J., said: "In construing a charter party, no greater effect can be given to writing than to print, although a different rule may prevail with reference to policies of insurance. Alsager v. St. Katherine Docks Co., 14 M. & W. 794." This distinction, however, seems unreasonable. The decision was reversed by the Court of Appeal on points not necessarily involving the passage quoted, in [1892] 1 Q. B. 253, and the Court of Appeals was sustained in [1893] A. C. 8. See Harding v. Cargo of Coal, 147 Fed. 971, 973. 16 Poel v. Brunswick-Balke-Collender Co., 216 N. Y. 310, 110 N. E. 619, 623; citing Sturtevant Co. v. Fireproof Film Co., 216 N. Y. 199, 110 N. E. 440; Sturm v. Boker, 150 U. S. 312, 327, 14 S. Ct. 94, 37 L. Ed. 1093; Summers v. Hibbard, 153 Ill. 102, 38 N. E. 899, 46 Am. St. Rep. 872; R. J. Menz Lumber Co. v. McNeeley, 58 Wash. 223, 108 Pac. 621, 28 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1007. The New York court added: "When the printed matter is not evidently intended to be incorporated in the contract and the understanding of the parties is doubtful, it is to be determined, as similar issues are determined, as a question of fact in the light of the surrounding circum if the printed and written matter can by any reasonable construction be reconciled, this will be done.17 § 623. Secondary rules: An interpretation given by the parties themselves will be favored. The interpretation given by the parties themselves to the contract as shown by their acts will be adopted by the court, 18 stances. Sturtevant Co. v. Fireproof Film Co. supra; Clark v. Woodruff, 83 N. Y. 518, 522. In the present case the printed clauses are to the left of the signature of the defendant. They are printed in clear type, under a caption printed in type larger than the other type, which caption plainly reads: 'Conditions on which the above order is given.' The printed clauses are at least as plain and as prominently displayed upon the face of the order as the written matter contained therein. They are not in conflict with that which is written. Under these circumstances they must be deemed to be a part of the order and cannot be eliminated therefrom by the court upon an inference as to the intention of the parties, which is not reflected in the order or in any evidence that was received upon the trial." 17 Harding v. Cargo of Coal, 147 Fed. 971, 973; Hardie-Tynes Foundry Co. v. Glen Allen Oil Mill, 84 Miss. 259, 36 So. 262; Eager v. Mathewson, 27 Nev. 220, 74 Pac. 404; Gabbert v. William &c. Oil Co., 76 W. Va. 718, 86 S. E. 671. 18 Fitzgerald v. First Nat. Bank, 114 Fed. 474, 52 C. C. A. 276; Nelson v. Ohio Cultivator Co., 188 Fed. 620, 112 C. C. A. 394; Bunday v. Huntington, 224 Fed. 847, 140 C. C. A. 415; Bransford v. Regal Shoe Co., 237 Fed. 67, 150 C. C. A. 269; Birmingham Waterworks Co. v. Windham, 190 Ala. 634, 67 So. 424; Clark v. J. R. Watkins Medical Co., 115 Ark. 166, 171 S. W. 136; S. R. Watkins Medical Co. v. Williams, 124 Ark. 90, 187 S. W. 653; Woodard v. Glenwood Lumber Co., 171 Cal. 513, 153 Pac. 951; New Brantner Ditch Co. v. Kramer, 57 Col. 218, 141 Pac. 498, Ann. Cas. 1916 B. 1225; Reeves v. Daniel, 143 Ga. 569, 85 S. E. 756; Geithman v. Eichler, 265 Ill. 579, 107 N. E. 180; Windmiller v. People, 78 Ill. App. 273; Roush v. Roush, 154 Ind. 562, 55 N. E. 1017; Indiana Natural Gas Co. v. Stewart, 45 Ind. App. 554, 559, 90 N. E. 384; Pratt v. Prouty, 104 Ia. 419, 73 N. W. 1035, 65 Am. St. Rep. 472; Nicholl v. Wetmore, 174 Iowa, 132, 156 N. W. 319; W. T. Tilden Co. v. Densten Hair Co., 216 Mass. 323, 103 N. E. 916; Klemik v. Henricksen Jewelry Co., 128 Minn. 490, 151 N. W. 203; Williams v. Chicago, etc., Ry. Co., 153 Mo. 487, 54 S. W. 689; St. Louis v. Laclede Gaslight Co., 155 Mo. 1, 55 S. W. 1003; Williams v. Auten, 68 Neb. 26, 93 N. W. 943; Wilhoit v. Stevenson, 96 Neb. 751, 148 N. W. 963; Van Dyke v. Anderson, 83 N. J. Eq. 568, 91 Atl. 593; Jarvie v. Arbuckle, 163 N. Y. App. Div. 199, 148 N. Y. S. 189; American Soda Fountain Co. v. Gerrer's Bakery, 14 Okl. 258, 78 Pac. 115; Wiebener v. Peoples, 44 Okl. 32, 142 Pac. 1036, Ann. Cas. 1916 E. 748; Gillespie v. Iseman, 210 Pa. 1, 59 Atl. 266; McMillin v. Titus, 222 Pa. 500, 503, 72 Atl. 240; Tustin v. Philadelphia, etc., Iron Co., 250 Pa. 425, 95 Atl. 595; Hassett v. Cooper, 20 R. I. 585, 40 Atl. 841; Phetteplace v. British, etc., Ins. Co., 23 R. I. 26, 49 Atl. 33; Williamson v. Eastern Building & Loan Co., 54 S. Car. 582, 32 S. E. 765, 71 Am. St. and to this end not only the acts 19 but the declarations of the parties 20 may be considered. But if the meaning of the contract is plain, the acts of the parties cannot prove a construction contrary to the plain meaning.21 Such conduct of the parties, however, may be evidence of a subsequent modification of their contract.?? Rep. 822; Herndon v. Wardlaw, 100 S. Car. 1, 84 S. E. 112; State v. Board of Trust, 129 Tenn. 279, 164 S. W. 1151; Woodward v. Edmunds, 20 Utah, 118, 57 Pac. 848; Douglass v. Morrisville, 89 Vt. 393, 95 Atl. 810; Hairston v. Hill, 118 Va. 339, 87 S. E. 573; Lovett v. West Virginia Central Gas Co., 73 W. Va. 40, 79 S. E. 1007. "Lette v. Pacific Mill Co., 88 Fed. 957, affd. 94 Fed. 968, 36 C. C. A. 587; Clark . University of Illinois, 103 Ill. App. 261; Gillett v. Teel, 272 Ill. 106, 111 N. E. 722; Baxter Springs v. Baxter Springs L. & P. Co., 64 Kans. 591, 68 Pac. 63; Lewiston &c. R. Co. v. Grand Trunk R. Co., 97 Me. 261, 54 Atl. 750; Winchester v. Glazier, 152 Mass. 316, 25 N. E. 728; Reynolds v. Boston Rubber Co., 160 Mass. 240, 245, 35 N. E. 677; C. D. Smith Drug Co. v. Saunders, 70 Mo. App. 221; Kopper v. Fulton, 71 Vt. 211, 44 Atl. 92; Clark v. Lambert, 55 W. Va. 512, 47 S. E. 312; and see cases in the preceding note. Laclede Construction Co. v. T. J. Moss Tie Co., 185 Mo. 25, 84 S. W. 76; Ganson v. Madigan, 15 Wis. 144, 153, 82 Am. Dec. 659. In Scotch Mfg. Co. . Carr, 53 Fla. 480, 482, 43 So. 427, the court said: "If it be true, even in the case of a written contract the terms of which are doubtful or ambiguous, that the construction placed thereon by the parties themselves may be shown and shall govern, as the cited cases hold, with how much more force does this principle apply to oral contracts? The principles of technical nicety cannot be strictly applied in the construc tion of these everyday oral contracts made by plain business men in their course of trade and traffic. To do so would frequently result in overthrowing the meaning and understanding of the parties." 21 Northeastern R. Co. v. Hastings, [1900] App. Cas. 260; Railroad Co. v. Trimble, 10 Wall. 367, 19 L. Ed. 948; Cowles Electric Smelting Co. v. Lowrey, 79 Fed. 331, 24 C. C. A. 616; Lesamis v. Greenberg, 225 Fed. 449, 140 C. C. A. 481; Adams v. Turner, 73 Conn. 38, 46 Atl. 247; Joliet Bottling Co. v. Joliet Citizens' Brewing Co., 254 Ill. 215, 98 N. E. 263; Finch v. Theiss, 267 Ill. 65, 107 N. E. 898; Western Ry. Equipment Co. v. Missouri Malleable Iron Co., 91 Ill. App. 28; Wilkins v. Young, 144 Ind. 1, 41 N. E. 68, 590, 55 Am. St. Rep. 162; Clarke v. Rogers, 159 Ky. 762, 169 S. W. 485; Menage v. Rosenthal, 175 Mass. 358, 56 N. E. 579; Cowles Elec. Smelting Co. v. Lowrey, 79 Fed. 331, 24 C. C. A. 616; O'Brien v. Peck, 198 Mass. 50, 84 N. E. 325; Boeing v. Fordney, 184 Mich. 153, 150 N. W. 852; Meissner v. Standard Equipment Co., 211 Mo. 112, 133, 109 S. W. 730; Cincinnati v. Gas Light, etc., Co., 53 Ohio St. 278, 41 N. E. 239; Howell v. Johnson, 38 Or. 571, 64 Pac. 659; Sternbergh v. Brock, 225 Pa. 279, 74 Atl. 166, 133 Am. St. Rep. 877, 24 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1078; Rea v. Pennsylvania Canal Co., 245 Pa. 589, 91 Atl. 1053; Fass v. South Atlantic L. Ins. Co., 105 S. Car. 107, 89 S. E. 558. 22 O'Brien v. Peck, 198 Mass. 50, 84 N. E. 325; Matgolys v. Mollenick, 98 N. Y. S. 849. § 624. Secondary rules: Conflict between prior and subsequent clauses. It was early laid down "That, in a deed, if there be two clauses so totally repugnant to each other, that they cannot stand together, the first shall be received, and the latter rejected." 23 The same doctrine has been held in some modern cases applicable to contracts generally.24 It is obvious, however, that such a rule is extremely artificial, and can only be accepted as a last resort. In most recent cases where it has been applied the later clause was inconsistent with the general purpose of the contract, and for this reason alone might have been disregarded. If, however, the first clause is general in terms, and the latter is particular,25 or if the latter clause is repugnant only to part of the earlier, it seems that the latter clause would be given full effect, and the earlier subjected to such qualifications as the latter might make necessary. 26 The true rule seems to be as stated in a recent Maine decision: 27 "When one intention appears in one clause in an instrument, and a different, conflicting intention appears in another clause in the same instrument, that intention should be given effect which appears in the principal or more important clause." § 625. Secondary rules: Guaranties. A contract binding a surety, it has been held, should if pos 23 2 Bl. Comm. 381. 24 Employers' Liability Assur. Corporation v. Morrill, 143 Fed. 750, 74 C. C. A. 640; Henne v. Summers, 16 Cal. App. 67, 71, 116 Pac. 86; Jones v. Pennsylvania Casualty Co., 140 N. C. 262, 52 S. E. 578; Straus v. Wanamaker, 175 Pa. 213, 226, 34 Atl. 648; Smith v. Clinkscales, 102 S. Car. 227, 85 S. E. 1064; Dustin v. Interstate &c. Assoc., 37 S. Dak. 635, 159 N. W. 395, L. R. A. 1917 B. 319; Bean v. Ætna Life Ins. Co., 111 Tenn. 186, 78 S. W. 104; Wisconsin, etc., Ins. Co. v. Wilkin, 95 Wis. 111, 118, 69 N. W. 354, 60 Am. St. Rep. 86. 25 English v. Shelby, 116 Ark. 212, 172 S. W. 817. 20 In Williams v. Hathaway, 6 Ch. D. 545, 549, Jessel, M. R., said: "It is said that if you find a personal covenant, followed by a proviso that the covenantor shall not be personally liable under the covenant, the proviso is repugnant and void. I agree that this is the law; but that by no means applies to a case where the proviso limits the personal liability under the covenant without destroying it, thus leaving a portion of the original covenant remaining; in that case the proviso is perfectly valid. There is no authority against that view." 27 Union Water Power Co. v. Lewiston, 101 Me. 564, 65 Atl. 67. sible be construed in his favor.28 But there seems little propriety in such a rule and it is opposed to a number of decisions.29 Certainly if such a rule exists, it must be confined to cases of sureties for accommodation. A guaranty given for the business advantage of the guarantor, and written by him instead of being construed in his favor indeed comes within the rule so often applied to insurance policies, "that the words of the writer of the contract shall be taken most strongly against him." 30 This has been so held frequently in recent years in regard to the contracts of surety companies.31 The question whether slight variations of risk shall discharge a surety from liability under his contract is often confused with questions 28 Nicholson v. Paget, 1 C. & M. 48. See also Mellville v. Hayden, 3 B. & A. 593; Bell v. Bruen, 1 How. 169, 11 L. Ed. 89; Sterling v. Wolf, 163 Ill. 467, 45 N. E. 218; Jewel Tea Co. v. Shepard, 172 Ia. 480, 154 N. W. 755; Ryan v. Williams, 29 Kans. 487, 497; State v. Dayton, 101 Md. 598, 61 Atl. 624. Numerous other decisions say that the surety's contract should be "strictly" construed. "Lawrence v. McCalmont, 2 How. 426, 450, 11 L. Ed. 326; Weinreich Est. Co. v. A. J. Johnston Co., 28 Cal. App. 144, 151 Pac. 667 (under Cal. C. C., § 2837); Gamble v. Cuneo, 21 N. Y. App. Div. 413, 47 N. Y. S. 548, affd., 162 N. Y. 634, 57 N. E. 110; United States Rubber Co. v. Silverstein, 161 N. Y. S. 369; Daly v. Old, 35 Utah, 74, 83, 99 Pac. 460; Noyes v. Nichols, 28 Vt. 159, 173. In Hargreave v. Smee, 6 Bing. 244, 248, Tindal, C. J., said: "The words employed are the words of the Defendant in this cause, and there is no reason for putting on a guaranty a construction different from that which the Court puts on any other instrument. With regard to other instruments the rule is, that if the party executing them leaves anything ambiguous in his expressions, such ambiguity must be taken most strongly against him.” To the same effect is Drummond v. Prestman, 12 Wheat. 515, 6 L. Ed. 712; United States Rubber Co. v. Silverstein, 161 N. Y. S. 369. 31 American Surety Co. v. Pauly, 170 U. S. 133, 42 L. Ed. 977, 18 S. Ct. 552; Tebbets v. Mercantile &c. Co., 73 Fed. 95, 38 U. S. App. 431, 19 C. C. A. 281; Topeka v. Federal Union Surety Co., 213 Fed. 958, 130 C. C. A. 364; Equitable Surety Co. v. Bank of Hazen, 121 Ark. 422, 181 S. W. 279, 1200; New Haven v. Eastern Paving Brick Co., 78 Conn. 689, 702, 63 Atl. 517; Van Buren County v. American Surety Co., 137 Ia. 490, 115 N. W. 24, 126 Am. St. Rep. 290; Streator Clay Mfg. Co. v. Henning Vineyard Co., 176 Ia. 297, 155 N. W. 1001; Hormel v. American Bonding Co., 112 Minn. 288, 128 N. W. 12, 33 L. R. A. (N. S.) 513, and note; Rule v. Anderson, 160 Mo. App. 347, 142 S. W. 358; Farmers' Bank v. Ogden, 192 Mo. App. 243, 182 S. W. 501; Bank of Tarboro v. Fidelity &c. Co., 128 N. C. 366, 38 S. E. 908; Cowles v. United States Fidelity &c. Co., 32 Wash. 120, 72 Pac. 1032; United American &c. Co. v. American Bonding Co., 146 Wis. 573, 131 N. W. 904, 40 L. R. A. (N. S.) 661. |