such contract had been received by the agent, and paid over to the defendants, who retained the same, that then the said facts are in law an adoption of the contract, and as binding on them as if a previous authority had been given the agent. This instruction was held to be erroneous; first, because the jury was not required to find, that the defendants knew on what account the money was paid them,—and second, that the defendants knew the terms of the contract on which the money was received, See Evidence, 17.

COUNTY COURT.

Ib.

1. The jurisdiction given to the county courts, to review, confirm or set aside inquisitions had, under the provisions of the law authorizing the appellant to condemn land, for the construction of its road, is special and limited, and from its decisions no appeal lies to any other court. The Wilmington, &c. Rail Road Co. vs. Condon, 443 2. Where the company, subsequent to such inquisition, occupied the land condemned and commenced the construction of their road, Cecil county court, (Chambers, Ch. J. and Hopper and Eccleston, A. J's,) refused to hear evidence in support of objections filed by the company to the inquisition, and confirmed it. Ib.

seizin of the demandant's husband, and evidence that in the first proceeding, her marriage was admitted. Sellman vs. Bowen,

50

2. In ordinary applications to equity for a decree for dower, and for rents and profits, where the seizin of the husband is denied, it is the course of that court to send the parties to law, to litigate the legal question, while in the meantime, Ib. they retain the bill, 3. A widow can only, in equity, recover damages from the alienee of her husband, for the detention of her dower. A court of law canIb. not award them, 4. The alienee of a husband seized of land, after the husband's death, who receives the rents and profits, is considered in equity as a trustee or bailiff to the extent of the widow's claim for dower, and cannot defeat the claim for mesne profits by pleading limitations,

5.

16.

Ib.

A widow who sues the alienee of her husband, at law for dower, may after her recovery, then sue him in equity for rents and profits, 6. Rents and profits are decreed to the widow of one seized during coverture, as against his alienee, from the time of demand made by the widow, and are estimated according to the improved value of the premises and from the time of the improvements, if any, were made, Ib. 7. The act of 1825, ch. 117, does not require exceptions to be filed, to the auditor's statement, made for the purpose of exhibiting the rights of the parties, as they had been solemnly adjudicated by the chancellor by a previous order. Miller vs. Allison, et al,

35

8. The ordinary statements of the views and opinions of the auditor upon the rights of the parties, designed to give them an opportunity, more distinctly to present to the chancellor the matters in contest, are within the act of 1825, ch. 117, and should be excepted to in the Court of Chancery,

9.

Ib.

Where a party reaps profits by his own voluntary act, founded upon contract with another, he is not as against the creditors of such other party at liberty to vacate his contract to their prejudice, and claim to participate in equity and conscience, upon the insolvency of

93

such other party, equally with his
creditors in his estate and in oppo-
sition to the terms and effect of the
original agreement. Maryland Sa-
vings Institution vs. Schroeder,
10. A court of equity decrees the
specific execution of a parol agree-
ment, on the ground of part per-
formance, and notwithstanding the
express provisions of the statute of
frauds. This is on the ground_of
fraud in refusing to perform after
performance by the other party,
and to prevent the statute from
being an engine of that fraud, which
it was enacted to prevent,
Ib.
11. It is no objection to a decree for
the sale of real estate, for the pur-
pose of distributing the proceeds
among the parties entitled, that the
interest of a party to the proceed-
ings to a portion of the proceeds,
has not been sustained by proof.
Calwell vs. Boyer,

136
12. It in such a case however, is ne-
cessary that the parties litigant,
should prove their title to the pro-
perty to be sold; but when there
was nothing in the proceedings
putting their title in issue, prima
facie evidence was deemed suffi-
cient to support the jurisdiction of
the court,
Ib.

13. Since the act of 1832, ch. 302, all
objections to the competency of
witnesses, and the admissibility of
evidence must be raised by excep-
tions filed in the court of Chancery,
or county courts as courts of equity;
and no point relating to either shall
be raised, or noticed, or determined,
or acted upon, by the Court of Ap-
peals, unless it shall clearly appear
in the record, that such point had
been raised by exceptions as afore-
said,
Ib.
14. Where the court below certified,
that a bill had been taken pro con-
fesso, against a defendant, and an
ex parte commission issued, be-
cause he had failed to answer ac-
cording to the rules of the court;
and such rules were not in the
record, nor the time of holding its
intermediate equity terms prescrib-
ed by law; this court will assume
the verity of such certificate, and
presume that the order pro confesso,
was legitimately passed,
Ib.
15. When a supplemental bill is filed
to bring in a new party in interest,
such new party alone should be
made to respond to it,
Ib.

Ib.

16. The answer of one defendant is
not evidence against a co-defendant,
even as to matters in contest be-
tween the complainant and such
co-defendant; and much less would
such answer be evidence, in adju-
dicating upon the conflicting claims
of the defendant's inter se,
17. A court of equity has no jurisdic-
tion over what is called " good
will," and where a bill was filed
upon a contract alleged to be of
that description, claiming of the
purchaser or party in possession,
an account of rents and profits,
arising from certain stalls in market
houses in the City of Baltimore,
the bill was dismissed, but under
the circumstances of the case, with-
out costs. Zeigler vs. Sentzner, 150
18. For the violation of such a con-
tract, if the subject be one fit for
a contract, the remedy is at law,
where damages may be given by a
jury,
Ib.

19. That a judgment mala fide, and
by surprise, arising from the frau-
dulent and deceptive conduct of the
adverse party, by which the com-
plainant has been lulled into a se-
curity fatal to his rights, would be
against conscience, and ought to be
enjoined by a court of Chancery, is
a clear proposition; but it is equally
clear, that no person can enlist a
court of equity in his favour, unless
he enters its doors with clean hands;
and when he seeks to be relieved
against injustice, arising from the
bad faith of his adversary, he ought
not to be obnoxious to the same
imputation himself. Dilly vs. Heck-
rotte and Barnard,

170

of the opposite party, it is too late after a trial at law, for the losing party to apply to a court of equity for relief upon that ground. He should have filed his bill for a discovery before the trial, Ib. 24. After a verdict and judgment at law, the legal intendment or presumption is, that every thing was proved at the trial which was necessary to maintain the suit. Per Th. Buchanan, A. J. Ib. 25. If a complainant omits to state an equitable case in his bill, the court cannot notice it, though established by the proof, Ib.

26. The rule is well established in this state, that the charges, or allegations of a bill, not admitted by the answer, must be proved, 16. 27. To warrant a court of Chancery in issuing an injunction, strong prima facie evidence of the facts on which the complainant's equity rests must be presented to the court to induce its action. Union Bank of Maryland vs. Poultney, 324 28. In such a proceeding, the mere oath of a party, as to the existence of a debt, of which he holds in his possession the written evidence, without producing it, should not be regarded by the chancellor as any proof of such debt, 16. 29. Where the existence of a debt depends on a written instrument, of which the complainant is presumed to be in possession, it should be exhibited with the bill or a satisfactory reason assigned for its nonproduction, Ib. 30. A party holding a prior lien on lands has no right to prevent by injunction a subsequent judgment creditor from enforcing his judgment by execution; as a sale under such execution could not defeat or impair his prior lien; but would leave him at law, and in equity, in the same condition as if such sale had never taken place, Ib. 31. The great purpose and object of a court of equity in assuming jurisdiction to restrain proceedings at law, is to afford a more plain, adequate and complete remedy for the wrong complained of than the party can have at law. Glenn and Kennedy vs. Fowler, et al, - - 340 32. Where a statute has made provision for all the circumstances of a particular case, no relief in equity can be afforded, although the pro

34. Courts of equity have sometimes interposed to prohibit proceedings at law, upon the ground that having possessed itself of the general subject, by an application for its aid, to compel a disclosure or for the exercise of some other admitted jurisdiction, it will dispose of the whole matter and thus avoid a multiplicity of suits,

Ib.

35. The grant of a several fishery, in a public navigable river, cannot be presumed from the mere uninterrupted use and enjoyment of the right of fishing for more than twenty years. Delaware and Maryland Rail Road Co. vs. Stump, 479 36. If such presumption can be made at all, from the fact of such use and enjoyment, it must be shown to have been in exclusion of the right of others, and the absence of an averment to that effect, in a bill praying for an injunction to protect such right, was held to be fatal to the complainant's case, 37. Though the grant of a right to erect wharves, and employ steamboats, if destructive of the paramount right of general navigation and fishing, may be void; the remedy is not by injunction, which is only applicable to special injuries in violation of private rights. Public grievances are not to be redressed by individuals at their own suit. Ib. See Lien,

Mortgage, 1, 2, 3.
Orphans court, 12, 13, 15.

DEVISE.

Ib.

1. J. S. died in 1797, intestate, and seized of two parcels of land, which had descended to her from her father, leaving an only brother, her heir at

law. Upon his death without is-
sue, and intestate, it was Held,
that though the descent from his
sister to him was an immediate de-
scent, according to the principles
of common law, it was also mediate
from the father, from whom the
brother derived his inheritable blood;
and was therefore a descent upon
the part of his father, and embraced
by the act of descents of 1786, ch.
45. Stewart's lessee vs. Jones,
2. Though according to the principles
of the English law of descents, the
descent from brother to brother is
immediate, and title may be made
by one brother to another, without
mentioning their common ancestor;
yet such ancestor is regarded as the
fountain of inheritable blood, and
consequently the descent is mediate
from him,
Ib.

1

Ib.

3. The legislature of this State, by the
act of 1786, ch. 45, changed the
English common law of descents in
many of its essential features, and
imparted new inheritable capacities
unknown to that law. On failure
of lineal heirs in the descending
line, if the estate descended to the
intestate on the part of the father,
it directs that it shall descend to the
brothers and sisters of the blood of
the father, without discriminating
between the whole, and the half
bloods; showing manifestly, that
though the descent is immediate
from the person who died seized,
the inheritable blood is derived from
the ancestor, from whom the estate
descended to such person,
4. Distinction pointed out between the
case of Stewart's lessee vs. Evans, 3
Har. and John. 287, and Hall vs.
Jacobs, 4 Ib. 245, and the decision
in the latter case, shown to be foun-
ded upon the circumstance, that
the estate was acquired by pur-
chase, by the party from whom the
descent was traced,
Ib.
5. H, by his will dated in 1828, devised
and bequeathed to his wife, one-
third part of his real and personal
estate, and to his two sons, Henry
and Nathan, in fee simple, all his
real property in the city of Anna-
polis. To another son, and his heirs
for ever, he gave his plantation in
Anne Arundel county; and all the
rest and residue of his estate, both
real and personal, after his wife's
third should be taken out, he de-
vised and bequeathed to his three

sons, share and share alike. Held,
that under this will, the wife was
entitled to that share of her hus-
band's estate, which the law gave
her, and no more; that is, one-third
of the real for life, and one-third of
the personalty absolutely. Ham-
mond vs. Hammond,

437
6. The word "estate" in a devise, will
be descriptive of the subject of pro-
perty, or the quantum of interest,
according to the context, and will
pass a fee, when the intention of the
testator does not restrict it, to im-
port a description, rather than an
interest,

lb.