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44.822/1:549/2

TO AUTHORIZE A CONTRIBUTION BY THE UNITED
STATES TO THE TIN BUFFER STOCK ESTABLISHED
UNDER THE FIFTH INTERNATIONAL TIN AGREEMENT

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A BILL TO AUTHORIZE A CONTRIBUTION BY THE UNITED
STATES TO THE TIN BUFFER STOCK ESTABLISHED UNDER
THE FIFTH INTERNATIONAL TIN AGREEMENT

MAY 11, 1978

Printed for the use of the
Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs

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HOUSE COMMITTEE ON BANKING, FINANCE AND URBAN AFFAIRS

HENRY S. REUSS, Wisconsin, Chairman

THOMAS L. ASHLEY, Ohio
WILLIAM S. MOORHEAD, Pennsylvania
FERNAND JA ST GERMAIN, Rhode Island
HENRY GONZALEZ, Texas
JOSEPH G. MINISH, New Jersey
NNUNZIO, Illinois

CA

માં પૂરા

JAMES M. HANLEY, New York

PARREN J. MITCHELL, Maryland
WALTER E. FAUNTROY,

District of Columbia

STEPHEN L. NEAL, North Carolina
JERRY M. PATTERSON, California
JAMES J. BLANCHARD, Michigan
CARROLL HUBBARD, JR., Kentucky
JOHN J. LAFALCE, New York
GLADYS NOON SPELLMAN, Maryland
LES AUCOIN, Oregon

PAUL E. TSONGAS, Massachusetts
BUTLER DERRICK, South Carolina
MARK W. HANNAFORD, California
DAVID W. EVANS, Indiana

CLIFFORD ALLEN, Tennessee

NORMAN E. D'AMOURS, New Hampshire

STANLEY N. LUNDINE, New York

EDWARD W. PATTISON, New York

JOHN J. CAVANAUGH, Nebraska

MARY ROSE OAKAR, Ohio

JIM MATTOX, Texas

BRUCE F. VENTO, Minnesota

DOUG BARNARD, Georgia

WES WATKINS, Oklahoma

ROBERT GARCIA, New York

J. WILLIAM STANTON, Ohio
GARRY BROWN, Michigan
CHALMERS P. WYLIE, Ohio

JOHN H. ROUSSELOT, California
STEWART B. MCKINNEY, Connecticut

GEORGE HANSEN, Idaho

HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois

RICHARD KELLY, Florida

CHARLES E. GRASSLEY, Iowa

MILLICENT FENWICK, New Jersey
JIM LEACH, Iowa

NEWTON I. STEERS, JR., Maryland
THOMAS B. EVANS, JR., Delaware
BRUCE F. CAPUTO, New York

HAROLD C. HOLLENBECK, New Jersey

S. WILLIAM GREEN, New York

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TO AUTHORIZE A CONTRIBUTION BY THE UNITED STATES TO THE TIN BUFFER STOCK ESTABLISHED UNDER THE FIFTH INTERNATIONAL TIN AGREEMENT

THURSDAY, MAY 11, 1978

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC STABILIZATION OF THE

COMMITTEE ON BANKING, FINANCE AND URBAN AFFAIRS,

Washington, D.C. The subcommittee met at 10:15 a.m. in room 2220 of the Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. William S. Moorhead (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Representatives Moorhead, Vento, and Kelly.

Chairman MOORHEAD. Good morning. The Subcommittee on Economic Stabilization will please come to order. Today the subcommittee takes up legislatively for the first time the subject of international commodity agreements. We do so in our role as watchdog over the many-sided inflation problem, one aspect of which is prices of internationally traded raw materials. This being a first for us, I have permitted myself an opening statement that is slightly longer than is my custom.

Last June, the subcommittee explored with witnesses from the State and Treasury Departments the new administration's emerging policy toward international commodity agreements. We learned that the policy had two key elements.

First, there was to be a more sympathetic attitude by the United States toward these agreements than in the past, particularly those using the device of buffer stocks to stabilize prices.

But second, the United States would sign such agreements only when they would contribute to a solution of our own domestic inflation problem; that is, agreements that could hold down prices in booms and not just hold them up when world demand was weak.

The international tin agreement is the only one in existence so far that has an operating buffer stock. Unfortunately, it has not been successful in holding the price of tin below the agreed ceiling. The legislation before us is designed to make the tin agreement work better by increasing the size of the buffer stock, through a U.S. contribution of up to 5,000 tons of excess tin in our national stockpile.

No one is making excessive claims for the anti-inflation payoff of this contribution. Obviously more important is a separate proposal, not before this subcommittee, for the United States to sell unilaterally a much larger quantity of excess stockpile tin. But still, the bill before us is important as an indication of administration and congressional attitudes toward international commodity agreements and the buffer stock mechanism.

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