293. Classification of the preceding views of the question,
294. After these considerations the reference to what is called comity
295. Reference to the means of distinguishing the extent of laws,
296. Personal liberty not then attributed to all in Massachusetts and
the British Islands by legislation,
297. Effect of former international recognitions of slavery, .
298. If liberty attributed by internal law to all in Massachusetts and the
British Islands,
300. Supposed insufficiency of such attribution, if of legal personality
299. Legal personality may have been attributed to all,
301. Attribution of individual rights where some do not actually enjoy
personal liberty,
302. How this may have been in Massachusetts or the British Islands,
303. Reasons against admitting their universal extent in Massachusetts,
304. Personal liberty not then enjoyed by all in the British Islands,
305. How a natural law is distinguishable in this connection,
306. The extent of the local law determinable by reference to foreign
decisions,
307. Its extent, so determined, in Massachusetts and the British Islands, precluded comity,
Application of the foregoing to Lord Mansfield's reasons for his
decision.
308. The judgment vindicated by international law operating in three
forms,
309. Inconsistency of Lord Mansfield resulting from his doctrine of public law,
310. The nature of the inconsistency further explained,
312. Attempt to state the correct doctrine of international law in such
313. Whether negro slavery had, before that case, been lawful in England,
314. Stowell's over-statement of the previous recognition of its lawfulness,
315. The previous practice of holding negroes in bondage there, why not legalized,
316. How legal conclusions might be different for England and the
General principle derived from the jural character of all law.
Question of status on return to slave domicil.
326. The condition of a free negro was not quasi-internationally guaran-
teed by a national law,
325. The owner's property was not quasi-internationally guaranteed by
that law,
328. Negro slavery not longer ascribable to the law of nations, meaning
universal jurisprudence,
329. The slave-trade not then contrary to the law of nations, in the
sense of international law,