[Beatty v. Brown.] statutory right of redemption, which right exists, of course, only after foreclosure, is without equity unless it avers the tender which the statute requires to be made to the purchaser or his vendee. This results from the terms of the statute itself (Code, § 1881), as has been declared by this court in the following among other cases: Paulling v. Meade, 23 Ala. 505; Spoor v. Phillips, 27 Ala. 193; Carlin v. Jones, 55 Ala. 624 ; Stocks v. Young, 67 Ala. 341; Lehman, Durr & Co. v. Collins, 69 Ala. 127; Pryor v. Hollinger, 88 Ala. 405, 6 So. Rep. 760; Lehman, Durr & Co. v. Moore, 93 Ala. 186, 9 So. Rep. 590; Beebe v. Buxton, 99 Ala. 117, 12 So. Rep. 567. In no case has it been decided that tender and an averment of the fact are not essential, though there may possibly be a dictum in one of the cases to that effect; and there are one or two cases which, upon casual reading, might seem to support that view, but these will on examination be found to involve bills to assert and effectuate the equity of redemption, which exists only, of course, before foreclos ure. As respects the purchase money bid and paid for the land at the foreclosure sale, and the ten per cent. per an num thereon, a tender must in all cases be made, alleged and proved; and such tender when practicable must be made to the purchaser or his vendee before bill is filed. If this is not done, the bill must allege a valid and sufficient excuse for the complainant's failure to do it. Where such excuse exists and is alleged, the bill must go further and allege a present tender by payment into court and must be accompanied by a delivery of the money to the register of the court. Thus in Beebe v. Buxton, supra, it is said: "The statute not specifically prescribing the mode in which the tender must be made. the absence of the purchaser or his vendee from the State is recognized as an excuse for the failure to make tender to him in person, and as occasioning a necessity to file a bill for redemption in which the tender may be made. To the sufficiency of a tender made in this way, the payment of the money into court is essential.Spoor v. Phillips, 27 Ala. 193; Trimble v. Williamson, 49 Ala. 525; Alexander v. Caldwell, 61 Ala. 543; Caldwell v Smith, 77 Ala. 157; Stocks v. Young, 67 Ala. 341. As the statute clearly makes a payment or a tender a condition to the exercise of the right, we think * * [Beatty v. Brown.] that such payment or tender must be made to the purchaser or his vendee in person, or, when that is not practicable, by the deposit of the money in court on the filing of the bill to redeem." The statute takes no account of the possible ignorance of the debtor as to the amount of purchase money to be repaid. It, to the contrary, proceeds on the by no means unreasonable assumption that he will always know or be able to advise himself of the price at which his property has been sold; and it is absolute and unequivocal in its requirement that such price and a certain per centum thereon shall be refunded or tendered as a condition to the exercise of the right it gives. It is equally clear in its terms as to the lawful charges required to be paid or tendered; but a case might possibly exist, though the present is not one of them, where on account of the purchaser's absence from the State, and the debtor's consequent inability to see or confer with him, a lawful claim constituting a charge on the land might be held by the purchaser without the knowledge of the debtor, and, in such case, it may be that a bill to redeem, averring a valid excuse for failing to pay or tender before suit, tendering in its allegations, accompanied by payment into court, the purchase money and ten per cent. per annum thereon, and offering to pay all charges that might be found to exist, would be sufficient. This, however, we do not decide. And with respect to any claim the purchaser may have for permanent improvements: Inasmuch as the amount of such claim-or rather the value of such improvements where the claim in fact exists-must be agreed on or determined by arbitration (Code, § 1889), the complainant, where he had had no opportunity to treat with the purchaser, could not know the amount of this item and need only, we should say, offer in his bill to pay it upon ascertainment. This question is not in the present case; and we have adverted to it and the matter next preceding only to make it appear that it is not here decided that where for good cause tender is not made before suit, the tender averred in the bill by payment into court should embrace in all cases lawful charges and the value of permanent improvements. The present bill is fatally defective under the foregoing principles, wholly regardless of whether it sets forth a good excuse for a failure of tender before suit or not. [Lyon et al. v. Dees.] It in itself makes no tender by alleging that money is paid into court, and no money was paid into court. For this, in any view, there can be no excuse. This suffices to sustain the decree of dismissal entered below, and we will not extend this opinion by a discussion of the facts put forward to excuse failure of tender before suit further than to say that they are to our minds manifestly insufficient, a conclusion which must ensue from the absolute requirement that the purchase money, interest and lawful charges must be paid or tendered. admitting, as it does, of no inquiry having in view the reduction of the amount to be so paid or tendered to the extent of cross demands of the mortgagor against-not the purchaser with whom alone he is now dealing-but the mortgagee. Affirmed. Lyon et al. v. Dees. Bill in Equity for the Redemption of Lands, and for the Cancellation of Deeds. 1. Bill to redeem; multifariousness.-A bill filed to redeem lands covered by several mortgages to the same defendant, and to have cancelled a deed executed by the sheriff under an execution sale, the judgment debt being paid, and to have cancelled a deed from the mortgagee defendant to his sister, which was made without consideration, is not multifarious, since the court having jurisdiction for one purpose will, upon proper proof, settle all questions necessary to the granting of the relief prayed. 2. Same; mortgagee chargeable with proceeds from the sale of land.-On a bill filed for redemption from various mortgages given to secure the same debt and for an accounting, the mortgagee is properly chargeable with the price of a part of the land sold under one of the mortgages, though a defective deed was made to the purchaser, and the latter had not paid the amount bid at the sale, when it appears that the conveyance was intended to operate as a deed, and the sale has been ratified by the mortgagor who is the complainant. APPEAL from the Chancery Court of Choctaw. The bill in this case was filed on December 29, 1886, [Lyon et al. v. Dees.] by the appellee, W. J. Dees, against J. M. Lyon, M. J. Lyon, his sister, and Calvin Dees; and prayed for an accounting between the defendant J. M. Lyon and the complainant, and that the complainant be allowed to redeem certain lands, which were conveyed to the defendant J. M. Lyon by a mortgage, and afterwards sold under the power of sale; and that the deed from the sheriff to J. M. Lyon, conveying the lands sold under an execution sale be set aside, and that the deed from J. M. Lyon to M. J. Lyon, his sister, be cancelled as being voluntary and void. The respondents interposed a demurrer to the bill, on the ground of multifariousness. This demurrer was overruled. Such other facts as are necessary for an understanding of the questions decided on this appeal are sufficiently stated in the opinion. On the final submission of the cause, on pleadings and proof, the chancellor decreed that the complainant was entitled to the relief prayed for. The present appeal is prosecuted by the respondents, who assign as error the interlocutory decree overruling the demurrer, and the final decree of the chancellor. H. T. TAYLOR, for appellants. W. F. GLOVER, contra. COLEMAN, J.-The amended bill shows that appellant J. M. Lyon, the defendant, was the assignee of a judgment recovered by one Ward for the sum of $482.70 against W. J. and Calvin Dees; that after the death of Ward the judgment was revived in the name of the assignee, with the consent of the judgment debtors, for the full amount of the judgment. The bill further avers that J. M. Lyon was the mortgagee of three several mortgages executed by complainant Dees, one dated 18th of May, 1878, for $500, one dated 27th of August, 1878, for $514, and one dated March 6th, 1882, for $350. The bill avers that the two mortgages of the year 1878 were executed to secure the same debt and embraced 1,300 acres of land, the subject of this controversy. The bill also avers that Ward, the judgment plaintiff, agreed with complainant and Calvin Dees, the judment debtors, to take $200 for the judgment, that this amount was advanced by J. M. Lyon as a loan to them, under the [Lyon et al. v. Dees.] agreement that the judgment was to be assigned to him merely as a security for this loan. The bill further avers, that the consideration of the mortgage of March 6th, 1882, for $350 included the $200 loaned to pay Ward for the judgment, some advances which were to be made by Lyon to assist them to make a crop, and usurious interest, and that this latter mortgage was upon other lands and property not embraced in the mortgage of 1878. The bill avers that Lyon had proceeded to enforce both the judgment for its full amount, and also the mortgage given to secure the same debt. The bill avers that J. M. Lyon had used his advantages as mortgagee and assignee oppressively and unjustly. That he had extorted large sums of money as forbearance money and had taken possession of all the lands, and all the property conveyed in the mortgages. The bill avers that complainant had fully paid his entire indebtedness, prays for an account, and that he be let in to redeem, and offers to do equity. The defendants demurred to the bill on the grounds of multifariousness, in that the bill seeks to redeem under a judgment and also under mortgages. The foregoing statement of the averments of the bill is a sufficient answer to show that the bill is not subject to the objection of multifariousness. The object of the bill is to redeem the lands from the same debtor covered by several mortgages, and to cancel the deed of the sheriff executed to J. M. Lyon, and to cancel the deed of J. M. Lyon to his sister, Mary J. Lyon. The court having jurisdiction for one purpose, will settle all questions necessary to granting the relief prayed upon proper proof. Lyons . McCurdy, 90 Ala. 497, 8 So. Rep. 52; Bullock v. Tuttle, Ib. 439 and 440, 8 So. Rep. 69. To so much of the bill as averred that the judgment was assigned to J. M. Lyon as a mere security for a loan of two hundred dollars, the respondent pleaded that the judgment was revived for the full amount, with the consent of the complainant. This question was considered and adjudicated adversely to respondents by this court on a former appeal.-Lyon v. Dees, 84 Ala. 595, 4 So. Rep. 407. We will not consider this question further. Upon submission of the case upon pleadings and proof, the chancery court held that plaintiff was entitled to relief, and ordered the master to state an account, and |