abroad. We are endeavoring to fix that point for five kinds of ships in five different navies. It is a complicated job but we have made good progress.

We have, in the first place, gotten pretty well by the difficulties arising from the question of whether a navy should be limited by total tonnage or by the tonnage of each kind of ship. This had balked the Preparatory Commission at Geneva for years.

We have agreed to have a treaty governing the use of submarines against merchant vessels in time of war.

We have presented our suggestions of relative programs for our Navy, the British, and Japanese, and these nations have likewise presented theirs to us. The French have presented their figures and the Italians theirs. As you know, ours and the British are not far apart. We believe that we and the Japanese are coming nearer to an understanding.

The reconciliation of British, French, and Italian figures has been delayed by the fall of the French Government, but nothing has been lost by that except time, for when the French delegates come back the discussion of their matters can begin again where they left off some days ago. If the figures had been so close as to cause no argument we need not have come, for the whole thing could have been done by mail.

If they were so far apart as to be impossible of adjustment there would be no reason to stay. But neither of these things is true and we are here, as the British papers put it, to sit till we settle. We have as much time as anybody and America can afford considerable patience for it is well to remember that several of the other nations represented here have much more complicated problems of security than we have and a few days more or less is nothing compared with the value of arriving at a solution in a calm and unruffled state of mind.

This kind of conferring costs relatively little in money and has infinite possibilities of good will besides actual economy. It does not cost as much to keep this whole delegation in commission as it does one of the smallest cruisers. If the principle of limitation had not been accepted at Washington and we had been in a competitive race in all categories, I am certain our Navy would have cost us twice what it has in the last eight years and for that double cost we should have no more security than we have had and far more ill will. Such irritation as has occurred about naval matters has arisen concerning the kinds of ships not limited at Washington. Our main purpose is to obviate that in the future. I know of no plan that holds out such high hopes of economy in expenditure and dividends in good will and none more likely to produce a well-planned and efficient navy.

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Statement to the Press by the Chairman of the American Delegation, Henry L. Stimson, London, March 6, 1930

There seems to be an impression that the work of the American Delegation at this conference is likely to result in an increase instead of a reduction in the tonnage of the navies of the world. The surest way to answer that is to give such results as seem to be within reach up to date. The plan which in its essentials appears to be acceptable to America and Great Britain provides for a net reduction in the tonnage of the American Fleet, in capital ships, cruisers, destroyers, and submarines, built, building or appropriated for, of over 200,000 tons, and an even larger reduction on the part of the British Fleet. If vessels authorized but not commenced were included in existing fleets the amount of the reductions would be much greater.

Of course these reductions are contingent upon some reductions being made in the fleets of other powers.

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14

Delegation Press Statement, London, March 26, 1930

Rumor was current last evening to the effect that the American Delegation had made a change of their attitude toward consultative pacts and were willing to enter into such a pact for the purpose of saving the conference. It was authoritatively denied at the headquarters of the American Delegation that any change had taken place in the attitude of the American Delegation, and its attitude remains as its spokesmen gave it out several weeks ago. At that time it was made clear that America had no objection to entering a consultative pact as such; on the contrary, the United States is already a party to a number of treaties involving the obligation of consulting with other powers. It will not, however, enter into any treaty, whether consultative or otherwise, where there is danger of its obligation being misunderstood as involving a promise to render military assistance or guaranteeing protection by military force to another nation. Such a misunderstanding might arise if the United States. entered into such a treaty as a quid pro quo for the reduction of the naval force of another power. That danger has hitherto inhered in the present situation where France has been demanding mutual military security as a condition of naval reduction, as appears from her original statement of her case last December. If, however, this demand for security could be satisfied in some other way, then the danger of misunderstanding a consultative pact would be eliminated from an entirely different standpoint. In such a case the American Delegation would consider the matter with an entirely open mind.

15

Statement to the Press by the Honorable David A. Reed, London,

April 3, 1930

I can't too strongly impress on you the fine spirit in which the Japanese and British have met us. There was no disposition to quibble on the part of any one of the three delegations. All three delegations have been frank and fair. I can't imagine a pleasanter negotiation than it has been. The result is not a victory for anyone, but an honorable and reasonable settlement between the three.

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16

Radio Address by the Honorable Hugh S. Gibson, London, April 6, 1930

As I have been afforded this opportunity to speak to you to-day about the progress of the London Naval Conference, I am glad to be able to give you a record of concrete results. During the past week definite agreement has been reached between the United States, Great Britain, and Japan. This agreement is the result of months of patient and friendly negotiation, but the time has been well spent for the agreement is advantageous to all three countries and constitutes an important contribution to international friendship and good understanding. Let me state briefly what this settlement means in terms of reduction. It means that from the fleets of the three powers nine battleships are to be scrapped, without replacement. Under the terms of this arrangement, the Japanese battleship fleet will consist of nine battleships. The reduction of the combined battleship fleets of the three countries will, therefore, equal in numbers the third largest battleship fleet in the world. This is not all. Under the terms of the Washington treaty, the United States, Great Britain, and Japan were committed to the laying down of 26 battleships between now and 1936. Under the arrangement of the last week, not one battleship will be laid down during the next six years. These 26 battleships would cost between $800,000,000 and $900,000,000. How much of that will be spent after 1936 depends on the next conference. None of it will be spent during the life of the treaty made by this conference. It is easy to make this comparison between what the limitation on battleships agreed to here saves over the limitation agreed to in Washington eight years ago. It is not possible to make such a comparison for the limitation of cruisers, destroyers, and submarines, for the Washington treaty failed to limit such vessels.

The great achievement of this conference is that it has arrived at a basis for limiting all kinds of vessels in the three largest fleets and the cruiser, destroyer, and submarine tonnage under this limitation will be far below the lowest limit which was discussed at Geneva in 1927. To those of us who have followed the efforts for limitation since the Washington Conference, the results attained here so far are beyond reasonable expectation; but, actually, reduction is not the most important part of this agreement. If the reduction had been less and the agreement were made on a higher level, it would still